Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka

In an interesting article about Sri Lanka, Tisaranee Gunasekara explains how the Rajapaksha siblings are using Sinhala Buddhist nationalism to keep people from uniting against them (Only A Pawn In Their Game). The economy is in doldrums and unemployment is very high __ youth unemployment between 20% to 25% __ but Sinhalese are overwhelmingly optimistic about the future. Sinhalese believe that as Rajapaksa siblings delivered militarily and won the civil war, they will also eventually deliver economically. Perhaps, Sinhalese will wake up in a couple of years but by then, the author argues, the virulent discourse against minorities would have done enough damage.

Tisaranee informs us that Rajapaksas are playing a game that has been played before in Sri Lanka. In the 1950s, politicians, realizing that they cannot win power on the basis of real economic or social issues, decided to divide the Sri Lankans. The 1953 hartal was against rulers and united Sri Lankans of all shades and outlooks. However, within two years, ethnic/religious/linguistic issues came to the forefront. (Perceived) preference for minorities by the state became the main issue and linguistic-religious nationalism dominated the minds of both Sinhalese and Tamil Sri Lankans and the rest is history.

It is difficult to think how violence can be committed in the name of Buddhism but in many countries, extremism is on the rise and Sangha leadership and monks are in the forefront of fight to subdue minorities (see The Rise of Extremist Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar).  

What I found interesting is that most militant nationalists -- whether civic, ethnic or religious -- today believe that  they are fighting a defensive war. As violence is unacceptable, the only way for nationalists to justify their militancy against minorities is arguing that they are fighting a defensive war. Minorities, even when are in very small numbers, are presented as overpowering, controlling and secretly trying to destroy the country with the assistance of foreigners. They are shown to be in cahoots with the enemies and bent on country's destruction. This scenario then demands action from majorities to save their nation, their country and future of their children. 

In June 2014, Aluthgama, a peaceful tourist resort in southwest Sri Lanka, where Muslims and Buddhists have lived side by side peacefully for generations, became a scene of mob communal violence primarily because of a rally by hardline Buddhist nationalist monks:

The rally, organized by the far-right Buddhist group Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force), was called in response to an alleged altercation in the area between a group of young Muslims and a Buddhist monk and his driver on an important Buddhist religious holiday days earlier.

Addressing the crowd of thousands Sunday, the BBS's leader, Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, gave an inflammatory speech.

Video footage from the event shows the orange-robed monk using derogatory terms for Muslims and, to approving roars from the crowd, vowing that if any Muslim laid a hand on a member of the Sinhalese majority -- let alone a monk -- that would "be the end" of them.

 Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, far-right Buddhist group Bodu Bala Sena's general secretary

 Source: Fear, shock among Sri Lankan Muslims in aftermath of Buddhist mob violence

After the rally, Buddhist mobs marched through Muslim neighborhoods, torching and destroying dozens of homes and shops, witnesses told CNN.

Following consecutive nights of violence, in which local medical staff say at least four people were killed and sixteen seriously injured, those made homeless by the rioting were sheltering in the town's main mosque Tuesday, shell-shocked and fearful of what may come next. (See Fear, shock among Sri Lankan Muslims in aftermath of Buddhist mob violence)

Taliban argue it's not drones or Afghanistan, it is the unislamic system

In a recent statement, the Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)'s spokesman clarified (one more time as they clarified before too, see TTP wants enforcement of sharia: Spokesman) that it is not the US drone attacks on tribal areas or Pakistani leaders being US slaves or presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan that is their reason for fighting. 

According to a news report, Shahidullah Shahid said it is the system that was imposed on Pakistan after 1947. It is clear TTP want their own system ( which they call Islamic system or sharia) imposed on Pakistan. And they think they have large support and are getting more popular in Pakistan (TTP claims its popularity graph is going north )

I hope this will clear the minds of some Taliban apologists but I am not very confident. See this statement by Imran Khan Taliban never sought imposition of Sharia in previous agreements Imran. 

Some will argue that TTP did initially accept talks under the Constitution of Pakistan. Yes, they did but there was no clear statement. It was only the negotiators that negotiated with the TTP negotiators (isn't it absurd) that assured us that TTP accepts Pakistan's Constitution. However, this lukewarm acceptance would last only for a few days and TTP's demands made clear that they do not accept the constitution or democracy.

Is Bibi a victim or an instigator?

An article in Al-Monitor Bibi becomes a victim of Israel's radical right argues that Israel's Prime Minister is facing pressure from his own cabinet members to reject any reasonable accord with the Palestinians. On February 13 several cabinet members marched in the controversial E1 area in the East Jerusalem. E1 or East Jerusalem 1 is the part of the land where, the Israeli government announced in December 2012, three thousand settlement housing units would be constructed to connect the illegal settlement of Ma’ale Adumim to Jerusalem and thereby ending any hope of a contiguous independent Palestinian state.

Transport Minister Katz is quoted as saying,

There must be construction in E1, and anyone who opposes this is opposed to the Ma'ale Adumim block being a part of the State of Israel, and let them not tell stories. One land, one state, strong and united, with Judea, Samaria and Hebron.

Judea and Samaria are the West Bank of the Jordan River and are almost nine-tenths of the future Palestinian state, so it is clear these cabinet members want nothing to do with the two-state solution.

Source: Gettyimages

But as Akiva Aldar, the author of the article, argues in the end, Bibi has been an instigator and a champion of such demands and even now can do a lot to stop them:

Twenty years after Netanyahu led the incitement campaign against the “Oslo criminals,” he has become a victim of that same messianic political movement that he nurtured. And perhaps, when he sits down next week in the Oval Office across from President Barack Obama, all the prime minister will want to say is, “You see who I have to deal with?” Let us hope that the leader of the greatest democracy will answer the guest from the little democracy thus: “I’m sick of these stories. A leader who has truly set reaching a peace agreement at the top of his priority list would have fired there and then the recalcitrant ministers and deputy ministers.”

Religious Nationalism and Holyland

The concept of holy land is very important in religious nationalism. Though every nationalism has a territorial dimension and all nationalist sing songs about the special significance of the piece of globe that they crave and usually there is religious dimension of it too (as America is frequently referred to as 'new Israel' or 'new Jerusalem'), religious nationalism is different as land sometimes even becomes more important than the people. Some areas have special significance for some religions like Palestine/Israel for the three Abrahamic religions, Hijaz (Saudi Arabia) for Islam or Rome for Christianity. Palestine/Israel is particularly linked with the word holy land because of the preponderance of Abrahamic religions in the world (An article about the importance of this land for the Judaism, Islam and Christianity and consequences for the conflict HolyLand, Unholy War: The Religious Dimension of Israeli-Palestine Conflict). However, religious nationalists are not limited because of absence of such significance. They create the significance themselves and the land becomes 'holy' even when the religious scriptures, prophets and early religious leaders never gave any importance to this particular piece of globe.

The usual arguments of the religious nationalists about holy land are as follows:

1. This land is special and have been awarded/gifted to people by God (or gods) to create a specific type of society where good always prevails and that is free from all evils i.e. heaven on earth. As one can notice the human agency is downplayed here.
2. The only way to create this society is to implement religious laws. Any other type of laws or mixing of other laws with religious laws would lead to strife, violence and eventual destruction of this society.
3. People from other religions have to accept that this is chosen land so they cannot be equal nationals/citizens.
4. Democracy is acceptable but it should be within the overarching framework of the religious doctrine.

An obvious similarity between religious and ethnic nationalism is that both appear to be discriminatory. However, religious nationalists would argue that they are more closer to civic nationalism as their nationalism is based on specific values that anyone can adopt and join. This is unlike ethnic nationalism that is based on ethnicity that is usually difficult to change for an individual.    

