tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36462450922539345962024-03-05T04:14:49.253-05:00Religious NationalismWhat is religious nationalism? Is it important? How it affects the politics of different countries? Is it increasing or on the way out? Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.comBlogger197125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-6397100423680091502024-02-04T04:33:00.003-05:002024-02-04T04:33:19.393-05:00Gandhi's Ram Rajya: Inclusive, secular, and democratic<p> Mahatma Gandhi talked a lot about Ram Rajya and the BJP and RSS are using this to show that Gandhi would have been okay with what they are doing now. In 2014, <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/political-pulse/ram-rajya-modi-speeches-ayodhya-visit-gandhi-9088398/">Modi said in an election rally in Ayodhya</a>:</p><p>“Jab log Mahatma Gandhi ko puchha karte the ki raj kaisa hona chahiye… to Mahatma Gandhi ek shabd me samjha dete the ke agar kalyankari rajya ki kalpana karni hai to Ram Rajya hona chahiye. ( Trans. When people used to ask Mahatma Gandhi about what kind of rule should be...Mahatma Gandhi would explain it in only one phrase that if we want a Welfare State then it should be Ram Rajya).” </p><p>A week after Ram Mandir's inauguration, CM Yogi Adityanath tweeted on Gandhi ji's anniversary:</p><p></p><blockquote>Bapu's ideology calls for humanity, freedom, and harmony. His teachings pave the way for the realization of the concept of Ram Rajya and world peace.</blockquote><p> </p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicETcZzN8cWuFCXOtlwUmKmqsfjnzIInlA_84GE9F7n5PxdARKkE2uFXufKYOb0060qjHDv2NZDjUpmtBk6JhLCS5tolC6bruOcOBMWjvoqZelzkv51Ly7zSNhyphenhyphenFMDn1OsXoA51mZuIDyHfJw7eUVBB4tiMd9g06k-l5TpAFewHZqgayP929B74IFEElKY/s259/Modi%20Ram%20mandir.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="194" data-original-width="259" height="253" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicETcZzN8cWuFCXOtlwUmKmqsfjnzIInlA_84GE9F7n5PxdARKkE2uFXufKYOb0060qjHDv2NZDjUpmtBk6JhLCS5tolC6bruOcOBMWjvoqZelzkv51Ly7zSNhyphenhyphenFMDn1OsXoA51mZuIDyHfJw7eUVBB4tiMd9g06k-l5TpAFewHZqgayP929B74IFEElKY/w642-h253/Modi%20Ram%20mandir.jpeg" width="642" /></a></div>Source: <a href="https://www.cnbctv18.com/politics/analysing-prime-ministers-speech-at-ram-mandir-what-it-means-for-secular-democratic-india-18875461.htm">CNBCTV18</a><br /><p>But is it true? Did Modi's and Yogi's want Gandhi's Ram Rajya? What Gandhi meant when he said he wanted Ram Rajya?</p><p><br /><u>Mahatma Gandhi's Ram Rajya was not Hindu Raj</u></p><p>S. N. Sahu in his article <a href="https://thewire.in/communalism/gandhis-ram-rajya-was-no-hindu-raj">Gandhi’s Ram Rajya Was No Hindu Raj</a> in The Wire writes:</p><p></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">Speaking in Bhopal on 10th September 1929, Gandhi made it very clear that his idea of Ram Rajya was not theocratic in nature and scope and remarked, ‘By Ramarajya’ I do not mean Hindu Raj”. “I mean by ‘Ramarajya’ the Divine Raj, the Kingdom of God… For me Rama and Rahim are one and the same deity”. Rahim, or the merciful, is one of the synonyms of Allah.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He added, “I acknowledge no other god but the one god of Truth and righteousness”. “Whether the Rama of my imagination ever lived or not on this earth, the ancient ideal of Ram Rajya is undoubtedly one of true democracy in which the meanest citizen could be sure of swift justice without an elaborate and costly procedure,” he added.</p></blockquote><p><u>Muslims can understand Gandhi's Ram Rajya as Khudai Raj and Christians as the Kingdom of God</u></p><p>Gandhi ji tried to clarify further that Muslims should not be afraid of Ram Rajya as Ram Rajya is the same as the Khudai Raj. In Haimchar, Bihar, <a href="https://www.mkgandhi.org/articles/greligion&politics.htm">Gandhi ji said in 1947</a>. </p><div><blockquote>My Rama is another name for Khuda or God. I want Khudai raj, which is the same thing as the Kingdom of God on earth.</blockquote><p> In the Harijan on 18th August 1946, he wrote:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote>When I visit the Frontier Province or address predominantly Muslim audiences I would express my meaning [of Ramrajya] to them by calling it Khudai Raj, while to a Christian audience, I would describe it as the Kingdom of God on earth (Source: <a href="https://www.google.com.pk/books/edition/Seculiarism/n7nnnaVSFMgC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=gandhi+ramrajya&pg=PA106&printsec=frontcover">A. K. Lal <i>Secularism</i></a>, p-106)</blockquote><p> <u style="text-align: left;">Mahatma Gandhi's Ram Rajya was about freedom and democracy</u></p><p></p></div><p>Sahu further explains in Gandhi's own words that Gandhi's Ram Rajya was about freedom, without inequality, and a perfect democracy where there would be prompt and cheap justice and freedom of <span style="text-align: justify;">worship, speech, and the press.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote>Just two years before the attainment of independence, Gandhi outlined the religious and political dimensions of Ram Rajya. When one Sailendra Nath Chattopadhyaya asked him, “Why do you wish to live for 125 years, and what is Ram Rajya?”, he explained that his wish to live for 125 years depended on the quality of selfless service he would render. On the issue of Ram Rajya he explained that when religiously translated this meant Kingdom of God on Earth but its political components were “perfect democracy in which inequalities based on possession and non-possession, colour, race or creed or sex vanish.” He went on to add that in such a Ram Rajya “…land and State belong to the people, justice is prompt, perfect and cheap and, therefore, there is freedom of worship, speech and the Press.”</blockquote><p> </p><p style="text-align: left;"><u>Mahatma Gandhi's Ram Rajya was about swift justice</u></p><p>Rishika Singh in her article <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/this-quote-means-ayodhya-ram-temple-gandhi-ram-rajya-9120495/">With Ram Temple consecration in Ayodhya, recalling what Gandhi said about Ram Rajya</a> in the Indian Express gives further evidence of Gandhi's Ram Rajya not being what Modi, the BJP, and the RSS are trying to make. She writes, "Gandhi's ideal State, 'Ramrajya', was not associated with a particular religion but was more about moral values – justice, equality, and truth, dispensed even to the most marginalised." It was never about the Hindu religion: </p><p></p><blockquote>He[Gandhi] wrote in the magazine Young India in the same year [1929], “Whether Rama of my imagination ever lived or not on this earth, the ancient ideal of Ramarajya is undoubtedly one of true democracy in which the meanest citizen could be sure of swift justice without an elaborate and costly procedure. Even the dog is described by the poet to have received justice under Ramarajya.”</blockquote><p></p><p><br /></p><p></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><u>Conclusion</u><br /><br />As Professor <a href="https://thewire.in/communalism/mahatma-gandhi-angel-of-history-ram-rajya-ayodhya">Ira Bhaskar writes on Gandhi's assassination anniversary</a>, the Ramrajya of Gandhi and Modi/RSS are completely different:<br /><br /></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">As a devout Ram bhakt, Gandhi’s idea of Ram and of Ram Rajya was a completely different one from the exclusionist and majoritarian Hindutva one that we see in circulation today. Gandhi’s Ram was a benevolent leader whose “ moral quality and habitual adherence to truth” were key for the realization of the peace, plenty and harmony of an imagined Ram Rajya. Unlike Gandhi’s imagining of the new modern nation as one based on “Hindu and Muslim unity” which was for him “the cornerstone of swaraj,” the Hindutva project from the 1980s onwards transformed Ram into a virulent crusader of the rights of the Hindus against the minorities. In contrast, Gandhi stood for “minority rights, religious freedom, justice and forgiveness” and is one who sacrificed his life for communal amity. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p></blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;"><br /></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-1189218126411453832024-02-03T12:19:00.000-05:002024-02-03T12:19:06.258-05:00What January 22 is, what it isn’t: Pratap Bhanu Mehta<p style="text-align: justify;">One of the most prominent intellectuals of India, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, writes about the spectacle everyone witnessed on 22 January. The <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/pratap-bhanu-mehta-january-22-ayodhya-ram-temple-9120210/?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email">following article</a> feels like an obituary of another India, an India where the Indian Constitution was supreme, Hinduism was religious, and pride came after the achievement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">There are moments in history that appear to drive wave after wave of people in a great torrent of catharsis, ecstasy, emotion and an elevated group mood that almost all conventional analysis, historical categories, moral measures and political prognosis seem beside the point. It would be foolish to deny that the pran pratishtha of Ram Lalla in Ayodhya is one such event. Just in sheer magnitude, of the tens of millions of people mobilised, whose identity, emotions and hopes are, at least for the moment, oriented towards Ayodhya, this event has almost no precedent in history. It is a watershed moment. The pran pratishtha following the foundation stone of Ayodhya, marks the consecration of Hinduism as a political religion pure and simple. It is not just a moment where the state, which has pulled all its mighty power behind this event, ceases to be secular. It is also the moment where Hinduism ceases to be religious.</p></blockquote><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgNZaHZ6LxMF8Pzt6DbqhWqo8C-0EFAmt3AkYuV8-aznmYA4cXFEmDeRzqWoXH36MdpUGfJ80N2HHm8njMJMEKlg4aXqtMXlLjUZnN8o1OWTHQOp2ZweQ-eAUPFn7aoYSImcgvrCwyBBISlQeOWU3W3_F6dct_WJ_DGUpEhpp-EcfxNuxkbSm231Vxnzqq1/s1024/ayodhya-PM%20Modi-RSS%20Bhagwat.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="722" data-original-width="1024" height="276" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgNZaHZ6LxMF8Pzt6DbqhWqo8C-0EFAmt3AkYuV8-aznmYA4cXFEmDeRzqWoXH36MdpUGfJ80N2HHm8njMJMEKlg4aXqtMXlLjUZnN8o1OWTHQOp2ZweQ-eAUPFn7aoYSImcgvrCwyBBISlQeOWU3W3_F6dct_WJ_DGUpEhpp-EcfxNuxkbSm231Vxnzqq1/w590-h276/ayodhya-PM%20Modi-RSS%20Bhagwat.jpeg" width="590" /></a></div> Source: <a href="https://www.prokerala.com/news/photos/ayodhya-prime-minister-narendra-modi-and-rss-chief-mohan-bhagwat-at-the-3646737.html">prokerala</a><br /> <p></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">The sheer spectacle of the event, now fusing modified but still traditional yama and niyama, with mass broadcasting and mass mobilisation, is itself considered an achievement. The spectacle is the statement: That Hindus have asserted their collective power, reclaimed their historical agency, and overcome the deep sense of insecurity, and despite some murmurings, for once managed to make something a show of unity. The BJP has kept its promises. Prime Minister Narendra Modi now donning the mantle of Hindu kingship, has the ability to get millions of people to play their parts for an audience of One, with all institutions, corporations, sects, civil society, media singing the same tune. It is a terrifying spectacle on any proper measure of democracy. But as a form of deference to mass sentiment it is now carrying its own democratic imprimatur. There is something quite astonishing about this mobilisation of power. You have to struggle to remember its ominous origins and shadows.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Some parties may contest the ceremony. But everyone has to rush to declare their allegiance to Ram. Even Opposition parties are obliged to pay allegiance to Ram in the form that ironically was best described by Iqbal when he called Ram the Imam-e-Hind. The Ram whose role in Indian cultural and spiritual life was one whose centre was everywhere and circumference nowhere, has now been anchored to a centre. Ram has been transformed from a radiant glow of righteousness, compassion, and imaginative power into something merely instrumental: A litmus test for national loyalty. We are now more valorous devotees of Ram — more than Tulsidas or Gandhi, who rejected the logic of retaliation. You now have to swear allegiance to this Imam-e-Hind, or else.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In many ways, Bhagwad Gita 17.18 captures the spectacle being made out of this ceremony perfectly. It goes: satkara mana puja artham tapah dambehna cheva yat/kriyate tadiham proktam rajas am chalam adhruvam (Penance and austerities performed ostentatiously out of pride for the sake of gaining honour and recognition are all in the mode of a passion. Its benefits are unstable and fleeting). This is both an accurate description of this mode of worship and a warning. It names this worship for what it is: A spectacle. But the fact that the passions and emotional resonances it produces are transitory is not reassuring in this context. It will require that the deep insecurities and needs this spectacle has tapped into be constantly satiated. The passion around Ram is not a form of ecstasy finding its final repose in a radiant calm. It is going to be one in a long chain where our pride will have to be constantly fed. This is because in an inversion of dharma, the relation between pride and its object is reversed. We no longer take pride in genuine achievement; generating pride is considered the achievement.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the Mahabharata there is an evocative word, Dharma Dhwajii. It is a pejorative for those who make a show of their worship in what is a sign of lack of real faith. The term Dharma Dhwajii refers to those who, as it were, care about the flag more than they care about dharma. The Dharma Dhwajiis have, for the moment, won the political, cultural and emotional battle fair and square. It is the overwhelming power of this moment, and the fact that we now inhabit a political universe solely dominated by power, that expressing even ambivalence about this pran pratishtha seems more like blowing straws in a hurricane. Bearing witness, fighting for republican ideals, are all now reduced to self-satisfied snarks or expressions of sour grapes. There is no real ideological counterpoint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rallying around the dhwaja is clear. What dharma it portends is less clear. The content of this new Ramrajya, is, for a moment, founded in a logic of retaliation and blood, rancour and division, that India’s post-1951 constitutional ideals sought so hard to avoid. That project was, first and foremost, betrayed in many different ways by its own custodians. The Dharma Dhwajiis, with popular acclaim, have reduced whatever was left of the dharma of that republic to ruins. The only content to the new dharma one can see on the horizon is, ironically, to intensify the logic of the 1930s: To create an ethno nationalist state with its cult of power and violence, its worship of purity and concentration of power. This is a project that never ends well. It produced devastating wars in Europe, and the partition of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This time the partition is more intimate and close: It is running through families. It is also a fissure within Hinduism. Worshipping idols is central to Hinduism, no matter what deracinated intellectuals might tell you. It gave Hinduism a playful intimacy. But the idols we worship are no longer intimate; they are mega showpieces. More grievously, concentration on the idol was a path to self-consciousness. But now, as the philosopher, Arindam Chakrabarti, once wrote, the idol has been replaced by the I-doll, the worship of the “I”. We are consecrating our own collective narcissism in the image of God.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the Ramayana, in any version, there is always a sense of sadness around Ram himself. Bhavabhuti captured it beautifully: Ram has been filled with the rasa of pity/ kept hidden by his profound demeanour/the sharp pain of it held deep within/ like a clay pot baking in embers. This moment of triumphalism is also accompanied by a pain that cannot even be expressed. It will cook in the embers of this moment. Ram’s dhwaja has been planted. But the question of dharma is met only with a yawning and ominous silence.</p></blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;"></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-6974634423209254222023-03-18T05:26:00.001-04:002023-03-18T05:26:45.138-04:00Warrior Virgin, Warrior Queen, Champion General Mary, and Mother of Power<p>How can Virgin Mary be used as a symbol of war, military, imperialism, and violence? Virgin Mary was as far from war and violence as a human can possibly be. But Christian nationalists have used Mary as a militaristic icon since ancient times. </p><p>Dorian Llywelyn, a Jesuit priest, scholar of Catholicism, and President, the Institute for Advanced Catholic Studies, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences has written a fascinating article about how Mary has become a warrior queen and a military general, who has won many battles, for many nations. </p><p>In his article, <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/news/stories/3734/the-patriotic-virgin/" target="_blank">The patriotic Virgin: How Mary’s been marshaled for religious nationalism and military campaigns</a>, Mr. Llywelyn traces the history of the Warrior Virgin from ancient times. He gives the example of a prayer from 4th century Christians in Egypt to Christian's victory over Persians after Constantinople was besieged by the Persian navy in 626 AD. Christians believed that their prayers to Mary destroyed the Persian fleet. Mary was given the military title 'Champion General' in the Akathist hymn that has been prayed in both the Orthodox and Eastern Catholic churches. Since then, Mary has been used as a symbol of the military and nation. In the Argentinian and Chilian militaries, she is still considered a national patroness and a general.</p><p> Mr. Llywelyn mentions interesting and intriguing episodes of history when both sides of the conflict invoked Warrior Mary. During the War of Mexican Independence (1810-21), local forces invoked "Our Lady of Guadalupe," a title of Mary used in Mexico while the Spanish imperialist army invoked another title for Mary, “Virgin of Los Remedios,” as their protector and supporter. </p><p>Another such episode is the reign of English Queen Elizabeth I, called the "Virgin Queen" because she was never married. However, many of her English supporters also considered her the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24412521">second Virgin Mary</a> under whom the golden age of purity and justice was restored. She was the head of the Anglican Church and Catholic Christians suffered harsh persecution during her reign. In her book, "The Virgin Mary in The Perceptions of Women: Mother, Protector, and Queen," Joelle Mellon wrote that during those difficult times, when death or imprisonment was a real threat, the English Catholics asked Mary for protection and gave her a new title: <a href="https://nds.edu/blog-entry/mother-mary-warrior-queen/">Mother of Power</a>.</p><p>A mural in Kyiv, Ukraine depicting the Virgin Mary cradling a U.S.-made anti-tank weapon</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjR5UK-AKhobSl405TXhtuspF3xSjOiHqw8FxhDjn6AUhsIBQXMWKrC9_5ADbvcldDe9ip1wZxqNnO2-o-6uIKqHR1pI9Vd0oiM8d4Ff5tDX26T2914dZtSOtUPuR7sv-txNT4anem-BUA9dZ7GtXnrJaLuIIzgXJCpgCWA-pGTMLGdf_OIW3E1vonlMA/s276/Mary%20warrior%20ukraine.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="182" data-original-width="276" height="263" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjR5UK-AKhobSl405TXhtuspF3xSjOiHqw8FxhDjn6AUhsIBQXMWKrC9_5ADbvcldDe9ip1wZxqNnO2-o-6uIKqHR1pI9Vd0oiM8d4Ff5tDX26T2914dZtSOtUPuR7sv-txNT4anem-BUA9dZ7GtXnrJaLuIIzgXJCpgCWA-pGTMLGdf_OIW3E1vonlMA/w616-h263/Mary%20warrior%20ukraine.jpeg" width="616" /></a></div><br /><p>Source: <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/news/stories/3734/the-patriotic-virgin/" target="_blank">The patriotic Virgin: How Mary’s been marshaled for religious nationalism and military campaigns</a></p><p><u>Mary as a national symbol</u></p><p>Mary has been used as the national symbol of many countries. Catholic countries are particularly susceptible to Mary's devotion as Mr. Llywelyn explains:</p><p></p><blockquote><p>Off the battlefield, many Catholic cultures have historically felt they had a special relationship with Mary. In 1638, King Louis XIII formally dedicated France to the Virgin Mary. Popular belief interpreted the subsequent birth of the future Louis XIV as Mary’s miraculous reward, after 23 years of waiting for a male heir.</p><p>About two decades later, Polish King Jan II Kazimierz consecrated his country to Mary amid a war. Both acts reflected church and political leaders’ beliefs that their countries had a sacred mission and divine approval for their political ambitions.</p><p></p></blockquote><p>This religious symbolism allows rulers to justify their actions, whether it's war, peace, theft, or imperialism, based on religion. </p><p><u>Mary as a warrior</u></p><p>Ancient symbols and personalities are often reimagined and reinterpreted by powerful rulers or groups so that current political positions and actions can be justified. Traditions are invented and people think of them as ancient and long-standing while in reality these traditions of are relatively recent origin.</p><p>The following <a href="https://mysticalrose.tripod.com/virgin.html">excerpt from a Novena/prayer to Mary</a> shows that the "gentle maid" is also a powerful warrior. </p><p><br /></p><p></p><blockquote><p>How strange it seems to think of Mary as a warrior.</p><p>The gentle maid of Nazareth, the Virginal Mother, the Mother of the Prince of Peace, is still called -and properly called- "More terrible than army in battle array."</p><p>And so she is....</p><p>Mary, conqueror of heresies</p><p>Mary, triumphant always in the battle with sin.</p><p>When then we put on the scapular, which is Mary's uniform, we join in a special way the regiment of which Mary is the queen and honorary colonel.</p><p>We pledge ourselves to do battle against the enemy of the human race.</p><p>We will be victorious as Mary is victorious, and conquering as Christ is conquering.</p></blockquote><p>Although the battles and triumphs are spiritual, once you make someone honorary colonel of a regiment, it's easy to use it to also battle corporeal enemies that threaten us in the real world. The following image of Mary, with a club in her hand, is particularly interesting.</p><p><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiOYMT3_2wYTKpxlaMFYUCQShrwlmrRdrrrBDxEl-ngPn77ubVoEk7Fe-MRTOvUNWmvRm1kmW_n0P0rjIMZjx20cJcy6iugeum4yUC4YHVReStPYyvADpsL4K-JkDeKTowYt52rQAT2uKfPW5nLly6OSj61fIMxBPPsDYtdylpwDJ9t5LmG8lSHJE8cNg/s267/Madonna%20Mary%20with%20a%20club.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="267" data-original-width="230" height="298" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiOYMT3_2wYTKpxlaMFYUCQShrwlmrRdrrrBDxEl-ngPn77ubVoEk7Fe-MRTOvUNWmvRm1kmW_n0P0rjIMZjx20cJcy6iugeum4yUC4YHVReStPYyvADpsL4K-JkDeKTowYt52rQAT2uKfPW5nLly6OSj61fIMxBPPsDYtdylpwDJ9t5LmG8lSHJE8cNg/w585-h298/Madonna%20Mary%20with%20a%20club.jpeg" width="585" /></a></div><br /><p>Source: <a href="https://mysticalrose.tripod.com/virgin.html">Virgin most powerful: Catholic Belief in Mary's Strength </a></p><p></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-61528770900848785052023-03-17T23:08:00.000-04:002023-03-17T23:08:03.448-04:00Hindu Civilizationism: Make India Great Again<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Abstract</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Hindu civilizationism is more than a century old phenomenon that has been steadily gaining strength. Its recent amalgam with populism has made it ascendant, popular, and mainstream in India. This paper explores how Hindu civilizationism is not only an essential part of the Hindutva and BJP’s narrative but also the mainstay of several government policies. The “other” of the BJP’s populist civilizationist rhetoric are primarily Muslims and Muslim civilization in India and the aim is to make India “vishwaguru” (world leader) again after 1200 years of colonialism. The evidence of this heady mixture of civilizationism and populism is numerous and ubiquitous. This paper analyzes topics such as Akhand Bharat, the golden age, denigrating Mughals, Hindutva pseudoscience, and Sanskrit promotion to highlight the evidence.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Article</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">1. Introduction</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Civilizationism uses a religio-civilization classification of people to define national identity. Territorial nationalism is deemphasized as the nation is imagined beyond national boundaries. Citizens, who are considered part of the civilization-nation based on religion, are asked to defend or save their civilization which is considered under threat. The state becomes a means to achieve the objective which is civilizational longevity and success.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">This civilizational rhetoric has become more common as populist leaders around the world have used it to attract voters who are dissatisfied with the dominant ideologies and established mainstream parties. Numerous authors have pointed out how rightwing populist European parties and leaders defined self and the other not in national but in broader civilizational terms. Christian civilization, Christian heritage, or Judeo-Christian civilization and traditions are considered in crisis and under threat from Islam and Muslims. The “patriots” are told they have only two choices, act or go extinct (Brubaker 2016, 2017; Kaya and Tecmen 2019; Ozzano and Bolzonar 2020; Yilmaz and Morieson 2021; Marchetti et al. 2022).</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Populism is generally considered a thin ideology that attaches itself to rightwing or leftwing ideologies to give coherence, strength, and program to its rhetoric. Yilmaz and Morieson (2022a) have identified civilizationism as another thick ideology that populism attached itself to. Civilizationism, for them, is an idea that divides and categorizes people based on “civilizations” that are primarily based on religion. This is different from the usual division of people based on nations and populists’ framing of “the people” as people of a country.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Hindu civilizationism, like in many other countries, is closely associated with rightwing nationalism and populism. Hindutva (literally Hindu-ness) is a popular political ideology that defines Indian values and nationalism primarily in terms of Hinduism and Hindu civilization, lays claim that only Hindus have the right to rule in India, and aims to replace a secular Indian constitution with a Hindu state (Hindu Rashtra). Hindutva political parties, organizations, and social movements raised the flag of civilizationism before Indian independence in 1947, and more than a century later, they are still its torchbearers. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is just the latest and most successful of the political rightwing conservative organizations. In terms of making Hindu civilizationism popular, the BJP plays second fiddle to almost a hundred-year-old Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a militant Hindutva organization.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Hindu civilizationism, therefore, is not a new phenomenon. It started as part of Hindu revivalism in the early 19th century. Hindu revivalists, such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy, the founder of Brahmo Samaj, wanted to reform Hinduism and Hindu society so that it could rise above the social evils and iniquitous rituals and regain its position as a great civilization. Later, in the last century, civilizationist organizations were formed whose main objectives were political even when they were not working as a political party. For a long time, from the 1940s to the 1970s, these organizations and the political parties they supported remained unpopular. However, civilizationists started winning elections at the state level in the 1980s and won national elections in the late 1990s. They ruled India under Prime Minister Vajpayee (1999–2004) but as they did not have the majority of Lok Sabha seats, they were always dependent on other parties and could not fully implement their agenda. The second decade of the 21st century brought a sea change in their fortunes as, like many rightwing civilizationists in other countries, they discovered an affinity between their ideology and populism. The embrace of populism under Prime Minister Modi made them the supreme political force and, currently, Hindu civilizationism is the dominant ideology in India. PM Narendra Modi has trounced the opposition in the 2014 and 2019 national elections and he is by far the most popular leader in India, most likely to win the 2024 national elections (Pradhan 2022).</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Modi riding a chariot reminiscence</span><span style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: medium;"> of ancient Hindu Gods, Avatars, Rajas and Hindu civilization</span></span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhf9GscFLndiiuYBvp1h0exm7ZH4WEkE6ZzadTLOiO_4fyUg9D6IjyBaxAlFXqRRMlMJp07PVNO4t7zbgtuE9VPKI02i-8-spn6E1CpFnpUXSFxI8fiJ77yh3pvrB6hMVG-5ACgl1Ys0g-yEMkuPccuP0ZmXf80uvhzN1U3UiEmuMFioHnfg2lHVwlVDA/s1280/Modi%20in%20a%20chariot.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" data-original-height="848" data-original-width="1280" height="338" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhf9GscFLndiiuYBvp1h0exm7ZH4WEkE6ZzadTLOiO_4fyUg9D6IjyBaxAlFXqRRMlMJp07PVNO4t7zbgtuE9VPKI02i-8-spn6E1CpFnpUXSFxI8fiJ77yh3pvrB6hMVG-5ACgl1Ys0g-yEMkuPccuP0ZmXf80uvhzN1U3UiEmuMFioHnfg2lHVwlVDA/w627-h338/Modi%20in%20a%20chariot.jpeg" width="627" /></a></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Source: <a href="https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1352582313717100544?s=20">Narendra Modi Twitter</a><br /><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">During the last decade, Hindu civilizationism rhetoric has been rising steadily, with the support of populism. The people-elite divide of populism has been used to discredit the Congress Party and Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. Similarly, the people-outsider divide, another regular feature of populist politics, was used to declare Hindus as the only original inhabitants of India and Muslims and Christians as outsiders. Fear, threat, and crisis were used by Modi, like other populists, to force ordinary Hindus to be afraid (Hindu khatray main hai: Hindus are in danger) and act as advised by Modi. Finally, Modi’s image as the only strong, decisive leader in India was carefully crafted, as in the case of many other populist leaders, to sway voters (Modi hai to mumkin hai: If there is Modi, then it is possible) (Sinha 2021; Saleem 2021; Saleem et al. 2022; Yilmaz and Morieson 2022b).</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">The othering of Muslims and other political forces as anti-nationals and non/fake Hindus is increasing in India. Hinduism has been presented as under threat from Muslims despite Hindus being close to eighty percent of the Indian population. Indians are being made to believe that Muslims and Westerners are again plotting to subjugate Hindus as they did many times during the previous twelve hundred years. The BJP has achieved what was unimaginable a few decades ago (Varshney 2019; Amarasingam et al. 2022).</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">However, it must be clear that Modi is not more civilizationist than previous civilizationists. The key difference between Modi and Hindu civilizationists of the 1960s and 1970s is the degree of populism, not the degree of civilizationism. Like Modi, Hindu civilizationists of the 20th century were also talking about Akhand Bharat, the golden Vedic age, oppressive Muslim/Mughal invaders, superiority of Hindu civilization, and Sanskrit promotion. Hindutva party manifestos of Hindu Mahasabha and Bharatiya Jana Sangh give ample evidence of civilizationalism (Saleem 2021). Populists are quite successful in the use of transnational solidarity today due to a number of reasons, such as revolution in information and communication technologies, globalization, increase in economic inequality and distrust in democratic institutions in numerous countries, rise in ethnic/religious attachments with the concurrent decline in liberalism, etc. However, they were not the first ones to use transnational solidarity. For instance, between 1987 and 1989, during the Ram Mandir movement, hundreds of thousands of bricks were donated for the eventual construction of Ram Mandir in Ayodhya. These bricks were donated in response to a campaign by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a Hindutva organization. The Ram Mandir movement and VHP campaign were pro-Hindutva and Hindu civilizationist. They were also transnational as bricks for the mandir were donated not only by people living in India but also by people of 55 other countries of the world (Udayakumar 1997; Hindustan Times 2021)....</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">In the following section, the prominence of Hindu civilizationism in present day India and Hindutva leaders’ consistent efforts to prove the grandeur and glorious achievements of Hindu civilization will be shown. The section will also demonstrate how Hindu civilizationism is being promoted by denigrating Muslim civilization and its achievements. Most of the papers on civilizationism focus on Christian-majority and Muslim-majority countries. This paper analyzes civilizationism in India, a Hindu-majority country. The key theoretical contribution of this paper is that it presents the evidence that civilizationism as a concept is as applicable and functional in a Hindu majority country as it is in Christian, Jewish, and Muslim majority countries.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Rest of the article can be read <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/3/338" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-39780136974025473252023-02-16T13:26:00.000-05:002023-02-16T13:26:07.321-05:00Jewish Civilizationism in Israel<p style="text-align: justify;"> My article "Jewish Civilizationism in Israel: A Unique Phenomenon" as published in <i>Religions</i> journal in February 2023.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Populism and civilizationism have transformed the politics of many countries. Many scholars consider them the biggest challenges to democracy since the rise of fascism and communism in the first half of the last century. The close affinity between populism, civilizationism, and rightwing politics has also been analyzed and recognized in many countries from Turkey to India to the US. However, there are three areas that distinguish the appearance of civilizationism in Israel. First, in contrast to many other countries, civilizationism in Israel is not a new phenomenon. It has been an essential part of Israeli nationalism or Zionism since the early 20th century. Second, unlike many countries, Jewish civilizationism in Israel is an article of faith for all major Israeli political parties. It is not a slogan raised only by the rightwing, conservative part of the political spectrum. Finally, one observes an affinity between civilizationism and populism. Civilizational rhetoric is the mainstay of populist leaders, such as Trump, Erdogan, etc. In Israel, populism and civilizationism have no special relationship as civilizationism is mainstream politics. All politicians, populists and non-populists, have to pay homage to Jewish civilizationism; otherwise, they will not succeed. This paper analyzes the Israeli founding fathers’ statements, the Declaration of Independence, Israeli state symbols, the revival of the Hebrew language, the Law of Return, the first debate in the Knesset, and the more recent Nation-State Law to demonstrate how Jewish civilizationism is old, mainstream, and not exclusively populist.</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhmhZBgZkKfnwnrlK5LNkyAbVGNhS9nJz8h3BAkzxFMHLUi_-V31b9FeqZJ8KYFDiDADDIDszJ55ac3nWUxM4DjCeQxB7TDBSGsd4je_xJGq-euTpjLY6UGtTmopWizZhwgdw1r9ZhdnOHOWiRinclBVtnGPXRkTEBCUeXyjUjNhRkheQpYCHO_4vk8uA/s400/Israeli%20flag%20menorah.