Malta, LGBT rights, abortion, & religious nationalism

Malta, a small island nation in the Mediterranean Sea, has a national identity that is strongly influenced by Catholicism. The religious culture of Malta can be traced back to the Order of the Knights of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem (also called the Knights Hospitaller and the Knights of Malta) which participated in the Crusades and were given the control over Malta in 1530 because of their contribution and devotion to the religious cause. Knights Hospitaller had an interesting history. A religious order created in the 7th century to take care of the Christian pilgrims and sick in the Holy Land (Jerusalem) it became a military order by the turn of the millennium. It also expanded and had properties donated to them or built by them all over Europe. After the fall of Jerusalem (1187) to Saladin and later of Kingdom of Jerusalem (1291), the Knights moved to Cyprus and then captured Rhodes to become Knights of Rhodes in the 14th century. Here, the Knights primary opponents were Barbary pirates and Muslim Turks. The Ottomans were eventually able to able to defeat Knights after almost fifty years of a military campaign in 1522. The Knights were allowed to withdraw from Rhodes and after seven years were given the control of Malta by the Spanish monarch, courtesy a former knight and Pope Clement VII in 1530 for a symbolic annual tribute of a single Maltese falcon. From 1530 to 1798, the Knights of Malta, as they were called, ruled and shaped life in Malta. Napoleon defeated them in 1798, on the way to the Egyptian invasion. Later, Malta came under the British in 1814 and became independent in 1964.

Philip Barker in his book, Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God be for Us, contends that Malta's Catholic identity, acquired under the Knights, was crystallized under the rule of the religious "other." First, it was Muslim Turks, then anticlerical French, and finally, for the next one and a half century, it was Protestant Britain. Due to the domination of religious other, "Catholicism is central to self-perception" of the Maltese. Unsurprisingly, Maltese politics is influenced by the majority religion and Article 2 of the Constitution makes Catholicism the state religion of Malta, gives the Church the duty and the right to teach people morality, and makes religious teaching mandatory in all public schools.

One can argue that, like in Ireland and Poland, Catholicism is an integral part of Malta's nationalism. Religious nationalism until recently accepted and proclaimed. The preeminance of the Catholic Church could be seen in state ceremonies. For instance, in Maltese courts, a person under aoth also has to kiss a cross presented to him/her (minorities are allowed to kiss their own holy books or the Maltese constitution). All incoming Prime Minister tradiotnally kiss a cross after taking oath. In January 2020, after taking the oath, the new PM Robert Abela also kissed the cross. And it was quite a scandel when Alfred Sant, a Labour PM, refused to kiss the cross in 1996. 

An interesting article in The Economist (Malta leads the way for gay and transgender rights in Europe) rightly argues that the tiny island "is deeply Catholic and hardly an oasis of liberalism." Usually, it is Northern and Western European countries that come up with policies that are then followed by Eastern and Southern European countries. Sometimes, the latter adopt these policies on their own accord but, at other times,  they have to be pushed. Many Eastern European countries, for instance, adopted liberal policies when these policies were made a requisite condition for entry into the European Union. 

Malta is conservative country but changes are happening and the hold of religious elements, particularly the Catholic Church, is decreasing. In 2011, Malta legalized divorce after a long hard fight. It required a national referendum to decide the issue. In 2013, the Labour Party, a center-left party defeated the center-right Nationalist Party. The Labour Party took power after fifteen years. Since then, Labour Party has come up with several liberal policies. First, in 2016, Malta became the only country in Europe to ban conversion therapy for gays. Second, in July 2017, Malta made the language in the official documents gender-neutral. Gendered terms, such as father, husband, wife, and mother, were removed from the country’s Marriage Act and all other laws. Next, in August 2017, Malta legalized same-sex marriage. Some would, however, argue Malta has been liberal since the early 2000s. Gays were allowed to openly serve in the military in 2002 and discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation have been criminalized since 2004.

Source: Malta leads the way for gay and transgender rights in Europe

Today, Malta is recognized as one of the most gay-friendly countries in the world. This may be taken as an indication of decrease of religious nationalism and many would hope that Malta would soon become a secular country. However, although the hold of the Catholic Church has wanned, it is still very influential. Exihbit 1: Malta is the only country in the EU that still bans abortion entirely. Even in case of incest, rape or danger to mother's life, abortion is not allowed. 

And the new PM Abela is not oging to change things. He sees no reason why the constitution should be amended and Roman Catholicism removed as Malta's official religion. He said:

Malta is a secular state, but the constitution also affords a strong, fundamental freedom that everyone is entitled to his religion of choice...While I believe in a secular society, where there is a distinction between the State and religion, and the autonomies are respected, we share common values and I wanted to send a message.

Abela is also for strict policy against abortion. He has made clear that he would not support any changes in the law regarding abortion (Malta Today).

Is there a separation of church and state in Islam?

Millions of people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, even scores of academics, believe that in Islam, there is no separation of church and state. They point out to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) being a prophet as well as the head of the state. The period of the first four righteous caliphs, the Rashidun (632-661), is also presented as evidence.  The presence of close links between Muslim kings and ulema (scholars of Islam) and the implementation of Sharia by Muslim sovereigns strengthens the case and finally, views of noted Islamists and examples of governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia are used to close the argument.