The current debate on whether Israel should be a Jewish state or not is particularly interesting in terms of the concept of holy land (See Four reasons why Israel must be recognized as a Jewish state and Why Israel Can't be a 'Jewish State')

For those who may think concepts like holy land are 'out there' believed by 'others', here is a powerful argument on the importance of holy land concept in the US history Sacred Geographies: Religion, Race, and the Holy Land in U.S. Literature 1890 -1920 by Molly K. Robey.

Gulen Movement : Transnational Religious Nationalism

An  (a little dated but interesting) conversation at Baker Institute, Rice University on Gulen/Hizmet movement. Transnational Religious Nationalism in Turkey: Gulen Movement 

Some points by Joshua D. Hendricks, whose book Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World came out in 2013: 

1. Gulen is a collective identity movement that very much relies upon the effective support of loyal supporters that constitute the upper echelons of the movement. They are what Max Weber has called 'charismatic aristocracy'.
2. Movement is more about social mobility than about religion or spirituality. Strategies incorporated to reproduce a sense of community and purpose in the Gulen movement is a very instructive case by which we can observe how the teachings of a charismatic leader can become routinized and institutionalized as an avenue for social mobility.
3. As a collective actor is Turkish context, the Gulen movement's preference for ambiguity, while discussing its organizational model, is perfect understandable. However, the US public sphere is very uneasy with this ambiguity when it comes to organizational capacity and this is likely to continue to be an Achilles heel for the movement here. 
4. AKP has been very successful in Turkey and it claims to be a conservative and not an Islamist party. AKP's success has a lot to do with its own actions but other groups have also contributed to it. The civil society coalition supporting the AKP is much broader and Gulen movement is a very important part of that coalition.
5. Gulen movement started from Izmir from a few student dormitories, Many of these dormitories later became colleges/high schools. The first two such colleges were Fateh college, Istanbul and Yamanlar college, Izmir. Later there were hundreds of such schools.
6. The focus of these schools was sciences and math. These subjects are central to their curriculum as Gulen teaching have argued that sciences and math is another way to talk about Creation. It is argued that Quran and science are two versions of the same story.
7. As students of these schools outperformed others educationally, it became difficult for Gulen's critics to claim students are brainwashed/Islamized in these schools. Ss schools first expanded to different part of Turkey and then to numerous countries of the world. The US now hosts most Gulen-inspired schools in the world, outside of Turkey.   
8. These schools provide a starting point for Turkish businesses and serve as informal Turkish embassies. Every time an AKP minister/official visits abroad, they visit these Turkish schools and praise them.
9. In addition to schools, Gulen sympathizers control banks, NGOs, media (TV stations, newspapers, journals etc.), educational supplier companies, publishing companies, an ICT firm, a thinktank, and many interfaith dialogue institutes throughout the Western world.
10. Islam in the 'other', the 'alien' in the West. The popular conversation about Islam in the West is very static, very uniform and very essentialist. More than one point seven billion people are talked about as they are all the same.  
11. Gulen teachings are similar to teachings of other revivalist charismatic leaders. 
12. Gulen 'aristocrats' talk about the exponential spread of Gulen movement but then they also claim there is no Gulen movement because there is no organic connection between its different parts (or what are claimed to be its different parts). So what is it?
13. Most of the people did not come to the movement because of Gulen or his teachings, although now they consider him to be the most learned person in the world (Gulen is called Hoja Effendi --- the esteemed teacher) and their principal inspiration. They came to the movement through their schools, their teachers, the subsidized housing assistance they received etc. So, at least for recruitment, motivation to participate is far from spiritual.
14. Recruitment is based on a market process where student/parents are first attracted to the Gulen movement because of its excellent entrance exam preparation for universities and then students are offered subsidized housing in cities. This subsidized housing units are called 'houses of light' and most student first come to know about Gulen teachings at these units. Most probably, in these units, students also come to know about all these Gulen inspired companies and possibly jobs/employment opportunities there. So, this is actually a social mobility movement in a society, like Turkey, where there are not many avenues of social mobility. 
15. Success leads to conspiracy. One of the main criticisms is that Gulen movement is taking over the state. Classical Islamist groups were about seizing the state but now there are many types of Islamic movements and many are not focusing on capturing the state and Gulen is one of them. 
16. But why Gulen movement is popular outside Turkey? Similar model as in Turkey. It is the excellent education provided or the 'teach to the test' methods or the promise of social mobility that attracts people rather than the Gulen teachings. Secondly, there is a demand for 'moderate' Islam here in West and Gulen is packaged for that.
17. Gulen movement maynot be all about selfless service to humanity or Islam. There are visits, conferences, awards, dialogue etc. arranged to popularize a specific view of Gulen. Gulen movement, in the words of its leaders here, presents a specific view of Turkish foreign policy. 
18. There is already a backlash against the movement in Russia, Holland and here in the US. Main reason for this backlash is ambiguity. Gulen inspired institutions are linked but these links are denied publicly.
19. Although there are are no legal links, Gulen schools in the US are linked with ideational, social, clientele networks etc. and these links are denied again and again. There are denials by schools and Gulen himself but his legal team in his US immigration application claimed that he is linked to hundreds of similar schools around the world.
20. Why this secrecy and contradiction? This is mind-boggling for parents and others here in the US, although understandable in Turkey.
21. Conclusion: Gulen movement is a successful non-violent Islam-inspired movement and it is important for not only Turkey but also for the world. So, they should come clean and not be ambiguous.

Y. Alp Aslandogan , President of Interfaith Dialogue, an organization linked with Gulen Movement, responded:

1. I accept that Gulen personality and teaching have something to do with the movement success, but not everything is related to Gulen. Similarly, it would not be correct to say that test-preparing schools or hostels are the biggest attraction.
2. Alternative theory about movement success- the sugar crystallization process. Gulen was the crystal that was dropped from outside, the other political, social, economic circumstances were already there. Turkish people were disillusioned by their leadership for decades and Gulen and his friends got their trust, through their work/service and are still successful because of their service/hizmet.
3. Spirituality plays a large part but this is not to deny the economic aspect of Gulen movement. Maybe somebody can do a study to locate where is the balance.
4. Gulen movement is not presented as but is actually an antidote to Al-Qaida. Gulen position against violence is decades-old and he is against Al-Qaida from the very start.
5. Conferences and visits are for social scientists/ people to learn about the movement. Movement does not know what the researchers are going to write. And there is no attempt to hide. For example, Joshua lived with movement members for months and movement did not know what he was going to write but still there was facilitation. If this is not transparency then what is. Similarly, there are other  researchers who were facilitated by the movement and then praised and criticized movement, without any reaction from the movement. 
6. There is not much backlash against the movement but some backlash against schools in some countries? This backlash is much more complicated then anger against the movement and its practices. For example, in Russia, backlash had something to do with contracts of military equipment.
7. Criticism by some parents (9 emails to Joshua) in the US has to be balanced by the vote of confidence of thousands of families who send their kids to these schools even today. Who is right, you decide?
8. There is also a phenomenon of 'guilt by association'. As Joshua said, people associate Islam with Khomeini and so any movement linked with Islam is also associated with Khomeini and then criticized or thought of as part of a conspiracy.
9. Movement has done a lot for Kurdish citizens and other minorities. Thousands of free schools/academies are working in Kurdish areas to get Kurdish children to become lawyers, doctors, engineers etc.  There is also village gatherings to educate illiterate villagers. Gulen affiliated TV channels were also the first to broadcast in Kurdish language after Turkish government decriminalized the Kurdish language broadcasting.  

US Jews less committed to Israel because of their religiosity or because of Israel's politics

Recently, Pew released report of the American Jewry A Portrait of Jewish Americans. The following infographic details some of the important stats in the report.