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="283" data-original-width="400" height="341" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhmhZBgZkKfnwnrlK5LNkyAbVGNhS9nJz8h3BAkzxFMHLUi_-V31b9FeqZJ8KYFDiDADDIDszJ55ac3nWUxM4DjCeQxB7TDBSGsd4je_xJGq-euTpjLY6UGtTmopWizZhwgdw1r9ZhdnOHOWiRinclBVtnGPXRkTEBCUeXyjUjNhRkheQpYCHO_4vk8uA/w594-h341/Israeli%20flag%20menorah.jpeg" width="594" /></a></div><br /><p style="text-align: justify;"><br /></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Article</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Recent years have seen a rise in civilizational rhetoric in several democratic societies across different continents. In April 2022, Turkish President Erdogan inaugurated the Islamic Civilizations Museum in Istanbul to showcase the versatility and superiority of Islamic civilization (Daily Sabah 2022). In November 2022, Jordan Bardella won the presidential election of the rightwing National Rally party, replacing Marine Le Pen, promising to defend French civilization (Associated Press 2022). In December 2022, Modi said, “India was the most refined idea of human civilisation, the most natural voice of humanity” (The Statesman 2022). While the focus of nationalism is territorial, the civilizational rhetoric prioritizes defending or saving a civilization based on religion, not a state. The state is considered a single manifestation of civilization that spans many territories and millennia. Both rightwing and leftwing populist leaders have used this rhetoric to win voters and elections by denouncing liberalism and established mainstream parties. For instance, in Europe, numerous rightwing populist European parties and leaders have fought and won elections based on the argument that Christian civilization or Judeo-Christian civilization and traditions are under threat from Islam, Muslims, and other refugees that do not belong to the White Christian civilization (Yilmaz and Morieson 2021; Ozzano and Bolzonar 2020; Brubaker 2016; Kaya and Tecmen 2019; Marchetti et al. 2022).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Yilmaz and Morieson (2022) have identified civilizationism as another thick ideology that populism, a thin ideology, attaches to itself to give itself a solid defensible argument. They define civilizationism in the following way:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Civilizationism is an idea which posits that the world and its peoples can be divided into several ‘civilizations’, most of them defined by religion. Adhered to populism, civilizationism defines self and other not primarily in national terms, but civilizational terms...</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This article focuses on Jewish civilizationism in the state of Israel. Three aspects distinguish Israel from most other countries where civilizational rhetoric and politics have been successful. First, in most of the other countries, such as in the United States, Turkey, India, and Poland, civilizationism, linked with religion, was until a few decades ago a fringe phenomenon (Saleem 2023). Scholars link it primarily to the 21st century. This might be the case for other countries but, as this chapter will show, Israeli civilizationism is mainstream and as old as the Israeli state, if not older. Israeli nationalism or Zionism is based on Jewish civilizationism. From the First Zionist Congress in 1897 to the Nation-State Law passed in 2018, Jewish civilizationism has monopolized Israeli nationalism and defeated attempts by many Israeli scholars and leaders to make Israel a state honoring the histories and lives of all its citizens equally.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Second, in numerous countries, civilizationism is closely associated with rightwing nationalism and populism. It is the rightwing parties and movements that have raised the flag of civilizationism, and they are its key torch bearers. Whether it is the Republican Party in the US, the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, or the Bharatiya Janata Party in India, the rightwing conservatives spread religio-civilizational rhetoric and are the most impressed by it. This is not the case in Israel. It was the socialist, broadly secular leftwingers that raised the flag of Jewish civilizationism and created the state of Israel. Even after the creation of Israel, the broadly leftwing parties ruled Israel for thirty years and kept Jewish civilizationism alive.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Finally, when one studies other country cases, one observes an affinity between civilizationism and populism. Civilizational rhetoric is primarily the mainstay of populist leaders. Civilizationism has played a key role in making such leaders win elections and dominate the political arena. Erdogan and Modi, two populist leaders, have used civilizationism to completely change the politics of their countries. Now, even the opposition parties in Turkey and India have to resort to civilizational rhetoric to prove their authenticity. Populist leaders instrumentalize religion and religious identity to create a sense of fear that the national culture and identity are civilizational, and that it is under attack by people from foreign civilizations living not only outside the state but also inside the state. In Israel, this exclusive affinity between populism and civilizationism breaks down. As Jewish civilizationism is not limited to the left wing or right wing, similarly, it is not limited to populist or mainstream politics. Jewish civilizationism is Israeli nationalism as propagated by the state, and rejecting it means rejecting the basis of the state. Therefore, no political party, populist or non-populist, can succeed in Israel without bowing to this altar.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The rest of the article can be read <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/2/268" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-47077143232064397142022-12-22T09:04:00.004-05:002022-12-22T09:04:27.978-05:00The nexus of religious populism and digital authoritarianism in Pakistan<p><b>The nexus of religious populism and digital authoritarianism in Pakistan</b></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjInaQjhm7vByELqhQ0fTA5Xwq_5n3WdoJnBJGopfdGNCPzyz6WAP8GA10qdhI8y0am02i_StHiEcaPfRjPtYQB2EoGX4BcZmeZ77ZK0R2MraPvI-qzA-qigfFNLxyNUUUhRfPF74GOkPYkRQ-b2LpSlFzrHDLL9K-IB9fFJnKYIGkzVaD8W6w5F2YO6Q/s2000/democracy%20digital.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1204" data-original-width="2000" height="431" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjInaQjhm7vByELqhQ0fTA5Xwq_5n3WdoJnBJGopfdGNCPzyz6WAP8GA10qdhI8y0am02i_StHiEcaPfRjPtYQB2EoGX4BcZmeZ77ZK0R2MraPvI-qzA-qigfFNLxyNUUUhRfPF74GOkPYkRQ-b2LpSlFzrHDLL9K-IB9fFJnKYIGkzVaD8W6w5F2YO6Q/w593-h431/democracy%20digital.jpg" width="593" /></a></div><br /><p>Source: https://www.citizenlab.co/</p><p>Abstract</p><p>Pakistan’s democracy has a turbulent political history. In the seven decades since its creation, the country has faced four military-led dictatorships and another two decades under indirect military rule. Given this political trend, authoritarianism is not a novel phenomenon in the country. Digital authoritarianism, however, is a relatively new domain of oppression. This paper looks at how a political party in power and the “establishment” (military elite and its civilian collaborators) have been increasingly controlling digital mediums as well as weaponizing cyberspace. This dual control and usage allow for growing digital authoritarianism.</p><p><br /></p><p>Using the case study of Islamist civilizational populist Imran Khan’s government (2018-2022) and its collaboration with the military establishment in enforcing digital authoritarianism, this article provides a four levels of assessment of internet governance in Pakistan: 1. whole network level, 2. sub-network level, 3. proxy level, and 4. user level. In addition, the role of Khan’s political party’s Islamist civilizational populist outlook in contributing to authoritarianism is also discussed. A lot of censorship happens around the ideas of protecting Islam and Pakistan’s Muslim identity. Thus, Pakistan’s digital space is oppressive where ideas of religion, ontological insecurity, and nationalism are weaponized to legitimize the state’s growing authoritarianism. </p><p>Read the article at the <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/the-nexus-of-religious-populism-and-digital-authoritarianism-in-pakistan/">European Center for Populism Studies</a></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-72898748826141340542022-12-22T08:45:00.001-05:002022-12-22T08:45:50.912-05:00Hindutva civilizational populist BJP’s enforcement of digital authoritarianism in India<p> </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi8pZFWoTBL2chjuOVQqxAnqBo7RT5fC0ayxa59cwfURVIB32SomfsBgmWlazt118R9oDeKNWfGBTwoT4O5DQMcttAvy7AStKT-BZG2fPYMVQ6T_V6lJtx4mMYxfudYKFyWlin-deLaURSlTvUOiVE4HnkiDgBTODbNhpIbWimBkfGsicbmfJn4_FgkvQ/s900/Populist%20authoritarianism.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="600" data-original-width="900" height="361" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi8pZFWoTBL2chjuOVQqxAnqBo7RT5fC0ayxa59cwfURVIB32SomfsBgmWlazt118R9oDeKNWfGBTwoT4O5DQMcttAvy7AStKT-BZG2fPYMVQ6T_V6lJtx4mMYxfudYKFyWlin-deLaURSlTvUOiVE4HnkiDgBTODbNhpIbWimBkfGsicbmfJn4_FgkvQ/w575-h361/Populist%20authoritarianism.jpeg" width="575" /></a></div>Source: https://www.thefinancialexpress.com.bd/<p></p><p>Abstract:</p><p>The largest democracy in the world is now moving towards authoritarianism under the Hindutva civilizational populist prime minister Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s rule. This article focuses on digital rights in India that have seen a sharp decline in recent years. It explores the transformation of the internet and social media, from a relatively open and liberal space to a restricted one. This survey of India’s digital landscape finds that the rise of civilizational populist Modi and his eight years long rule have led to an upsurge in digital surveillance and control and has fostered an environment of online harassment and bullying for those who are critical of the BJP’s views and politics. The article uses a four-level framework (Full Network, Sub-Network, Proxies, and Network Nodes) to explore digital authoritarianism by the BJP government. At each of these levels, the Hindutva populist government has closed avenues of open discussion and exchange of views by enforcing new rules and regulations.</p><p><br /></p><p>Read the article at the <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/hindutva-civilizational-populist-bjps-enforcement-of-digital-authoritarianism-in-india/">European Center of Populism Studies</a></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-29312219189794558842022-12-21T23:52:00.003-05:002022-12-21T23:52:23.441-05:00A Quest for Identity: The Case of Religious Populism in Pakistan<p>Pakistani Identity</p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiS1aGOA2Llt-WIsdqrz2li1UKVPKCiANjVnGHfRZtMB_YWBJUQw3m4n9FPrfzuMRTiPvYpdl4I3_WnVlYtNbEjxoIaXd0CkNhmH1-kwUq4uuAOoAjIHV2_qmRwcq6x5CKK5AA-YMTnma4yHdN440YOcKmc7G80ojMQUfk4RKJROfhM0u7JWCVMSFqNSg/s2048/Pakistani%20identity.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1152" data-original-width="2048" height="344" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiS1aGOA2Llt-WIsdqrz2li1UKVPKCiANjVnGHfRZtMB_YWBJUQw3m4n9FPrfzuMRTiPvYpdl4I3_WnVlYtNbEjxoIaXd0CkNhmH1-kwUq4uuAOoAjIHV2_qmRwcq6x5CKK5AA-YMTnma4yHdN440YOcKmc7G80ojMQUfk4RKJROfhM0u7JWCVMSFqNSg/w564-h344/Pakistani%20identity.jpeg" width="564" /></a></div><br /> Source: BBC<p></p><p>Abstract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Since its founding, both civil and military Pakistani governments have used religious populism to consolidate support and legitimize their actions. This has paved the way for religious populism to become a part of the nation’s cultural imagination and identity. During the country’s “infant” or “fragile” democratic phase, religious populism was repeatedly used to consolidate support. Religious parties and groups hold great political sway in the county. Through the use of religious populism, these factions have been allowed to nurture their own “people” who are partisan towards “others.” The weak level of governance, political turmoil, and distrust in institutional capabilities has pushed the public into the arms of religious populists. </p><p>The article can be read at <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/a-quest-for-identity-the-case-of-religious-populism-in-pakistan/">European Center for Populism Studies</a></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-76404449415076915772022-12-21T23:33:00.001-05:002022-12-21T23:33:32.539-05:00Military and Populism: A Global Tour with a Special Emphasis on the Case of Pakistan<p> <span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;">Pakistan army chief General Qamar Bajwa and Prime Minister Imran Khan in Miranshah</span></p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgVdpLE9DMZTHIqWHEr3VAYnaFqcinrKlyrM48Bz6ltXG3tGji_vB94Szz6llBrP4SzHh69ScpwsXuNPewsNk_wvh12O9qMyq7D25uly7IiyrFGn646b7G81CZRQF5HyDjyiNMEUJTb80nwpxMMg_gUyj81PWTjdnJ-JYR2tYOYil8MTcA08ti2ewBXFQ/s504/bajwa-imran.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="341" data-original-width="504" height="363" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgVdpLE9DMZTHIqWHEr3VAYnaFqcinrKlyrM48Bz6ltXG3tGji_vB94Szz6llBrP4SzHh69ScpwsXuNPewsNk_wvh12O9qMyq7D25uly7IiyrFGn646b7G81CZRQF5HyDjyiNMEUJTb80nwpxMMg_gUyj81PWTjdnJ-JYR2tYOYil8MTcA08ti2ewBXFQ/w501-h363/bajwa-imran.png" width="501" /></a></div><p></p><p><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;">Source: Khyber TV</span></p><p><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;">Abstract</span></p><p><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;">Although </span><a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="2566b5a560bc29dbf918f9b74221fcdd" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none !important; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">populism</a><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;"> has become a focus of research in the last decade, there hasn’t been much academic work on how militaries around the world have reacted/acted to the rise of populist leaders. There is some timeworn research on the relationship of militaries in Latin America with various left-wing populist governments and leaders from the 1930s to 1970s. Given that </span><a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="2566b5a560bc29dbf918f9b74221fcdd" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none !important; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">populism</a><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;"> was largely understood in the context of left-wing politics, with the rise of </span><a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="d19ed211b6d1f3fe4927d82f9b87b655" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/right-wing-populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none !important; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">right-wing populism</a><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;">, the literature on the military and </span><a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="2566b5a560bc29dbf918f9b74221fcdd" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none !important; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">populism</a><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;"> needs to be advanced by studying the relationship between </span><a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="d19ed211b6d1f3fe4927d82f9b87b655" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/right-wing-populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none !important; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">right-wing populism</a><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;"> and the military. This article aims to address this gap by looking at the </span><a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="d19ed211b6d1f3fe4927d82f9b87b655" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/right-wing-populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none !important; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">right-wing populism</a><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;"> case study of Pakistan, where the military has actively participated in the rise of a religious populist leader. To situate the case study within the larger literature of the military and </span><a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="2566b5a560bc29dbf918f9b74221fcdd" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none !important; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">populism</a><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;">, the dynamics and history of military associations with </span><a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="2566b5a560bc29dbf918f9b74221fcdd" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(93, 106, 226) !important; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none !important; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">populism</a><span style="color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;"> and populist leaders are revisited in the article’s first part.</span></p><p><span style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;">The article can be read at <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/military-and-populism-a-global-tour-with-a-special-emphasis-on-the-case-of-pakistan/">European Center for Populism Studies</a></span></p><p><span style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #444444; font-family: Lato, sans-serif; font-size: 17px;"><br /></span></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-14126872281372729902022-12-21T23:04:00.006-05:002022-12-21T23:39:35.426-05:00Civilizationist Populism in South Asia: Turning India Saffron<p style="text-align: justify;">Bajrang Dal Rally</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjf4ofvXYfyuK4IAxA2kt4FNF7xnYCaiyoZuBzuTfoEEm1WKdHrZLMbN_QQ3g67HQKMsnQnVltGu4TmgF4b3fcsAS8iMQrLYqXPiPufh2Cp5quV_GXipNKdnjZe-kfbwwsY52Pp4D8KOoNjIxlY6FzSPYKWQCU_G3Ok7qK_LikfiwknYf5O0-C1y-vsoQ/s267/Bajrang%20Dal.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="189" data-original-width="267" height="363" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjf4ofvXYfyuK4IAxA2kt4FNF7xnYCaiyoZuBzuTfoEEm1WKdHrZLMbN_QQ3g67HQKMsnQnVltGu4TmgF4b3fcsAS8iMQrLYqXPiPufh2Cp5quV_GXipNKdnjZe-kfbwwsY52Pp4D8KOoNjIxlY6FzSPYKWQCU_G3Ok7qK_LikfiwknYf5O0-C1y-vsoQ/w570-h363/Bajrang%20Dal.jpeg" width="570" /></a></div><br /><p style="text-align: justify;">Source: The Hindu</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> <span face="Lato, sans-serif" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #444444; font-size: 17px;">The 21<span style="box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 12.75px; line-height: 0; position: relative; top: -0.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">st</span> century has witnessed a significant shift in how the concept of nationalism is understood. A political marriage between identity politics and <a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="2566b5a560bc29dbf918f9b74221fcdd" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226); border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: #5d6ae2; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">populism</a> has resulted in “civilizationism,” a new form of nationalism that entails an emotionally charged division of society into “<a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="d114fa32a0cb8bfcf51e10faa862a098" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/the-people/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226); border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: #5d6ae2; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">the people</a>” versus “the Other.” All too often, the divisive discourses and policies associated with civilizationalist <a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="2566b5a560bc29dbf918f9b74221fcdd" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226); border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: #5d6ae2; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">populism</a> produce intercommunal conflict and violence. </span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span face="Lato, sans-serif" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #444444; font-size: 17px;">This paper draws on a salient case study, India’s Hindutva movement, to analyze how mainstream populist political parties and grassroots organizations can leverage civilizationist <a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="2566b5a560bc29dbf918f9b74221fcdd" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226); border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: #5d6ae2; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">populism</a> in campaigns to mobilize political constituencies. In surveying the various groups within the Hindutva movement and conducting a discourse analysis of their leaders’ statements, the paper shows the central role of sacralized nostalgia, history, and culture in Hindutva populist civilizationism. By analyzing the contours and socio-political implications of civilizationist <a aria-describedby="tt" class="glossaryLink" data-cmtooltip="2566b5a560bc29dbf918f9b74221fcdd" href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/populism/" style="border-bottom: 1px dotted rgb(93, 106, 226); border-image: initial; border-left: none; border-right: none; border-top: none; box-shadow: none; box-sizing: border-box; color: #5d6ae2; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: background-color 150ms linear 0s, color 150ms linear 0s;">populism</a> through this case study, the paper contributes to the theoretical understanding of the concept more generally.</span></p><p><span face="Lato, sans-serif" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #444444; font-size: 17px;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Read the paper at <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/civilizationist-populism-in-south-asia-turning-india-saffron/">European Center for Populism Studies website</a></span></span></p><p><span face="Lato, sans-serif" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #444444; font-size: 17px; font-weight: 600;"><em style="box-sizing: border-box;"><br /></em></span></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-85227853226970694262021-12-01T09:46:00.001-05:002021-12-01T09:46:26.884-05:00As Imran Khan fails, he turns to religious nationalism to save him<p style="text-align: justify;">Imran Khan came to power as a populist right-wing politician. His key support came from the powerful Pakistani military, which arranged favorable judicial verdicts against ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and other leaders of (Sharif's party) Pakistan Muslim League (N), a sycophantic media, a hostile atmosphere for PMLN second-tier leadership forcing them to change loyalties, and rigging on the election day.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The military also helped discredit the religious credentials of the right-of-center PMLN leadership by painting them as pro-Ahmadi or pro-Qadiani. A new extremist organization, the Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), was supported by the military to arrange protests all over the country and to force the country to come to a standstill. The military refused to come to the aid of the civilian government which it was constitutionally bound to. Furthermore, once Sharif's government bowed before the extremists, an army general was photographed paying money to the TLP protesters publicly. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">All this was, however, before the 2018 elections. As time passed by and the economy and governance deteriorated sharply, the confidence of even Imran Khan's supporters in his competence went downhill. Blaming the opposition and using the COVID-19 pandemic to hide misgovernance worked for a period but when corruption and mismanagement soared and the military also reduced its support, instrumentalizing Islam was the only possible way to retain popularity.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">During the last three years, Imran Khan has reversed the trend of decreasing religious nationalism in Pakistan that was almost two decades old. As explained in my book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/State-Nationalism-Islamization-Historical-Analysis/dp/331954005X" target="_blank">State, Nationalism, and Islamization</a>, religious nationalism increased during the 30- year period from the early1970s to the late 1990s. With the start of the new century, there was a change, and the Pakistani state reduced (not end) its support for religious nationalism and extremism. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Following are some of the key actions taken by the Imran Khan government/party to instrumentalize Islam after he came to power in 2018:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Riyasat-e-Madina rhetoric: From his maiden speech after becoming the Prime Minister, Imran has vowed to make Pakistan a newer version of the Madina state. In his maiden speech, he said that his<span style="text-align: left;"> 22-year struggle was aimed at turning Pakistan into a state like the Madina state, led by Hazrat Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him). He said that the West has adopted riyasat-e-Madina's principles of the welfare state, accountability, simplicity, justice, spending on education, etc., while Pakistan had not. Importantly, during the last three years, he has not worked consistently on any of the above objectives. Pakistan is more corrupt today than it was in 2018 while the accountability regime and courts have only targeted his political opposition.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="text-align: left;">2. Even during the height of COVID 19 pandemic, Imran Khan was not ready to anger religious extremists and temporarily stop congregation prayers. He risked outbreak of virus and deaths of hundreds of thousands Pakistanis just to appease extremists. Most religious conservatives were ready for the temporary end of congregation prayers as almost all of 50 Muslim-majority countries had done so but Imran was not reasdy to anger extremists who were a minority.</span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhz-2_OlQig88dPAxR-fCVlUp1KCjmc3TQuvegs8kaH1UTFjzx-9jpab2PvHf8rr5XpCGOgnUX0Jo917DjBtS_ZBpjssA2WabD1HED1oYeMB1xP_NL0cwWvUUF8Y8Vodf1QVYelLIPOCAWM/s768/Covid+lockdown+mosques.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="438" data-original-width="768" height="366" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhz-2_OlQig88dPAxR-fCVlUp1KCjmc3TQuvegs8kaH1UTFjzx-9jpab2PvHf8rr5XpCGOgnUX0Jo917DjBtS_ZBpjssA2WabD1HED1oYeMB1xP_NL0cwWvUUF8Y8Vodf1QVYelLIPOCAWM/w640-h366/Covid+lockdown+mosques.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div><br /><p style="text-align: justify;">Source: Republicworld.com</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Imran's government intends to implement the Single National Curriculum which increases the amount of religious content in the primary and secondary school curriculum, including making Arabic mandatory. This will also pave way for the hiring of thousands of madrassa-educated men by the government, influencing not only the teaching of Islamiat and Arabic but also of other subjects and the overall milieu.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Imran Khan has twice bowed before the TLP extremists and accepted their demands even when the military was supporting him. He accepted such ridiculous demands as declaring the French ambassador persona non grata. The most recent agreement between the TLP and the government has been kept in secret which shows that it also has some ridiculous and illegal demands. He has also said that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which has been implicated in the murder of thousands of innocent Pakistanis, would be pardoned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Imran Khan has repeatedly blamed women clothes for increase in crimes agianst women and then repeatedly claimed that he didn't mean what he said or people didn't understand what he was saying. These statements curry favor with the conservatives who also argue that crimes agianst women are largly due to women's independence, clothes, and activities outside their homes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. <span style="text-align: left;">Rehmatul Lil Alameen Scholarship Program: </span><span style="text-align: left;">Prime Minister Imran Khan also launched the Rehmatul Lil Alameen Scholarship Program 2021 which would help finance undergraduate education of underprivileged and deserving students across the country.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. National Rahmatul-Lil-Alameen Authority was launched by the PM in 2021. This authority aims to promote research on Seeratun Nabi (Peace Be Upon Him) and guide youth on multiple aspects of the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) life. According to PM Khan, it will monitor media for any blasphemous content and school curriculum for promoting the true image of Islam.</p><p style="text-align: left;">7. The Punjab Government, also led by the PTI,<span style="text-align: left;"> decided in 2021 to make Naazrah Quran education compulsory for classes 1-5 for schools across the province, This was in addition to the Compulsory Teaching of the Holy Quran Act, 2018.</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: left;">8. The PTI Punjab Chief Minister</span> Usman Buzdar has also ordered that the recitation of Darood-e-Ibrahimi (verses in praise for Holy Prophet (PBUH)) before the national anthem and after the recitation of the Holy Quran must be ensured at the public school assemblies. </p><p style="text-align: left;">9. Imran Khan has raised issue of Islamophobia at various fora, including the UN General Assembly. He has also written letters to major social media companies as well as leaders of 50 Muslim majority states to highlight the issue and to call for its end. However, crucially, he has been very silent about what is happening to Uighar Muslims in China or Sri Lankan Muslims, showing his hypocrisy and duplicity.</p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-7813303323187181882021-10-07T15:25:00.000-04:002021-10-07T15:25:05.882-04:00Hinduism, Hindutva and Hindu Populism in India: An Analysis of Party Manifestos of Indian Rightwing Parties<p><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.2px;"><b>Abstract:</b></span></p><p><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.2px;">Since the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a lot has been written on Hindu nationalism. Prime Minister Modi’s ascendency has similarly resulted in a plethora of books and articles on Hindu populism. However, most of the literature does not distinguish between the two. Hindu nationalism and Hindu populism overlap, particularly in Modi’s India and Modi’s BJP, but they are not the same. In this article, after a discussion on Hinduism’s affinity to populism, an attempt has been made to distinguish between Hindu nationalism and Hindu populism based on an analysis of Hindutva parties’ election manifestos. Since independence, three Hindutva parties have made a name for themselves at the national level: Hindu Mahasabha, Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), and BJP. Based on their importance and success at the national level, one manifesto of Hindu Mahasabha, two manifestos of BJS and four manifestos of the BJP were analyzed based on criteria chosen after the literature review. The results show that while Hindu nationalism was strong and visible in early Hindutva parties (Hindu Mahasabha and BJS), Hindu populism was weak and sporadic. Interestingly, for the BJP, there is a rise and then drop in Hindu nationalism while Hindu populism has consistently increased.</span> </p><p><br /></p><p><b>Article:</b></p><section id="sec1-religions-12-00803" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.2px; margin: 0.5em 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; text-align: justify;" type="intro"><h2 data-nested="1" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: black; font-size: 13.2px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 30px 0px 10px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0.5em 0px; text-rendering: optimizelegibility;">1. Introduction</h2><div class="html-p" style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-block: 1em; margin-inline: 0px; margin: 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 2em;">Prime Minister Modi’s approach and strategy to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic has been universally acknowledged as a disaster. The second wave exposed the deficiencies of his leadership style and his overall grasp of problems facing his 1.3 billion people. Many experts are blaming it on his populist politics and pointing as evidence to other populist leaders, such as Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro, who also failed to manage the pandemic (<a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B17-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Collinson 2021</a>; <a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B22-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Friedman 2021</a>; <a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B47-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Santoshini et al. 2021</a>). Others have criticized his Hindutva ideology, disregard for science and constitutionally ordained secularism and the othering of minorities that divided the nation instead of uniting it against the pandemic (<a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B26-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Guha 2021</a>; <a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B53-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Viswanath 2021</a>). Hindutva and Hindu populism have been part of Modi’s success story from the start. He is a man from a very humble background who dethroned the famed Nehru-Gandhi dynasty and their party, the Indian Nation Congress, which was the dominant political party in India for more than fifty years. While Modi is not the first Hindu nationalist Indian prime minister, he is certainly the first one who has used both Hindu nationalism and populism. Although there has been a plethora of scholarship on Hindu nationalism, Hindu populism is mostly studied as an auxiliary component of Hindu nationalism or of the broader rightwing<a class="html-fn" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#fn001-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-size: 9.9px; font-weight: 700; line-height: 0; max-height: 1e+06px; position: relative; text-decoration-line: none; top: -0.5em;" title="">1</a> populist movement that has taken the world by storm during the last decade. There is a need to trace Hindu populism’s history in India and to distinguish it from Hindu nationalism.</div></section><section id="sec2-religions-12-00803" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; margin: 0.5em 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; text-align: justify;" type=""><h2 data-nested="1" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: black; font-family: Arial, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.2px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 30px 0px 10px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0.5em 0px; text-rendering: optimizelegibility;">2. Religion and Populism</h2><div class="html-p" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.2px; margin-block: 1em; margin-inline: 0px; margin: 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 2em;">Populism is a concept that is difficult to define and highly contested. Populism can be leftwing or rightwing and it can instrumentalize the majority religion and exacerbate religious conflicts in the society or it can stay away from religion. It can be national or civilizational (<a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B14-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Brubaker 2017</a>). Scholars have defined it based on ideology, rhetoric or policies but no definition can accommodate the protean concept and efforts to conceptualize this intriguing idea are continuing (<a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B59-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Yilmaz and Morieson 2021</a>; <a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B38-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Mackert 2019</a>; <a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B43-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Plagemann and Destradi 2019</a>). For this article, populism refers to a kind of politics that divides the population into two parts, a small, corrupt ruling elite and an oppressed, exploited pure majority. Sometimes, besides this vertical dimension, there is also a horizontal dimension where the righteous majority is threatened by perfidious insiders and outsiders that are in cahoots with the corrupt elite. A temporal dimension is often also part of the populist politics where populist leaders disown and repudiate the present while singing about the glories of an imagined past and an impending future if the populist leader is allowed to lead.