Several assumptions are made in these arguments that have no basis in history. These assumptions are based on applying a normative framework based on European experience on Islam. Understanding Islamic religion and history using European and Christian experience as the model will, unsurprisingly, lead to distorted and/or sub-optimal results. Following is an example of Muslims and Islam being considered copies of Christians and Christianity and Christian history of Europe being considered a model for Muslims to adopt:

Consider the most famous waves of Christian violence, in the 16th and 17th centuries. Wars of religion devastated Europe, killing huge percentages of national populations. States disintegrated and acts of terror were commonplace. The main impetus for these wars was the question of which Christian sect - Protestantism or Catholicism - would rule each state. Clergy had great amounts of political power, dispensing law and owning huge tracts of land. Nationalism was, as yet, weak. The question of which religion would dominate in which area was also the question of who would rule. 

Eventually Europe’s religious wars calmed down, and a solution was reached. In the Peace of Westphalia, it was agreed that governments - not clergy - would get to decide which religion would prevail in their territories...

Nowadays, the Middle East is embroiled in a set of conflicts that look a bit reminiscent of the European Wars of Religion. A few powerful, cohesive states - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey - are fueling proxy wars in anarchic areas like Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen...Just as the European Wars of Religion featured Christians mostly killing Christians, the Islamic Wars of Religion feature mostly Muslims killing other Muslims...The obvious solution, it would seem, is for Islam to come to the same collective realization that Christianity came to after 1648 - that church and state make for a volatile mix, and should be separated. (Source: Noah Smith: Islam Needs To Separate Church and State)

The antagonistic relationship that Christianity had with the state for its initial three hundred years has no parallel in Islam, whose relationship with the state was without serious disagreements. Furthermore, and more importantly, there has never been a church in the form of the Catholic Church in Islamic history. One can search far and wide and will not find it. There has never been a pope, with his bishops, in Islamic history that could speak for God. In medieval Europe, there was one Pope (except for a few decades) and many rulers, making the Pope's opinion and approval important. In almost all Muslim realms, in contrast, there was one king and scores of Muslim scholars to choose from. There were many kings who may have been excommunicated by Muslim clerics but since there was no central religious authority so there were few repercussions for the king (excommunicating clerics, however, suffered imprisonment, exile, and even execution for their transgression). Kings and emperors always had many more clerics to endorse them than those who reject them.    

Graham E. Fuller, in his book A World Without Islam (2012) brilliantly unpacks the differences between sway and power of the Catholic Church and the lack of anything similar in the Islamic history (as given in Separation of “church and state” in Islamic history):

Islam actually had no parallel to the intimate links between church and state in the West, where the church itself wielded great political and economic power.  While Islamists today — those speaking for forms of political Islam — constantly emphasize the indissoluble unity of religion and state in Islam (din wa dawla), in fact, this perception is largely a modern ideological construct: state power in Islam was virtually always distinct from the clerics.  Religious officials in Islamic states never appointed leadership or controlled the state.  (Clerical domination of the state in today’s Iran is a glaring exception, a modern Shi‘ite innovation.)  Even in Saudi Arabia the monarchy in most contexts is far more powerful than are clerical institutions.

To be sure, the legitimacy of Muslim rulers historically depended upon their implementation of Shari‘a law, at least in theory, but a great deal of the time rulers did not seriously implement its spirit, and they rarely could be overthrown for such religious lapses.  In fact, some medieval Muslim clerics inadvertently dispensed virtual carte blanche authority to misrule by secular powers by declaring that anarchy (fitna) was worse even than oppressive rule (dhulm).  Indeed, no sultan or Muslim ruler in Islamic history ever kneeled to ask forgiveness before a grand mufti in the way that Henry IV was forced to do before the pope in 1077 in Canossa for challenging papal authority on some key secular matters. Henry VIII of England had to break with Rome entirely simply to secure the divorce he sought from his wife.  Thus, intimate linkage between religious and state power marked most of Christian history in a way that has had no parallel in Islam.  (122-123)

And this lack of a Church, with a capital C, in Islam is not a historical development. It is what flows from the Quran and the Sunnah (of the Prophet), two basic sources of Islam. Nowhere in the Quran is there mention of the establishment of a Church. Similarly, the Prophet, in his life, did not establish a Church. Islam propagates a direct relationship between an individual and her God, enjoins Muslims to study the Quran and seek guidance from it. Clearly, this set-up does not favor the establishment of a powerful church and a priesthood that can rival kings. 

Historically, after the Prophet, the religious authority of the leader was withdrawn. The Rashidun, whose period is considered to be a model, to be emulated by all future leaders, by the Sunnis, did not have religious authority. They did introduce some new things or promoted some actions but their decisions regarding religion were always contested and remain contested today. They did not have the religious authority of a prophet, not even a pope. There were many companions of the Prophet who were considered equally or more well-versed in Islamic precepts and edicts than the four caliphs. It is nor without reason that the four righteous caliphs never claimed to be in communication with God or receiving any direct instructions (like the Prophet did). The Prophet also clearly told in his lifetime that after him, there would no revelation. The door of revelation, the direct communication with God, was permanently closed for all times to come after him. There is also no claim for a superior esoteric knowledge that the leader will have had over and above others. None of the caliphs claimed it. Although Shiites do believe Ali, the last of the Rashidun, had superior esoteric knowledge of divine rules, he ruled for only four years and what to say of his religious authority, his temporal authority was contested like none of the other three previous caliphs. During his whole tenure, he fought to end a rebellion and he was martyred before the rebellion ended.