This report also surveyed Jewish Americans' support for Israel

Benjamin Barer (Jewish Intermarriage and Israel) discusses one claim made by eminent Jewish sociologist Steven Cohen on the basis of above stats showing support of Israel in various groups of Jewish Americans. Cohen claimed that if more Jewish children are raised in homes with two Jewish parents than the support of Israel would be more widespread.

Barer argues that the support of Israel may not be based on religiosity (i.e. more religious Jews are more supportive of Israel), linking it with homes with two Jewish parents. It may be linked to Israeli politics or how the Israeli state acts. As a committed Jew, planing to become s rabbi, he contends

In this case, we (younger, committed Jews) need to get the message across that there are other reasons why we -- not only 'cultural Jews' or 'Jews of no religion' -- are seen to have lessened (or abandoned) our attachment to Israel. Prime among them is that we do not define engagement with Israel purely as support for Israel. We know that critiquing Israel is a necessary, if sometimes difficult, part of forming and maintaining a robust relationship with a country that speaks in our name. Thus, when we see Israel acting -- politically and religiously -- in ways that we do not believe serve Israel's or Judaism's best interests, we feel inclined to speak out. Simply decreasing the rate of intermarriage among the next generation of Jews will not fix this problem. Talking about Israel, and the ideals that we hope it to embody, might.

Barer argument is valid but Cohen is also correct. Jewish Americans are less now less ready to support Israel no matter what it does, even when it ignores Jewish values. However, unconditional support is still more prevalent and likely to be more prevalent in religious Jews because probably they are more aware of Jewish history and feel more strongly about Israel's claim on the land. And so they are ready to ignore Israel's injustices in view of the centuries of injustice Jews have faced and do not think Palestinians have much right over the West Bank and Gaza.

Hence, there will be more people like Barer in future but they will still be a minority in the religious Jews group.

Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism

When a state argues to be based on religious nationalism, religion becomes important in defining who are full citizens of that state. It is a case similar to countries based on ethnic nationalism. Japanese, Turkish, Korean or German nationalisms are based on specific ethnicities and those ethnicities are sometimes consciously and blatantly and sometimes unconsciously prioritized. Not long ago, a Russian, having German ancestry, who could not speak German and had never lived in Germany had a stronger claim to German citizenship than a Turk, who had not only been born in Germany but had lived in Germany all his life.

In such 'ethnic' nations, it becomes very important to clearly define who has the 'correct' ancestry and who has not. It becomes important for the state to know, for example, whether both your parents of a citizen were born in the country or not, even if both of them are also citizens. These defining markers are controlled by the state as means of informing the masses who they are and what should be important to them and punishing those who ignore these markers. Recently, the highest court of Dominican Republic court stripped thousands of people of citizenship because their parents had entered the country illegally decades ago (see Haitian-descended residents of Dominican Republic stripped of citizenship by high court). 

In case of religious nationalism, the focus is on religion or sect so defining who is a Muslim, Jew or Catholic becomes important. An Irish joke makes this point clear. In Northern Ireland, a car is stopped at a checkpoint and policeman asks the driver, 'Are you a Catholic or a Protestant?' The driver answers, 'I am an atheist.' The policeman thinks for a few seconds and then asks, 'A Catholic-atheist or a Protestant-atheist?'

The first nationality marker is of course whether one is a member of the national church. This marker discriminates against those who are not members but states with religious nationalism usually ignore this criticism as many states based on ethnic nationalism also do when they discriminate against those not belonging to prioritized/majority ethnic group.

However, as citizenship comes with significant social, cultural and economic benefits, markers of nationalism (ethnic or religious) are contested. Minorities try to dilute these markers to be part of the mainstream while diverse social groups within the titular group try to narrow them to get a larger share of benefits. As a result, in case of ethnic nationalism, the titular group experiences more ethnic fragmentation and infighting. And in states with religious nationalism, sectarianism rages unless state decisively intervenes. Readers of this blog will remember that Malaysian lawmakers from ruling party UMNO recently suggested that Islam should be limited to Sunni sect. A much horrible aspect of sectarianism is visible in Pakistan where there are attacks on religious places and leaders of rival sects (Sectarian killings soar in Pakistan, raising fears of regional spillover).

Source: The Various Strands of Shiite-Sunni Discord

Can religious nationalists stop sectarianism? I personally think the answer is no.

Controlling the religious content in states based on religious nationalism

Controlling religious content is a key issue for states based on religious nationalism. There was a time when many governments either ignored this content or used it for their own political benefit or denied its link with religious violence. Now it's different. Most governments have realized extremist religious material is highly dangerous, so religious books, pamphlets, and speeches have to be regulated. Whether it is media or schools, religious states are increasingly trying to define what is right and what is wrong 'religion' or 'religious content'. 

In 2014, Hassan bin Salem talked about how Saudi Arabia is limiting access of religious preachers to schools (See Saudi Arabia tries to stop religious lectures in schools). Salem argues that it is not the first time it is done.

The move of the Ministry of Education is not the first of its kind, as the call has been reiterated over the past years. Sometimes, schools were compelled to obtain official approval prior to any lecture, and other times the ministry would specify the scholars who are allowed to give lectures without prior permit. These would be members of the Council of Senior Scholars. Other scholars would first have to obtain an official permission from the relevant authorities.

The goal of all of these steps, procedures and reservations is to protect students from being affected by any extremist theses or militant opinions that may be raised by some preachers. It is an important goal that the ministry ought to give enough attention.

Pakistan also tried to regulate the public diffusion of religious content that it considers extremist and aiding sectarianism and terrorism. The following four points of the 20-point National Action Program (NAP) , issued after the Peshawar massacre in December 2014, are reproduced below: 

11. Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organisations through print and electronic media.

13. Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely.

14. Concrete measures against promotion of terrorism through internet and social media.

18. Action against elements spreading sectarianism.

However, it appears that efforts of both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have not been successful. Similarly, in Israel, extremist views have become more and more kosher and mainstream, despite some efforts by the government to restrict the downward slide. The reason is clear. While some parts of these states are working to regulate and control religious content, other parts are working to spread them. Furthermore, when state itself is publishing and promoting discriminatory content, it is difficult to decide where to draw the line. One solution frequently prescribed is to draw the line when the content calls for violence. However, this apparently easy solution is actually not so easy as it is difficult to define what is a call for violence.

Is Religious Nationalism in Malaysia an end in itself or just a mean to continue the erstwhile Malay Nationalism?

Michael D. Barr and Anantha R. Govindasamy discuss this issue in their article 'The Islamisation of Malaysia: religious nationalism in the service of ethnonationalism' in Australian Journal of International Affairs (2010). The abstract is copied below.

The relationship between religious, ethnic and national identities in Malaysia has long been fraught with uncomfortable tensions especially for the 50 percent of Malaysians who are outside the dominant Malay- Muslim communal grouping. Until the accession of Dr Mahathir to the prime ministership at the beginning of the 1980s, it was clear that ethnic identity trumped religious identity, even though being Muslim was already intrinsic to being accepted as Malay. Being a non-Malay Malaysian was to accept a subordinate, but not a drastically uncomfortable role in the nation. Since the 1980s, however, religious identity appears to have replaced ethnicity as the central element of nation identity as the society has been systematically even aggressively Islamised. Yet appearances can be deceiving, and there is a strong case to be made that Islamisation in Malaysia is basically a variation of the original Malay ethnonationalism, using the nearly complete symbiosis between Malay and Muslim identity as the point of articulation that allows religious nationalism to serve as a cipher for ethnonationalism but a version of ethnonationalism that is much less accommodating of minorities than was traditional Malay nationalism. This article places contemporary events in a historical context and then focuses on just one aspect of Malaysia’s program of Islamisation that is both contemporary and central to national identity developments in the education system, and particularly within the secondary school history curriculum to demonstrate that in this instance at least, religious nationalism is operating as a surrogate for ethnic nationalism and has, in fact, intensified ethnic nationalism by raising the stakes for the communities that are outside the core national group.