</div><div class="html-p" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.2px; margin-block: 1em; margin-inline: 0px; margin: 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 2em;">Before the 1970s, for almost a hundred years, secularization theory was the dominant sociological paradigm. The major assumption of the theory was that religion would gradually decline as human societies progress. Its role in the public sphere would probably completely disappear while its role in the private sphere would be limited. The idea seemed to make sense as the increased knowledge about nature, scientific and technological progress, pluralization of religious field, functional differentiation, enlightenment, theory of evolution, more archaeological data falsifying religious myths, sexual revolution, etc., made a modern person less amenable to accept certainties of divine edicts. The functions that religion used to perform in the ancient and medieval world were performed by secular concepts in the modern world. The secularization of Western Europe, since the 17th century, seemed to be the model that other regions were destined to follow as they moved up the ladder of human progress.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEipy8mETukxrmSpzJgGygoa08Zk11VXGiow3o5qzYqJoCmkNi18jeyikpWtrkzCrKKZfk3AAliOKUcjMGZiJ8hOC3C_I5GfYwS0KqSnIShdyTVRw_sh9vZovCyCiRVAi2U8ZT4PS5X1sKcj/s361/Hinduism+OM.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="336" data-original-width="361" height="298" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEipy8mETukxrmSpzJgGygoa08Zk11VXGiow3o5qzYqJoCmkNi18jeyikpWtrkzCrKKZfk3AAliOKUcjMGZiJ8hOC3C_I5GfYwS0KqSnIShdyTVRw_sh9vZovCyCiRVAi2U8ZT4PS5X1sKcj/s320/Hinduism+OM.jpeg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><div class="html-p" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.2px; margin-block: 1em; margin-inline: 0px; margin: 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 2em;"><br /></div><div class="html-p" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.2px; margin-block: 1em; margin-inline: 0px; margin: 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 2em;">The 1970s, however, reasserted or re-established the role of religion not only in the private sphere but also in the public sphere. The Iranian Revolution, the emergence of the moral majority movement in US politics and rise of religious parties and fundamentalist movements in many developing countries were few of the many indications of the change. The re-emergence of religion that was supposed to be consigned to the dustbin of history as a key explanatory factor in domestic, regional and international politics was surprising for many scholars (<a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B25-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Grzymala-Busse 2012</a>). The 1980s and 1990s came up with further evidence of the impact of religion on politics. The religious fervor and avidity of Pope John Paul II, President Reagan and Islamist mujahideen in the fall of Communism and the Soviet “evil” empire was critical. These developments perhaps forced Samuel Huntington to come up with his controversial theory of “Clash of Civilizations”, where civilizations are primarily defined on the basis of religion (<a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B29-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Huntington 1993</a>). The start of the 21st century totally debunked secularization theory or thesis as 9/11 attacks made religion one of the most significant factors in international politics, although there are still some scholars that believe in a much-diluted form of the secularization theory...</div><div class="html-p" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.2px; margin-block: 1em; margin-inline: 0px; margin: 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 2em;"><br /></div><div class="html-p" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.2px; margin-block: 1em; margin-inline: 0px; margin: 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 2em;"><h2 data-nested="1" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: black; font-size: 13.2px; line-height: 1.5; margin: 30px 0px 10px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0.5em 0px; text-indent: 0px; text-rendering: optimizelegibility;">6. Two Distinctions: Hindu Nationalism (Hindutva) vs. Hindu Populism and Populist Political Leaders vs. Populist Parties</h2><div class="html-p" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 13.2px; margin-block: 1em; margin-inline: 0px; margin: 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 2em;">Hindu nationalism started to become popular in the late 19th century. It came out of the Hindu revivalist movements which tried to “modernize,” unite and Semitize Hinduism. For these Hindu revivalist movements, the British were a source of both envy and threat. Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj are two of the most famous revivalist movements. These movements and developments created a Hindu consciousness which later became the basis of Hindu nationalism. The first ideologue of Hindu nationalism was V. D. Savarkar who wrote the book <span class="html-italic" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-style: italic; max-height: 1e+06px;">Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?</span> in the early 1920s and associated Hindutva with not only religion but also with land, culture and language (Hindu, Hindi, Hindustan). He argued Hindu is the one who considers India as the land of his forefathers (<span class="html-italic" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-style: italic; max-height: 1e+06px;">pitribhumi</span>) as well as his holy land (<span class="html-italic" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-style: italic; max-height: 1e+06px;">punyabhumi</span>). Savarkar was a nationalist but there is debate whether his politics in the Hindu Mahasabha party can be called populist or not. Savarkar was certainly rousing a large majority of people against the corrupt elite, but his prime target changed depending on the time, from British, the Congress, to Muslims. Moreover, as far as strategy and style were concerned, he was not a populist leader, trying to lead an unorganized mass against the enemy using dirty rhetoric and bad manners (<a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B52-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Visana 2020</a>; <a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B50-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Tharoor 2018, pp. 40–50</a>). Similarly, his party Hindu Mahasabha cannot be called a populist party as it was not anti-elite. It was much more pro-British than Congress and relied for support on Hindu aristocracy, gentry and business elite, and had urban, high caste roots, similar to the pre-Gandhian Congress (<a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B4-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Bapu 2013, pp. 26–43</a>). So, Hindu Mahasabha was Hindu nationalist but not Hindu populist. This difference between rightwing nationalism and rightwing populism is important to keep in mind.</div><div class="html-p" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 13.2px; margin-block: 1em; margin-inline: 0px; margin: 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 2em;">Although numerous rightwing populist parties are nationalist and a few nationalist parties have become populist, this does not mean that nationalist and populism are the same or always exist together. Rightwing nationalism has been growing since the 1970s. Israel had thirty years of leftwing governments before it had its first rightwing nationalist government in the late 1970s. However, since then, Israel has steadily moved rightward and this rightwing shift has helped make Benjamin Netanyahu the longest serving prime minister of Israel, without being populist. There were less remarkable rightwing shifts in both the US and British politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Populism in the US and Europe is a comparatively new phenomenon and with the rise of rightwing populism, there is also a less consequential rise in leftwing populism. Former President Trump was a rightwing nationalist populist but he was not the first rightwing nationalist president, and the Republican Party had long espoused rightwing nationalism. Almost every rightwing populist is a nationalist, but every rightwing nationalist is not a populist.</div><div class="html-p" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 13.2px; margin-block: 1em; margin-inline: 0px; margin: 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 2em;">Keeping in view the above, while discussing the rise of Narendra Modi there is a tendency to extend Modi populism to the BJP early days in the 1980s or even to Hindu nationalists before India independence. As discussed above, Hindu nationalism has existed since the start of the 20th century. Hindu sabhas were formed and later many joined to form the first Hindutva or Hindu nationalist party. Now, one can argue that Hindu Mahasabha was also populist but just because Modi was populist, all Hindu nationalist parties cannot be painted populist. If one has to demonstrate the link between Hinduism and populism since the early 20th century, then one has to define populism, select a measuring scale and show the existence of populism. Modi populism is even insufficient to declare the BJP populist before Modi’s rise. In fact, some scholars have argued that the BJP before Modi was not populist. The anti-elitism was missing before 2013. <a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B43-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">Plagemann and Destradi</a> (<a class="html-bibr" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803/htm#B43-religions-12-00803" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #3156a2; font-weight: 700; line-height: inherit; max-height: 1e+06px; text-decoration-line: none;" title="">2019</a>) argue that Hindutva, although itself fuzzy, is the core and “thick” part of the BJP ideology and has defined the BJP during its whole life. In contrast, (Modi’s) populism is the “thin” ideology and is a recent addition to BJP’s repertoire. It may or may not survive Modi. This raises many questions. Was the BJP populist in 1984 or 1994 or even in 2004 under Vajpayee and Advani? There are no rigorous studies to decide one way or the other...</div></div><div class="html-p" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.2px; margin-block: 1em; margin-inline: 0px; margin: 0px; max-height: 1e+06px; padding: 0px; text-indent: 2em;">The rest of the article can be read <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/10/803" style="font-size: 13.2px; text-indent: 26.4px;" target="_blank">here</a>.</div></section>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-58405511901162658702021-02-05T02:24:00.000-05:002021-02-05T02:24:16.316-05:00US Christian Nationalism, Devout Non-White Christians & Patriotism<p style="text-align: left;">American Christian nationalism, one would assume, would embrace all Christians but it has not for the last five hundred years. American Christian nationalism has always been White Christian nationalism. How can not be when for hundreds of years non-whites, particularly Blacks, were not even considered fully human? Citizenship and Christianity of Blacks were always in doubt. </p><p style="text-align: left;">With Blacks suffering the wrath of the American state until the late 1970s, a hundred years after the Civil War and 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, it is unsurprising that their relationship with the American state is different from White American's. The benevolence of the American state and reverence for American exceptionalism and militarism were contested ideas in the Black community. And Blacks found it difficult to accept that America has always been a "shining city on the hill" and the American military has always been a force of righteousness and freedom. </p><p style="text-align: left;">See below how Senator Warnock of Georgia, who is the senior pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta since 2005, was criticized for his Christian beliefs and the social gospel, that do not conform to Christian nationalism and American exceptionalism. The Ebenezer Baptist Church has a long history of progressivism and the social gospel movement. Here Martin Luther King, Jr. and his father preached for more than 40 years. These are excerpts from <span style="text-align: left;"><a href="https://religionandpolitics.org/2021/01/14/what-the-attacks-on-raphael-warnocks-faith-reveal-about-christian-nationalism/?utm_source=R%26P+Master+List&utm_campaign=bbe60ceb3d-Weekly_RSS_Campaign_2017_12_15_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_05ad9d7d17-bbe60ceb3d-53874749" target="_blank">What the Attacks on Raphael Warnock’s Faith Reveal about Christian Nationalism</a> by </span><span style="text-align: left;">Quardricos Driskell in <i>Religion and Politics</i>:</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: left;"><br /></span></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">Ugly symbolism and dangerous rhetoric were on display during the Georgia Senate races as well. The campaign of Republican Senator David Perdue, Ossoff’s opponent, ran an attack ad that enlarged the Jewish candidate’s nose in what Ossoff said was the “oldest, most obvious, least original anti-Semitic trope in history.” Warnock’s opponent, Republican Senator Kelly Loeffler, repeatedly attacked the pastor as radical because of his faith and social justice sermons. The National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) released an attack ad against Warnock featuring excerpts of black theologians and famed preachers: the late Rev. Dr. James Cone, the Rev. Dr. Jeremiah Wright, and the Rev. Calvin O. Butts, ending with its editorial proclamation: “You can tell a lot about a man by the company he keeps.” What was and is lacking in Republicans’ understanding of Warnock’s preaching is any sense of its historical imperatives and, particularly, any depth of understanding of the Black church and its preaching tradition, the social gospel movement, and Black liberation theology.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For too long, the Republican Party has claimed to be the party of the faithful, namely through its identification with the Religious Right. For decades, they have claimed the mantle of “Moral Majority.” Paul Weyrich, the late political activist and co-founder of the conservative Heritage Foundation, wrote in the 1970s, “The new political philosophy must be defined by us [conservatives] in moral terms, packaged in non-religious language, and propagated throughout the country by our new coalition. When political power is achieved, the moral majority will have the opportunity to re-create this great nation.” Today, these Christians—mainly white evangelicals with a swath of Catholics and other Protestants—make up the backbone of support for Trump.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The GOP does not have a monopoly on religious voters or Christian values, though. They have tied their politics to a corrupted brand of white Christianity—as seen at the Capitol riot and the rally before it. Among the symbols there, perhaps none were so numerous as those of Christianity, including crosses, images of Jesus, and signs with biblical verses. The meld of the GOP and Trump and Christian nationalism seemed complete. When the mob violently stormed into the Senate chamber, one insurrectionist could be seen carrying the “Christian flag.” Outside, some protesters unfurled a massive banner. It read: “Jesus 2020.”...<span style="text-align: left;"> </span></p></blockquote><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">These Trump supporters seem to say that it is not right to malign their Christianity or beliefs in this way, just as it was not right to ask any questions of Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s conservative Catholic faith during her confirmation hearings. Yet, somehow it was fair game to attack Warnock for his faith, beliefs, and sermons without any theological context or understanding. How fascinating it is to see whose beliefs and interpretations are publicly dissected and criticized.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">During Warnock’s campaign, a video of him preaching that “nobody can serve God and the military” turned into a rallying cry for some Republicans, who accused him of being anti-military. Loeffler, his opponent, said that Warnock “insulted our active service military members. He insulted our veterans. He insulted their families.” Meanwhile, other Republicans, including Senator Tom Cotton, demanded that Warnock drop out of the race. And yet, Scripture says “no man can serve two masters”—the biblical verse that Warnock was invoking to mean that a devotion to God must come first. This lack of understanding about the Black preaching tradition is willful and not a product of simple unawareness. It is necessary to protect a white evangelical worldview.</p></blockquote><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj8wYGUaDjsqFffZ7Sgrc9_YaNZqr3FLyD3_-hDrIrcYe6TF_WCUD8ySbALi_sAOUF8Q0tAUpGMkYjxSZS2jNU_4NSKs8_mKCSi96hMctXLE6li2cI7AgrIyujvsnbJ9x3lENzEEAs50c5r/s780/Warnock.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="508" data-original-width="780" height="416" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj8wYGUaDjsqFffZ7Sgrc9_YaNZqr3FLyD3_-hDrIrcYe6TF_WCUD8ySbALi_sAOUF8Q0tAUpGMkYjxSZS2jNU_4NSKs8_mKCSi96hMctXLE6li2cI7AgrIyujvsnbJ9x3lENzEEAs50c5r/w640-h416/Warnock.jpg" width="640" /></a></div><br /><p>Source: <a href="https://religionandpolitics.org/2021/01/14/what-the-attacks-on-raphael-warnocks-faith-reveal-about-christian-nationalism/?utm_source=R%26P+Master+List&utm_campaign=bbe60ceb3d-Weekly_RSS_Campaign_2017_12_15_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_05ad9d7d17-bbe60ceb3d-53874749" target="_blank">What the Attacks on Raphael Warnock’s Faith Reveal about Christian Nationalism</a> </p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">The Black tradition of the social gospel equipped civil rights leaders with much of their movement’s intellectual underpinning. Essentially, to attack Warnock as “radical” is to attack, square-on, the legacy of King. Like Warnock, he believed that racism, sexism, militarism, poverty, and classism were deeply ingrained iniquities that long have threatened America’s democratic ideals. Whenever religious figures speak in the prophetic tradition that critiques American imperialism and exceptionalism, they are vilified as anti-American. These tropes are compounded and used more frequently against those situated in the Black church and African American preaching tradition. In 1967, King’s “Beyond Vietnam” address at Riverside Church crucially condemned America for its lack of empathy and financial resources for the poor and racially oppressed while calling for the end of America’s proliferation of the military-industrial complex. As pastor of Atlanta’s Ebenezer Baptist—where King, his father, and maternal grandfather were pastors—Warnock’s preaching proclaims the belief that Christianity is spiritual and political and grounded in justice for the oppressed. The attacks against Warnock are not only jabs at the Black prophetic preaching tradition but also digs at Black American Christian communities on the whole, who through the practiced preaching of biblical texts, like that of the Exodus story, insistently call America to be its better self.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Religious beliefs emerge from a much broader and more complex political-ideological context than our holy books, alone, can provide. For instance, the idea of climate crisis denial is often inextricably linked to belief in unfettered capitalism, justified by a kind of “prosperity theology,” the belief that material gain is a reward from God for personal virtue. No one should be surprised at the intersection of faith and public policy. Many presidents and politicians have used the symbols of Christianity to appeal to the American people. The famed sociologist Robert Bellah coined the term “civil religion,” the belief that semi-religious national symbols—often derived from the Abrahamic faiths—are used to unite the country during difficult times.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">What happens to our civil religion now? Where there is hope, it will come from boundary-breaking leaders like Ossoff and Warnock, who herald a new day in Congress. These newly elected senators support issues like voting rights, inclusiveness, and access to healthcare, as well as taking care of people regardless of their background—a nod to the biblical value of opening hands to those in need.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Republican Party’s current fusion with Christian nationalism is dangerous. The idea that America was founded as a Christian, mostly white nation—and that an authentic American must be Christian—erodes the very sanctity of any unifying “civil religion.” This reality was egregiously illustrated on January 6 by Trump’s incitement of violence from his Christian supporters on the National Mall. It was ignobly seen in his use of the Bible and a church as pretexts to forcibly remove peaceful protesters from Lafayette Square last June. Warnock’s sermons, like King’s sermonic critiques of America, are not distortions of the Bible like these events. Rather, they are prophetic commentaries on the power structure that supports the idea of Christian nationalism. And they are needed more than ever, from the pulpits of Georgia to the congressional chambers of Washington.</p></blockquote><p><br /></p><p>Jonathan Walton, dean of the Wake Forest University School of Divinity, explains in his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/12/30/warnock-georgia-senate-runoff-black-church/" target="_blank">Washington Post article </a>that criticism of Warnock, and earlier of Martin Luther King, Jr. and President Obama's minister Reverend Jeremiah Wright of Chicago, is based on "ignorance about the progressive Black church tradition." Their sermons may appear unpatriotic but in fact, they are deeply patriotic.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">Preachers such as Warnock may strike the comfortable as offensive, but their critiques aren’t unpatriotic screeds. Rather, they proclaim a deep love for, and thus a deep disappointment in, a country that too often fails to affirm the self-evident truth in our nation’s creed, that all people are created equal and endowed by God “with certain unalienable Rights.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The mischaracterization isn’t new. Wright, President Barack Obama’s former pastor, was pilloried during the 2008 presidential election for his 2003 sermon, “Confusing God and government” despite decades as a respected clergyman and having served honorably in the Marine Corps. Wright was accused of preaching “anti-white and anti-American rhetoric” for saying “God damn America” in a sermon that addressed a list of this nation’s sins, including Native American genocide, slavery and unjust wars. Go back a bit further in history and Martin Luther King Jr. — himself once a pastor of Atlanta’s Ebenezer Baptist Church — was accused of being “the most notorious liar in the country” by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The attacks misconstrue African American progressive and prophetic religious protest. Informed by the evangelical strand of the social gospel, this tradition places an overwhelming moral emphasis on society’s most vulnerable and oppressed. It demands that Christians bear witness and ameliorate the suffering of others, as set forth in the parable in Matthew 25 where Jesus likens our treatment of God with how we treat those without food and shelter, or those who are sick and imprisoned: “Truly I tell you,” Jesus says of those who enter God’s kingdom, “whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me.” Indeed, in his December debate with Loeffler, Warnock said: “I’m a Matthew 25 Christian.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Bearing witness in this way involves uncomfortable truth-telling directed toward those in power. In 2008 at the National Press Club, Wright explained that his aim was to hold his government accountable, not to tear it down: “God doesn’t bless everything. God condemns some things … God damns some practices and there’s no excuse for the things that the government, not the American people, have done. That doesn't make me not like America or unpatriotic.” Similarly, in his 1967 address, “Beyond Vietnam,” King called the U.S. government “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today.” He didn’t mean America could do no right. But it is necessary to acknowledge where America is wrong toward ultimately transforming “the jangling discords of our world into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such a spiritual orientation demands moral courage and candor from clergy. Some call it speaking truth to power and others call it parrhesia — candid, fearless speech that challenges the status quo. Historians and literary scholars alike refer to this rhetorical tradition in America as a jeremiad, based on the laments of the biblical Hebrew prophet Jeremiah against unjust practices in ancient Israel, for it’s the Hebrew prophets who provide the moral vocabulary and vivid imagery for preachers such as Warnock who are a part of this tradition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Bible is replete with the scathing indictments of those who wept over oppression. Recall Jeremiah: “Woe to him who builds his palace by unrighteousness, his upper rooms by injustice, making his own people work for nothing, not paying them for their labor” (Jeremiah 22:13); and Amos, decrying those who “trample on the heads of the poor as on the dust of the ground and deny justice to the oppressed” (Amos 2:7). The biblical prophets enunciated their divine call to be voices of the voiceless and defenders of the defenseless. They did not try to soothe or assuage listeners with euphemistic phrases. Their rhetoric was often blunt, unyielding and contentious.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is the beauty and burden of this tradition. Those informed by it — including abolitionists David Walker and Sojourner Truth, and contemporary voices such as the Rev. Otis Moss III of Chicago and the Rev. Leslie D. Callahan of Philadelphia — hold that clergy cannot convey faithfully the spirit of God’s concern for the most vulnerable without being honest about the ways our society, including public policy, is complicit in their suffering. To answer God’s call is not merely to comfort the afflicted. It is also to afflict the comfortable. To not do so would be derelict of Christian duty for those who embrace this progressive and prophetic spiritual stance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">That some may find this form of Christian witness troubling makes sense, considering that many preachers in America specialize in positive affirmations and promises of personal and national prosperity. It can be easier to find comfort in the conciliatory tones and feel-good phrases that can be found in their churches on Sunday mornings. Some see those who appease and affirm the cultural markers of power as more hopeful than clergy who channel the seeming doom and gloom of the jeremiad. But in the prophetic tradition, hope comes from our ability to confront the worst of ourselves as a nation, progressing toward our better selves, not from sentimentality or naive optimism.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When Warnock inveighs against politicians who “pick the pockets of the poor” to “line the pockets of the ultrarich,” that doesn’t make him anti-capitalist. He’s making the charge that certain policies and policymakers willfully ignore the concerns of the most defenseless among us and insisting that our nation can do better. Saying “nobody can serve God and the military” at the same time isn’t a shot at the faith of our troops. It’s a reminder to the faithful of the teaching in Zechariah 4:6 that true victory, according to God, comes “Not by might nor by power, but by my Spirit” — that ultimate hope is grounded in love and justice, not weapons of warfare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">These appeals to love and justice have animated progressive Christians to fight to protect rights and expand opportunities for the socially marginalized. This has been true during every epoch of this nation: Abolishing slavery, women securing the vote, defending labor rights and dismantling segregation are just a few examples. In this tradition, clergy must call out the folly of power, industrial efficiency or wealth predicated on the unjust treatment of any segment of society. Whether the ill is human trafficking or the warehousing of the vulnerable by lucrative privatized prisons, “dishonest money dwindles away” (Proverbs 13:11).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It shouldn’t surprise that Black churches, born as institutional responses to Black oppression, have produced some of this nation’s most powerful voices, who have helped emancipate American democracy. At an 1852 Independence Day commemoration, Frederick Douglass addressed the gathering and asked: “What to the slave is the Fourth of July?” He answered his own question by saying that to the enslaved, “your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty, an unholy license; your national greatness, swelling vanity.” That Douglass gave speeches throughout the United States and Europe castigating what he called slaveholding Christianity made him a target for White indignation and claims of anti-Americanism. Yet today he is universally lauded as a patriot.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It may be convenient for Warnock’s adversaries to attack him for lacking an uncritical embrace of American exceptionalism and unqualified veneration of her customs. It may be useful to try to tarnish a pretty clear political asset in the South: being a minister. But when Warnock’s opponents claim he’s un-American, they’re not just presenting an uninformed view of his preaching, they’re negating the true gift of Warnock’s tradition: loving America enough to be honest about its flaws while calling for America to aspire to its highest, most noble ideals.</p></blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-76231097460487751202021-01-23T13:46:00.003-05:002021-01-23T13:46:35.886-05:00Malta, LGBT rights, abortion, & religious nationalism<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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Malta, a small island nation in the Mediterranean Sea, has a national identity that is strongly influenced by Catholicism. The religious culture of Malta can be traced back to the Order of the Knights of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem (also called the Knights Hospitaller and the Knights of Malta) which participated in the Crusades and were given the control over Malta in 1530 because of their contribution and devotion to the religious cause. Knights Hospitaller had an interesting history. A religious order created in the 7th century to take care of the Christian pilgrims and sick in the Holy Land (Jerusalem) it became a military order by the turn of the millennium. It also expanded and had properties donated to them or built by them all over Europe. After the fall of Jerusalem (1187) to Saladin and later of Kingdom of Jerusalem (1291), the Knights moved to Cyprus and then captured Rhodes to become Knights of Rhodes in the 14th century. Here, the Knights primary opponents were Barbary pirates and Muslim Turks. The Ottomans were eventually able to able to defeat Knights after almost fifty years of a military campaign in 1522. The Knights were allowed to withdraw from Rhodes and after seven years were given the control of Malta by the Spanish monarch, courtesy a former knight and Pope Clement VII in 1530 for a symbolic annual tribute of a single Maltese falcon. From 1530 to 1798, the Knights of Malta, as they were called, ruled and shaped life in Malta. Napoleon defeated them in 1798, on the way to the Egyptian invasion. Later, Malta came under the British in 1814 and became independent in 1964.<br />
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Philip Barker in his book, <i><a href="https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=gWyTAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA149&lpg=PA149&dq=malta+%22religious+nationalism%22&source=bl&ots=Q0F4F7bqkS&sig=ACfU3U3_wKixx86Fc-dyl-SfEUzqqS3VTw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi5z92uvavhAhWMkxQKHQMKA3EQ6AEwA3oECBMQAQ#v=onepage&q=malta%20%22religious%20nationalism%22&f=false" target="_blank">Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God be for Us</a></i>, contends that Malta's Catholic identity, acquired under the Knights, was crystallized under the rule of the religious "other." First, it was Muslim Turks, then anticlerical French, and finally, for the next one and a half century, it was Protestant Britain. Due to the domination of religious other, "Catholicism is central to self-perception" of the Maltese. Unsurprisingly, Maltese politics is influenced by the majority religion and Article 2 of the Constitution makes Catholicism the state religion of Malta, gives the Church the duty and the right to teach people morality, and makes religious teaching mandatory in all public schools.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">One can argue that, like in Ireland and Poland, Catholicism is an integral part of Malta's nationalism. Religious nationalism until recently accepted and proclaimed. The preeminance of the Catholic Church could be seen in state ceremonies. For instance, in Maltese courts, a person under aoth also has to kiss a cross presented to him/her (minorities are allowed to kiss their own holy books or the Maltese constitution). All incoming Prime Minister tradiotnally kiss a cross after taking oath. In January 2020, after taking the oath, the new PM Robert Abela also kissed the cross. And it was quite a scandel when Alfred Sant, a Labour PM, refused to kiss the cross in 1996. <br />
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An interesting article in The Economist (<a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/06/05/malta-leads-the-way-for-gay-and-transgender-rights-in-europe?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/maltaleadsthewayforgayandtransgenderrightsineuropedailychart" target="_blank">Malta leads the way for gay and transgender rights in Europe</a>) rightly argues that the tiny island "is deeply Catholic and hardly an oasis of liberalism." Usually, it is Northern and Western European countries that come up with policies that are then followed by Eastern and Southern European countries. Sometimes, the latter adopt these policies on their own accord but, at other times, they have to be pushed. Many Eastern European countries, for instance, adopted liberal policies when these policies were made a requisite condition for entry into the European Union. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Malta is conservative country but changes are happening and the hold of religious elements, particularly the Catholic Church, is decreasing. In 2011, Malta legalized divorce after a long hard fight. It required a national referendum to decide the issue. In 2013, the Labour Party, a center-left party defeated the center-right Nationalist Party. The Labour Party took power after fifteen years. Since then, Labour Party has come up with several liberal policies. First, in 2016, Malta became the only country in Europe to ban conversion therapy for gays. Second, in July 2017, Malta made the language in the official documents gender-neutral. Gendered terms, such as father, husband, wife, and mother, were removed from the country’s Marriage Act and all other laws. Next, in August 2017, Malta legalized same-sex marriage. Some would, however, argue Malta has been liberal since the early 2000s. Gays were allowed to openly serve in the military in 2002 and d<span style="text-align: left;">iscrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation have been criminalized since 2004.</span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEix3d3Jd9JgeBfP1jfRqHaVvC1QQxWoTnfxRH2hM2yfmEOzwyRACFXMPiQlT_vCYYYpJ1rQKfzRoY7UKBH6Z8gkCJjh_LlP-6uVhPjJ9_MH1wq7wJJ9bVP-G46E3kzQO9IkJ-foO_2uY6FS/s1600/LGBT+in+Europe.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="501" data-original-width="640" height="500" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEix3d3Jd9JgeBfP1jfRqHaVvC1QQxWoTnfxRH2hM2yfmEOzwyRACFXMPiQlT_vCYYYpJ1rQKfzRoY7UKBH6Z8gkCJjh_LlP-6uVhPjJ9_MH1wq7wJJ9bVP-G46E3kzQO9IkJ-foO_2uY6FS/s640/LGBT+in+Europe.png" width="640" /></a></div>
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Source: <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/06/05/malta-leads-the-way-for-gay-and-transgender-rights-in-europe?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/maltaleadsthewayforgayandtransgenderrightsineuropedailychart" target="_blank">Malta leads the way for gay and transgender rights in Europe</a></div>