If Rashidun could not (or did not) claim religious authority, the caliphs that came afterward had no choice but to leave religious authority in the hands of clerics. The caliphs after Rashidun were not very different from Christian or Hindu kings. They had attained power not because of their close association with Islam or the Prophet, but due to their superior military might and political acumen. They knew it and most of the Muslims under than knew it so there were not many attempts to enforce something different. Of course, there were few dynasties that did claim divine right to rule, such as the Fatimids, but their religious authority was never completely accepted in their own realm, what to say in the whole Muslim world.

The relationship between Muslim kings and emperors on one hand and the chief judge (Qazi ul-quzat) and chief law interpreter (Shiekh ul-Islam) -- two powerful positions generally reserved for clerics -- was mostly similar to the relationship between the king and the (grand) vizir. Vizirs had authority but they served at the pleasure of the king. The king could appoint any of the scholars of Islam to the above-mentioned posts and usually, the selection was based on scholar's acceptance of the sovereign's authority. 

The king had to publically follow Islam and enforce Sharia. But here again, kings had options. They could suspend or ignore rules they did not like. They could also publicly flaunt their non-acceptance of some parts of Sharia and get away with it. Most of the Muslim kings murdered their rivals (including their brothers, nephews, etc.) and fought wars against other Muslim kings, leading to the deaths of thousands of Muslims. Many of them drank alcohol and had harams full of women. 

Unsurprisingly, there is also an Islamic tradition of God-fearing, learned, and illustrious clerics avoiding and refusing any relationship with the rulers. All founders of the five major schools of thought of Islam (Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Shafa'i, Imam Malik, Imam Hanbal, and Shiite Imam Jaafar) had an antagonistic relationship with their state authorities. A few of them, such Imam Abu Hanifa, were offered the posts of chief faqih (interpreter of law) and/or chief judge but they refused. There are also some hadiths (sayings of the Prophet) that discourage people from accepting powerful appointments or having a close relationship with rulers:

Whoever goes to the gates of the ruler will endure trail/temptation. A person does not move closer to the ruler except that he moves further away from Allah. (Source: Musnad Ahmad 8619)

He who has been appointed a judge among the people has been killed without a knife. (Source: Sunan Abu Dawud 3571)

The rule of ulema or theocracy is a concept alien to Islam. Medieval Islamic texts, many written by clerics themselves, almost never present clerics as an alternative to a bad or unislamic ruler. The concept of Walayet-e-Faqih or guardian jurist (developed by Imam Khomeini and later enshrined in the Iranian Constitution) is a new concept even in the long Shiite tradition. Even now, many of the Shiite clerics both inside and outside Iran reject this concept.  

The above discussion also invalidates the last argument. The Islamists and the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia might claim that there is no separation of church and state in Islam but it is clearly not the case. Therefore, they can keep justifying their desires or their actions by pointing to something imaginary but their proclamations do not make it real. Some rudimentary knowledge of the Quran, the Sunnah, and Islamic history settles the question that the church and state are separate in Islam.

  

Ireland's waning religious nationalism

Nationalism and Christianity were very close and overlapping in 19th century Europe. Most of the European countries believed their nation had a special affinity with God. Since all of these countries were Christian-majority, so the God was Christian God (See Religious nationalism in 19th century Europe). While many European countries lost their enthusiasm for religious nationalism in the early 20th century, Ireland, primarily due to the long history of Catholic persecution by the Britishers, was brimming with Christian nationalism at that time (See Irish Nationalism, Easter Rising (1916) and Catholic Church). After independence, Ireland adopted a constitution that highlighted the role of the Catholic Church. For instance, the Preamble of the Constitution stated:

In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred,We, the people of Éire,

Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial,

Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful independence of our Nation, And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations, Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.

Furthermore, Article 44(1)2º stated, "The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens. (This clause was removed by the Fifth amendment as given below).

Source: Ireland: A Chronology of De-Christianization

In the wake of the Irish referendum on liberalizing abortion, Church Militant, a Catholic magazine published an article Ireland: A Chronology of De-Christianization to demonstrate the gradual delinking of the Catholic Chruch and the state in the Republic of Ireland. The chronology only mentions the defeats and ignores the victories of those who believed in religious nationalism such as the 1983 referendum related to abortion and the 1986 referendum on divorce. In 1983, 66.9% voted to approve a constitutional amendment recognising the right to life of the unborn child (In 2018, almost the same proportion (66.4%) voted to repeal this amendment). In 1986, 63.5% rejected a proposed constitutional amendment to remove the prohibition on divorce that was part of the original constitution enacted in 1937:

1972: Irish voters approve, by a referendum margin of 84 percent, a constitutional amendment repealing Article 44 of the Irish Constitution, which recognized "the Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of citizens."

1973: The Irish Supreme Court declares a right to marital privacy which includes contraceptive use, but declines to overturn laws prohibiting the sale of contraceptives.

1979: The Health (Family Planning) Act becomes law, allowing pharmacists to dispense contraceptives to those holding a prescription from a doctor.

1985: The Health (Family Planning) Amendment Act becomes law, allowing the over-the-counter sale of condoms and spermicides to anyone over the age of 18.