Source: Early Malay nationalism

As the title and abstract shows, authors think that the current Islamization is just a way to promote Malay nationalism which has been diluted over the years because two of its main pillars, Malay language and adat, have been widely adopted and are not the distinguishing features anymore. So, Islam is the only distinguishing feature of Malay identity and so it is being used to keep the Malay ascendancy intact and promote the centrality of Malay identity in the national identity.  As authors contend:

It should rather be regarded as a tool in the service of that ethnic agenda -- a program of hegemony designed to reinforce Malay occupation at the heart of Malaysia’s nation-building project and to condition non-Malays and non-Muslims to accept their assimilation into the Malaysian nation as subordinate, peripheral partners. We also argue that this project has had the entirely predictable effect of reducing the comfort levels of the non-Muslim minorities.

To prove their point, authors trace the history of Malaysia and show that Islam was previously only a part of Malay identity and was not given much prominence. Since Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981, however, Islamization of state has made great strides. Islamic diet, dress, architecture etc. have been promoted by the state. There also have been changes in laws and constitution and non-Malay partners of UMNO have been unable to stop these changes which make them peripheral partners in the national project. Authors also present a detailed analysis of history books of two grades that show how Islam is prioritized.

That Malaysia has been more Islamized since the 1980s is, without doubt, true and almost all of the article gives evidence of that. However, the evidence that authors give for it being a facade for continuing Malay dominance is not strong. Evidence from many Muslim-majority countries shows Muslims societies being more concerned about religious practice and behavior and governments enacting laws to promote them. Why cannot Malaysian elite be following this global trend? Why the change in Malaysian state is not the result of the change in society which is now more religious than thirty years ago? Why is it not the result of identity issues becoming more important for Malays (the main voting bloc for UMNO) as they become more prosperous, making previously dominant economic issues recede in significance?  

Reza Aslan on the Future of Religious Nationalism

A five minute video Future of Religious Nationalism based on an interview of Reza Aslan, author of Zealot: Life and Times of Jesus of Nazareth and No God but God: The origin and Evolution of Islam.
Aslan  argues that religion as the focus of collective identity is not something weird but religion is a force that cannot be controlled in geographic boundaries by a state. Religious nationalism will thus fade away but it cannot be suppressed.

The prescription of Aslan is that religious nationalism should be allowed to fail. Aslan contends that if we allow religious nationalists to compete and win, one of the two things will happen. Either religious nationalists will fail or they will moderate their ideology as AKP, the ruling party of Turkey, has done.

Malaysia's turn to Islamism?

Malaysia's two characteristics has always pulled it in opposite directions. Its multi-ethnic/religious composition forces it to move away from political Islam but its religious/Malay nationalism drives it toward political Islam. If one looks at Malaysian history, one can see a clear trend of its ruling party United Malays National Organization (UMNO) using more religious rhetoric and agreeing to more legislation linked to Islam, despite always governing with a coalition of Chinese and Indian parties. Recently, UMNO has taken more steps in the same direction:

• For the first time, it has agreed to consider the applicability of Hudud punishments in Malaysia.
• Some of its leaders have called for narrowing the definition of Islam to Sunni sect, thus excluding the Shias. UMNO can now claimed to be defender of Islam, not only from outside but also from the inside.
• In the recent general assembly of UMNO, Prime Minister Najib has largely ignored the UMNO's slogan for last election '1Malaysia', propagating a Malaysia in which all are equal partners. PM Najib has also given in to conservatives in his party over the use of the word 'Allah' by Christians.

Analysts have given several reasons for this recent religious turn in UMNO. 

• UMNO has won the lowest number of seats in last elections since 1969 and Chinese and Indian voters largely rejected UMNO-led coalition. UMNO, therefore, feels it has no option but to shore up its core Muslim Malay constituency.        
• UMNO wants to break the opposition alliance by weening away Islamist Pan-Malaysian Islamic party (PAS) by showing its commitment to Islam.
• UMNO's previous strategy of getting votes by providing economic benefits to Malays has been less effective recently due to economic slowdown and other parties committing to Malay interests.

However, UMNO also understands that too sharp a trend toward Islam-based politics will not only be a bad election strategy but will also be disastrous for ethnic harmony in Malaysia. 

'The Hindus' Controversy

A book on Hinduism has been withdrawn by The Penguin India publishers. Controversial Book, 'The Hindus', By Religious Scholar Wendy Doniger Withdrawn By Penguin Over Lawsuit. 

The lawsuit against the book was filed by Shiksha Bachao Andolan, an organization that has filed cases against other books before for misrepresenting Indian history, leaders etc.Major Victory for Shiksha Bachao Andolan Samiti

Talking to Time, Shiksha Bachao Andolan's president Dinanath Batra explained why he thinks The Hindus should be banned. He claimed that it hurts Hindu sentiments and disrespects national icons.Sex, Lies and Hinduism: Why A Hindu Activist Targeted Wendy Doniger’s Book

Ms. Doniger said that she was 'deeply troubled by what it foretells for free speech in India in the present, and steadily worsening, political climate'. Penguin withdraws book on Hinduism

Arundhati Roy criticized the decision. Arundhati Roy criticises Penguin for pulping The Hindus: An Alternative History. In an open letter to Penguin India, she wrote,  

“Everybody is shocked at what you have done. You must tell us what happened. What terrified you? The elections are still a few months away. The fascists are, thus far, only campaigning... And you’ve already succumbed.”

Shiksha Bachao Andolan is considered close to Hindu nationalist organizations, including the opposition party BJP. 

It appears India and Pakistan are following each other. Nationalist/religious groups in both countries force others to comply with their versions of history.  

Iran and Saudi Arabia: Two religious nationalistic states in competition

An article from Tehran Times on the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Iran-Saudi Relations: How to manage unsavory competition)

Is the competition because of their competing Shia and Wahabi nationalisms or because of more mundane quest for regional supremacy or a combination of both?

Competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran was apparent even in pre-revolutionary Iran and some will argue that it is the most recent manifestation of the centuries-old rivalry between the Arabs and the Persians. But has having different religious nationalisms made rapprochement more difficult?

Is Qatar a new causality of Saudi-Iran competition? Besides Brotherhood and Al-Jazeera, Iran is cited as the third issue that led to the unprecedented recall of Saudi, Emarati and Bahraini Ambassadors from Qatar. Three Gulf Countries Pull Ambassadors from Qatar over its support for Islamists. Are Qatar and Oman planning to defy Saudi Arabia on Iran? Qatar, Oman seek to enhance ties to counter Saudi Arabia’s sway over PGCC

Nationalism Crash Course

Since we are talking about religious nationalism, it will be important to also understand what is nationalism. So, enjoy this you tube video on  nationalism (Nationalism Crash Course). A more academic post on nationalism will follow.

An important fact that this video highlights is the link between public education and nationalism.  

Questions about Modi, the incoming Prime Minister of India

A recent article about Narendra Modi gives a balanced view of what will happen if Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) wins the next elections and Modi becomes the Prime Minister of the largest democracy in the world (In Upcoming Indian Election, the Legacy of Religious Violence Looms). 

There are apprehensions about Mr. Modi's promotion of Hindutva (Hindu nationalism) in the past and his current dog-whistle strategy; his role in massacre of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002; his links with Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (a Hindu organization that has used violence in the past to implement Hindutva and where Modi learned politics); and his authoritarian streak. These apprehensions add to what minorities in India already fear about the rise of the BJP, a right-wing Hindu nationalist party.