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Today, Malta is recognized as one of the most gay-friendly countries in the world. This may be taken as an indication of decrease of religious nationalism and many would hope that Malta would soon become a secular country. However, although the hold of the Catholic Church has wanned, it is still very influential. Exihbit 1: Malta is the only country in the EU that still bans abortion entirely. Even in case of incest, rape or danger to mother's life, abortion is not allowed. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">And the new PM Abela is not oging to change things. He sees no reason why the constitution should be amended and Roman Catholicism removed as Malta's official religion. He said:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div><br /></div><div></div><blockquote><div>Malta is a secular state, but the constitution also affords a strong, fundamental freedom that everyone is entitled to his religion of choice...While I believe in a secular society, where there is a distinction between the State and religion, and the autonomies are respected, we share common values and I wanted to send a message.</div><div></div></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>Abela is also for strict policy against abortion. He has made clear that he would not support any changes in the law regarding abortion (<a href="watch_catholic_reference_in_constitution_does_not_need_to_change_but_all_religions_welcome_abela_says" target="_blank">Malta Today</a>).</div></div>
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Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-87795988113663584982021-01-18T22:13:00.001-05:002021-01-18T22:13:41.860-05:00Pakistan, Internet Freedoms and Digital Blasphemy<p style="text-align: justify;">Pakistani Constitution guarantees freedom of religion (Article 20), freedom of speech (Article 19), freedom of assembly (Article 16), freedom of movement (Article 15), and the right of free trial (Article 10A) but throughout most of its history, these freedoms and rights have been unavailable to most of its citizens. No one expects much under a martial law government or when a general is "legally-elected" president. However, when there is a democratic government, like today, when the military is not formally controlling the government, one expects the constitution would be given importance. Unfortunately, this is not true. Minorities, particularly Ahmadis, face persecution and prosecution. To make things more horrible, the Government of Pakistan, is now attempting to silence Ahmadis overseas. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Aysha Khan in her article, titled <a href="https://religionnews.com/2021/01/13/pakistan-attempts-to-prosecute-ahmadi-us-citizens-for-digital-blasphemy/" target="_blank">Pakistan attempts to prosecute Ahmadi US citizens for digital blasphemy</a>, informs us about the legal notices issued to US citizens:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">Pakistani authorities have asked leaders of the American Ahmadiyya Muslim community to take down its official website, claiming that the U.S.-based site violates Pakistan’s strict blasphemy laws and new cybercrime regulations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority said in a legal notice issued on Dec. 24 to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community USA’s spokesmen, Amjad Mahmood Khan and Harris Zafar, that failure to remove the website TrueIslam.com would result in fines of up to $3.14 million or criminal sanctions, including possible 10-year-prison sentences.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“This is a new frontier in persecution of Ahmadi Muslims in the digital space,” said Khan, a lawyer in Los Angeles who has testified before Congress about blasphemy and religious freedom. “Pakistan wants to impose its abominable blasphemy laws on the whole world by targeting U.S. citizens and U.S. websites.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Brad Adams, who heads Human Rights Watch’s Asia Division, said “censoring Ahmadis and using blasphemy laws to airbrush them from Pakistani society” is part of the “widespread and rampant discrimination and social exclusion” Ahmadis face in Pakistan.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In Pakistan, home to about 4 million Ahmadis, the constitution and penal code declare members of the Ahmadiyya sect non-Muslims and impose harsh penalties — including death — for those who call themselves Muslims or publicly engage in religious activities. Ahmadis accepts the sect’s 19th-century founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, as the messiah and as a subordinate prophet to the Prophet Muhammad, a belief many Muslims consider blasphemous.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“This is a malicious attempt to chill free speech and expression by a Muslim American website,” attorney Brett Williamson of O’Melveny & Myers, which is representing TrueIslam.com pro bono, wrote in a letter to PTA on Monday (Jan. 11).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He described the takedown notice as “legally infirm, but also patently absurd in its reach.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The website is registered and hosted in the U.S. and is aimed at an American audience. Zafar and Khan are both U.S. citizens and the threat of extradition is virtually nil, but both have relatives in Pakistan and say penalties would make it impossible to travel there.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Law professor Arturo Carrillo, who directs George Washington University Law School’s Global Internet Freedom Project, said this case shows that the Pakistan government is now using its controversial cybercrime laws in an effort “to repress online expression and content emanating from outside the country’s borders because the government has deemed it to be undesirable and unlawful.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">PTA officials did not respond to requests for comment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In 2016, Pakistan enacted digital regulations that allowed authorities to block online content in the “interest of the glory of Islam.” Last year, the government passed blanket censorship laws that would allow authorities to order tech companies to remove digital pornography, blasphemy and anti-state content, drawing ire from Google, Facebook, Twitter and other platforms.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">But human rights experts say the takedown notices also come amid increased targeting of Ahmadis’ online religious expression. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">One day after issuing the takedown notice to TrueIslam.com, PTA also sent notices to Google and Wikipedia, threatening penalties and prosecution if the platforms failed to remove “sacrilegious content” associated with the Ahmadi sect’s beliefs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">PTA said it was responding to complaints regarding an “unauthentic” Ahmadi translation of the Quran on the Google Play Store; “misleading” search results that returned the Ahmadi leader Mirza Masroor Ahmad’s name when the term “Khalifa (caliph) of Islam” was searched; and “deceitful” Wikipedia articles that suggested that the Ahmadi caliph is Muslim.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Officials also demanded that all internet service providers serving Pakistan block content from Ahmadi websites, including TrueIslam.com, the English-language magazine Al Hakam and the international satellite TV network MTA. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Five of Pakistan’s top Ahmadi leaders have also had cases filed against them in recent weeks over religious activity on WhatsApp, Khan told Religion News Service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Earlier in December, Khan told a hearing of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom that extremists in Pakistan were intent on using the country’s cyber crime statutes to initiate blasphemy cases against Ahmadis.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">But this latest action, Khan told Religion News Service, is “a very slippery slope in terms of what this could mean for other minorities. We’re the canaries in the coal mine. This would mean any potential website or digital content that is quote-unquote blasphemous can be the subject of criminal prosecution.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">USCIRF Commissioner Johnnie Moore described the takedown notices as “recklessly brazen” and said he expected fierce bipartisan condemnation from both the Trump and Biden administrations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“Surely, the Pakistani government doesn’t intend on threatening American citizens within the United States?” Moore asked. “Surely, Prime Minister Imran Khan doesn’t want this controversy, now?”</p></blockquote><p> </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2bb2Fu25TBoh8_QFnzlfDlYSw_xDdVDaUNgPsrrTxI83zZ5DO2NGj4QsbC1KWTZPXipj9uDjGlphHDk7ubQZs8ojvN8Eecn3KzFzk0fqNdXLpYwyKoiBlhggqNsyCs516DgCeITiy2e0t/s460/internet460.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="276" data-original-width="460" height="384" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2bb2Fu25TBoh8_QFnzlfDlYSw_xDdVDaUNgPsrrTxI83zZ5DO2NGj4QsbC1KWTZPXipj9uDjGlphHDk7ubQZs8ojvN8Eecn3KzFzk0fqNdXLpYwyKoiBlhggqNsyCs516DgCeITiy2e0t/w640-h384/internet460.jpg" width="640" /></a></div><br /><p style="text-align: justify;">Source: <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/datablog/2012/apr/16/internet-censorship-country-list" target="_blank">Battle for the internet</a></p><p style="text-align: justify;">And if you thought that was the end of it. It is not. The Government of Pakistan intends to be more cruel as far as internet freedoms are concerned. The censorship will increase further and things will get worse. Asif Shehzad, in his Reuters story, explains what the government wants to do next (you can read the full story <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/pakistan-socialmedia-censorship/new-internet-rules-to-give-pakistan-blanket-powers-of-censorship-idINKBN27Z2KF" target="_blank">New internet rules to give Pakistan blanket powers of censorship</a>):</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">Pakistan is all set to roll out new internet rules that critics say will give the government wide powers of censorship after rejecting requests from social media companies for consultation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Muslim-majority Pakistan already has media regulations that adhere to conservative social customs. Last month, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) blocked TikTok for failing to filter out “immoral and indecent” content.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The new rules were approved initially by Prime Minister Imran Khan’s cabinet in February.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They give the PTA “removal and blocking” powers of digital content that “harms, intimidates or excites disaffection” towards the government or poses a threat to the “integrity, security and defence of Pakistan”.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A service provider or social media company could face a fine up to 500 million rupees ($3.14 million) for non-compliance, which would in turn trigger a mechanism preventing the uploading and live streaming, particularly related to “terrorism, hate speech, pornography, incitement to violence and detrimental to national security”.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">A platform has to act within 24 hours or, in case of an emergency, six hours to remove content. The rules also empower the telecom authority to block an entire online system.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">PTA spokesman Khurram Mehran told Reuters the rules were meant for a better coordination with foreign-based social media companies, which usually “don’t respond to legal requirements”.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Any platform that has more than half a million users in the country will have to register with the PTA within nine months and establish a permanent office and database servers in Pakistan within 18 months.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The new rules shocked rights activists who complained that there had been no consultation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“The expansion of these powers is just horrendous,” Nighat Dad, a digital rights activist, told Reuters.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“The consultation never occurred,” said Jeff Paine, managing director, Asia Internet Coalition (AIC), a joint forum of social media platforms, urging the government to “work with industry on practical, clear rules”.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The AIC said in a statement: “The draconian data localisation requirements will damage the ability of people to access a free and open internet and shut Pakistan’s digital economy off from the rest of the world.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“It’s chilling to see the PTA’s powers expanded, allowing them to force social media companies to violate established human rights norms on privacy and freedom of expression.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><br /></p><p style="text-align: justify;"> </p></blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;"></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-24186565950731458352021-01-16T00:41:00.000-05:002021-01-16T00:41:26.197-05:00Vaccine for Holocaust survivors living in other countries but not for Arab Israelis & Palestinians living under Israeli occupation?<p style="text-align: justify;">Israel is planning to provide Coronavirus vaccine shots to Holocaust survivors living anywhere in the world. Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Omer Yankelevich on 12th January announced this new policy. <span style="text-align: left;">Erin Ben-Moshe in her article </span><a href="https://www.jns.org/israel-explores-plan-to-provide-free-vaccines-to-holocaust-survivors-worldwide/" style="text-align: left;" target="_blank">Israel explores plan to provide free vaccines to Holocaust survivors worldwide</a><span style="text-align: left;"> reports Yankelevich's statement:</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">“During this global crisis, we have an opportunity to support Holocaust survivors whose resilience continues to guide and inspire humanity today,” said Yankelevich. “It is our collective obligation to safeguard this treasured yet vulnerable population in the spirit of mutual responsibility.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“Now is the time for all of us, Jewish institutions and leaders from across the world, to come together in this operation,” she said. “Together, we can ensure that Holocaust survivors are efficiently vaccinated, wherever they live.”</p></blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: justify;">However, Ben-Moshe also informs that there are no definite plans yet on how to manage vaccination of around 130,000 Holocaust survivors outside Israel (around 200,000 are Israelis):</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote>As of now, there is no definite plan to finance and manage the vaccination project, including the involvement of Jewish philanthropic networks. Solutions for other expected hurdles, such as obtaining permits from foreign governments and the purchase of vaccines by the ministry, are also being examined. The statement also notes that vaccines for this initiative will be acquired separately and in addition to Israel’s current supply.</blockquote><p></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: justify;">Nathan Jeffay in his The Times of Israel article, </span><a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-group-sparks-debate-with-plans-to-vaccinate-worlds-holocaust-survivors/" style="text-align: justify;" target="_blank">Israeli group sparks debate with plans to vaccinate world’s Holocaust survivors</a><span style="text-align: justify;">, has collated other questions raised about this scheme. The first objection is from the agency that is supposed to distribute the vaccine:</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">Shalom Corps was set up a few months ago by Israel’s Diaspora Affairs Ministry and the Jewish Agency. While Diaspora Affairs Minister Omer Yankelevich has waxed lyrical about the plan, the Jewish Agency only learned about it through the media, and has not echoed her enthusiasm.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“It’s quite an undertaking,” a Jewish Agency spokeswoman told The Times of Israel on Wednesday. “We weren’t aware of it and haven’t had a chance to properly look into whether it’s feasible.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Haaretz cited an anonymous source familiar with the Jewish Agency’s reaction saying that officials in the organization were “shocked” and “outraged” when they saw a story on the idea, which they called “abhorrent.”</p></blockquote><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg21GWQmETrxSV4nmDy8uVSewPBBF_oRYRpE-qTFJsS7Idlfcnwt-nFlwKN9g7lBlxeilYy3q2m3ZzTWlZFe0DAk7dONpYQlUKfLRmxSfipRzEmGHWslvJ6IZ68lTxOnc9tXumGuR1lLx2d/s1280/1280px-Pfizer-BioNTech_COVID-19_vaccine_2020_E.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="853" data-original-width="1280" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg21GWQmETrxSV4nmDy8uVSewPBBF_oRYRpE-qTFJsS7Idlfcnwt-nFlwKN9g7lBlxeilYy3q2m3ZzTWlZFe0DAk7dONpYQlUKfLRmxSfipRzEmGHWslvJ6IZ68lTxOnc9tXumGuR1lLx2d/w600-h213/1280px-Pfizer-BioNTech_COVID-19_vaccine_2020_E.jpg" width="600" /></a><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></div><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">... the source who spoke to Haaretz regarding discussions in the Jewish Agency said it would be “unfeasible, illegal, immoral, diplomatically disastrous and an absolute impossibility” to interfere with the way individual countries distribute vaccines by creating special provision for Jewish Holocaust survivors.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Strict regulations, which vary from country to country, govern medical procedures, and while experts say some do permit private vaccination for select individuals, the plan could run into legal issues in other jurisdictions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p></blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">While Israel is planning to vaccinate Holocaust survivors that are citizens of other countries and most of them are most likely vaccinated by their governments in the next few months (most of the Holocaust survivors live in the rich Western countries, which have advanced health systems and already secured large amounts of vaccine doses, and are prioritizing vaccination of their older population, which also includes Holocaust survivors), it has shown far less concern about Palestinians under its occupation or even its own Arab Israeli population:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">In the midst of the fanfare surrounding Israel’s vaccine campaign, Palestinian activists and rights groups have criticized Israel for not offering the vaccine to the millions of Palestinians living under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under Article 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is required as an occupier to “ensure the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics” — in this case, the COVID-19 vaccine. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Israel has deflected such criticisms, saying the obligation to vaccinate Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza lies in the hands of the Palestinian Authority (PA). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Meanwhile, Israeli leaders insist that they are vaccinating all Israeli citizens, regardless of race or ethnicity, equally and fairly — including the state’s 2 million Palestinian citizens. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">But that just might not be true, human rights advocates have pointed out. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">While Palestinians citizens of Israel qualify, just as Jewish Israelis do, to receive the vaccine and would not be turned back at a clinic simply because they are Palestinian, rights groups are claiming that there are other sinister mechanisms of discrimination at work when it comes to Israel and its distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Adalah — The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel has slammed Israel’s emergency medical service for failing to provide vital COVID-19 information, including facts relating to the vaccine, available in Arabic. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The website of Magen David Adom (MDA), the emergency service responsible for informing the Israeli citizenry on everything from COVID-19 guidelines and updates, how and where to get tested, and vital information regarding the vaccine, currently only provides information and updates in Hebrew and English.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This, Adalah says, is unacceptable, and marginalizes millions of Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up 20% of the population and primarily speak Arabic. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">“In Israel, Magen David Adom is basically the equivalent of the Red Cross,” Adalah attorney Sawsan Zaher told Mondoweiss. “All of the essential information that they provide is not available at all in Arabic.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Zaher told Mondoweiss that she believes, as someone who has been documenting and fighting against discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel for years, the failure to provide vital information regarding COVID-19 and the vaccine in Arabic is “not a coincidence.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“There is a policy of systematic racial discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel,” Zaher said, and the failure of official bodies like MDA to cater to all citizens is just one small example of that policy. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Zaher pointed to Israel’s 2018 Nation State Law, which among other provisions declared that only Jews have the right to self-determination, as a template for discrimination against Palestinians “on all levels.”</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“Having the Jewish Nation State Basic Law… which stated that Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people, excluded the Palestinian citizenry from the preamble and the definition of who the citizens are,” Zaher said.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“This exclusion is providing constitutional legitimacy to discrimination of Palestinians on all levels,” she said, including, for example, “not providing a very important website in Arabic which is vital.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“Unfortunately this [discrimination] is seen not only on high level policies, but basic policies and decisions like providing information in Arabic or making sure all campaigns on COVID-19 awareness are provided equally in Palestinians and Arab towns,” Zaher said. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The implications of not having accurate COVID-19 information in Arabic are potentially devastating and far-reaching for Palestinian communities in Israel, where reports have indicated widespread misinformation regarding the virus and the vaccine. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">With no official Arabic-language platforms to educate people on the vaccine and combat existing misinformation, advocates fear that it could lead to significant cases of Palestinians in Israel refusing to get vaccinated, therefore putting the community at greater risk. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The implications of such discriminatory practices when it comes to the coronavirus, Zaher says, are “a matter of life and death.” (<a href="https://mondoweiss.net/2021/01/israel-says-vaccine-equally-available-to-all-citizens-but-is-that-really-the-case/" target="_blank">Israel says vaccine equally available to all citizens. But is that really the case?</a>)</p></blockquote>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-10671731757665959592021-01-03T01:06:00.003-05:002021-01-03T01:49:24.294-05:00Five stages of Kurdish nationalism<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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M. Hakan Yavuz divides the rise of Kurdish nationalism into five stages and argues that</div>
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The state's policies are the determinant factors in the evolution and modulation of the Kurdish ethno-nationalism. The major reason for the politicization of Kurdish cultural identity is the shift from multi-ethnic, multi-cultural realities of the Ottoman empire to the nation-state model.</blockquote>
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Yavuz contends that there is nothing natural about the development of Kurdish nationalism as is true of other nationalisms. Kurdish nationalism has an 'ethnie' that Smith seems necessary for any nationalisms and this ethnie has been used by Kurdish ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize Kurds. The Kurds are, however, divided along the tribal, linguistic, region,al and religious lines. These divisions, which have been sustained due to rugged, mountainous geography, have been a major reason for weakness in Kurdish nationalism.</div>
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Yavuz declares the tribal structure as the core depository of Kurdish identity and argues that it has both helped and harmed Kurdish nationalism.</div>
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This tribal structure played a dual role: it prevented the formation of a Kurdish unity by keeping them fragmented, and preserved a heightened Kurdish particularism vis-a-vis the Turks, Persians, and Arabs.</blockquote>
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Kurdish nationalism started to take shape due to the centralization policies of the Ottoman empire (1878-1924); it acquired an ethnic bent/consciousness under Kemalist reforms (1925-61); later influenced by the broader Turkish political struggles, class consciousness, and leftist dominated it (1962-83); the 1980 coup led to a military struggle (1983-99); and finally the capture of Ocalan and end of Kurdish insurgency has moved it to its present/last stage.</div>
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Stage 1: Anti-centralization Revolts and Politicization of the Islamic Identity</b></div>
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Centralization and modernization of the Ottoman empire led to revolts in Kurdish areas. However, one should be cautious in calling them national revolts as they were primarily local. As modernization reforms decreased the hold of tribal ties/loyalties, Sufi networks, like Naksibendi and Kadiri, increased their influence and Kurdish ethnic awareness rose in the forms of Islamic consciousness. While putting revolts against its policies, the Ottoman state also decided to use Kurds (and their Islamic consciousness) and Sultan Abdulhamid II formed the Hamidiye Regiments to counter Russians and Armenians. However, Islam didn't become a crucial part of Kurdish nationalism as it is part of Turkish nationalism.<br />
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Stage 2: National Secularization (1925-61)</b></div>
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The way the Ottoman empire was partitioned and the annulled Treaty of Sevres has left deep scars on the collective memory of Turks. British support for the Kurdish state and the inclusion of Kurdish autonomy in the unfair treaty is not forgotten.</div>
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After the war, Turkey became a predominantly Muslim nation and cosmopolitan Ottomanism gave way to secular nationalism that abhorred diversity. Ottoman legacy, however, resulted in a paradox that is still unresolved:</div>
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Due to the Ottoman legacy, Turkey embodies an irresolvable paradox in the foundation of the Republic in the 1920s. On the one hand, the state, formed as a result of demographic Islamization of the country, used Islam to unify diverse ethnolinguistic groups; on the other hand, it defined its 'progressive' civilizing ideology, known as Kemalism, in opposition to Islam.</blockquote>
<span style="text-align: justify;">However, the Turkish state wanted to promote its own brand of Islam that was not acceptable to both Turks and Kurds. The end of Caliphate in 1924 was one of the main reasons for the first Kurdish rebellion, known as the Sheik Said rebellion, and so it was based on ethnoreligious nationalism. Due to the authoritarian approach of </span><span style="text-align: justify;">the </span><span style="text-align: justify;">Turkish state </span><span style="text-align: justify;">and its promotion of </span><span style="text-align: justify;">Turkish ethnic nationalism, there were two more Kurdish revolts (</span><span style="text-align: justify;">the revolt of Agri in 1930-31 led by Ihsan Nuri Biltis and Zaza/Alevi Kurds revolt in 1937-38 around Dersim).</span></div>
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<b><span style="text-align: justify;">Stage 3: </span>Secularization of the Kurdish Question through Socialism <span style="text-align: justify;">(1961-83)</span></b></div>
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As Kurds became more educated, the tribal and religious leaders slowly lost their power and intellectuals became the new leaders. The Turkish state was always aligned with the West but, during the 1950s, it became a partner by joining NATO and sending its forces to support the US forces in the Korean War. The Kurdish intellectuals, like many other university students in the West, were disillusioned with the West and expressed their Kurdish grievances in socialist idioms. With the Turkish state in the Western camp, socialism seemed to be an apposite ideology for all those oppressed by the Turkish state, including the Kurds. Kurds, particularly Alevi Kurds, took a leading part in Leftist magazines (such as bilingual Turkish-Kurdish Deng and Dicle-Firat), political parties (such as Labor Party), and groups (such as Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (DDKO is its Turkish acronym)). After the 1970 coup, the Labor Party and DDKO were outlawed. The repression continued as well as the ambush and sabotage in the 1970s. In November 1978, Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK) was formed, with Abdullah Ocalan as its head. The 1980 coup declared radical Islam, the Left, and Kurdish nationalism as key threats to the Turkish state. Repression increased and all avenues of cultural expression were blocked. The terrorist activities of the PKK moved even outside Turkey as a Turkish consulate in France was bombed in November 1980. The key achievement of the PKK during this period was taking tribe and Islam out of Kurdish nationalism.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Stage 4: Emergence of PKK (1983-99)</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The return of (partial) democracy did not change the state repression and the PKK militant campaign. The PKK during this time got help from other countries. Syria allowed it to establish training camps and Western European countries gave space for organization and propaganda. The PKK attacked not only the hybrid regime and its supporters but also Turkish nationalism. This increased Kurdish consciousness and politicization of Turkish nationalism. The killings and terrorist activities of PKK continued in the 1980s and 1990s. The target was not only the Turkish state but also Turkish civilians and Kurdish civilians who did not identify with the PKK. There were some unilateral ceasefires by the PKK but they did not last long. Later, Syria stopped its support for the PKK and the Turkish military used the Regional State Emergency Governorate (OHAL) which included almost all the Kurdish majority provinces to take special measures, ignoring normal constitutional protections, to defeat the PKK which even used children and female suicide bombings to fight them. The Turkish state also helped create Islamic Kurdish hit squads which killed PKK supporters in broad daylight, with state support. The scars of this conflict were deep and affected every person in the region.</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>PKK Flag</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2hvHak0OJMKJXLsPHM0S-qTNLv_eVhRpd6H9hGyijBRrd9qOJlze3r41DIGrVXjEJyQ9AUsYjchgNevljK4cyxtId23VySqAfK6xW5eomJvUV2hEuXBVsjdVuRYGouwXK5woKrNE3WTWq/s1920/1920px-Flag_of_Kurdistan_Workers%2527_Party.svg.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1280" data-original-width="1920" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2hvHak0OJMKJXLsPHM0S-qTNLv_eVhRpd6H9hGyijBRrd9qOJlze3r41DIGrVXjEJyQ9AUsYjchgNevljK4cyxtId23VySqAfK6xW5eomJvUV2hEuXBVsjdVuRYGouwXK5woKrNE3WTWq/w455-h213/1920px-Flag_of_Kurdistan_Workers%2527_Party.svg.png" width="455" /></a></div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">Source: Wikipedia</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Stage 5: Kurdish problem as a European problem (2000- )</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In 1998, Turkey increase its pressure on Syria and threatened to retaliate militarily if it did not completely stop helping the PKK. Turkey was emboldened by close support from the US and Israel and the Syrian military's problems because of old equipment and the non-availability of spare parts after the collapse of the USSR. Syria caved in and an agreement was signed with Turkey ending support to the PKK. Ocalan was forced out of Syria and Lebanon and was eventually captured from Kenya, with the US support. The PKK tried to up the ante and increase violence but it failed. Ocalan during his trial praised Ataturk and said that he was ready to serve the Turkish state and termed democratic struggle as the only feasible solution to the Kurdish question. He was awarded a death sentence that was later commuted to a life sentence. In its 7th Extraordinary Congress, the PKK gave up armed struggle and several of its members surrendered to Turkish authorities. After being declared a "candidate state" by the EU in December 1999, the pressure on the Turkish state also increased. It had to implement several decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had given several decisions against its brutal tactics against Kurds and it also had to be more concerned about human rights, rule of law, and minority rights. This led to a series of measures to allow cultural expression of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. The PKK also toned down its secularism and accepted Islam as part of Kurdish nationalism to increase its support.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj5k8JrfIAL7yrP_zuRmpegXEHQQGo9XcrBrVVQD722lo14i0IVWt0BHmf-iNp9z2ostFnF6M0qoYnsKczHGJDD57LkhhXusWmkDL95k5tV8tHhatse3sOaFVZNVixQ1ZuvWJWvFbQ0Iqwh/s976/4A0B2DEC-EDA0-4CCC-9D65-EBBC44832BC6.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="649" data-original-width="976" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj5k8JrfIAL7yrP_zuRmpegXEHQQGo9XcrBrVVQD722lo14i0IVWt0BHmf-iNp9z2ostFnF6M0qoYnsKczHGJDD57LkhhXusWmkDL95k5tV8tHhatse3sOaFVZNVixQ1ZuvWJWvFbQ0Iqwh/w538-h213/4A0B2DEC-EDA0-4CCC-9D65-EBBC44832BC6.jpeg" width="538" /></a></div>Source: <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100" target="_blank">BBC</a><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Yuvaz's article was written in 2001 so it ends with the hope that the situation will improve. With the arrival of the AKP and Erdogan on the scene, initially things improved but soon there was another insurgency in 2004. In 2009, Erdogan initiated a new social contract with the Kurdish minority ("Kurdish Opening") and took several measures to recalibrate the Kurdish-Turkish relations. However, relations again deteriorated and in 2015, the Turkish state and the PKK was fighting each other again. The misery of the Kurdish people is continuing. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div>