1987: Ireland's first openly homosexual public official, David Norris, is elected to the Senate. A pedophilia defender and anti-Catholic bigot, Norris would call Pope St. John Paul II an "instrument of evil" and Pope Benedict XVI "a Nazi." His 2011 presidential campaign would implode after it was revealed that he sought clemency for a convicted homosexual child rapist who had been his partner in sodomy.

1988: In Norris v. Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights rules that Irish law prohibiting sodomy violates Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

1989: The Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act becomes law, which outlaws so-called hate speech directed against so-called sexual orientation.

1990: Mary Robinson, a former senator who advocated for the legalization of contraception, divorce and homosexuality, is elected the seventh president of Ireland. Robinson was the nominee of the Labour Party, but was also endorsed by the Marxist-Leninist Workers Party.

1992:The Health (Family Planning) Amendment Act becomes law, allowing the unrestricted sale of contraceptives to anyone over the age of 17.

1992: In Attorney-General v. X, the Irish Supreme Court declares a right to abortion arising from a threat to the life of the mother, including suicidal ideation.

1992: Voters in Ireland reject, by a referendum margin of 65 percent, a proposed amendment to the Irish Constitution which would overturn the X ruling.

1992: The Thirteenth Amendment to the Irish Constitution is passed, by a referendum margin of 62 percent, establishing a "right to travel" outside the country for the purpose of procuring an abortion. Between 6,000 and 8,000 Irish women go to England each year to kill their unborn children.

1992: The Fourteenth Amendment to the Irish Constitution is passed, by a referendum margin of 59 percent, establishing a right to obtain information about abortion.

1993: The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act becomes law, decriminalizing sodomy in Ireland.

1995: The Fifteenth Amendment to the Irish Constitution repealed, by a referendum margin of 50.2 percent, the constitutional prohibition against divorce, and allowed the civil dissolution of marriage.

1998: The Employment Equality Act becomes law, prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon so-called sexual orientation.

2000: The Equal Status Act becomes law, prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations based upon so-called sexual orientation.

2003: The European Convention on Human Rights Act becomes law, by which Ireland accepts the radically anti-Christian legal code of the European Union.

2007: In Foy v. Ireland, the Irish High Court rules that Irish law contravenes Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights by refusing to recognize as a woman a man who underwent so-called sex re-assignment surgery.

2010: The Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act becomes law, without a recorded roll call, establishing civil unions for same-sex couples.

2011: The Republic of Ireland closes its Embassy to the Holy See. Diplomatic relations with the Vatican are maintained through the Irish Embassy to the Italian Republic and the Apostolic Nunciature in Ireland.

2011: The first openly homosexual TD's (members of parliament) — Jerry Buttimer, John Lyons and Dominic Hannigan — are elected to the Dail.

2013: The Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act becomes law, legalizing abortion in cases of suicidal ideation by the mother.

2015: The Children and Family Relationships Act becomes law, allowing homosexual partners to adopt children.

2015: The Thirty-Fourth Amendment to the Irish Constitution is passed, by a referendum margin of 62 percentage, allowing two persons to contract marriage "without distinction as to their sex."

2015: The first openly homosexual cabinet minister, Leo Varadkar, the son of an Indian immigrant, becomes Minister of Health.

2015: The Gender Recognition Act becomes law, allowing individuals to define their own gender.

2015: The Employment Equality Amendment Act becomes law, which extends anti-discrimination law pertaining to homosexuals and the so-called transgendered to Catholic schools and hospitals, and other religious institutions.

2016: American-born Katherine A. Zappone becomes Ireland's first openly lesbian cabinet minister, when she is appointed Minister for Children and Youth. Zappone is civilly "married" to Ann Gilligan, a former Catholic nun with whom she became romantically involved while both were studying at Jesuit administered Boston College.

2017: Leo Varadkar becomes Ireland's first homosexual prime minister.

2017: The United Nations recommends that Irish schools introduce compulsory sex education, which should include "comprehensive sex education for adolescent girls and boys covering responsible sexual behaviors and focused on preventing early pregnancies, and ensure that it is scientifically objective and its delivery by schools is closely monitored and evaluated."

2018: Dail Eireann passes, in its second reading, the Provision of Objective Sex Education Bill, which, if enacted, would force Catholic schools to indoctrinate Catholic children with propaganda affirming abortion, contraception, gender dysphoria and sodomy.

2018: The Irish Department of Education orders Catholic schools to change religion classes from an opt-out to an opt-in requirement.

2018: The Irish government proposes an amendment to the Status Act, which would forbid Catholic schools from giving enrollment preference to Catholic students. 

2018: The Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution, which guaranteed the right to life of unborn children, is repealed in a national referendum by a margin of 66.4 percent.

There are still some remnants of religious nationalism, such as the Preamble and Article 6 (1):

All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, under God, from the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, according to the requirements of the common good.

Article 44(1):

The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour religion.

Finally, the oaths of the President, Council of State, and judges etc. start with the words, "In the presence of Almighty God, ..."

Religious nationalism in 19th century Europe

Hugh McLeod in his article, "Christianity and nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe" (International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, Vol. 15, No.1, 2015) discusses the 19th century European nationalisms, the relationship between Christianity and nationalisms and religious support for the First World War in all the European countries.

McLeod argues that nationalism was one of the most influential ideologies in 19th century Europe, along with socialism, liberalism and conservatism. Nationalism was sometimes allied with liberalism and at other times with conservatism. Socialists were also not devoid of nationalist sentiments. 