These apprehensions about Modi and BJP are countered by the following arguments:

• No party in India has attained majority since the 1990s. So, Modi and BJP would have to make coalitions to rule and these coalitions with regional parties would keep them in check. This happened in 1998-2004 when BJP last ruled India and this will happen again.
• India is too diverse and has too many social, economic, administrative and cultural players. All these cannot be fitted in the straitjacket of Hindu nationalism, even if Modi and BJP try.
• The alternative is more of Indian National Congress, the party of Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. This party not only has become ineffective, corrupt and staid after ruling for last ten years but also have a record of failing to safeguard minorities.   
• Muslims themselves have moved on, so the world (including the US) should also. What happened in 2002 is in past and one should look to the future.

All these arguments are cogent and compelling but what outsiders and at least some Indian minorities fear are not regular riots and persecution under Modi. 

It is the gradual movement of the center of Indian politics towards right. Some statements and actions that were previously unthinkable, becoming mainstream. Like what happened in Europe recently. Right wing nationalists are not winning in Europe but they have changed the conversation about minorities and immigrants.  

It is one riot or massacre that puts minorities 'in their place' for a whole generation, like what happened in Gujarat under Modi's watch. Modi might not have played any role in the massacre but he surely contributed to the atmosphere where such massacres were possible.    

Is studying religion a service to the state? Will the 'praying division' of the Israeli military disband?

Studying religion may be accorded as much importance as military service in states based on religious nationalism. At the time of Israel's formation, to unify all groups behind the national cause, the secular political leadership made a deal with the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish (Haredi) leadership under which Haredi religious students, studying Torah, would be temporarily exempted from the compulsory military service. The special arrangement came to be known as Torato Omanuto arrangement. 

This arrangement was not an issue when the number of yeshiva (religious school) students asking for exemption using this arrangement was small. However, when the number grew almost exponentially (from less than a thousand in 1968 to more than forty thousand in 2005), secular and other Jewish religious groups started complaining. A case was filed against the exemption in the 1990s. The court decided that the arrangement was illegal as it had only been based on the orders of a defense minister. A law had to be passed to continue Torato Omanuto arrangement.

Students at Jerusalem’s Mir Yeshiva, the largest Jewish seminary in Israel

Source: Jerusalem - Israel Finance Ministry Cuts Yeshiva Funds After Court Ruling, Angers Ultra-Orthodox Jews

Israeli government formed a committee in 1999 under former Supreme Court Justice Tzvi Tal to come up with an agreed version of a bill that would be passed by the Knesset. Report of Tal committee resulted in Tal law (Deferral of Military Service for Yeshiva Students Law) which had to be renewed after every five years. Under this law, getting exemption became a bit more difficult and Israeli military (IDF) was asked to increase the number of Orthodox units (units where certain military rules are relaxed to ease the sensibilities of religious Jews) to make it easier for yeshiva students to serve. However, it did not result in much change and yeshiva students continued to avoid enlistment in large numbers as before. Although government admitted to the Supreme Court that there was a very small increase in enlistments by yeshiva students, it extended the law in 2007. The situation did not improve even after efforts by government and in 2012 the court declared Tal law unconstitutional. Prime Minister Netanyahu tried halfheartedly to come up with a compromise and a new law but talks failed and Knesset was dissolved. 

After the elections, Netanyahu formed a new government in March 2013 without ultra-religious parties and promised equal burden-sharing arrangement but due to the pressure of right wing parties from outside and conservative members of his own party, there was no progress on the issue. It was in these circumstances that court issued an interim injunction in February 2014 to compel the government to act by freezing part of the funding to yeshiva students and questioning the authority of the defense minister to keep issuing exemptions (Funding cuts for Haredi draft-dodgers finally puts an end to Knesset foot-dragging).

This issue brings into focus the Jewish character of Israeli nationalism. Yeshiva students claim to be doing at least as important national service (keeping Jewish tradition alive and praying for the Israeli people) as military personnel and they have been called 'praying division' of the Israeli military. Obviously, yeshiva students and their supporters believe in Jewish nationalism and are enraged at the attempts of other Israelis to belittle Torah study. Other Israelis, however, find it difficult to understand why yeshiva students would not bear an equal burden in the defense of a state in which they (yeshiva students) have such a privileged position.

It is important to note, however, that despite the reluctance of ultra-orthodox Jews to join the Israeli military, the Israeli military is gradually becoming more religious as there are many types of religious Jews in Israel. Most of the new recruits come from the settlements and are very religious. The Israeli governments and military have given various concessions to the religious sections of the society (such as some segregation of sexes in the military, separate units etc) and later have enlisted in large numbers. This development has implications for future peace with Palestinians as many 'settler-soldiers' join the military not to defend national boundaries of Israel but the biblical boundaries of Israel and Biblical Israel included the West Bank, Gaza, and other areas. The refusal of many Israeli soldiers to uproot settlers from Gaza in 2005 is an indicator of what problems Israel can face, if Israel makes a peace deal with the Palestinians and agrees to withdraw from these areas.   

Estimating/Measuring Religious Nationalism

Measuring the religious content of a country's nationalism is difficult. Nationalist struggles bring together a broad spectrum of ideas and groups. However, there is usually some specific culture, religion, language, ethnicity (or aspects thereof) that are prioritized, highlighted and repeatedly mentioned to inscribe them to the nation’s memory. Even primordialists, those who believe in immemorial, unchanging nations, now agree that nationalists have to choose from tens, if not hundreds, of different folk tales, martyrs and myths to help the ‘rebirth’ of the nation.

It is difficult to quantify the role of religion in a country’s nationalism but effort can be made to at least come up with criteria on the basis of which a reasonably fair assessment can be made and countries can be compared. Three criteria can be selected to assess religion’s role in nationalism of a country: founding fathers statements/actions during and after nationalist struggle; national mottos, crests, emblems, anthems, flags; and public pronouncements of leaders on national holidays. The more religion figures in these three criteria, more is its role in nationalism.

Founding Fathers' statements/actions

Period of independence is important in studying nationalism as it is the period when leaders decide, devise and employ the nationalistic myths, martyrs, narratives and slogans to arouse and mobilize people. After the independence is won, this is the period which people look back on to decide who they are.

Aviad Rubin in his article (The status of religion in emergent political regimes: lessons from Turkey and Israel, 2013) argues that the period of new regime formation is very important, ‘The conditions in place at the moment of regime formation are of crucial importance to the future status of religion in the state…Following the establishment of the new regime, the emerging political elite is likely to implement the fundamentals of its political agenda... After being solidified in institutional and constitutional arrangements, the initial structure can remain resilient for many years despite significant social and political changes.’

Mottos, crests, anthems and flags

Symbols are very important to nationalism. They define nations and make them visible. As Michael Walzer in his article (The Facsimile Fallacy, 1967) contends flags, anthems and other national symbols are required because nations had to be personified and seen before they are loved. Gabriella Elgenius in her book Symbols of Nation and Nationalism: Celebrating Nationhood (2011) argues that national symbols ‘repeatedly illuminate boundaries and raise awareness of membership’, hence they are crucial to nationalism. Geisler in his book National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative (2005) explains why these symbols are significant part of nationalism and nation-building effort.

‘Yet national symbols perform an important function not only as catalysts for the formation and maintenance of national identity. They take on a particularly crucial importance in fusing a nation to a state. For especially in those cases where the territorial boundaries of the state do not correspond to the geographic outlines of the ancestral “homeland” claimed by a nation, or where a state is created without the ideological support structure of a nation, national symbols are charged with the difficult task of creating a nation’. 