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Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-39849164514789386432021-01-02T22:53:00.000-05:002021-01-02T22:53:42.622-05:00Role of non-religious parties in Islamization of Pakistan<p style="text-align: justify;">Nadeem Farooq Piracha (NFP) has written a very detailed and excellent article on non-religious parties' role in Islamization of the government (<a href="https://nayadaur.tv/2020/08/role-of-non-religious-political-parties-in-pakistan-in-fanning-religious-extremism/" target="_blank">Role of non-religious parties in fanning religious extremism</a>). He calls it "fanning religious extremism" but the examples he gave and the speeches he cited cannot all be termed as religious extremism. NFP starts with the 1953 Ahmadi riots in Punjab that were covertly supported or encouraged by the then Chief Minister Mumtaz Daultana, who was not religious but wanted to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Others have argued that this instrumentalization of Islam for political ends in Pakistan much earlier than 1953. Some scholars point towards the passage of Objectives Resolution in March 1949 as the first instance of using Islam for political ends by non-religious parties and non-practicing leaders. Most Indian scholars, of course, term the whole independence movement of Pakistan as an example of using Islam to fan division, hatred, and communalism, all for mundane political objectives. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The "selling of religion for political ends," as Pakistan's first President Iskander Mirza termed it while abrogating Pakistan's first (1956) constitution, continues unabated from 1953 onwards. General Ayub's tenure (1958-69) is considered by many as the apex of Islamic modernism. The article also hints at agreeing with this idea especially before 1965. However, digging a little deep, one can see that Ayub was not really against using Islam for his own political ends. Islamic modernism was employed by Ayub Khan to promote the development agenda of his regime. The fact that he included, not one (as in the 1956 Constitution) but two constitutional bodies to research on Islamic history, law, philosophy, etc., and to advise the government in the 1962 Constitution (articles 199 to 207) bespeaks of his willingness to instrumentalize Islam. We can agree that Ayub was not fanning extremism but he was also instrumentalizing Islam. Bengalis would also point out to his using of Islam to denigrate them and to deny them their political, democratic, and civil rights in Pakistan. Ayub infamously wrote in his book, <i>Friends, Not Masters</i>, "In addition, they [East Pakistanis] have been and still are under Hindu cultural and linguistic influence." Inferior Muslims (Bengalis) were, of course, not allowed to rule superior Muslims (West Pakistanis), even if the inferior ones are in majority. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's story of caving in to religious parties or his unfortunate attempt to steal their thunder is often told as a modern-day replication of a Greek tragedy. Bhutto is proclaimed as a non-religious hero, who started with a secular vision, but was eventually defeated by the nefarious Islamist forces. The reality is, as always, more complex. Bhutto did pay homage to religious sentiment from the start, much before he came to power. The slogan of "Islamic socialism" was used by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Bhutto himself during the 1970 election campaign. Furthermore, as NFP informs in his article, Bhutto was forced to adopt religious clauses in the new 1973 Constitution and later other Islamization measures, including declaring Ahmadis non-Muslim, not only by the religious parties but also by non-religious parties which allied with religious parties in order to dent Bhutto's popularity and defeat him.</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhsyX8KuWz9q0CyTezcTmO8QKMFjI5PYU2MsD5VNqmnWbSTVvyeWx41YniFf0UiEcnRCc0-CZh73fooUnk-fEr_VIL0ecoHMYYEeFEvrRqTx9359tBcIhDrh2pZ7EO9snyu1Kh7pueXquMo/s1080/61293852-1BD7-4EEF-B869-49652CD8D4D3.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1080" data-original-width="657" height="591" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhsyX8KuWz9q0CyTezcTmO8QKMFjI5PYU2MsD5VNqmnWbSTVvyeWx41YniFf0UiEcnRCc0-CZh73fooUnk-fEr_VIL0ecoHMYYEeFEvrRqTx9359tBcIhDrh2pZ7EO9snyu1Kh7pueXquMo/w623-h591/61293852-1BD7-4EEF-B869-49652CD8D4D3.jpeg" width="623" /></a></div><br /><p style="text-align: justify;">Source: <a href="https://nayadaur.tv/2020/08/role-of-non-religious-political-parties-in-pakistan-in-fanning-religious-extremism/" target="_blank">Role of non-religious parties in fanning religious extremism</a></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The 1990s saw Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League led the charge towards Islamization. Islam was used to browbeat and defeat PPP. Not surprisingly, the name of the opposition alliance, cobbled together by the military and led by Sharif, was <i>Islami Jamhori Ittihad</i> (Islamic Democratic Alliance). Benazir was portrayed as Western and not truly Muslim. She was linked with India and Israel.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">After the restoration of democracy in 2008, using Islam for political purposes by the non-religious parties declined a bit. However, this changed when the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, and many other parties decided to support religious parties protest against an amendment in the Finality of Prophethood declaration by the electoral candidates. The PTI continued to smear Sharif, even after the amendment was taken back and the law minister resigned, of not really believing in the finality of prophethood. In addition to the help of the military, this usage of Islam to defame its opponent was crucial in its win in Punjab.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Hence, NFP is right. Non-religious parties have been using Islam to get a political or electoral advantage. The million-dollar question is why they are doing it? And why they have succeeded at least in some cases? Is it because of Pakistan's religious nationalism?</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><br /></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-20470199187041721322021-01-02T07:19:00.002-05:002021-01-02T07:33:40.765-05:00March 2021 Israeli elections and "fifty shades of right"<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Israel is going to have its fourth national Knesset elections in two years in March 2021. Whether this election will result in a stable government is anybody's guess. However, one thing is certain, rightwing will dominate the Knesset and the new government, irrespective of how long they last. This will be a case of "fifty shades of right." This means that any meaningful solution to the Israel-Palestine issue is unlikely, to say the least.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Following are excerpts from my article <a href="https://nayadaur.tv/2021/01/upcoming-israeli-elections-and-its-impact-on-palestinians/">Upcoming Israeli elections and its impact on Palestinians</a> published in <i>Naya Daur</i>: </span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"></span></span></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">National elections will be held in Israel in March 2021 and these elections will again be dominated by the rightwing, making a solution of the Palestinian issue unlikely or impossible. This article unpacks why Israel is having the fourth national election in two years. Later, it analyzes the politics of various rightwing leaders and parties regarding the Palestinian issue to see whether this election can lead to a solution to the Israel-Palestine conundrum...</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Today, Israel’s political space is dominated by rightwing parties, which Eran Globus’s an Israeli analyst termed, “fifty shades of right.” The major rightwing party is the Likud party. It has been in government since 2009, with Netanyahu as PM. This party is expected to win the most seats (28 or 29) in the coming elections. Most of the rightwing parties, except religious parties, have come out of Likud as their leaders have been part of Likud and served in Netanyahu administrations. The most recent and the most important breakaway party is called “New Hope” and is led by Gideon Sa’ar, who until last month was a Likud member for 17 years and was Netanyahu’s Minister of Education (2009- 13) and Minister of Interior (2013-14). New Hope is expected to win the second largest number of seats (17 or 18) in the Knesset.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><o:p><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"></span></o:p></p></blockquote><blockquote><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQ4inzwZkY-xJjHoTvVf54RBBIJi819rEGrmslDsKh6-gn944UsFlI-86JeL5ArnWjyhDcd2G0vHWnw4vJl7JNv4qlObDeuBlgYTZyv-B8gtz1ReWy3ylrpJ86vxWzP6DKDIuNSmQ7XQPw/s1200/1338849684.gif" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="698" data-original-width="1200" height="284" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQ4inzwZkY-xJjHoTvVf54RBBIJi819rEGrmslDsKh6-gn944UsFlI-86JeL5ArnWjyhDcd2G0vHWnw4vJl7JNv4qlObDeuBlgYTZyv-B8gtz1ReWy3ylrpJ86vxWzP6DKDIuNSmQ7XQPw/w608-h284/1338849684.gif" width="608" /></a></div><br /> Source: <a href="https://hk3.news/tech-today/ar-vr-tech/netanyahu-gantz-saar-and-bennett-battle-it-out-to-mark-their-territory-israel-election-2021/">hk3.news</a><p></p></blockquote><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><o:p><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"> </span></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Yamina, the party/coalition that is expected to win the third largest number of seats (between 12 and 14) is again led by someone who was tutored by Netanyahu for a number of years. Nafteli Bennet entered politics in 2006 as Chief of Staff to the then Leader of Opposition Netanyahu and served him until 2008. He then served as leader of an Israeli settler organization before forming his own political party and remained minister with different portfolios in Netanyahu-led governments.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><o:p><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"> </span></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Two key religious parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, expected to win seven or eight seats each, are also loyal allies of Netanyahu and are likely to support him in forming the next coalition government. Shas represents the Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewish people (from Middle Eastern and North African countries) while the United Torah Judaism represents Ashkenazi Jewish people (from European countries). While most of the supporters of these parties are Ultra-orthodox religious Jewish, some modern orthodox and secular Jewish people also support them.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><o:p><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"> </span></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Next, we have Yisrael Beytenu, a party led by Avigdor Lieberman, another Netanyahu protégé. From 1993 to 1996, when Netanyahu was the party leader, Lieberman served as Director-General of the Likud. After the Likud party won the election and Netanyahu was the Prime Minister, Lieberman became the Director-General of the PM's Office for a year (1996-97). In 1999, he formed his own party, Yisrael Beytenu, and has been part of numerous rightwing governments under Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Netanyahu. Yisrael Beytenu is expected to win five or six seats in March. As the table below shows, the rightwing is going to dominate the March 2021 elections winning between 76 and 82 of the total 120 Knesset seats.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><o:p><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"> </span></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><o:p><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"> </span></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Public Opinion Polls for March 2021 elections: Expected number of seats<o:p></o:p></span></b></p><table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoTable15Grid5DarkAccent1" style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none; color: black; text-align: justify;"><tbody><tr style="height: 20.2pt;"><td style="background-color: #4472c4; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: white; border-left-width: 1pt; border-style: solid none solid solid; border-top-color: white; border-top-width: 1pt; height: 20.2pt; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.8pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><b><span style="color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Party<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p></td><td style="background-color: #4472c4; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-style: solid none; border-top-color: white; border-top-width: 1pt; height: 20.2pt; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><b><span style="color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Minimum<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p></td><td style="background-color: #4472c4; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: solid solid solid none; border-top-color: white; border-top-width: 1pt; height: 20.2pt; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><b><span style="color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Maximum<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p></td></tr><tr><td style="background-color: #4472c4; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: white; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.8pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Likud<o:p></o:p></span></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #b4c6e7; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">28<o:p></o:p></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #b4c6e7; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">29<o:p></o:p></span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="background-color: #4472c4; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: white; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.8pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">New Hope<o:p></o:p></span></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #d9e2f3; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">17<o:p></o:p></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #d9e2f3; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">18<o:p></o:p></span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="background-color: #4472c4; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: white; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.8pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Yamina<o:p></o:p></span></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #b4c6e7; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">12<o:p></o:p></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #b4c6e7; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">14<o:p></o:p></span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="background-color: #4472c4; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: white; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.8pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Shas<o:p></o:p></span></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #d9e2f3; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">7<o:p></o:p></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #d9e2f3; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">8<o:p></o:p></span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="background-color: #4472c4; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: white; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.8pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">United Torah Judaism<o:p></o:p></span></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #b4c6e7; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">7<o:p></o:p></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #b4c6e7; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">7<o:p></o:p></span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="background-color: #4472c4; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: white; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.8pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Yisrael Beytenu<o:p></o:p></span></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #d9e2f3; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">5<o:p></o:p></span></p></td><td style="background-color: #d9e2f3; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">6<o:p></o:p></span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="background-color: #4472c4; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: white; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.8pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><b><span style="color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Total Rightwing seats<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p></td><td style="background-color: #b4c6e7; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><b><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">76<o:p></o:p></span></b></p></td><td style="background-color: #b4c6e7; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; border-bottom-color: white; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: white; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 155.85pt;" valign="top" width="208"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: center;"><b><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">82<o:p></o:p></span></b></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><o:p><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"> </span></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><o:p><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"> </span></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">Many people think that Netanyahu is the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East. It might be true in the past but now there are numerous obstacles to peace. The leadership of all the parties discussed above has at various times opposed giving any concessions to the Palestinians. Lieberman resigned numerous times whenever even a small concession was given to the Palestinians. He was dismissed by PM Sharon for his harsh opposition to Gaza disengagement in 2004 and resigned in 2008 for resuming peace talks with Palestinians and again in 2018 for ending the brutal Gaza War. He has also given many statements against Palestinians and Israeli Arabs which were considered racist by many analysts. Bennet, the leader of the Yamina party, as mentioned above, served as leader of an Israeli settler organization and has been opposed to a Palestinian state and to the freezing or uprooting of illegal Jewish settlements. Similarly, Gideon Sa’ar of the New Hope party has always been to the right of Netanyahu. He has been a recalcitrant opponent of the two-state solution (calling it once a two-state illusion) and has shown an inability to show genuine concern for Palestinian rights. Religious parties, Shas and United Judaism, do not have a clear policy on the two-state solution but are against the division of Jerusalem and the freezing of Israeli settlements, making them unlikely partners in a peace deal.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><o:p><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"> </span></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;">The discussion above clearly shows that the new Israeli government will not be supportive of the two-state solution, so the ordeal of the Palestinians is, unfortunately, going to continue. The election campaign will force these parties to move more to the right to outflank each other, resulting in extreme and intransigent positions regarding a Palestinian state. </span></p></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: trebuchet;"><br /></span></span></p><p><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Merriweather; font-size: 18px;"><br /></span></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-11708086117860648202020-12-30T13:33:00.001-05:002020-12-31T00:00:46.802-05:00Shashi Tharoor:The Battle of Belonging: On Nationalism, Patriotism, and What it Means to Be’<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;">Shashi Tharoor has delivered another tour de force. We have already discussed his book <i>Why I am a Hindu </i>on this blog <a href="https://religious-nationalism.blogspot.com/2019/03/hinduism-and-hindutva-debate.html" target="_blank">Hinduism and Hindutva Debate</a>. In 2020, he has come up with another book that broadly focuses on the same issues but from a different perspective. While <i>Hinduism and Hindutva Debate</i> unpacked the differences between Hinduism and Hindutva, the <i>Battle of Belonging</i> examines the differences between patriotism and nationalism and what it means to be patriotic and nationalist in India. He then contrasts the idea of India and the Hindutva idea of India. In the ongoing battle of belonging chapter, he analyzes various recent actions of the BJP government, such as the building of Ram temple, revocation of Article 370 for Jammu & Kashmir state, and Citizenship (Amendment) Act, and attempts to impose of Hindi language. In the final chapter, writing in a prophetic mode, he explains how the battle for the Indian soul can be won against the forces of Hindutva.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjwG_PRC6AGVugVU5jcyiwDu5zpZNFY7CNlXQUXMtA6aM1ULAj9byiwkf3XcnEMNl4OyVFe-BGkilxKNATCewDcQjSXAHEE8QY-SDE1i7CPUgIqtAWQuq4f-6s5KNMzLH-piUyideo_oe2E/s750/ShashiTharoor_BattleOfBelonging_Interview_01112020_1200x800_FB.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="500" data-original-width="750" height="291" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjwG_PRC6AGVugVU5jcyiwDu5zpZNFY7CNlXQUXMtA6aM1ULAj9byiwkf3XcnEMNl4OyVFe-BGkilxKNATCewDcQjSXAHEE8QY-SDE1i7CPUgIqtAWQuq4f-6s5KNMzLH-piUyideo_oe2E/w663-h291/ShashiTharoor_BattleOfBelonging_Interview_01112020_1200x800_FB.jpg" width="663" /></a></div>Source: <a href="https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/secularism-principle-and-practice-india-danger-shashi-tharoor-136646" style="font-family: times;" target="_blank">Secularism as principle and practice in India is in danger': Shashi Tharoor</a><br /><span style="font-family: times;"><br /></span><p></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;">Following is a link to Shashi's 35-minute interview with Karan Thapar in which he talks about his book.</span></p><h1 class="title style-scope ytd-video-primary-info-renderer" style="border: 0px; color: var(--ytd-video-primary-info-renderer-title-color, var(--yt-spec-text-primary)); font-size: var(--ytd-video-primary-info-renderer-title-font-size, var(--yt-navbar-title-font-size, inherit)); font-variant: var(--ytd-video-primary-info-renderer-title-font-variant, inherit); font-weight: 400; line-height: var(--yt-navbar-title-line-height, 2.4rem); margin: 0px; max-height: calc(2 * var(--yt-navbar-title-line-height, 2.4rem)); overflow: hidden; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; text-shadow: var(--ytd-video-primary-info-renderer-title-text-shadow, none); transform: var(--ytd-video-primary-info-renderer-title-transform, none);"><yt-formatted-string class="style-scope ytd-video-primary-info-renderer" force-default-style="" style="word-break: break-word;"><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hLd28UG5rXI"><span style="font-family: times; font-size: small;">Are Some Indians More Indian than Others?'— Shashi Tharoor Echoes the Pigs in Orwell's Animal Farm</span></a></yt-formatted-string></h1><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;">Following are some excerpts from Shashi's interview with the PTI (More excerpts can be found here <a href="https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/secularism-principle-and-practice-india-danger-shashi-tharoor-136646" target="_blank">'Secularism as principle and practice in India is in danger': Shashi Tharoor</a>):</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times; word-spacing: 3px;"></span></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times; word-spacing: 3px;">I don't agree, because the 37% vote won by the BJP last year is not a majority! Yes, Hindutva has successfully exploited fear of the 'Other', just as most reactionary ideologies do. The Hindutva ideologues in power have also had no qualms about appropriating or undermining the ostensibly independent branches of governance, from autonomous bodies like the Election Commission or the RTI (Right To Information) commissioners or the Reserve Bank to even media and the courts, in the service of their version of nationalism. This creates a sort of self-reinforcing echo chamber, in which the government is able to constantly push Hindutva ideas.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px; text-align: justify; word-spacing: 3px;"><span style="font-family: times;">That is why I would caution against the idea of Hindutva being 'popular', as you suggest. How can we tell? Sure, the BJP holds a commanding parliamentary majority, but it has worked overtime to suppress dissenting voices. In that sense, it is difficult to get an accurate gauge of support for Hindutva among ordinary Indians. I do not think that a majority of the country supports the hateful rhetoric and exclusionary nature of Hindutva...</span></p></blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px; text-align: justify; word-spacing: 3px;"><span style="font-family: times;"></span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px; word-spacing: 3px;"><span style="font-family: times;"></span></p><blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px; text-align: justify; word-spacing: 3px;"><span style="font-family: times;">Judging by the number of times I have been asked this question, I do recognise that there's a very real and tangible concern for some liberal Indians. But as I have often pointed out, we in the Congress Party are very clear that we cannot allow ourselves to become a BJP-Lite. I have long argued that any attempt to emulate 'Pepsi Lite' by 'BJP Lite' will end up with us becoming like ‘Coke Zero' that is, Congress Zero. Congress is not BJP in any shape or form, and we should not attempt to be a lighter version of something we are not. Nor are we trying to, in my view.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px; text-align: justify; word-spacing: 3px;"><span style="font-family: times;">The Congress party makes a distinction between Hinduism and Hindutva. The Hinduism we respect is inclusive and non-judgemental, whereas Hindutva is a political doctrine based on exclusion. So we are not offering a watered-down version of the BJP's political messaging: Rahul Gandhi has made it explicitly clear that, for all avowing of his personal Hinduism by going to temples, he does not support any form of Hindutva, neither soft nor hard.</span><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></p></blockquote><blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px; text-align: justify; word-spacing: 3px;"><span style="font-family: times;">As a Congressman, I understand that whereas Hinduism is a religion, which is the personal concern of every individual, Hindutva is a political doctrine that departs fundamentally from the principal tenets of my Hindu faith. While Hinduism is inclusive of all ways of worship, Hindutva is indifferent to devotion and cares principally about identity. Hinduism is open to reform and progress, which is why it has flourished for 4,000 years; Hindutva is reactionary and regressive, with its roots in the racial pride' ethos that spawned fascism in the 1920s, which is why it is unlikely to outlast its current peak this century.</span></p></blockquote><p><br /></p><p>Also, see Shashi discussing his book and his ideas with Shekhar Gupta:</p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ji6xb6zxZdE" target="_blank">Shashi Tharoor on ThePrint Off the Cuff with Shekar Gupta</a></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; margin-bottom: 1rem; margin-top: 0px; word-spacing: 3px;"><span style="font-family: times;"></span></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-52540072174615311652020-12-30T11:19:00.004-05:002020-12-30T11:19:39.543-05:00Israel: An Ethnocracy or Democracy? Can a Zionist state be a democratic state?<p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;">Judaism is a religion, Zionism is a political ideology. As anti-Zionism is increasingly being equated with anti-Semitism, there is a need to analyze these terms in the historical context and how they are being used today. The implications of how these terms are defined are not only limited to Israelis, Palestinians, or people in the Middle East but also to Jewish people living all over the world and their relationship with the majorities in the countries they live in.<span style="background-color: white;"> Richard Silverstein, in his famous blog, Tikun Olam, discusses in detail Zionism, Isreali democracy, BDS, fascism, Holocaust, white supremism links with Judeo-supremism, BLM-Jewish relations, etc. Some excerpts of blog are reproduced below (Entire blog can be accessed <a href="https://www.richardsilverstein.com/2020/12/27/conflating-judaism-and-zionism-bad-for-the-jews/" target="_blank">Conflating Judaism and Zoinism: Bad New for Jews</a>):</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;">Often arguments over political or religious terms used in everyday discourse are dry or the province purely of zealots. But these terms can develop a power all their own. Religious or political azealots take them to heart and make life and death decisions based on their interpretation. This is the case regarding Judaism and Zionism.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;">Israel’s founding document and sacred text of Zionism, the <a href="https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #409909; text-decoration: none; transition: all 0.1s ease-in-out;">Declaration of Independence</a>, defined the state as “Jewish” and inextricably tied to the Diaspora, which was anticipated to ensure its future by furnishing much of its immigrant population. Later in 1985, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_Laws_of_Israel" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #409909; text-decoration: none; transition: all 0.1s ease-in-out;">Israel’s Basic Law</a> added the term “democratic,” thus yoking the two words inextricably.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;">After 1977, and the ascendancy of the far-right Likud and other ultra-nationalist parties, the unresolvable tension between “Jewish” and “democratic” become clear. They paid lip-service to Israel’s democracy and embraced the supremacy of Israeli Jews. Passage in 2018 of the nation-state law as a Basic Law enshrined the notion of Judeo-supremacy. It also defined with solemn permanence the subjugation of Palestinian citizens of Israel.But the seeds of Israeli racism were there from the state’s inception. It was <em style="box-sizing: border-box;">not</em> democratic because it did not offer non-Jewish citizens equal rights. In fact, Palestinians lived under martial law from 1948-1966.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;">Israel offered Jewish citizens superior rights, <a href="https://archive.vn/z13Up" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #409909; text-decoration: none; transition: all 0.1s ease-in-out;">the definition of an ethnocracy</a>. That is, a nation in which the majority ethnic or religious group enjoys a set of rights which the minority is denied. This phenomenon was strengthened after 1967, when the settler movement became a de facto form of Judeo-supremacy. Its original focus was on “settling” Jews outside the Green Line in what it called the Greater Land of Israel (i.e. Palestine). But its political ambitions gradually became much more expansive till today, when it maintains a firm grip on virtually all the levers of state power.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;">Many Diaspora and Israeli Jews shared a liberal Zionist dream of a Jewish democratic state. But we have come to understand that democracy and “Jewishness,” in terms of the Israeli state, cannot be reconciled. They simply cannot coexist.<span style="background-color: white;">The same is true of Judaism and Zionism. Israel, in the beginning, was a secular state in which the ruling parties endorsed socialism and offered a version of the welfare state. But when Benjamin Netanyahu became finance minister in 2003, he dismantled it with a series of harsh Thatcherite polices. They in turn rendered socialism obsolete. Even more recently Israel has dropped secularism as well. A </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secularism_in_Israel#Secular" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #409909; text-decoration: none; transition: all 0.1s ease-in-out;">plurality of Jews</a><span style="background-color: white;"> continue to be secular, but overwhelming political power and social control rests on a system </span><span style="background-color: white;">of Judeo-supremacism...</span></p></blockquote><blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;"><span style="text-align: left;">For this reason, it’s critical to distinguish between Judaism as a religion and Zionism as a political ideology. Israel is a</span><span style="text-align: left;"> </span><em style="box-sizing: border-box; text-align: left;">nation</em><span style="text-align: left;">, not a</span><span style="text-align: left;"> </span><em style="box-sizing: border-box; text-align: left;">religion</em><span style="text-align: left;">. Zionism is a</span><span style="text-align: left;"> </span><em style="box-sizing: border-box; text-align: left;">political</em><span style="text-align: left;"> </span><span style="text-align: left;">movement, not a</span><span style="text-align: left;"> </span><em style="box-sizing: border-box; text-align: left;">theology</em><span style="text-align: left;">. Judaism as a religion is a spiritual expression which eschews, at least in the Diaspora, political power. Remember Zechariah’s famous dictum: “Not by might, now by power, but by My Spirit says the Lord of Hosts.”</span></p></blockquote><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjWOlHJxqPR7UivQaKJRsrcBFgmmiE3NZYbeNx1puG7GTmfNxE9-RoT3J3Z1RSIrySiqVN8u8vvHrZF6GgkmsHBzWWSCyGbbpO3oC4khXmBMoHdtdlUztM4JqViVnTiwtOnN6Ei_TsyS9jT/s1200/4000.jpg.webp" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="630" data-original-width="1200" height="280" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjWOlHJxqPR7UivQaKJRsrcBFgmmiE3NZYbeNx1puG7GTmfNxE9-RoT3J3Z1RSIrySiqVN8u8vvHrZF6GgkmsHBzWWSCyGbbpO3oC4khXmBMoHdtdlUztM4JqViVnTiwtOnN6Ei_TsyS9jT/w587-h280/4000.jpg.webp" width="587" /></a></div><br /> <p></p><blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;">Mixing politics and religion poses tremendous danger. When a conflict lies in the realm of politics it is often possible to arrive at compromise. It might not be easy, and it may take years. But political differences can be negotiated and resolved. Politics are not always rational, but at their best they are. Conflicting political views can be resolved through rational discussion and analysis.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;">But once a conflict takes on a religious dimension, compromise becomes almost impossible. You have moved from the material world to the divine. A nation which believes that God has sanctified it has assumed a mantle of omnipotence and infallibility. With God on your side, you are invincible. Such beliefs have been the cause of immense human suffering over the ages.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;"><span style="text-align: left;">Israel’s prevailing religious ultra-nationalism has succeeded in wielding religion as a powerful tool in a political conflict. Just as von Clausewitz said that war was “politics by other means,” so Israel’s political-religious extremists offer warrior Judaism as politics by other means. This is the malady afflicting Israel today.</span><span style="background-color: white;"> </span></p></blockquote><p> </p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; caret-color: rgb(34, 34, 34); color: #222222; font-family: Roboto, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; margin: 0px 0px 26px; padding: 0px; text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white;"></span></p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-39515907558693552962020-12-17T21:45:00.005-05:002020-12-17T21:48:34.316-05:00The making of lynchistan and the cow cabinet<p style="text-align: justify;">Earlier this year, the documentary <a href="https://www.thequint.com/videos/documentaries/mob-lynching-cow-vigilantism-india-gau-raksha"> The Making of Lynchistan: Inside India’s Deadly Gau Raksha Network</a> won the prestigious Ramnath Goenka award. This documentary informs how mob lynchings by cow vigilantes in India are a pre-planned organized crime supported by politicians and police. Asmita Nandy and Meghnad Bose, the documentary makers said: </p><p></p><blockquote style="text-align: justify;">“Our documentary The Making of Lynchistan: Killing in the Name of the Cow is an explainer on the nexus between the police, politician and the gaurakshaks,” said Nandy. “We spoke to gaurakshaks, who told us how these attacks are carried out. Sitting in front of people who proudly claim to have resorted to violence is intimidating,” said Bose.</blockquote><p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">In this blog, I have been writing about the rise of Hindu nationalism and increasing focus on saving cows and violence against Muslims. Some of the blogpost related to it are as follows</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://religious-nationalism.blogspot.com/2019/03/hinduism-and-hindutva-debate.html">Hinduism and Hindutva Debate</a> March 2019</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://religious-nationalism.blogspot.com/2017/09/a-national-ministry-for-cows.html">A national ministry of cows? </a>September 2017</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://religious-nationalism.blogspot.com/2017/11/gau-rakshaks-cow-protectors-and-modibjp.html">Gau rakshaks' (cow protectors) rise under Modi/BJP: Is there a more sinister agenda?</a> November 2017</p><p style="text-align: justify;">More recently, another event demonstrated the increasing power of Hindutva, Hindu nationalism, and cow rakshaks. Madhya Pradesh chief minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan after praying at a temple announced on 18th November 2020 the formation of a "cow cabinet." It consists of ministers of the following departments: farmer's welfare, animal husbandry, forests, panchayat and rural development, revenue, and home. The significant point to note is that the Congress, which claims to secular and is the main opposition party in Madhya Pradesh, did not oppose this measure but tried to say that they were better cow rakshaks. They claimed that the Congress government had started the work on the construction of 1,000 cow shelters.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Former Chief Minister and state Congress president Kamal Nath said that Chouhan did not keep his promise made before the 2018 Assembly elections.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote>Shivraj Singh, who announced the formation of a separate cow ministry (department) in the state before the 2018 assembly elections, is now talking about setting up a cabinet for cow protection and fostering...He has forgotten his old announcement..."There has been no work for cow protection and promotion during the 15 years' BJP rule in the state. On the contrary, they reduced the money given for cow shelters. </blockquote><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi2KcF9iFhKlsr_uaSBAm607fMUe_LnutSqagTEhyphenhyphensoaZNWJJjPomf8PyKEPInYh1JT6k4fxuynmuBSyxnYjXX5RPVRRgZgl_U44gBXgn8IHMywtmg8iDheSI7hFQtrqWBTw724QYvnQJLe/s633/cow+protection+in+Madhya+Pradesh.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="253" data-original-width="633" height="279" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi2KcF9iFhKlsr_uaSBAm607fMUe_LnutSqagTEhyphenhyphensoaZNWJJjPomf8PyKEPInYh1JT6k4fxuynmuBSyxnYjXX5RPVRRgZgl_U44gBXgn8IHMywtmg8iDheSI7hFQtrqWBTw724QYvnQJLe/w586-h279/cow+protection+in+Madhya+Pradesh.jpg" width="586" /></a></div>Source: <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bhopal/shivraj-singh-chouhan-announces-madhya-pradesh-cow-cabinet-a-first-in-country/articleshow/79294217.cms">The Times of India</a><br /><p style="text-align: justify;">To be fair, the Congress government did pass laws against cow vigilantism after two incidents in 2019 and also amended the anti-cow slaughter law, making provision for the transport of cows with permission. </p>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-24000261666715199292020-12-10T22:29:00.002-05:002020-12-10T22:29:26.776-05:00Nationalism and Islamization: Is there a causal link?<p> </p><p align="center" class="Heading" style="line-height: normal; margin-top: 0in; text-align: center;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 26.0pt;">Nationalism and Islamization: Is there a causal link?<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p> (First chapter of my book <i><a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-319-54006-1">State, Nationalism and Islamization: Historical Analysis of Turkey and Pakistan</a></i>, 2017)</o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Defining Islam’s role in government is one of the most