Mcleod distinguishes between three types of nationalisms in nineteenth-century Europe:

Nationalism 'from below': The nationalism of the subject peoples, living within the great European Empires, that asserted their right to more autonomy or independence

Unification nationalisms: The nationalism of the people, who belonged to the same culture but were divided into numerous small states, that sought to form a unified nation-state for these 

Nationalism ‘from above’: The nationalism propagated by the governments through the education

system, etc. in their own countries so that their people are ready to defend or attack and do not fall prey to nationalism 'from below.'

Mcleod explains, with examples, why nationalism and Christianity were so close and overlapping in 19th century Europe or, in other words, why religious nationalism was so popular at that time:

Many of the classic histories of nationalism see it as an essentially secular ideology – even as a ‘political religion’, substituting for a declining Christianity. The French Revolution does indeed demonstrate this possibility. But more often nationalists made free use of Christian symbols and concepts, and churches willingly embraced nationalist ideologies. 

Benedict Anderson famously defined the nation as an ‘Imagined Community’, whereby people felt an affinity with millions of others, whom they had never met and with whom they might have little in common, because they belonged to the same ‘nation’. But this ‘Imagined Community’ could not be created out of nothing. Its basic building blocks were shared language and/or shared historical memories. Even the language sometimes had a significant religious dimension, as is shown by the importance of translations of the Bible in the history of many languages. The historical memories nearly always had a significant religious dimension. The alliance between religion and nationalism was two-edged in its implications both for nationalism and for Christianity – as I shall argue. But it was uniquely potent as a means of inspiring both devotion to the nation and loyalty to the church. As regards the latter, it is well known that, in an era of increasing secularisation in many parts of Europe, loyalty to the church reached its highest levels in countries such as Ireland, where the links between religious and national identities were closest. Conversely, secularisation progressed much more rapidly where nationalism had a predominantly anti-church or anti-religious character....  

When nationalists pointed to shared experiences of oppression or of unity against external foes, these experiences were more often than not associated with religion. For example, in the eyes of Irish nationalists, the clearest example of British oppression was offered by the anti-Catholic Penal Laws ..... For English nationalists, on the other hand, the proudest moment in their national history was the defeat in 1588 of the Spanish Armada.... 

The national heroes whom they revered more often than not had an evident religious significance. The greatest figures in Spanish history were Ferdinand and Isabella, ‘The Catholic Monarchs’, who had not only united the nation, but had forced Muslims and Jews either to convert or to leave....  

Nationalists liked to celebrate distinctive national values and virtues, and very often these were seen as having religious roots. Thus nineteenth-century Britons frequently claimed that their political power, their economic success and their free institutions were all rooted in Protestantism. In a typical sermon of 1898, Dr Welldon, headmaster of Harrow School and later Bishop of Calcutta, claimed that ‘wherever there was a nation that was stationary and retrogressive it was Catholic, wherever there was a people that was progressive and Imperial it was Protestant’.... 

Nationalists celebrated the art, architecture, literature, music and folklore of their people, and very often these were shaped by specific religious traditions. A classic case is the French Catholic revival of the years around 1900, which was strongly coloured by nationalism.... An important part of this rediscovery was the realisation that French history and culture were so deeply imbued with Catholicism, that to be truly French it was necessary also to be Catholic. 

Nationalists also drew on ideas of national mission or chosenness. Many nineteenth century Britons believed that the British Empire had been providentially ordained to facilitate the spread of the pure Protestant gospel. Sometimes, as in France there were two rival versions of this national mission: one pointing to France’s historical identity as ‘The Eldest Daughter of the Church’, while the other focused on ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’.... 

More commonly, as in Britain, explicitly religious and more secular understandings of national mission, rather than being in opposition to one another were mutually reinforcing, offering a repertoire of justifications for national pride and national power which could be drawn upon separately or in combination as the situation demanded. The historian of missions, Andrew Walls, highlights the immense popularity of the poetry of Rudyard Kipling, whose justification for British (and American) imperialism as ‘The White Man’s Burden’, though not explicitly Christian, drew on biblical language and examples in a way that both Christian and agnostic readers found inspiring.

Meanwhile priests and pastors were often strongly influenced by nationalist ideas and gave them influential support through sermons, through ‘national’ hymns, through the teaching in church schools, through Christian youth organisations. 

Anniversaries of notable battles, as well as royal birthdays and jubilees provided occasions for special services with patriotic sermons and sometimes the composition of new hymns with patriotic themes. For example Queen Victoria’s jubilees in 1887 and 1897 were marked by numerous special services at which imperial themes played a big role. The year 1913 saw the anniversary of the Prussian uprising against Napoleon and special services were held in many German churches.... Walls notes a new category of ‘national hymns’ entering British hymn-books in the 1880s, and observes that it was then that hymn-books began to include the national anthem. The Swedish historian Alf Tergel refers to the popularity in the early years of the twentieth century of hymns by J.A. Eklund, bishop of Karlstad. In ‘Our Fathers’ Church’ he recalled Sweden’s decisive role in the Thirty Years’ War, and then went on to appeal to ‘Christian youth’ to ‘battle for God’s glory in the North’..... 

In Britain Christian youth organisations with military trappings proliferated in the years 1880–1914. The prototype was the Boys’ Brigade (BB), founded by a Glasgow Presbyterian in 1883, and also popular in the English and Welsh Free Churches. This aimed to attract members through the wearing of uniforms and military ranks, and marches through the street banging drums and blowing bugles, and carrying dummy rifles....