Flags, anthems and mottos are symbols that are recognized as related to a nation’s identity both inside the nation and internationally. Flags and anthems stir emotions across nations as they are considered embodiment of nation’s history and pride. Therefore, for understanding religion’s role in the nationalism of a country flags, crests, anthems and mottos can be analyzed for their religious content. Following symbols can be particularly useful:

1.      Official country motto, crest/emblem, anthem

2.      Mottos of the three/four armed forces, anthems

3.      Mottos of the states/provinces

National Days

Similarly, national days are important national symbols. If flags and anthems are visual and auditory symbols of a nation, national days are temporal symbols of nationalism. The selection of national day inform us how a nation sees itself and what is important to a nation. Beside the basis of selection of national days, what is said and done on a national day also shows the kind of nationalism (ethnic, religious, civic etc.) a nation believes in.  Therefore, to ascertain religion’s role in a country’s nationalism, not only the selection of the national day has to be analyzed but also the speeches of the head of government/state on that day. Number of references to religion/religion-related symbols in the public pronouncements by the President and Prime Minister (or head of state/government) on the most important national holidays would inform whether the nationalism is religious or not.  

Are Taliban religious nationalists or Pukhtun nationalists?

This issue has bedeviled analysts for a long time. The question keeps popping up as the solution of the Taliban insurgency in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is linked to it. Are they Pukhtun or Pashtun nationalists fighting to liberate their homeland or are they holy warriors fighting for the pristine Islam of the 7th century? Or if they are are a combination of both, which is the dominant ideology for the Taliban, Pukhtun nationalism or Islam/Islamism/pan-Islamism? 

In 2009, this issue was discussed with different shades of opinion making their case. Some claimed that Pukhtun nationalism was dominant and contended that the Taliban were the 'latest incarnation of Pukhtun nationalism' and 'the radical Islamist insurgency is itself a reassertion of the concept of Pushtunistan on both sides of the  Afghanistan-Pakistan border' as Kaplan did here (Saving Afghanistan). Others, and certainly the Taliban themselves, claim that they are Islamist or pan-Islamist i.e. believers in religious nationalism (like I Didn't Want To). Others have been more nuanced opinion as Michael Totten discussed this issue in 2009 (The Taliban and Pashtun Nationalism).  

The Taliban are more than an expression of Pashtun nationalism, of course. They represent a reactionary movement that idealizes the simplicity and extreme conservatism of 7th century Islam. By burnishing this ideology, the Taliban is able, absurdly, to attract support beyond its Pashtun base. 

The ethnic component, though, is a formidable one. It all but guaranteed a certain degreeof success by the Taliban in all of “Pashtunistan,” in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Yet all the while, the ethnic map imposes constraints, if not limits, on how far the Taliban can expand.

While many would argue that the Pakistani Taliban are different from the Afghan Taliban, the debate about their ideology does not change much. There is a popular perception in Pakistan that Pakistani Taliban were noble savages living in the blissful 'state of nature' before Pakistan army on the directives of the US entered tribal areas and destroyed the heaven. Imran Khan, leader of the party getting the second largest number of votes in last elections, believes in this theory of Pukhtun nationalism and claimed recently that sharia imposition was never one of Taliban demands, thus rejecting religious nationalism of Taliban ( Imposition of shariah is not Taliban demand: IK). His party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf won the provincial elections in the Pukhtunkhwa province, the province having Pukhtun majority and bordering Afghanistan. However, his coalition partners Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist party, believes otherwise and considers the Taliban as fellow religious nationalists, fighting to revive the glory of Islam. 

The current peace talk going on between the umbrella group of Taliban organizations, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has again focused attention on this issue. While Government of Pakistan (GOP) has tried to localize them and claimed that negotiations are about the specific tribal areas where Taliban are mostly based, Taliban and their negotiators have argued that the fight of Taliban is about Islam and so negotiations are about how to implement Shariah in the whole of Pakistan (Govt's committee waiting for Taliban's response).

One of the ways to tackle the issue will be to look whether the Taliban are ready to give up their tribal customs (or what they think as their culture) for Islam or vice versa? For instance, almost all Muslims believe that women education is recommended in Islam and this includes education of non-religious subjects. While the Taliban have tried to dodge the issue in the recent past, it is clear from their conduct and policies adopted during their five-year rule that they would prefer women limiting their study to basic Quran and Sunnah lessons. Similarly, while the Quran clearly speaks against the killing of innocents, the Taliban have shown their willingness to kill innocents, if they do not adhere to their (Taliban's) strict interpretations. After the US invasion, they have also engaged in kidnappings for ransom and drug trade, despite earlier acknowledging that these actions were forbidden in Islam. Drug trade was banned when the Taliban were ruling Afghanistan but now the Taliban not only allow it but profit from it. Clearly, the Taliban are not fully adhering to Islamic injunctions and using it to achieve their cultural, ethnic, group or personal objectives. 

However, the Taliban have always proclaimed themselves as soldiers of Islam and are very strict in observing Islamic ibadah and rituals. Using their pan-Islamic message, they have been successful in decreasing the strength of tribal loyalties that are very important for Pukhtun culture. This success, albeit, has remained confined to Pukhtuns and non-Pukhtun Muslims have rejected the Taliban's pan-Islamism. In fact, ethnic and sectarian divisions and boundaries in Afghanistan, 99% Muslim, have deepened after the Taliban emergence. In Afghanistan, the Taliban represent not Muslim nationalism but Sunni nationalism or even more restricted Salafi (Wahhabi) or Deobandi nationalism. They have failed to present themselves as an Islamic force to other ethnic and sectarian groups in Afghanistan and commentators are talking of two Afghanistans, one for Pukhtuns and other for non-Pukhtuns.

So, if the Taliban are not true Islamic warriors, are they true adherents of Pashtunwali, ancient code of Pukhtun nationalism? Not really. When the Taliban rose, they first rejected the tribal elders and jirga (an assembly of elders to settle disputes), both essential tenets of the Pashtunwali.  According to the code, badal or revenge was limited to the perpetrator, his family or his tribe. Under the Taliban, badal of a Taliban was extended to any anti-Taliban, a gross misinterpretation. Massacres of innocents and abduction of women of rivals are again not part of Pashtunwali but were part of the Taliban tactics.

Pukhtun Jirga (assembly of elders)

Source: Foreign Policy

So, are the Taliban religious nationalists or Pukhtun nationalists? They are both, meaning they are neither true religious/Muslim nationalists nor true Pukhtun nationalists. Like most groups, their history, ethnicity, religion, society, and culture has influenced them. The Taliban cannot eliminate any of these influences even if they want to. They are a farrago of Pakhtunwali, Deobandi school, and Salafism (Wahhabism) so they do not entirely and precisely follow the predominant practices of Pakhtunwali, Deobandi school, and Salafism.

The Taliban were students of madressahs of Deobandi sect of Islam, but quite different than the Deobandism practiced in other parts of South Asia. What Taliban practiced was a hotchpotch of Pashtunwali-Deobandism[12] with Saudi-inspred practices. The Saudi influence came up with the Saudi money in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.[13] They attempted to create more or less a state modeled on the principles of Saudi Arabia.[14] The Taliban ideology could be understood from their imposition of ‘Sharia’ based laws and banning of certain practices which they deemed against Islamic traditions. The Taliban ideology could be clearly examined by analyzing their acts and implementation of tribal-based practices. 

This elusive mix resulted in the edifice which Taliban tried to erect and which shocked the world. The Taliban clerics defined their state as true manifestation of an ideal Islamic one. In that sense they tried to implement a tribal customs-mixed Islam on Afghan populace that the world had never seen before. The Taliban’s Saudi influences were harsher than that of Saudis as they lacked oil wealth to appease the masses and Afghan society though tribal but not homogeneous Taliban went further in following the Saudi model and considered all of their practices as ‘true’ interpretations of Quran. As Deobandism is more of an urban phenomenon in India and Pakistan[15] the Deobandism of Taliban was much different and their practices were more inspired of Saudi system and the laws.[16] Despite of the world’s abhorrence of their imposed laws the Taliban laws were considerably well received in Pashtun dominated areas as most of these edicts were already part of Pashtun culture. (See Understanding Taliban through the prism of Pashtunwali code)

Okay, but can we ascertain which is the major influence on the Taliban, Islam or Pashtunwali? It is difficult as the Taliban are a collection of groups fighting under the overall command of the Taliban leader Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada. Most of these groups are close-knitted men, sometimes from one tribe, fighting under the command of one tribal leader in a particular area. Based on the preference of leader or tribe, either of the three influences (Pashtunwali, Deobandi or Salafism) can be dominant.