pressing political issues facing the Muslim majority countries (MMCs) today.
Acerbic debates relating to Islam’s relationship to laws, decrees and
policies have polarized many of these countries, making social harmony and
economic growth difficult to achieve. Mass media also increasingly focuses on Islamization,
invariably linking it to human rights violations, religious discrimination, and
terrorism. The ready explanations <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">for</span> the
phenomenon are fundamentalism, misogyny, nativism, bigotry, or plain old hatred
towards the West. This media frenzy has raised the specter of Islamization not
only in the MMCs but also in the West. <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">Many Westerners,
despite living in countries where Muslims form a small share of the population
and an even a smaller share of the political and economic elite, are worried
and ready to support anti-Sharia, anti-hijab or anti-minaret laws to thwart the
imminent Islamization of their countries.</span> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">News reports often seem to imply that the level of Islamization
of government is high in most </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">MMCs</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and it
is increasing further. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Yet, the</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> growth
and level of Islamization of government </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">vary</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
in the MMCs. In some MMCs, government policies and laws show a strong influence
of Islam. However, in many other MMCs, secular laws – mostly adaptations of
erstwhile colonial </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">laws</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> – prevail. On one
</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">extreme</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> are Saudi Arabia and Iran where the
judiciary </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">is primarily controlled</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> by the ulema
(religious scholars) and </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">laws</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> have to
conform to the principles of </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Sharia</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">. On the
other extreme are secular MMCs in Central Asia, Southern Europe or Sub-Saharan
Africa, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, Turkmenistan, Senegal, Burkina
Faso, etc. In these countries, religion and state are
officially/constitutionally </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">separate</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and
education and laws are secular. Between these two extremes lie most of the MMCs.
In some of them, the Islamization of government is limited to provisions of family
law but in others, it extends to diverse areas, such as religious education,
penal laws, and commercial regulations. What differentiates the latter group of
countries from Iran and Saudi Arabia is that, despite substantial Islamization,
the basic infrastructure of the legal system remains secular. Besides variances
in the level, there are also differences in the growth of Islamization of the government.
In some MMCs, the Islamization of government is increasing but in others, it is declining.
For example, while Malaysia recently decided to create a Sharia index to
evaluate how well its administrative policies conform to Islamic law, Egypt and
Pakistan introduced new restrictions on imams, mosques, and madrassas.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">What is the primary source of this variation? A growing
literature on Islamist movements/parties argues that this variation in
Islamization is largely due to the differences in the popularity of these parties.
Popular Islamist parties, as compared to unpopular ones, are more likely to Islamize
the government themselves (after coming to power) or, as happens more often,
pressurize the rulers to </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Islamize</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> the
government. Other scholars have countered this argument by pointing out that high-level
Islamization of government </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">is often implemented</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
by authoritarian regimes to bolster their legitimacy in the MMCs </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">where</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> either Islamist parties do not exist or
are not very popular. Both these arguments, individually or in combination, explain
Islamization of government in some of the MMCs, but they do not explain its
variation across the Muslim world.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Due to the significance of this issue, it is
critical to analyze why, in some MMCs, does Islam play a large role in government
affairs while in others, it has only a minor influence?</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
This book contends that it is not the popularity of religious parties or
autocratic regimes’ need for legitimacy but Islam’s role in an MMC’s nationalism
that has the most influence on the Islamization of government. Two very dissimilar countries, Turkey (secular
nationalism dominant, with a low level of Islamization of government) and
Pakistan (religious nationalism dominant, with a high level of Islamization of
government), have been chosen to test this argument.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Academic literature on religious nationalism
supports the view that, irrespective of specific religious tradition, religion’s
role in nationalism and government are closely related (Rubin 2013; Rieffer
2003; Barker 2008, 68-69 and 107).</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Islam's role in
nationalism is frequently employed to explain Islamization of government in many
countries. For example, numerous country studies of Islamization in Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Iran or Gulf countries have
linked Islamization to the nationalism of these
countries. However, nationalism is often ignored when Islamization of
government is more broadly discussed, as a
phenomenon happening in multiple countries. In such studies, autocratic
rulers’ needs or Islamist parties’ popularity are prioritized as explanations. This inclination of downplaying religion’s role in
nationalism in fostering Islamization of government is especially perplexing as
even in non-Muslim countries, religion plays a much larger role in governments
of countries whose nationalism is closely linked with a particular religious
tradition. For example, religious
injunctions have influenced public policies in Israel, Malta, and Ireland and
this influence is legitimized on the keystone of religion’s special
relationship with the nation (Binder 1961; Weiss 1986; Yadgar 2010; Cohen 2012;
House 2013; Lacroix 2011).</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt;">THE PUZZLE: Why Islamization of government?</span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Sacralization of <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">politics</span>
is a phenomenon not limited to the MMCs. Religious precepts, values and
discourse influence politics in a <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">large</span>
number of dissimilar countries. In such countries, opinions of Popes, Ayatollahs,
Swamis, or <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">Rabbis</span> matter and politicians can
ignore them at their own peril. Emotional appeals to religion are common and policies
<span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">are presented</span> as moral imperatives. The
pious are frequently warned of the vanishing of their <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">creed,</span> if they do not mobilize or vote in a certain way. The relegation
of religion to the private sphere, as predicted by many eminent sociologists in
the twentieth century, has evidently not transpired. <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">Even in countries, which are constitutionally secular and/or have a large
number of religiously unaffiliated ‘nones’, there are regular instances of
politicians passing laws or making new rules to placate and pander to the religious
sentiments of the majority.</span> Whether it is the defunding of Plan
Parenthood and usage of administrative procedures to shut down anti-abortion
clinics in the US or meat bans in India, religions continue to display their relevance
and resilience, even in secular countries.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sacralization of politics (or
Islamization) in the MMCs, however, has garnered increasing attention because
of its alleged link with terrorism. The following section delineates the gaps
in understanding of the phenomenon of Islamization. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">For many MMCs, independence came after more than hundred years
of bitter struggle against colonialism. People were, therefore, enthusiastic
about finally ending the external rule and gaining national sovereignty. Erwin Rosenthal
(1965) argues that after achieving independence, the national goals were
“self-expression and self-fulfillment” and the place of Islam/Sharia in the
laws and constitutions became a salient issue. Conservative groups considered enshrining
a prominent role for religion in the government not only beneficial but also a
sacred duty of the faithful. Many of them argued that the continuance of the
Western laws meant (Christian) colonial powers were still ruling their nation. However,
these groups, despite having sympathy of significant segments of the population,
were not very successful because most of the newly independent MMCs were led by
leaders, who were had no interest in Sharia. O</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">ften
educated</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> in the West, they lived lives more similar to their former
colonial masters than to the majority of their countrymen. Some of them were
not even Muslim. Muhammad Ali Jinnah of Pakistan, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, François
Tombalbaye of Chad, and Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia are some of the prominent examples
of s</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">uch</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> leadership. These leaders
frequently had a very low opinion of ulema and considered Sharia an obstacle to
the craft a modern nation. Not surprisingly, under their rule, Islamization of
governments was limited to few insignificant changes in laws and </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">MMCs'</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">governments</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
remained largely secular. Ulema’s criticism of the government’s secularism </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">and immorality were ignored</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> for the most part. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">It was only in the 1970s, in some cases decades after
independence, that many MMCs took serious steps to Islamize the laws and
government policies and started to fashion a public sphere defined by religious
motifs (Hibbard 2015, 297-8).</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The Iranian
revolution, defeats in Arab-Israeli wars, disenchantment with other ideologies
(Arab nationalism, Baathism, socialism, capitalism, etc.), and the rise of rich
conservative Gulf monarchies are some of the international factors cited to
explain this change.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> However, despite these influences, Islamization of government
was </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">often</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> a domestic affair and most of
its motivations and repercussions were also domestic. Sinno's (2010) statement
about the use of Islam in Afghanistan may be </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">true</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
for many MMCs:</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">The
strategic use of religion plays an important
role in the ability of some Afghan political actors to legitimize their
actions, mobilize support, undermine rivals, attract foreign aid, and control
populations</span></i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Following are some the principal explanations given in the
literature for the Islamization of the government in the MMCs:</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";"> </span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Lack
of political legitimacy;</span></p><p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: -0.25in;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: -0.25in;">Weak, heterogeneous state</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: -0.25in;">;</span></p><p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo5; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: Symbol; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: -0.25in;">·<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: -0.25in;">Presence</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: -0.25in;"> of popular Islamist parties/
movements.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">There are also some essentialist
explanations that hold Islam as monolithic, primitive, and/or state-centric, uniquely
designed to impose its bigoted misogynist Sharia on Muslims and unsuspecting others.
However, as these explanations are getting rarer in academic literature and
have been appropriately critiqued, they are not being discussed here.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Lack of political legitimacy<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">In
October 2013, several Saudi women buckled up and drove their cars themselves,
instead of seeking the help of their male relatives or calling a cab. Some of
them were arrested and detained as women are not issued driving licenses in
Saudi Arabia. On both these occasions, Saudi regime was severely criticized not
only by Western media but also by commentators in many other MMCs. While Saudi
government cited religious reasons for the continuation of their anachronistic
policy, most experts blamed <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">Saudi royals’
long-standing strategy of </span>seeking political legitimacy through
Islamization of government. Using Islam as a tool to gain political legitimacy
is, however, not something peculiar to the Saudi monarchy. Numerous other <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">autocratic</span> regimes, lacking electoral
legitimacy, have also been guilty of instrumentalization of Islam. <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">Using the examples of Righteous Caliphate (considered
by most Sunni Muslims as the golden age) or Shia Imams (considered by most Shia
Muslims to be the only ones fit to rule), they claim that it is the prerogative
of the righteous to rule.</span> Examples of this phenomenon are numerous. In
Sudan, General Abbud and later General Numayri used Islam to gain legitimacy (Fluehr-Lobban
1991; 71-89).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Similarly, in Bangladesh,
General <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">Zia-ur-Rahman</span> and General Ershad,
introduced Islamization policies to legitimize their military takeovers and to
prolong their rule (Raiz 2010). Colonel Qaddafi <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">introduced</span>
Sharia to consolidate his power in the early 1970s a<span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">nd in Iraq, Saddam Hussain, a secular Baathist, put restrictions on
alcohol and made religious education mandatory after his defeat in the ‘mother
of all battles’ (First Gulf War, 1990-91) to shore up his fast diminishing legitimacy
(</span>Harris 1986; <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">Sadi 2011, 27-8).</span> <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Like
autocrats, </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">democratic</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> leaders in the MMCs
have also Islamized the governments to buttress their rule. Electoral victories
provided them legitimacy but the democratic experiment was new, institutions
were weak, poverty widespread, bureaucracy corrupt, and difficulties enormous. Consequently,
many </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">democratic</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> leaders failed to fulfill
their promises of social justice and economic development, weakening support
for their rule. The religious right used this disillusionment to their
advantage and criticized </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">democratic</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
leaders for their westernization, immoral practices and lack of attachment to
Islam. Many </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">democratic</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> leaders then
resorted to Islamization of government to deflect criticism. Pakistan’s Prime
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was not a practicing Muslim, introduced many
Islamization policies to strengthen his government and weaken public support
for the religious right opposition (Saigol 1995, 470-1). In Malaysia too, Dr.
Mahathir </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">recruited Anwar Ibrahim (a popular
Islamist activist and the leader of the Islamic Youth League) and increased
Islamization of government to scuttle challenges from his own party rivals and
to thwart the progress of the principal opposition party, the Pan-Malaysian
Islamic Party (Means 2009).</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">More
recently, in Iraq, former Prime Minister Malaki also tried to use Islamization
to prolong his rule. (Mamouri 2013).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Weak, heterogeneous
state<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Seyyed
Vali Nasr (2001), one of the most erudite scholars of political Islam, contended
that Islamization of government had also <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">been
used</span> as a strategy for consolidating <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">a
weak</span> state. Most post-colonial states had arbitrarily drawn borders that
cut across linguistic, ethnic, religious and sectarian communities. Creating a
unified state and a strong nation identity out of diverse communities, which
were cobbled together solely to serve colonial interests, was not an easy job (Ezrow
and Frantz 2013, 56-9). Therefore, post-independence leaders had to spend
considerable time, energy and money on the twin tasks of state and nation
building. In at least some MMCs, according to Nasr, centrifugal forces,
threatening the weak post-colonial state, were countered by using Islam as a
unifying element. Presenting Pakistan and Malaysia as examples, Nasr
demonstrated how rulers of these heterogeneous colonial states <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">employed</span> Islamization to <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">counter</span> separatists and to keep their states
united. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Presence of
popular Islamist movements/parties <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Islamist
parties/movements (hereafter parties) contributed to the Islamization of the
government in two ways: sometimes formally and directly and at other times
indirectly. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A few Islamist parties were gaining power and
introduced Sharia-based laws themselves. These Islamist parties were proponents
of Islamization of government, long before they came to power. Islamization was
not the side dish for them, it was the main course. It was the central
principle on which the party platform <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">was built</span>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The leaders of these parties pledged that
they would Islamize the government once they achieved <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">power</span> and they fulfilled their <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">promises</span>.
Ayatollah Khomeini vowed to increase Islam’s role in government and rejected
the Westoxification (<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Gharbzadegi</i>),
toxic influences of the Western culture that were threatening Islam and the local
Persian culture. After the revolution, he delivered on his promises by
Islamization of laws and policies. More recently, former Egyptian President
Morsi also increased Islamization of the government as per decades of promises
by the Muslim Brotherhood movement and the manifesto of his Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP 2011). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">More
often, however, </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">popular</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Islamist parties
help increase the Islamization of </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">government</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> indirectly,
not by acquiring power but by threatening to </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">acquire</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
power. To prevent these parties from becoming more </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">popular</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and taking control of the state, rulers tried to steal
their thunder and Islamized the government themselves. President Hosni Mubarak
of Egypt, President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria, and President Abdullah Saleh of
Yemen all increased Islamization of </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">government</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
due to the threat of Islamist parties.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The
foregoing reasons, however, fall short of giving a convincing explanation of
the Islamization of government. The lack of legitimacy does not always lead to
the Islamization of </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">government</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Most of the
MMCs have been ruled by authoritarian regimes</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> since independence, but
Islamization of government has been a priority in only a few. Some countries
that have been under dictatorship for decades have </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">a low</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> level of Islamization of government while others that have
been democratic (albeit partially) have a higher level of Islamization of </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">government</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">. For instance, Kazakhstan has been
led by authoritarian President Nursultan Nazarbayev since independence in 1991.
During the last quarter of a </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">century</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">,
there have been elections but none of them was considered free and fair. In
April 2015, Nazarbayev was elected for the fifth term in office with more than ninety
percent of votes. However, despite his authoritarianism, Nazarbayev has never
tried to Islamize the government. In fact, he has cracked down on Islamists
(Rickleton 2015; Radio Free Europe 2015a). Similar is the case of Uzbekistan,
where former President Karimov suppressed Islamists and has ruled more
ruthlessly than Nazarbayev for more than two decades (Dyomkin 2014; Radio Free
Europe 2015b). Tunisia also did not become Islamized even after more than half
a century of dictatorships of President Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Islamization of
government is clearly less in these countries than in Malaysia, a longstanding
democracy, and in Pakistan, which has been a democracy for considerable periods
of time.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The
presence of strong Islamist parties in the MMCs increases the probability of
Islamization of government, but it is not a necessary or sufficient condition.
Examples of sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf demonstrate that Islamization of
government does not require </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">popular</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Islamist
parties. Conversely, popular Islamist parties in an MMC does not necessarily
mean a </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">high</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> level of Islamization of
government. Despite having no Islamist parties, governments in Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and Oman are more Islamized than governments of Egypt and Jordan, which
have popular Islamist parties.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">As Oliver Roy explains, regimes deal with Islamist
parties in contrasting ways, depending on how they (regimes) perceive they can
best control Islam, and the result is not always Islamization (or
re-Islamization as Roy calls it):</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-no-proof: yes;">Either moderate Islamist parties are integrated into the political scene
without any particular concessions being made to them (Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey),
or integration is accompanied by a state-ordered re-Islamization (Pakistan,
Sudan, Egypt), or else ideological concessions are made toward re-Islamization
while Islamist political participation is blocked (the Maghreb), or, finally,
no concessions are made, the contradiction being too great between the founding
values of the state and Islamism (secularism for Iraq and Syria, Qaddafi’s
philosophy for Libya)</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
(Roy 1994, 124-6)</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Finally, elite usage of Islamization of government as a way
to consolidate a weak, heterogeneous state is also rare. Many highly
heterogeneous MMCs, having a long history of </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">conflicts</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">,
like Chad and Sierra Leone, have a low level of Islamization of </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">government. Conversely, some MMCs</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> with low
ethnic diversity, like Saudi Arabia, have a high level of Islamization of </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">government</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">. It is particularly interesting and
enlightening to compare three neighboring MMCs of South East Asia as they
demonstrate, not positive, but an inverse relationship between heterogeneity
and Islamization of government. According to Nasr (2001), the Malaysian
government was Islamized to strengthen a weak heterogeneous state. However,
Indonesia, a vastly more </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">heterogeneous</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and
weak state at the time of its inception, was not Islamized. Meanwhile, Brunei,
a tiny nation much less heterogeneous than Malaysia and Indonesia, became the
most Islamized of the three, when it adopted </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Sharia</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
as law in 2014 (Ozanick 2015).</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Besides these reasons, geographical location also cannot
explain high Islamization of government. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Although
most of the MMCs with a high level of Islamization of government are in the
Middle East, many others are not: Pakistan is in South Asia, Libya in North
Africa, Afghanistan in Central Asia, and Mauritania in Sub-Saharan Africa.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
Furthermore</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">, Islamization of government does not
seem to be linked with per capita income as high level of Islamization of
government is found in low per capita income (such as Afghanistan and Mauritania),
middle per capita income (such as Iran), and very high per capita income (such
as Qatar and Saudi Arabia) countries.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">What, then, is primarily responsible for the Islamization of
governments in the MMCs? Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are considered the
three most Islamized </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">governments</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> in the
world (The ARDA 2015). Studying them, one could not help but notice the
prominent role of Islam in their nationalisms. All three have been called
religious nationalist states and scholars have linked the Islamization of their
governments to Islam’s role in their nationalisms. But this causal </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">link</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> of Islam's role in nationalism and the
Islamization of government has not been pursued when the focus is on
Islamization of </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">government</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> in multiple
countries. This book intends to fill the gap. It will </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">study</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> two very dissimilar cases, </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Turkey</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
and Pakistan, and demonstrate that Islam’s role in nationalism is one of the </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">key</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> causes of the Islamization of government in
both these states.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt;">State Nationalism</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">The story of nationalism mirrors history and modern history <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">mirrors</span> the story of nationalism; since about
the mid-nineteenth <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">century</span> no place in
the world remained untouched by its impact</span></i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">. (Harris 2009,
1)</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">For more than two centuries, nationalism is one of the most
powerful forces, if not the most powerful force, in the international arena. </span><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">There</span><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> have </span><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">been debates about how or when nationalism originated,</span><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> but </span><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">few </span><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">can deny its</span><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
significance</span><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">. </span><span style="background: white; color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">It is
argued that n</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">ationalism is powerful because people are interpellated with
nationalist ideology from their childhood. Not surprisingly, people internalize
nationalism and consider something natural and eternal. Education and media are
two vital agents of its socialization but as Michael Billig (1995) has
explained, there are hundreds of unnoticed routine practices that reinforce
nationalism. An outsider may notice these small things,
but local people do not. Color a piece of cloth one way and it becomes something
to die for and color it another way and it becomes a symbol of revulsion, deceit, and intense
hatred.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In the previous discussion, nationalism has been used in a
singular form. It might give rise to the idea that each country has a unique nationalism
and this book will analyze two unique ideas, Turkish and Pakistani </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">nationalisms</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">. Nothing can be further from the
truth. There is no unique Pakistani or Turkish nationalism or for that matter
unique French or Japanese </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">nationalisms</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">.