Again in France there were rival Catholic and Republican youth organisations in these years, but both were imbued with the nationalist spirit.... For Catholics and republicans alike, politics and religion were closely bound together and could not be clearly separated, and neither could be separated from devotion to an idealised Catholic or Republican France.

There were many reasons for the strongly nationalist colouring of much European Christianity in the nineteenth century, but among these reasons we should remember that priests and pastors could not be entirely detached from their social environment. It would indeed be crudely reductionist to suppose that clergymen thought and behaved exactly like other members of their social class, but it would be equally unrealistic to suppose that they lived entirely within a clerical sub-culture. Protestant clergy, in particular, who had been educated at university with future doctors and lawyers, and who also married and had children, were especially likely to be influenced by their family and by those of their parishioners with whom they mixed socially. Furthermore, both Protestant and Catholic clergy were highly politicised in this period, and were influenced not only by their families but by the political circles in which they moved...

German Empire Standard (1871-1918) with motto, Gott mit uns (God with us)

Source: Wiki Commons

Of course, religion and nationalism did not always agree and there were tensions as Mcleod explains:

In spite of many affinities, the relationship was two-edged. Religious sentiments and symbols could nearly always be drawn upon by nationalist orators and organisers – but churches were institutions with their own doctrines and interests which could contradict the nationalist agenda. 

A striking example was the conflict between Italian nationalism and the papacy. Enthusiasts for Italian unification initially hoped that the pope might give his blessing to their cause. But it soon became clear that Pius IX was completely opposed.... In response to papal obstruction, a nationalist movement that had initially been strongly influenced by Catholicism took on a strongly anti-clerical dimension.  

The church might also be strongly committed to nationalist objectives, while condemning the methods that some nationalists used. Here the classic example would be the persistent tensions between the Irish Catholic Church and the revolutionary wing of Irish nationalism, from the Fenians in the 1860s to the Provisional IRA in our own times. 

Moreover the alliance between religion and nationalism, while extremely effective in countries that were more or less religiously homogeneous, could raise problems within religiously divided nations, where appeals to the religion of the majority risked alienating minorities. Indeed there is a fundamental tension between a religion such as Christianity, which claims to have a message for all of humankind and in which ‘there is neither Jew nor Greek’, and the claims by nationalists that everyone’s first loyalty should be to his or her own people. 

So in the later nineteenth century many nationalists were seeking new bases for national identity which were religiously neutral and which circumvented confessional differences.... Sometimes this meant a focus on language, or even on sport.... But most often the search for alternative bases for national identity meant recourse to the newly fashionable racial ideas, which gained intellectual authority from trends in anthropology and in Social Darwinism.... In Great Britain the dominant imperialism of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was legitimated by belief in a national mission to bring civilisation and good government to less favoured regions of the world. This was often linked to Protestant Christianity and its plethora of overseas missions. But increasingly this religiously based concept of national mission was supplemented by, or even replaced by, claims for the racial superiority of the ‘Anglo-Saxon peoples’.... 

National churches were not surprisingly those readiest to identify with ‘the nation’. These national churches included most obviously the ‘people’s churches’ (Volkskirchen) of Germany and Scandinavia, the Churches of England and Scotland, the Greek Orthodox or Russian Orthodox Churches – but also the Catholic Churches of France and Spain which saw themselves as churches of the nation, or those of Ireland and Poland which claimed to speak for a nation as yet denied nationhood. Overt opposition to the nationalist agenda was most likely to come from minority churches, whether because of uncertainty as to how far they were really part of the national project – or whether the experience of being in a minority (and often of discrimination arising from this) tended to make such churches readier to question mainstream values and conventional wisdom. Thus in Germany the Catholic Church was more cautious than the Protestants in its support for militarism and imperialism....

McLeod's article demonstrates that religious nationalism was almost as popular in the 19th century Europe as it is now in Asia and North Africa.

Church and State in Nicaragua

Ian Bateson has written an interesting article in Foreign Affairs informing his readers how Daniel Ortega, the President of Nicaragua, has cozied up to the Catholic Church since 2006, despite having an adversarial relationship from the 1970s to the 1990s (See Church and State in Nicaragua: Letter From Managua). Nicaragua was ruled by Samoza family from late 1930s to 1979. The Samoza dictatorship was supported by the US and the Catholic Church. It was the US Marines which supported the first grab of power by the Samozas and the support remained strong for forty years. The Catholic Church also had cordial relations with Samozas. It was recognized as the official religion in the 1950 Constitution. As Bateson explains, Church had no problem with Somozas and did not want godless socialists/communists to succeed until the late 1970s when it started criticizing Anastasio Samoza:

There has never been a real separation of church and state in Nicaragua. Under the Somoza family, a dynasty of brutal U.S.-backed dictators who ruled the country from 1936 until 1979, gifts and favors flowed freely from the country’s rulers to its religious leadership, which rarely criticized the government. As late as 1977, as a revolution brewed against Anastasio Somoza, church leaders led masses across the country to pray for the ailing president’s health.