Saudi monarchy shifting away from religious nationalism?

In Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia (Middle Eastern Studies, 34(3), (July 1998)), Joseph Nevo argues that religious nationalism has proved to be a double-edged sword. Although Wahabi clerics have become civil servants and have delivered fatwas as directed, religious rhetoric has opened the regime to fierce criticism from religious clerics that are not state's payroll. 

Nevo contends that the Saudi rulers are now looking to develop other sources of identity and legitimacy besides Islam. However, there is not much information on what are these sources and how it is being done. Moreover, Nevo has not touched on how Saudi rulers have used their promotion of Islamic/Wahabi causes outside the kingdom to gain legitimacy inside the kingdom.

Ahmadinejad fought for Iranian (territorial) nationalism against religious nationalism

Reza Aslan, an Iranian-American and author of Zealot: The life and times of Jesus of Nazareth, argues that former Ahmadinejad was the first president to challenge the power of Iranian clerics and so we will soon miss him, despite our contempt for what he stood for. (See Missing Mahmoud_(Ahmadinejad)?)

Ahmadinejad promoted Iran's glorious past and an 'Iranian Islam', showing his preference for Iran over Islam. He also claimed to be in communication with the Hidden Imam, thus striking at the heart of clergy's argument that they are ruling on behalf of the Hidden Imam.

During the 20th century (and maybe even before), Iranians and their leaders have swayed between linguistic/territorial nationalism and religious nationalism.Some of the leaders promoted their choice of nationalism and tried to stamp out the other one, like Reza Shah/Khan and Imam Khomeini. Others preferred one type but didn't tried to forcefully negate other. Reza Shah's son and the last Shah, Muhammad Reza Shah  falls into this category though many people would not agree. Muhammad Reza Shah, like Ahmadinejad, tried to mix territorial nationalism with religion. Although, his preference was clearly territorial nationalism focusing on monarchy, he used religion too. He visited religious shrines, claimed to be visited/protected by Shia Imams and imam of Tehran was present on airport to give blessings to Shah every time Shah went for a foreign trip. 

Similarly, contrary to the popular image, leaders after Islamic revolution in 1979 have also tried use territorial/Persian nationalism while preferring religious nationalism. Imam Khomeini tried to end nauroz festival but backed out after resistance from Iranians. Currently, nauroz is main annual holiday in Islamic Republic and Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomenei addresses the nation on this festival that has nothing to do with Islam. Similarly, Iran's religious rulers have preferred Christian Armenians over fellow Muslims and fellow Shia brethren of Azerbaijan to support Iranian integrity.

    

‘Religion and politics’ in Israel: The mythology of Jewish nationalism

An interesting discussion on Israel and Jewish nationalism. For a long time, religious nationalists were not organized and indifferent to politics, not anymore. Bibi is just a symbol of new power of religious nationalists. Which way will Israel go? Jewish, democratic or Jewish and democratic



‘Religion and politics’ in Israel: The mythology of Jewish nationalism

Is religious nationalism a necessary condition for state Islamization?

Defining Islam’s role in state affairs is an issue that has bedeviled most Muslim majority countries (MMCs) since their independence from colonial rule. Debates about how Islam/sharia relate to constitutional provisions, policies and penal laws polarize the populace in thee countries and national consensus on this issue is a rarity. Sometimes it appears that a consensus has emerged about state Islamization in an MMC and the country has moved on to more mundane and less polarizing issues. However, soon events bring the issue back to the fore. As more MMCs democratize, new parties and social classes assume power and take a fresh look at their country’s problems. Public debates become more open in these fragile democracies and new constitutions, laws and policies are approved. Islamic precepts are part of these debates, implicitly or explicitly, because Islam is a powerful social force in these societies. Governments cannot ignore it even if they want to.

Yet, despite the similarity of circumstances in many MMCs, the success of state Islamization is varied. In some countries, it has succeeded to transform the state but in others, it’s conspicuous because of its absence. Some analysts have argued that this variance is due to differences in the popularity of Islamic movements/parties in the MMCs. They contend that popular Islamic parties cause state Islamization directly by implementing it after coming to power or indirectly by pressurizing those in power. Others have countered these arguments by pointing out that most of the successful state Islamization projects have been completed under autocratic regimes. They argue that authoritarian regimes use state Islamization to acquire legitimacy.

Source: The Islamization of Pakistan

Both these propositions have weak support. Recent news coming from the Middle East also does not support the argument that Islamic parties’ victories necessarily lead to state Islamization as Islamic parties have largely failed to Islamize the state even after winning elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey. Similarly, linking autocracy with state Islamization is difficult as most autocratic regimes in the MMCs have brutally suppressed Islamists and rejected state Islamization. So, what are the causes of state Islamization? Why, in some MMCs, Islam plays a large role in state affairs, while in others it has almost no influence on state laws and policies? 

It can be argued that it is Islam’s role in the nationalism of an MMC that influences the extent of state Islamization in that country. Scholars have pointed out that the relationship of religion with nationalism and religion’s role in the state may be closely linked. Successful state Islamization by authoritarian regimes or by Islamist parties may be possible only in MMCs where nationalism and Islam are intertwined. Even in non-Muslim countries, religion plays a much larger role in the public sphere and in the governmental affairs of countries where national identity is linked with a particular religion than in countries where nationalism is based on ethnolinguistic ties or has a civic character. Religious leaders in countries like Israel, Malta and Ireland have regularly influenced political issues and legitimized this intervention on the basis of their religion’s special relationship with the state.

What is Religious Nationalism?

This blog will focus on religious nationalism and its effects on the politics of diverse countries. I will mostly write about countries where religious nationalism is strong, such as Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, etc. However, other countries where religious nationalism is increasing (e.g. Turkey, Poland and the US) or decreasing (e. g. Nepal and Ireland) will also be discussed.

But before discussing the effects of religious nationalism, let's first define it.


Scholars have difficulty agreeing on how to define nationalism and religion so, unsurprisingly, efforts to come up with a universal definition of religious nationalism have been unsuccessful. Atalia Omer and Jason Springs (2013) in their book Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook argue that religious nationalism is the situation when ‘political and religious objectives are conflated and interwoven’. Later, they coin the term ethnoreligious nationalism which not only adds another complex concept, ethnicity, to the mix but also excludes states, such as Pakistan, where ethnicity works against religious nationalism, from the ambit of the definition.