Every state has multiple versions of nationalism and these versions contest
each other for acceptance and prominence. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">It is,
therefore, necessary to clarify that this book employs a constructivist
approach to explore state nationalisms in Turkey and Pakistan – that is, the
idea of the nation as constructed/promoted by the state and displayed in state
symbols and official representations of state action and identity – and the
varying role of Islam in this state-produced and presented version of
nationalism.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">State nationalism </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">is </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">the
nationalism propagated </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">by the state</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> (or
the state decision-makers) to promote a singular unified national identity.
This particular version of nationalism varies over time and </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">is always contested.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> It </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">is usually presented</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> in contrast to the popular/cultural
nationalisms that the masses believe in. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">State
nationalism is sometimes defined as elite nationalism and explained as the
nationalism of groups ‘politically or administratively powerful, being rich or propertied,
having a title or high of social rank, being well-educated, being a star, and
so forth’ and popular nationalism is the nationalism of the non-elite
(Whitmeyer 2002).</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> However, while emphasizing the distinction, it must be
acknowledged that </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">state nationalism is constantly
influenced by popular nationalism</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">(s) and it is not something ‘out </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">there,’</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> completely immune and separate.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">However, as the state is not a monolithic entity, prioritizing
state nationalism entails answering the secondary question, which state nationalism? Decision-makers/elites do
not always agree on the type of nationalism the state should promote. For
example, the political and military elites of Turkey and Pakistan have rarely
agreed on what should be promoted as Turkish and Pakistani nationalism. The
contestation within the state elite, as well as pressure from popular
nationalism(s), means state nationalism is not fixed or static. Figuring out
state nationalism – or Islam's role in state nationalism – is, therefore, not
easy. To deal with this issue, in this book,
Islam’s role in state nationalism is assessed by focusing on the presence of
Islamic themes in the widely accepted symbols of state nationalism such as anthems,
constitutions, flags, and images on the national
currency.</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><sup><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><sup><span style="border: none; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">[1]</span></sup></span></sup></a>
<span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">These
indicators of state nationalism will receive more discussion later in the
chapter.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt;">Religion and
State Nationalism</span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">The
irrational emotional dimension and intrinsic divisiveness of nationalism
frequently give rise to an uneasiness about it. However, misgivings about nationalism
are nothing compared to the intense dislike that is evoked by the mention of religious
state nationalism. A mix of religion and nationalism is considered highly dangerous
and explosive (Juergensmeyer 1993). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">It
</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">is difficult to define</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> the relationship
between majority religions and state nationalisms as they have been bitter
rivals as well as close friends, depending on the context. Two of the early
nations, </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">France</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and Great Britain,
exemplify these contrasting trends. </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Catholicism,
the majority religion in France, had historically a difficult relationship with
French state nationalism, due to French revolutionary ideals, conflicts with the
Pope, and wars with other major Catholic monarchies (Spain and Austria).</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
In contrast, Anglican Christianity, the dominant religion in Great Britain, was
</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">a key</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> constituent of British state
nationalism.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Rogers
Brubaker, Mark Juergensmeyer, Philip Barker and Barbara-Ann Rieffer have made
notable contributions regarding the relationship between religion and
nationalism, albeit without distinguishing between state and popular
nationalism. </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Brubaker (2012) proposes four ways
to analyze the coupling of religion and nationalism connection that can also be considered four types of relationships
between religion and nationalism. In the first case, religion and nationalism
contest each other. Each tries to become the primary identity of the nation, to
the exclusion of the other. Nationalism becomes the new ‘religion’ that is
trying to replace the old one. In the second type, religion explains some
aspects of nationalism. Usually, these aspects are linked with the origin and
early development of the nation. This type of relationship is quite common and religion is an implicit part of
nationalisms of a large number of countries. In the third type, religion
contributes to nationalism. It is a visible part of the national identity and some national myths and symbols are also based on religion. This type of
relationship is also common. Finally, Brubaker defines a robust and intimate relationship
between religion and nationalism. In this type, nationalism is primarily based on the majority religion and it is difficult to separate the
two. As William Safran (2005, 1) implies, in such cases, ‘state was, more often
than not, a secular manifestation of the dominant faith.’</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Barker (2008) argued that religious boundaries play a pivotal
role in blending religious and national identity. Giving examples from
‘secular’ Europe, he explains that religious and confessional boundaries and a
threat to national existence have helped the recognition of ‘other’ in
religious terms and made religion a key constitutive element of nationalisms of
Poland, </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Greece,</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and Ireland.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In contrast, Juergensmeyer (1993; 2008) prioritizes
international developments like the fall of communism, disenchantment with
capitalism, globalization and the resulting ideological vacuum for making religious
metaphors and symbolism part of nationalism.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-no-proof: yes;">Citing the writings of Gellner, Anderson,
and Hobsbawm, Rieffer (2003) claimed that although religion contributed
significantly to the Western European nationalisms, religion’s contribution is
diluted by presenting it as part of the national culture.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">
She contended that religious nationalism often results in<span style="mso-no-proof: yes;"> religion’s</span> precepts becoming
‘institutionalized in laws and procedures governing the <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">nation.'</span> In the context of MMCs, this institutionalization of
religion’s precepts in laws and procedures governing the nation can be called
Islamization of government. Hence, her research supports the idea advanced in
this book that increased the <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">role</span> of Islam
in nationalism would lead to increased Islamization of government.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Popular scholarship on Islam and state nationalism after 1945
can </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">be divided</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> into two periods; </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">the dividing point being the 1970s</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">. Before the
1970s, as discussed above, the leadership of most MMCs </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">was</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">areligious. They </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">downplayed
Islam and tried to put emphasis on economic development and secular
nationalism. Islam was considered a thing of past, part of the medieval,
pre-industrial age, related to the defunct empires. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">However, being anachronistic was not always a problem as in many MMCs,
myths of an even more distant pre-Islamic past were created and promoted to
present Islam (and Arabs in non-Arab countries) as a corrupting influence that
deviated the ‘nation’ from its true path. </span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The MMCs’ leadership</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
wanted to create modern, unified, powerful and industrial states, based on the
Western model. Prioritizing Islam went against both promoting national
uniqueness and unity, two essential ingredients of strong nationalism. Islam
was not unique to any MMC as it was majority religion of dozens of countries
spread over three continents. Islam also could not promote unity as most of the
MMCs had significant non-Muslim populations, making emphasis on Islam divisive. Therefore, the national elite emphasized non-religious
foundations of national identity to be more inclusive and to create more
compact nation-states. They focused on
ethnolinguistic (e.g. in Turkey) or dynastic (e.g. in Morocco, Jordan, Oman) or
ideological (e.g. in Syria, South Yemen, and Iraq) or territorial/historical
(Yemen, Lebanon) bonds and downplayed Islam.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Not surprisingly, in this political milieu, Islam appeared weak
and transient and many scholars thought that it had lost its battle against the
more powerful force, (secular) nationalism. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Sylvia
Haim (1955) described (secular) nationalism as the most powerful trend in
modern Muslim Arab political thought; Nikki Keddie (1969, 17) suggested that
popular loyalty in the Muslim world has transferred to the modern nation; and Rosenthal
(1965, xii) witnessed ‘a vulnerable Islam gradually giving way before a secular
nationalism.’</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In the 1970s, the environment both inside and outside the
MMCs changed. At the global level, the power of the West, primarily the US,
declined due to the Vietnam War and the end of post-World War II economic
expansion. It could not support as many repressive ‘modernizing’ regimes in the
MMCs as it did in the 1950s and 1960s. The </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Soviet
Union</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">, facing economic decline and internal problems, was also not
aggressively vying for global leadership or communist </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">ascendancy</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> in the Muslim world. Furthermore, the two Arab-Israeli
Wars made Muslim populations more aware of the West’s role in propping up Israel.</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[2]</span></span></span></a><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Previously, being aligned
with the West was considered a source of strength at the popular level, but
after the 1970s, it was a decision that had to be explained and rationalized. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">This was</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> also the time of the rise of oil-rich religiously
conservative monarchies that were ready to offer thousands of employment
opportunities and millions of dollars in aid to other MMCs. To benefit from
these changes, governments in many MMCs, some of which were still led by </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">areligious</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> elites, decided to instrumentalize Islam.
Islam’s role in state nationalism </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">was
highlighted</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Sharia</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> became the
source of constitutions and laws (Roy 1994, 26). Media, symbols, and education
were also used to propagate Islam and to link Islam with the state and the
government as Gregory Starrett described in </span><i style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Putting
Islam to Work</i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> (1998). These activities of governments increased Islam's
role in nationalism. Unlike previously, nationalism was no longer substituting
or downplaying Islam but accommodating it.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">After 9/11, as Islam came under the global
spotlight, Islam's role in the state nationalisms of the MMCs was exaggerated
in a section of media and academia.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> In contrast to the
1960s, it was argued that secular
elements of state nationalism were weak and becoming
weaker by the day as compared to Islamism
or religious nationalism. The ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative was employed
to de-emphasize and deny not only the potency of secular elements of state
nationalisms but also the nation-state itself. The specter of Islam,
fundamentalism or Islamism was seen
descending on the MMCs (Tibi 2002).</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">For a brief period, Arab Spring (2010-11) undermined this
narrative as Islam and Islamists played, at best, a limited role in these
uprisings. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">However, when Islamist parties won
elections in Egypt and Tunisia, references to the ‘Islamist threat’ came back
and some analysts claimed that the post-Arab Spring is a period of Islamists’
ascendancy and prerogatives of (secular state) nationalism were shrinking
(Krauthammer 2012; Rubin 2012).</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Some of these writings have obviously </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">been influenced</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> by the Islamists’ regular denunciation
of nationalism. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Two of the leading ideologues of
modern Islamist movements, Maududi and Sayyid Qutb, pleaded with Muslims to
shun nationalism as it had destroyed the unity of the Muslim Ummah by promoting
loyalty to land, language, or ethnicity (Nasr 1995; Toth 2013).</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Many
Muslim terrorist movements, most famously Al-Qaida and Daesh (Islamic State),
also reject secular nationalism. But is Islam’s role in state nationalism
increasing in the MMCs after 9/11? Researchers have not been able to answer
this question conclusively, one way or the other, for the whole Muslim world as
there are fifty MMCs, each with a unique history and a distinct culture. As
discussed earlier, in some MMCs, Islam's role in state nationalism is surging,
but in others it is declining. A definite answer, as in the case of religion’s
role in the nationalisms of Christian, Hindu or Buddhist-majority countries, is
only possible at the individual country level.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">A definite answer about Islam's role in state nationalism in
a particular MMC, however, would only be true for the present period. Islam's
role in state nationalism, like the state nationalism itself, is constantly
evolving. The contrasting relationships between religion and (state)
nationalism, as defined by Brubaker (2012), can be found in the same country at
various points in its history. In Iran, for example, secular ethnolinguistic
nationalism reigned supreme</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> in</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> the 1930s
and 1940s and it had an antagonistic relationship with Islam. During the 1960s
and 1970s, the last Shah of Iran accepted an implicit role of Islam in state
nationalism. Although anti-clericalism was still dominant, the antagonistic
relationship with Islam was toned down. Since the 1980s, however, Iran is a
country where national and religious identities are inseparable. Similarly,
early Bangladeshi state nationalism emphasized ethnolinguistic ties but later
in the 1980s and 1990s, Islam became a significant part of Bangladeshi state
nationalism. Recently, tables have turned </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">again,</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
and Islam’s role in Bangladeshi state nationalism is decreasing as the
government is promoting Bengali (ethnolinguistic) nationalism.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="background: yellow; color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-highlight: yellow;"><o:p> </o:p></span><span style="background-color: yellow; color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Islamization of government<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Islamization, like
nationalism, is not an easy concept to define. Scholars have used Islamization,
Arabization, Muslimization, Shariatization, and, more recently, Talibanization interchangeably
(Singh 2007; Shaikh 2008; Lindley-Highfield 2008; Korotayev 2000). Add to it,
the secondary concepts of re-Islamization, de-Islamization and creeping
Islamization and the <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">difficulty</span> to
untangle the conceptual muddle increases. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Following are some
of the definitions of Islamization in the academic literature, amply demonstrating
the difficulty in defining the concept. Julian Lee acknowledges the elusiveness
of the </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">concept</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and links Islamization
with ‘</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">conservative,</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> orthodox Islam’:</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></i><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">The perceived essence of any religious or
otherwise ideological movement is seldom if ever without significant variation
and contest among those who identify with it. By our referring to them as
Islamists … seem to be ascribed with the
default or most essential figuration of
what Islam is. But there is no entirely satisfactory way out of this quandary… “Islamization” refers in this book then to the process of instilling and creating that which is in ostensible accord with
orthodox conservative Islam</span></i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">.
(Lee 2010, 19)</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Michael Buehler
links Islamization to the </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">adoption</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> of
Sharia law (2016, 1). Salim, in the following definition, also links
Islamization with Sharia and Islamic doctrines. However, to use the definitions
of Lee, </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Buehler,</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and Salim, one still has
</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">to define conservative,</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> orthodox Islam,
Islamic doctrines and Sharia, which is not an easy task:</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-no-proof: yes;">A process of certain
measures and campaigns, regardless of the identity of the advocates and the
motives behind the actions, that call for the establishment of what are
regarded as Islamic doctrines in Muslim legal, political, and social systems…</span></i><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">It
is clear that the proponents of the formal implementation of shari’a consider shari’a the foundation of Islamization…In sum, the assumption of the proponents of shari’a-based reform is that the more shari’a
rules are incorporated into the state
legal system, the deeper the Islamization of a country. Under this scheme,
moves toward Islamization ultimately lead to attempts at founding an Islamic
state</span></i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">. (Salim 2008, 45)</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Farzana Shaikh
(2008) distinguishes between Islamization and Shariatization. She opines that
both ‘share an uncompromising emphasis on the enforcement of Islamic law at the
expense of the broader and vaguer commitment to the ethical principles of Islam.’
However, for her, leaders and supporters of Islamization and Shariatization are
dissimilar; Islamization’s major promoters are statist modernizing groups while
Shariatization’s key sponsors are non-Westernized groups, such as clerics. Shaikh’s
distinctions are, however, difficult to accept as Islamization of government is
always done with the help of clerics and Shariatization cannot be done without
the help of the state.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">It is clear from
the above discussion that there is no agreement on what is Islamization of
government, except the linkage between Islam, </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Sharia,</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
and the government. Due to the wide variety of ways in which Islam and Sharia
are</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> interpreted</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">, there can be and are
many contending views of Islamization of government.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt;">Operationalization of Variables</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Like many other social science concepts, it is difficult to
operationalize state nationalism and Islamization of government. Finding indicators
that can simultaneously give valid, reliable and precise measurements of these
concepts is close to impossible. Researchers, however, have not been daunted by
the challenging situation and have used a wide variety of indicators to measure
these concepts. As elites decide and promote state nationalism<span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">,</span> it has been measured directly by asking the
state elite (using interviews or surveys) or indirectly by analyzing their
speeches, books, and actions. State nationalism has also been estimated using
national symbols, such as flags or anthems. Similarly, Islamization of
government has been measured using a <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">multiplicity</span>
of indicators.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Some scholars have examined
<span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">laws;</span> others have studied <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">constitutions</span> and still others have conducted
public opinion surveys, ignoring the distinction between Islamization of
government and societal Islamization.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Measuring Islam’s Role in State
Nationalism</span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Measuring religion’s role in state nationalism is particularly
difficult. Nationalist struggles bring together a broad spectrum of ideas and
groups. However, there is usually a specific culture, religion, language,
ethnicity, or a blend that is prioritized, highlighted and so often mentioned
that it becomes inscribed on the nation’s memory. Even primordialists, who claim
nations are <span style="background: white;">ancient, </span>agree that
nationalists choose a few out of tens – if not hundreds – of battles, martyrs,
events, folktales, and myths to ‘awaken’ the nation.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Notwithstanding the difficulty, this book will make an effort to devise
criteria on the basis of which a reasonably fair assessment can be made and
state nationalisms of Turkey and Pakistan can be analyzed.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
Three criteria have been selected to assess
Islam’s role in state nationalism: the featuring of Islam in general clauses of
the Constitution that describe the nation; the presence of Islam-inspired
national mottos, emblems, anthems, flags etc. that the state uses to identify
Islam with the nation; and Islamic themes on banknotes, which are the most
common everyday symbols of the state that reach the hands of the people.
As the focus here is on Islam’s role in state nationalism, only those constitutional
clauses, national symbols and banknote images will be identified and studied that
demonstrate an increase or decrease in Islam's role.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Constitutions are windows to the national identity and state
nationalism. More than mere lists of legal principles, they inform us about the
national narratives/beliefs. The constitution embodies the hopes and
aspirations of the nation. Therefore, the Turkish and Pakistani constitutions
are good proxies for estimating Islam’s role in state nationalism. Clauses
relating to religion or secularism will </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">be
identified</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and changes in their number and content will be explored.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Banknotes’ iconography has recently been
recognized</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> as an instrument used by states to promote state nationalism.
A national currency is intimately linked with the nation as it is ubiquitous in
the nation and difficult to use outside the national territory. The images chosen for banknotes are useful indicators
of the character of state nationalism, as they have been issued regularly by
the state throughout the history of both countries (more than sixty unique
images on Turkish banknotes and around forty unique images on Pakistani
banknotes), allowing one to minutely follow the changes in the representation
of the nation on state instruments.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">National symbols (flags, emblems, etc.), anthems and
monuments are critical markers of national identity. They evoke deep emotions,
incite passions, identify nations and make them visible to their nationals as
well as foreigners. Perhaps the most obvious example of national symbols
revealing the link between state nationalism and religion are national flags.
Scores of national flags have either a cross or a crescent and star on them,
signifying a country’s link to Christianity or Islam respectively. Therefore,
national symbols are a good way to estimate Islam’s changing role in the state
nationalism of Turkey and Pakistan. As in the </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">case</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
of other indicators, only national symbols that introduce or reduce religious
content will be examined.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Measuring Islamization of Government</span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">Measuring Islamization of government is also difficult as
scholars cannot, as discussed above, agree on how to define it. Measuring Islamization
of government is part of the broader debate on how to approximate the role of
religion in the government in all countries.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Previously, scholars used to measure religion’s role in state affairs
solely by analyzing constitutional provisions and laws, embodying elements of the
religious precepts and practice. However, in the last two decades, research has
expanded to include many diverse criteria. While most of the work on this
subject has been qualitative case studies, there have been efforts to quantify
and standardize this estimation. The Bar Ilan University (Israel)’s Religion
and State Project, led by Jonathan Fox, is the most extensive and most successful
of these attempts (The ARDA 2015).<a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Unfortunately, this data
on distinct aspects of the state-religion relationship is not available before
the late 1990s. As this book intends to investigate the Islamization of
government (or lack thereof) in Turkish and Pakistani Republics since their
formation, this data cannot be used. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Islamization of government in this study is,
therefore, estimated using the following three indicators: the clauses in the
family/personal status laws that are based on Islamic law (Sharia), the
presence and functions of the ministry
of religious affairs, and the
government’s support for private and public religious education.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
These indicators have been used by various scholars to measure religion’s role
in the government or Islamization of government.</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title=""><sup><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><sup><span style="border: none; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">[4]</span></sup></span></sup></a></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Family law consists of the rules related to marriage,
divorce, inheritance, </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">custody,</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> etc.
Family law is key to gauging the extent of Islamization of government as </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">family</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> is at the center of Muslim culture.
Moreover, family law was the only part of the existing laws that was left
untouched by most European colonial powers, after they conquered the MMCs. It thus
became a symbol of Muslim identity and is still considered by many as such. The
degree to which the government patterns family law on secular or Western
principles or on traditional Muslim practices can, therefore, </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">be considered</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> as a crucial indicator of
Islamization of government.</span></p>
<p class="BodyA" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Governmental institutions (ministries, </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">departments,</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> etc.) dealing specifically with
religious practice are usually established to regulate religion(s) or to give
preference to one or more religions. The presence of a Ministry of Religious
Affairs (MRA) demonstrates the significance government attaches to religion.
This significance might be due to the government considering religion as an
ally or as a competitor. An analysis of the MRA’s presence and its functions
can thus be employed to determine government’s relationship with the majority
religion (i.e. Islam) as well as the level of Islamization of government.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The salience of education in the socialization of next
generation cannot be over-emphasized. Islamists, secularists, and other groups,
therefore, try to control schooling so as to create the new generation in their
own image. Government’s support for religious education in both public and
private schools is, therefore, a good proxy for Islamization of government.</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">[5]</span></span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Islam’s Role in Turkish and Pakistani <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">State Nationalisms</span> <o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Before moving on to
research design and methodology, it is worthwhile to take a look at the
dominant narratives that explain Islam's role in Turkish and Pakistani state nationalism.
<span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">These narratives are not grounded on a rigorous
analysis of the past, but paint and promote a picture of the past that
strengthens a particular view, usually the view endorsed by the state.</span>
In developing these narratives, as Fatma Gocek (2006, 85-103) has observed, events
are selectively highlighted or ignored depending on their perceived usefulness
for strengthening the narrative.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">There are two
dominant historical narratives in the literature about Turkish state
nationalism. In the first type, Turkish state nationalism is considered </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">largely</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> secular and always in contention with
Muslim nationalism or Islamism (Lewis 1961; Berkes 1964). The origins of this
narrative can be traced back to the nineteenth century.</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[6]</span></span></span></a><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> It gradually gained
ascendancy and in the late 1920s and early 1930s it became the official state
narrative. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Some scholars have explained this
dichotomous narrative in terms of center-periphery or state-society conflict in
Turkey, with the center/state representing secular state nationalism and the
periphery/society representing Muslim nationalism or Islamism (Mardin 1973;
Akcam 2004, 2).</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> This narrative </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">is based</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
on an earlier trend in scholarship that ‘juxtaposed Muslim societies against
secular states as mutually exclusive or inherently antagonistic categories,
albeit from different perspectives’ (Turam 2012, 3). The gradual rise of the
Refah Party and the current dominance of the AKP </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">are thus presented</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> as the defeat of Turkish state nationalism.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In the other
narrative, which is getting more popular after the 1970s, it is argued that Islam
has always been a vital constituent of the Turkish state nationalism. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The Greek-Turkish population exchange, varlık vergisi
tax, immigration policies giving preference to Muslims, mistrust of the
(Christian) West, and the discrimination against non-Muslims in Turkey are
presented as evidence of what Ilker Ayturk calls the ‘harmony thesis’ (Gurbey
2012, 42-3, Ayturk 2014).</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">It is contended
that even at the time of high Kemalism/aggressive secularism in the late 1920s
and 1930s, when the Turkish state promoted ethnolinguistic nationalism and
ostensibly rejected religion, Islam was a key component of Turkish state
nationalism (Cagaptay 2006, 156-7).</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> According to this narrative, Islam
has been and always will be an important part of the Turkish state nationalism.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Both these
narratives </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">are based</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> on the assumption
that Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism congealed into permanence around
the time of formation of modern Turkey. In the first narrative, Islam's role in
Turkish state nationalism is negligible and will always remain so. There is an
antagonistic relationship between the two for almost a </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">century</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and this relationship will continue in the future. In the
second one, Islam’s contribution to Turkish state nationalism has always been significant
and will continue to be in the future.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In this book,
however, it shall be contended that Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism has
been mutable, not static or fixed. It was high during the war of </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">independence</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> and then it became very </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">low</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> in the 1930s, and since the 1950s it has
been slowly increasing. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">This dynamic view of
Islam’s role better explains the variations in Turkish state nationalism since
independence than assuming that Turkish state nationalism was always secular or
always had a strong religious component.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Another
argument that is gaining traction acknowledges Islam's role in the Turkish state
nationalism but claims that there are many Islams, not one Islam, and that the
Turkish state, in each era, chose an Islam that it perceived as most suitable
for achieving its objectives.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
The early Turkish state chose a
modernist/rational Islam that also had an ethnic component. In the 1950s, 1960s
and 1970s, the ethnic component was de-emphasized and rationalism was toned down
and since the 1980s, it has chosen a conservative, neo-liberal Islam. Islam was
thus not discarded or dis-established in any era, but established in a unique
in each era of Turkish history as Davison (2003) explains the events of the
1920s:</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">The separation of religion from its
previous position of influence constituted a shift in Islam’s institutional and
legitimation position, not its formal, full elimination. How to explain, for
example, the new state religious establishment, the state religious educational interest, the marking of
religious identity on state identity cards, and the like? Islam was not disestablished; it was differently
established</span></i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Laiklik (laicism/secularism
as practiced in early Republican Turkey), according to this argument, was thus
not anti-Islam, but a different version of Islam than what was ascendant during
the Ottoman Empire (Davison 1998, 154). Westernized Young Turks were not
against Islam; they were against obstructionist and medieval (Arabic) versions
of Islam. They wanted to rediscover ‘true’ or Turkish Islam that was rational
and compatible with modernity (Azak 2010, 5-6).</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">This
argument has an element of truth as Ataturk and other Turkish leaders in many
of their statements praised Islam and claimed that they were only against those
who are using a false version of Islam, based on Arab and Ottoman culture, to
halt progress.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> For example, Ataturk
said in 1923:</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Our religion is a most reasonable and most
natural religion, and it is precisely for this reason that it has been the last
religion. In order for a religion to be
natural, it should conform to reason, technology, science, and logic. Our
religion is totally compatible with these</span></i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">. (Azak 2010, 14)</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The difficulty a
researcher confronts after accepting this narrative is that it becomes
extremely tough to ascertain whether the adoption of some symbol (or a
constitutional clause) increases or decreases Islam's role in state
nationalism. For example, did removing all Islamic references from the Turkish
Constitution in 1928 lead to an increase (or decrease) in Islam's role in
Turkish state nationalism? On the basis of traditional interpretations of
Islam, Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism was decreased. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">However, a believer in a modernist interpretation of
Islam can argue, as many did, that ‘true Islam’ revived and its role increased
in Turkish nationalism as previously a ‘false Islam,’ which was mixed with
politics, was ascendant.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In the case of
Pakistan too, there are two dominant narratives. However, unlike the Turkish
narratives, the difference between the Pakistani narratives is not about the
presence or absence of Islam’s role in state nationalism. The major difference
between the two narratives is whether Islam's role in state nationalism has
always been dominant or whether it has only become dominant since the late
1970s. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In the first narrative, Islam is
represented as the key component of Pakistani state nationalism and it is
stressed that Jinnah wanted to establish an Islamic state, although opinions
differ on whether the objective was a modern democratic or a traditional
Islamic state (Mujahid 1999, Ali 1967, Zaman 1985).</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> According to this
narrative, since Pakistan was created on the premise of Muslim nationalism,
denying or lessening Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism means denying
Pakistani nationalism. General Zia presented this view in 1981:</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Take out the Judaism from Israel and it
will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a
secular state; it would collapse.</span></i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> (Tharoor 2014)</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Nasim Jawed (2010,
15) calls proponents of this narrative ‘Islamic nationalists’:</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-no-proof: yes;">To many Islamic
nationalists it was not a matter of choice for the Pakistanis whether to build
their nationhood on the foundation of Islam or on a common and truly secular
cultural heritage: the latter in their view, simply did not exist</span></i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">When
these Islamic nationalists are confronted with evidence that Jinnah did not
want to make Pakistan an Islamic state, they respond that it is immaterial
whether Jinnah or other leaders of Pakistan’s independence struggle were
secularists – using religion as a tool of mobilization or as a ploy – or not as
most of the people voted for an Islamic state when they voted for Pakistan in
the 1946 elections.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Some even go
further and contend that it is the responsibility of Muslims, who are sovereign
over a piece of land, to establish Sharia (Nadeem 2001, 13). Ian Talbot (2005,
152-3) has aptly described this narrative as ‘the two nation theory of
Pakistani nationalism dealt in primordial certitudes’ that are fixed and
monolithic. According to this narrative, most of the difficulties Pakistan is facing
today and has faced since independence are due to the fact that Pakistani elite
has not embraced the paramount role of Islam in Pakistan and have often worked
to reduce it. Although proponents of this narrative accept that elite is now more accepting of Islam’s role than they
were in the 1950s and 1960s, they do not think it is enough.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Many experts also
accept this narrative and acknowledge Islam’s principal role in Pakistani state
nationalism. However, for them, this defining role constitutes a serious handicap. Sectarianism, terrorism, the separation of East Pakistan, the
rise of Taliban, etc. are all linked to the Islam’s dominant role in Pakistan’s
state nationalism. They, not surprisingly, advice a reduction in Islam’s role
and argue that even Jinnah was only using Islam and an Islamic Pakistan was not
his aim.</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; color: black; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">[7]</span></span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In
the other narrative, the critical significance of Islam for the creation of
Pakistan is acknowledged but its dominance and current (usually deemed
pernicious) manifestation is considered the result of the genesis of the mullah-military
alliance in the 1970s.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Many Pakistani
scholars and others, who subscribe to this narrative, reminisce about the
halcyon period when General Ayub Khan, and later Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, ruled
Pakistan and Islam’s role in state nationalism was
less dominant.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[8]</span></span></span></a> The contrast is
made between Jinnah’s Pakistan, which was tolerant, open and liberal,
and Zia’s Pakistan, which is dogmatic, illiberal and xenophobic.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">An example of this
narrative is the following passage:</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">So, how do we contend with the legacy of
Gen Zia ul Haq? Why was it possible for a
villainous military dictator to subvert the very spirit of the nation and sow
the seeds of religious militancy in a country founded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah?