Ortega, a socialist and an atheist, led a revolutionary insurgency against Samoza rule. He was the head of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN), was trained in Cuba and had Cuban support in his fight against the government. In 1979, the Sandinistas were able to overthrow the Somoza government and Ortega ruled Nicaragua until 1990. His time in power was difficult as the US was bent on ending his government. President Reagen supported the Contras, who were fighting a vicious civil war against Ortega's government, even when ordered not to do so by the Congress. This resulted in the biggest political scandal during the Reagan administration (the Iran Contra Affair). The Catholic Church also opposed Ortega and Sandinistas for most of their time in power and defrocked the priests that supported them. The Catholic bishops accused the Sandinistas of supressing Church's teachings, allowing abortions and violating human rights while the Sandinistas accused the Church of toeing US line and ignoring the widespread atrocities of the Contras. Ortega lost the election in 1990 and was out of power. He moderated his policies but still lost the 1996 and 2001 elections. However, recognizing the power of the Church, Ortega adopted conservative policies before the 2006 elections, Bateson writes:

As Ortega turned on the men of the cloth he once worked with, he found allies among other church figures. Cardinal Miguel Obando Bravo is one of them. Like Cardenal, Obando’s relationship with the FSLN has transformed. In the 1980s, Ortega’s government accused Obando of being the “arch enemy of the revolution” and of seeking to obtain U.S. support for anti-government contras. The animosity was mutual and longstanding: days before the 1996 presidential election, which Ortega lost, Obando delivered a church sermon in which he likened Ortega to a biblical snake.

That relationship underwent a reversal in 2005. That April, the Vatican accepted Obando’s resignation as head of the Archdiocese of Managua, and Obando’s relations with Ortega warmed. Months later, he officiated Ortega and Murillo’s marriage, and the next year, he campaigned for them during the run-up to the 2006 presidential election. 

It is not clear why Obando changed his position. Some have speculated that he did so to protect Roberto Rivas, a man many believe to be his biological son, from official pressure. “Obando was forced to cozy up to Ortega because of the corruption of Rivas, who is a kind of adopted son of [Obando]… Rivas made millions of dollars illicitly and put the cardinal in an awkward position,” the former Education Minister and Opus Dei minister Humberto Belli told El País in 2009.

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and Cardinal Miguel Obando in Managua, May 2009.
Source:  Church and State in Nicaragua: Letter From Managua

If Obando’s motivations were unclear, there is little ambiguity about the advantage his support gave the Ortegas. As the demand for religious policies, such as bans on abortion, grew in Central America, the blessing of the Nicaraguan church’s former leader gave Ortega the credibility to lead that movement in his country. “In the past, [the Ortegas] were against the church, but then they understood that made them unpopular,” Cristiana Chamorro, a daughter of former President Violeta Chamorro, who defeated Ortega in the 1990 elections, said in May. “Now, [Obando] is the family priest.”

But after years in political exile, Ortega needed to prove his conservative religious credentials before the 2006 elections. So 11 days before the vote, he threw his party’s support behind a proposed ban on all forms of abortion—one that would imprison women and healthcare professionals involved in ending pregnancies. Lawmakers passed the measure quickly, before Ortega won the presidency.

Since then, Ortega has consolidated his power, establishing control of the legislature and the courts by outmaneuvering the opposition. Most media outlets are in the hands of the government or its allies. Nicaragua’s electoral commission has consistently issued rulings that favor Ortega’s party, and in 2014, Nicaraguan lawmakers passed a constitutional amendment removing presidential term limits.

The full article can be read here. In 2016, Ortega won the third presidential election in a row.

Poland and the Catholic Church

Catholicism is generally considered the most vital ingredient of Polish identity. It is argued that during the last five centuries, the Polish state fought battles against the Russians (Orthodox Christians from the East), Ottomans (Muslims from the South) and Germans and Swedes (Protestants from the North and West), so defending Poland or defending the Catholic Church became one and the same and Catholicism formed the basis of Polish nationalism. Poland was partitioned between its neighbours in 1785 and did not exist as a state till 1918. During the nineteenth century, with the state gone, Church gained more importance. Catholic priests played a key role in Polish insurrections against occupiers. However, contrary to what is portrayed, Church was not the only expression of Polish resistance and, during the occupation, while priests supported the insurrections, the Holy See asked Poles to accept the Russian Tsar as their divinely anointed emperor. In 1945, its liberty was again compromised when it became a Communist state. During the post-1945 dark period, the Catholic Church was at the forefront, strengthening the myth that the Catholic Church was essential to Poland. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Archbishop of Warsaw (1948-81), was the undisputed leader of the resistance against Nazis and Communists for decades and the fall the Communist regime (1945-89) was aided by the selection of another Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II in 1978. The Catholic leadership, unsurprisingly, promoted the religious nationalism. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński once said that "nowhere else is the union between Church and nation as strong as in Poland." Pope John Paul II declared, "Without Christ, it is impossible to understand the history of Poland." The charismatic "Polish Pope" made the Church very popular and the linkage between Poles and their faith is still strong: 99% of the Polish children are baptised, 93% of weddings are also solemnized in Church and between 90% and 98% of the Poles will affirm their belief in the Catholicism. The national myth and the present demography helps make most Poles believe that Poland was always homogeneously Catholics, with few 'foreigners'. However, in reality, Polish state has always been ethnically and religiously heterogeneous. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Poland (or Poland-Lithuania) was a diverse nation, with Jewish, Orthodox, and Protestant communities. Ethnic Poles lived with Ukrainians, Belarusian, Prussians, Lithuanians, Jews and Livionians. It was only after the Counterreformation movement that Catholics established their hegemony and not only physically banish some non-Catholics from the Polish state but also expelled them from the state's historical narrative (See Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland). During the interwar years, when the Catholic Church again became dominant, it again tried to establish its hegemony and tried to restrict the religious freedoms of minorities.