Source: University of Manitoba

Before the 1970s, academic literature primarily portrayed nationalism as a new religion replacing the old religion so religious nationalism was an oxymoron. Nationalism developed in the 17^th and 18^th centuries in Europe and was predominantly based on ethnic and/or linguistic affinity. It was argued that as nationalism slowly gained strength, the power of religion waned and the nation became the primary or core identity of the people. Nationalism, like the old religion, had myths, symbols and heroes and expected similar undivided loyalty. Naturally, this led to a tussle between religion and nationalism and, in many states, nationalism and religion became competitors. Religious leaders criticized nationalism as a liberal or Western imposition that was intolerant of religion and promoted differences within the religious flock. Many modernist scholars agreed with these religious leaders that nationalism is linked with modernity and is detrimental to religion. Peter van der Veer in his seminal book, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India, rejects this dichotomy between nationalism and religion:

The claim that something like religious nationalism exists will be rejected by many students of nationalism for the simple reason that both nationalism and its theory depend on a Western discourse of modernity. This discourse constitutes the traditional as its antithesis and interprets difference as backwardness. A crucial element of the discourse of modernity is the opposition of the religious to the secular. One point I want to make in this book is that leading theories of nationalism tend to ignore the importance of colonialism and orientalism in the spread of nationalism. To understand religious nationalism in India we need both an analysis of tradition that is not prejudiced by the discourse of modernity and a theory of the impact of colonialism and Orientalism that does not deny agency to colonial subjects. (van der Veer 1994, x)

van der Veer argues that nationalism is not always the result of the demise of tradition/religion. Sometimes, it may be the result of the diffusion of tradition/religion and modernity as was the case in India:

Nationalism is generally assumed to belong squarely on the modern side of the great divide. It is the result of the demise of traditional society and is therefore a sign of modernity. But there is a tension between this view and the observation that, in many societies, nationalism is the product of diffusion. In the latter case, the modern is not the result of a historical transition; rather, the modern invades the traditional. According to Dumont, this leads to a period of uneasy combinations, as exemplified by Indian communalism, which combines religion and nationalism. (van der Veer 1994, 17)

Both Steve Bruce, in his book Politics and Religion (2003), and Roger Brubaker, in his article Religion and nationalism: four approaches (2012), have tried to explain different relationships between religion and nationalism or nationalists. Bruce has identified four types of relationships between religion and nationalists. 

1. Nationalists mobilize strong religious identities: In these countries, nationalism and religion are deeply enmeshed. It is difficult to separate the two. National identity is based on religious identity and, usually, the major rival country of these countries has a different sect or religion, which helps strengthen the relationship between religion/sect and the nation. Pakistan, Israel and Iran are examples of such countries. 
2. Nationalists mobilize and re-ignite weak religious identities: In countries exhibiting this relationship, changing boundaries and religious diversity has hindered in forging a strong religious identity with the nation. Bruce gives the example of Russia and Ukraine where nationalists are now trying to revive and possibly unite these weak identities. 
3. Nationalists reject strong religious identities: Usually, this rejection is due to national elite’s repudiation of any role of religion in public affairs after a period of tussle with the religious establishment. France, Mexico, etc. are examples of such a relationship. 
4. Nationalists again reject religious identities but the reasons are different: Bruce identifies most sub-Saharan African countries as examples of this type of relationship. The reason why African elite reject religious identities as the basis of nationalism is not only religious diversity in their countries but also the inability of the Christianity, the majority religion in most African countries, to provide the myths necessary for forging a strong nationalism. Christianity is further impaired by its complicity in the horrors of slavery and colonialism.

Roger Brubaker, in his article referred above, presents four ways to analyze religion and nationalism connection but these may also be considered to be four types of relationships between religion and nationalism. In the first case, religion and nationalism contest each other. Each tries to become the primary identity of a group of people, to the exclusion of the other. Nationalism is considered a modern religion that is trying to replace the old one. 

Second, religion explains some aspects of nationalism. Usually, these aspects are the origin and early development. Religion is an implicit part of the nationalist ideology of a large number of countries. Third, religion contributes to nationalism and is a visible part of the national identity. Some national myths and symbols maybe religion-based. 

Finally, Brubaker defines a much stronger relationship between religion and nationalism. In this case, it is difficult to separate the two. This relationship can be identified as religious nationalism but Brubaker is reluctant to call this type as nationalism as according to him nationalism is related to a polity existing within other polities and this type of religious nationalism downplays polities and nations. In this relationship, the majority religion and nationalism are so intertwined that the nation supposedly owes its existence to the religion. Nationalisms of Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia can be presented as examples of such nationalism. 


Phillips Barker in his book Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God be for Us (2009) argues that there are two aspects of religious nationalism, although the first is much more important than the second. Religion’s role in national identity defines religious nationalism. According to Barker, ‘Religion must be central to national identity and to conceptions of what it means to belong to a given nation. If religion is not the central feature of the national identity, it is at least one of the several features. In addition, these other features will nearly always be coterminous with religious identity. In other words, a religious nationalism may focus equally on religion and language, but the individuals engulfed by the religious and linguistic markers are one and the same.’ The second aspect of religious nationalism is political religion i.e. religious influence on state laws, policies etc. Barker explains it as ‘the extent to which identification translates into action.’

Roger Friedland in his article Money, Sex, and God: The Erotic Logic of Religious Nationalism (2002) argues that religious nationalism has to be understood on the basis of institutional logic, structure and metaphors and not in terms of (Marxist) class conflict or quest for power by clerics:

Religious nationalism cannot be explained and hence interpreted in terms of class-specific material or status injury~Simpson 1983:201–02!. Neither can it be understood as a project of religious inclusion, of group representation. Nor is it merely a clerical power-play. Religious nationalist movements are often led by the laity, not the clerics...

Religious nationalism seeks to extend the institutional logic of religion into the domain of the democratic nation-state, deriving authority from an absolute divine writ, rather than a subjective aggregation of the demos. The nation’s history is seen as a cosmic drama that pushes toward redemption, not progress. Agency is located in a disciplined self bound by faith in God, not a sacralized, self-interested monad. Society is constituted not by abstract, disembodied individuals in markets but through the gendered flesh of the family bound together by faith.

Friedland defines religious nationalism in terms of four constitutive elements:

A specific chain of four elements can be found in the symbolic order of all contemporary religious nationalisms. First, religious nationalism configures the territorial collectivity asa sacred space and a divinely invested subject. Religious nationalisms all focus on the penetration and permeability of the boundaries of that territorial space, whether by foreign investment, civil or foreign war, immigration, or a global commodified culture. The defense of the integrity of the territorial space, as in all nationalist projects, is the medium through which the coherence, identity, and power of the collective subject is known and narrated. In every case of religious nationalism, there is an acute sense that that boundedness is at risk. Second, religious nationalists direct the bulk of their attention to the bodies of women—covering, separating, and regulating their erotic flesh. Third, religious nationalists accord considerable symbolic importance to money, to foreign money, to money out of control. And fourth, religious nationalists submit lovingly to God. 

Barbara-Ann Reiffer in her article Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship (2003) argues that the relationship between religion and nationalism has not received due importance. In the writings of scholars of nationalism, religion is ignored completely or receives a cursory mention. Citing the writings of Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawm, she argues that although religion contributed significantly to the Western European nationalisms, only economic factors are highlighted or religion’s contribution is diluted by presenting it as part of the culture. She attributes this trend to the propensity in the scholars studying nationalism to present nationalism as a modern movement/concept. Reiffer contends that religious nationalism often results in religion’s precepts ‘institutionalized in laws and procedures governing the nation.’

Reiffer also offers a categorization of the different types of interaction between religion and nationalism. The first category, religious nationalism, refers to the situation where religion and nationalism are inseparable. According to Reiffer, ‘it is a community of religious people or the political movement of a group of people heavily influenced by religious beliefs who aspire to be politically self-determining.’ The second category is ‘instrumental pious nationalism’ where religion is part of nationalism but it is not nationalism's most cardinal aspect. Mostly, such nationalism is used by the political elite to provide an additional layer of national cohesion on the core based on other characteristics such as ethnicity, language etc. The third category is ‘secular/anti-religion nationalism’ where religion does not form any part of nationalism or nationalism is defined on the basis of the fight against the dominant religion. 

So, what is religious nationalism? As the above discussion shows, it is difficult to come up with a definition that encompasses all aspect of this complex phenomenon. I find Barker's definition better than others:

Religion must be central to national identity and to conceptions of what it means to belong to a given nation. If religion is not the central feature of the national identity, it is at least one of the several features. In addition, these other features will nearly always be coterminous with religious identity. In other words, a religious nationalism may focus equally on religion and language, but the individuals engulfed by the religious and linguistic markers are one and the same.