We can pose that question once again: is this Jinnah's Pakistan or is it Zia's?</span></i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> (Salahuddin 2010)</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Similarly, Rasul B.
Rais, one of the leading political scientists in Pakistan, writes in his
article titled, ‘Is this Jinnah’s Pakistan?’</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-no-proof: yes;">Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the
father of our nation, must be turning in his grave if angels were to carry the
news and pictures of today’s Pakistan to him — targeted killings of Shias,
persecution of Christians and public conversion of Hindus on live media.</span></i><i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">
This is not the Pakistan he or other
founders powered by a dream of an independent country envisioned. Were they around today, they would have launched
another independent movement — this time, to liberate the country from three
powerful influences that have taken the form of institutions and have, in many
ways, established their control over the soul of the country. They are
the mullahs, the military and the feudal
elites</span></i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">. (Rais 2012)</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In
this narrative, Islam's role in Pakistani state nationalism was stagnant or
largely inconsequential for the first thirty years and then it started
increasing in the late 1970s because of General Zia’s coup and the (first)
Afghan war.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Since then, due to
the continuing alliance between religious forces and a powerful military,
Islam's role in state nationalism has been increasing.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The commonality
between these two narratives is that Islam’s role in the Pakistani state
nationalism </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">is seen</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> as increasing since
the 1980s.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">However, as the following
three chapters will show, a careful examination demonstrates that Islam's role
in the Pakistani state nationalism has been</span><i style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
decreasing</i><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">for</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> the last sixteen
years. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Amid the rise of religious terrorism
inside Pakistan, this dramatic change in Islam's role in the Pakistani state
nationalism has been happening under the radar and has not been noticed by many.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">Research Design and Methodology</span></b><b><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">This study employs comparative
case study method for analysis. The <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">key</span>
benefit of the case study method is its focus and attention to detail. The
researcher using this method concentrates on a single case or a few <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">cases</span> and tries to understand all of their
aspects/dimensions, leading to an explanation of the past and the present as
well as predictions regarding the future. The major disadvantage of this method
is that since the research <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">is limited</span> to,
at the most, few <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">cases</span>, the results are
often not generalizable. <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">The case study method
has, therefore, been considered less appropriate for discovering general laws
and more suitable for answering the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and for
investigating a ‘contemporary phenomenon in depth and within some real-life
context’ (Yin 2009).</span> </span><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The choice of the
case study method for this study is based on the research puzzle of why and how
Islamization of government varies over time, which requires a comparative
historical analysis of the two countries’ politics.</span><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Many other scholars have also used multiple case studies
and comparative historical analysis for answering challenging political
questions (Collier & Collier 2002; Mahoney 2001; Moore 1993; Rueschemeyer
1992; Goldstone 1991). </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify;"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">To</span><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> explore the possibility of a causal link between Islam’s
role in state nationalism and Islamization of government, the following
chapters intend to fulfill the requirements of causality advanced by scholars. Russell
Schutt (2012, 184-93) lists five requirements for drawing causal connections
between variables. The absence of one or more of the following criteria makes
the connection doubtful:</span></p>
<ul style="margin-top: 0in;" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo8; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">Empirical Association: This criterion requires the
correlation between the explanatory and response variable(s). Variation in
one group may lead to <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">variation</span> in
the other;</span><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo8; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">Appropriate Time Order: This criterion requires the
appearance of explanatory variable(s) before the response variable(s);</span><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo8; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">Non-Spuriousness: This criterion requires that the association
between the explanatory variable(s) and response variable(s) may not be
because of other variable(s);</span> <span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo8; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">Causal mechanisms: The criterion identifies the mechanisms
that link explanatory variable(s) and response variable(s); and </span><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo8; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">Context: This criterion pinpoints the specific conditions in
which causal mechanisms will be operative.</span><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In the next six chapters, the
correlation and appropriate time order between Islam's role in state
nationalism and Islamization of government will be established. In each of these
chapters, the focus will be on the evolution of one indicator during the
histories of Turkey and Pakistan. The first three chapters will study the three
indicators of Islam's role in state nationalism and the last three on the
indicators of Islamization of government discussed above. The last chapter will
summarize the whole argument presented earlier and will restate the major
conclusions.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">Selection of Cases </span></b><b><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">Turkey and Pakistan have <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">been selected</span> on the basis of being the most different
cases. There are many dissimilarities between these two countries <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">that</span> make them contrasting cases. First, Turkey,
being the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, was a colonizer, while
Pakistan was a British colony for at least a hundred years. Secondly, in terms
of the state-Islam linkage, Turkey was the first and one of the few MMCs in the
world that espoused secularism. Secularism was one of the most cherished
principles of the Kemalist state and is still considered part of Turkish state
nationalism. Pakistan’s creation, on the other hand, is directly linked to
Islam and its state nationalism is viewed as an exemplar of religious
nationalism. Finally, Turkey is the only MMC <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">that</span>
has seen continued success of Islamic parties at the ballot box. The AKP has won
six national elections (five parliamentary and one presidential election) in a
row.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><sup><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><sup><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[9]</span></sup><!--[endif]--></span></sup></a> In
contrast, despite Islamization of government and support from the <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">military</span>, Islamic parties in Pakistan have been
unpopular and unsuccessful. Choosing the most different cases of Turkey and
Pakistan also provides the strongest justification for generalization.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="border: none; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-border-shadow: yes; mso-padding-alt: 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt;">O</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt;">utline of the book</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">There are eight chapters in this book. <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">After this chapter – which introduces the topic and
the research problem, lays out the conceptual framework, and describes the
research design and methodology – the next six chapters present research on the
indicators of Islam's role in state nationalism and Islamization of government.</span>
Each of these six chapters traces the history of <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">an indicator</span> from the inception of Turkish and Pakistani republics
to the present era. The historical analysis challenges the dominant conventional
narratives of Turkish and Pakistani <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">nationalisms</span>
and lays out the permutations each indicator has gone through. After giving a
brief introduction, each chapter is divided into two parts. The first part
discusses the indicator’s journey through Turkey’s history and the second part,
through Pakistan’s history.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The chapters
end with a brief comparative analysis of the two journeys. The first three
chapters (chapter two to chapter five) investigate the indicators of the explanatory
variable, Islam’s role in state nationalism. Chapter two examines four constitutions
of Turkey and three constitutions of Pakistan, focusing on articles related to
Islam or secularism. Chapter three and four highlight Islamic themes that
inform national symbols and banknote images respectively. Chapters five, six
and seven cover the three indicators of the response variable, Islamization of
government. Chapter five analyzes family laws of Turkey and Pakistan and reveals
their changing relationship with Islam. <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">Chapter
six focuses on Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) of Turkey and Ministry
of Religious Affairs of Pakistan and explains how, paradoxically, Diyanet has
grown into a huge institution in a secular republic while the Ministry of Religious
Affairs remains a small part of the government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.</span>
The policies regarding government support for private/public religious education
<span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">are inspected</span> in chapter seven. The concluding
chapter will demonstrate the causal link between the rise and fall of Islam in
state nationalism and the increase or decrease of Islamization of government.
This chapter will also highlight the implications of this research beyond
Turkey and Pakistan and identify further areas of research.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt;">Implications</span></b></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;">This study will contribute to two different areas of
research. First, it will help in understanding the politics of Turkey and
Pakistan. Both these countries have played a much larger role in international
affairs than their respective <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">sizes</span> or <span style="mso-no-proof: yes;">economies</span> would suggest. As middle powers on
the rise, it appears that these two countries will play an even more
influential role in the 21<sup>st</sup> century than they played in the past
century. Furthermore, both countries are already among the twenty-five biggest
economies in the world, based on gross domestic product (purchasing power
parity) data (World Bank 2015). Therefore, understanding their politics is
important. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">This study puts </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">into</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
perspective the recent interactions between Islam and politics in both
countries. According to many experts, Turkey, a secular republic, is moving
toward Islamization of government, while Pakistan is being further Islamized
even as it suffers from the </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">terrorism</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> of
Islamic militants who want to impose Sharia in the country. Is this analysis </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">an accurate</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> picture of reality? What are the
reasons for changing of course in Turkey and policy continuity in Pakistan?
This study will attempt to shed some light on these issues.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Second, while the focus of the study </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">is</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> Turkey and Pakistan, its results may help explain events in
other MMCs. These two countries also represent the opposite ends of the
Islam-politics continuum. Turkish governments have tried to suppress Islam’s
public role and until recently, Islam had a negligible role in the making of
laws, rules, and policies in Turkey. In contrast, Pakistani governments have
amplified Islam’s role in politics and the public sphere. Comparing and
understanding these two countries, helps us understand a whole range of
interactions that can happen between Islam and politics in an MMC.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">For example, after the success of Islamist parties in Egypt
and Tunisia in 2011, Islamization of government was considered unstoppable in
both countries. However, in both these countries, Islamists are now not in the
driving seat. The argument presented in this book (at least) gives a partial
explanation of what happened. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">It can be argued
that in Tunisia and Egypt, the Islamization of government was scuttled because
Islam’s role in the state nationalism of Tunisia and Egypt – </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">although present – was not sufficient for
the kind of Islamization attempted by the Al-Nahda and Muslim
Brotherhood-controlled governments.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> It would have been
better for these parties to slow the pace of Islamization of government.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">In sum, this book will demonstrate a causal link such that establishing
a strong role for Islam in state nationalism is shown to be necessary for a
strong Islamization of government.</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">
</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">Conversely, if Islam is weak, absent or diminishing in state
nationalism, Islamization of government will also falter.</span></p>
<p class="Body" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="border: none; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<div style="mso-element: footnote-list;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><br clear="all" />
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<!--[endif]-->
<div id="ftn1" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><sup><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><sup><span style="border: none; color: black; font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[1]</span></sup><!--[endif]--></span></span></sup></a> As there are many
excellent studies on state nationalisms of Turkey and Pakistan and it is the
explanatory variable in this book, the contestation with popular nationalism
and the intra-elite struggles that ultimately define state nationalisms of
Turkey and Pakistan will not be discussed in this book.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; color: black; font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Arab regimes also
highlighted the Western support as they could not explain to their compatriots how
a small country could defeat them.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; color: black; font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Based on the work of Grim
and Finke (2006) on the U.S. State Department's International Religious Freedom
reports, the state-religion relationship in nearly two hundred countries has
been quantified based on three indices and one variable (Government Regulation
of Religion Index, Government Favoritism of Religion Index, Social Regulation
of Religion Index and Religious Persecution).<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><sup><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><sup><span style="border: none; color: black; font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[4]</span></sup><!--[endif]--></span></span></sup></a> Each of these indicators
has a whole chapter devoted to it. References to some of these scholars would
be given in these chapters.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; color: black; font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> The increase of Islamic
references in curricula is another way to measure government support for
religious education and thereby a sign of Islamization of government. The
measure used in this book is based on Ahmet <span style="color: windowtext;">Kuru</span>’s
book <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Secularism and State Policies toward
Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey </i>(2009).<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; color: black; font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> As a result of a
combination of factors, a section of Ottoman elite gradually embraced Turkish
nationalism in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.
Initially, Turkish nationalism was not anti-Islamic or anti-clerical but it did
emphasize the belief in the Turkish nation over and above the belief in Muslim
or Ottoman nation (Hanioglu 2002, 85-98). <o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; color: black; font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Most notably, Ayesha Jalal
(1994) has persuasively suggested that Pakistan was a bargaining trick and
Jinnah only wanted a better deal for the Indian Muslims. The idea of Jinnah
trying to build a more secular state had been supported by scholars such as
Mohammad Munir in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">From Jinnah to Zia</i>
(1980), Ajeet Jawed in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Secular and
Nationalist Jinnah</i> (2009) and <span style="color: windowtext;">Moonis Ahmar </span>in
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Conflict Management & Vision for a Secular
Pakistan</i> (2014). Others have refuted these arguments, such as
Waheed-uz-Zaman in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad
Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality</i> (1985) and Saleema Karim in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Secular Jinnah and Pakistan</i> (2010).<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; color: black; font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Ayub Khan ruled Pakistan
from 1958 to 1969 and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, father of Benazir Bhutto, ruled
Pakistan from 1971 to 1977.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Admin.Admin-PC/Documents/CPPG/Minorities%20and%20public%20policy/Course%20readings/Week%206/Nationalism%20and%20Islamization.%20Is%20there%20a%20causal%20link.docx#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="border: none; color: black; font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> In the June 2015
parliamentary elections, AKP, for the first time, since 2002, was unable to win
the majority of seats in the Turkish Parliament. However, it was still by far
the largest party in the Parliament. In November 2015, it again won the
majority of seats and formed the government independently.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-59795195223133052042020-08-22T22:22:00.003-04:002020-08-22T22:24:28.459-04:00White evangelicals' jeremiad on DC tours<div style="text-align: justify;">Most religions exhort their followers to leave their evil/non-religious ways to move to a better future both on earth and hereafter. The religious narrative links the current woes to not accepting and adhering to religious edicts and cautions that if the people did not mend their ways, they will be replaced and/or destroyed. The unpleasant and unsatisfactory present is set between a cherished past and a glorious future. There is a call to return to the right path to avoid catastrophe. There are lamentations remembering the paradise lost in contrast to the dark present, and sorrow, despair, and grief are the main themes. Prophet Jeremiah and the Book of Lamentations are possibly the best expressions of this reoccurring religious theme.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Harvard researcher, Lauren Kerby, has written a book on how White evangelicals' tours to Washington DC help revive, support, and confirm the "Christian-origins" of the United States. Unsurprisingly, these tours strengthen religious nationalism. In an <a href="https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/08/how-will-white-evangelicals-vote-in-the-election/">interview with the Harvard Gazette,</a> she summarizes her book, “<a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9781469658773/saving-history/">Saving History: How White Evangelicals Tour the Nation’s Capital and Redeem a Christian America</a>.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6QR0I8dHLA6KWBkHrWbu7etQ9fEW4h0D9UxPsp-w5zARvFUPIOB95CuE39rCIeSfKpanrx3RRG_YZRayj3oEuoAsWvSXq-J7_d-XIeXAdNE_0y-uZU_uS40dE7awTEJjBbt7HsKC1jvdP/s630/Kerby_Saving_PB_9781469658773_FC-1-417x630.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="630" data-original-width="417" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6QR0I8dHLA6KWBkHrWbu7etQ9fEW4h0D9UxPsp-w5zARvFUPIOB95CuE39rCIeSfKpanrx3RRG_YZRayj3oEuoAsWvSXq-J7_d-XIeXAdNE_0y-uZU_uS40dE7awTEJjBbt7HsKC1jvdP/s0/Kerby_Saving_PB_9781469658773_FC-1-417x630.jpg" /></a></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Kerby points out that these tours, or more specifically tour guides, present white evangelicals as both insiders as well as outsiders:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">While I was in D.C., I noticed these two distinct — and contradictory — stories that guides and tourists told about Christianity in the U.S. In what I call the insider narrative, they claim that America is a Christian nation and that they, as Christians, are the rightful leaders of the nation. They argue that American law, for instance, is based in biblical law, and that the founders intended that Christianity would occupy a privileged position in government. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But they also tell stories about how the nation has abandoned its covenant with the Christian God, causing the United States to experience decline in morality and military power. This is what I call the outsider narrative: a story in which Christians are persecuted and victimized by a secular establishment that wants to erase the nation’s Christian heritage and keep conservative Christians and their values out of government.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Beyond the context of D.C., these two narratives are patterns for how white evangelicals talk about their relationship to the United States. Together, they form a jeremiad, the prophetic call for repentance and return to a past righteous state. And it’s worth noting that one of the most famous slogans of the 21st century follows this exact pattern: Make America Great Again.</div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Kerby also talks about how white evangelicals imagine themselves playing four roles in the American story depending on what benefits them. Two of these roles (founder and savior) focus on their position as an insider, while the other two (exile and victim) portray them as outsiders and are used to heighten their fears:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div></div><blockquote><div>An essential part of political strategy is how you position yourself in the story you’re telling. Are you the scrappy underdog? Are you the avatar for tradition? Are you a sympathetic victim? Depending on the circumstances, you’ll probably benefit more from one position than another.</div><div><br /></div><div>These four roles I identify — founder, exile, victim, and savior — are the different positions white evangelicals take in their political activities. They offer a lot of range, and if one isn’t working, it’s easy to switch to another role. For instance, as founders they can appeal to the authority of George Washington and other Christian leaders in early America to justify things like posting “In God We Trust” in schools. But if, say, something unflattering comes to light about a white evangelical leader, the victim role lets him dismiss it as an attack from anti-Christian forces. It’s a ready-made defense. </div><div></div></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>Kerby also explains that her book is about white evangelicals and not all evangelicals as non-white evangelicals do not relate to the American history the same way, and the DC tours, she has written about, did not have many non-white evangelicals in them:</div><div><br /></div><div><div></div></div><blockquote><div><div>By now, it’s old news that 81 percent of white evangelicals voted for Donald Trump. Non-white evangelicals, however, voted against him at a similar rate. Lumping all evangelicals together, as many outlets still do, erases non-white evangelicals. Even when theology is shared across these groups, the political behaviors I’m interested in are distinct. So it’s important to be specific about which subset of evangelicals I’m talking about, and even then, it’s worth noting that white evangelicals are themselves an internally diverse group. There’s enough commonality that we can make generalizations, but there will always be exceptions. </div><div><br /></div><div>The other reason I emphasize this group’s whiteness is because I’m talking about their historical relationship to the United States, and race is inextricable from that. White supremacy in the United States means that white evangelicals have enjoyed privileges and safety not granted to non-white communities, evangelical or otherwise. And one of the most distinctive features of Christian heritage tours is the way they highlight white Christians in American history and exclude everyone else. I want to draw attention to that with my word choice, because it shows the entanglement of Christian nationalism with white supremacy. When tourists say “Christian America,” they mean white evangelical America. It’s much narrower than it sounds.</div></div><div><br /></div><div></div></blockquote><div><br /></div></div>Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3646245092253934596.post-32085865587448218932020-07-24T12:17:00.001-04:002020-07-24T12:20:48.416-04:00Religious Equality in America and White Christian Privilege<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span style="background-color: white; font-size: 17.6px;">Khyati Joshi in her new book, “White Christian Privilege: The Illusion of Religious Equality in America,” documents how in diverse ways whiteness and Christianity is favored in the US. She argues that Americans believe that there is religious equality in the US because of the First Amendment. They think that the constitution and courts have been successful in making the US a land of religious freedom. Dr. Joshi contends that this belief is not true and links whiteness privileges to Christian privileges. In an article in Religious News Service by Simran Jeet Singh, Dr. Joshi explains using </span><span style="font-size: 17.6px; text-align: left;">three key concepts: Christian privilege, <span style="background-color: white;">Christian normativity, and Christian hegemony. </span></span><span style="font-size: 17.6px; text-align: left;">Christian privilege is associated with the everyday advantages that Christians have in the United States. Christian normativity "</span><span style="font-size: 17.6px;">refers to how Christian ideas, beliefs, and practices have become so entrenched in American society that they have become the national standard." Christian hegemony is linked with the state or government. It demonstrates the myriad ways in which the American state endorses Christianity. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">In Khyati Joshi’s new book, “White Christian Privilege,” Joshi brings religion into the conversation about privilege, arguing that our perception of whiteness suffers from an “optical illusion”: that religion is one place where there is equality in America.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">Because it is enshrined in the First Amendment of the Constitution, we presume that religious equality is manifest in our society as well. Yet any analysis that neglects white Christianity’s role in creating and upholding whiteness, Joshi argues, fails to capture the full picture. </span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi7qQLSs4vuHMUiaUasiqR0FmGpN_Mix9ub9iPuxsqt-ImBzX5YOTj6tOqh50S2hhEzOSoj2ctz7-ja_8IfzY9-qAXiMjkaMUYX7cdNSjNTbotXBqw2zXXqrZNGF__FDJzXpdWK9z1a85HV/s1000/White+Christian+Privilege+Joshi.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="701" data-original-width="1000" height="350" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi7qQLSs4vuHMUiaUasiqR0FmGpN_Mix9ub9iPuxsqt-ImBzX5YOTj6tOqh50S2hhEzOSoj2ctz7-ja_8IfzY9-qAXiMjkaMUYX7cdNSjNTbotXBqw2zXXqrZNGF__FDJzXpdWK9z1a85HV/w500-h350/White+Christian+Privilege+Joshi.jpg" width="500" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">Source: <a href="https://religionnews.com/2020/07/23/3839522/">Religious News Service</a></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">Joshi upends our usual approach to these questions by focusing not on marginalized communities’ experiences, but the other side of the equation: how the dominant group has created, sustained and framed its distinct advantages. In helping us to see “the rules of society that have been constructed to benefit Christians,” Joshi connects the dots of just how this privilege functions.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">The relationship between whiteness and Christianity becomes clearer as Joshi follows multiple threads through American history that inextricably intertwined one’s faith and the color of one’s skin. In the 1790s, the U.S. Congress passed a naturalization act that declared one must be a free white man of good moral character to become a citizen. Explicit about race and gender (white, man) but implicit about religion (good moral character), the legislation deftly linked whiteness and morality, itself an indicator of being a Christian in good standing.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">Nearly a century later, when African Americans were granted citizenship through the 14th Amendment (1868) and the Naturalization Act of 1870, it seemed on its face a sign of racial progress. But non-Christian communities — East Asians, South Asians and Native Americans — were still denied citizenship, ensuring that who counted as an American had as much to do with religion as it did with race.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">Joshi organizes the rules of Christian society using three key concepts. The first is Christian privilege, which pertains to everyday advantages that folks who identify as Christian or grew up as Christian have in the United States. She gives an example from her childhood in the American South in which a Hindu American named Suha is barred from starting on his high school soccer team because he refused to recite the Lord’s Prayer with his coach and teammates prior to their matches.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">Suha’s story transported me back to my high school soccer days in Texas. My team, too, would recite the Lord’s Prayer before each game. I would kneel alongside my teammates and bow my head out of respect – it never occurred to me until much later that I could have requested we say a Sikh prayer as well. Christian prayer was the default, and that this seemed normal to all of us.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">Joshi’s second concept, Christian normativity, is related: It refers to how Christian ideas, beliefs and practices have become so entrenched in American society that they have become the national standard. Christian — and particularly Protestant — ways of doing things come to be so normal that non-Christian approaches are perceived as deviant, even threatening. It doesn’t take much of a leap from there to understand why maintaining Christian normativity is at odds with achieving religious pluralism and religious equality.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">The third bucket is Christian hegemony. Here the state is the power that endorses Christianity, inserting the words “under God” into the Pledge of Allegiance and the inscription of “In God We Trust” on our currency. These and other examples, Joshi argues convincingly, point to how deeply Christianity has been established as our official religion.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">The first half of the book, which recounts how these constructs have worked their way through American history, is fascinating and illuminating: fascinating because it helps us see the subtle and overt ways in which religion has partnered with race to produce American racism; powerful because Joshi sheds light on an aspect of white supremacy that is so often left under the hood.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">In the latter chapters, rather than historicizing and teaching, she shifts slowly into practical matters, which comes as little surprise to those who know her social justice training. It’s also refreshing in an academic text, a genre that more often than not wallows in problematizing and stops short of solutions.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">An entire chapter, “Making Meaning and Making Change,” offers helpful advice on how to move forward, as well as a vision for what it would take to establish religious equality and religious pluralism in America.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">Two ideas of hers stuck out to me in particular, both of which I am yearning to see realized. One is changing our assumptions. Once we can see clearly past the optical illusion of Christian privilege, we will become conscious of how damaging our assumptions of Christian normativity can be for religious minorities. Seeing its harmful impact can and should move us to challenge and change our assumptions of what is normal and acceptable.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">Second is Joshi’s suggestion of changing our paradigms. Living within a structure built on white supremacist and Christo-centric norms makes it difficult for those who are not white and not Christian to establish equal footing. Bending the structure, opening the door for other faiths to exercise privilege of their own, won’t work, as we will ultimately end up with the same results. A meaningful interrogation calls on us to replace it with a new paradigm, one that does not privilege any groups over any others.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 17.6px;">These interventions are as powerful as they are compelling: It is clear that without these steps, we have no path to realizing religious equality and pluralism.</span></div>
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Raja M. Ali Saleemhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16906332221452077200noreply@blogger.com0