Largest Catholic Church in Poland: Basilica of Our Lady of Licheń
Source: Christian Tourism

The present-day Poland is very homogeneous. Ninety eight percent of the population belong to Polish ethnicity and around ninety percent are Catholics. However, this homogeneity is a recent phenomenon. Even before the Second World War, Catholics only had a two-thirds majority in Poland.  In 1921, newly revived Poland, "Rome's most faithful daughter," had 62.5% Roman (Latin) Catholic, 11.8% Eastern Rite Catholic, 11% Greek Orthodox, 10.8% Jewish, and 3.7% Protestants citizens. The war, change of borders, and voluntary migrations and forced deportations bequeathed Poland its religious and ethnic homogeneity. Ukrainians and Belarusians became part of Soviet Union and Germans were either killed in the War or fled or were expelled later on. Jewish minority was either destroyed in the Holocaust or fled. The homogeneity of Poland was further aided by the migration of Poles from Kresy ((Eastern) Borderlands), an area that was part of pre-WWII Poland but was annexed to the Soviet Union after 1945. 

In the 1990s, after democratization and defeat of communism, Catholic Church's influence increased. For instance, abortion, which was legal since 1956, was made illegal, except for few exemptions, in 1993. The Polish law on abortion is one of the most restrictive in Europe. The Church vigorously campaigned for the bill. Even the Pope came from Rome to campaign for the bill. There was such emotional support for the bill that its opponents felt threatened but the religious right was even then not happy with the law: 

Lawmakers approved the measure in January after heavy lobbying by the Roman Catholic Church and in a climate of such emotion and intimidation that virtually all state hospitals had already stopped performing abortions. Gynecologists who perform the procedure say they are targets of threats and attacks by militant anti-abortion campaigners...

Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, the associate general secretary of the Polish Bishops' Conference, said that the church was unhappy with the law as passed because "the principle 'Thou shalt not kill' does not allow any exceptions."

Halina Nowina-Konopka, a member of Parliament from the Christian National Party, said the law did not go far enough.

"It just regulates when you can kill and when you can't," she said. "It devalues human life in that it makes one life worth less than another. It's like ancient Sparta where they threw individuals who were less fit off the cliffs." ( See Tough Abortion Law Provokes Dismay in Poland)

Not only this law is still on the books, but there also have been attempts to ban abortion completely.

In 1993, the Polish state signed a concordat with the Church. This agreement was declared as a model for other post-communist countries by the Pope. The important thing to note was that the concordat was agreed and signed before the new constitution. Therefore, the Polish Constitution (1997) had to conform to the concordat, not the other way round. In fact, several drafts of the constitution had to be adjusted to conform it to the concordat. The concordat has been criticized for various reasons. Once signed, the concordat ended any possibility of constitutional separation of church and state. It also ended the equality of all religions before the state. The Catholic Church acquired a special position within the state because of its special relationship. Under concordat, the state promised to provide Catholic religious education in state schools if requested. The Church also made state declare seven religious days as public holidays. The state also accepted the role of Catholic military chaplains, administered by the (Catholic) military bishopric, in the Polish military forces. The controversial rightwing Radio Marya was also protected under the concordat (See Polish concordat (1993): Text and criticism)

The 1997 Constitution also shows several elements of religious nationalism. The preamble mentions God twice and the following sentence emphasizing Christian heritage of Poland:

Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values, 

The following articles go against the principle of the secularity of state:

Article 25(4): The relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by the international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute. 

Article 53(3): Parents shall have the right to ensure their children a moral and religious upbringing and teaching in accordance with their convictions. The provisions of Article 48, para. 1 shall apply as appropriate.

Article 53(4): The religion of a church or other legally recognized religious organization may be taught in schools, but other peoples' freedom of religion and conscience
shall not be infringed thereby. 

Article 104(2): Deputies, before the commencement of the performance of the mandate, shall take the following oath in the presence of the Sejm:
"I do solemnly swear to perform my duties to the Nation diligently and conscientiously, to safeguard the sovereignty and interests of the State, to do all within my power for the prosperity of the Homeland and the  well-being of its citizens, and to observe the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Poland."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God."

Article 130: The President of the Republic shall assume office upon taking the following oath in the presence of the National Assembly:
"Assuming, by the will of the Nation, the office of President of the Republic of Poland, I do solemnly swear to be faithful to the provisions of the Constitution; I pledge that I shall steadfastly safeguard the dignity of the Nation, the independence and security of the State, and also that the good of the Homeland and the prosperity of its citizens shall forever remain my supreme obligation."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God." 

Article 151: The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and ministers shall take the following oath in the presence of the President of the Republic:
"Assuming this office of Prime Minister (Deputy Prime Minister, minister) I do solemnly swear to be faithful to the provisions of the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Poland, and that the good of the Homeland and the prosperity of its citizens shall forever remain my supreme obligation."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God." (See The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997)

Secularization of Quebec Nationalism

Before the 1960s, Quebec's nationalism was a cocktail of ethnolinguistic and religious sentiments. It was difficult to define Quebec's nationalism without explaining the differences between Catholicism and Protestantism and without reminding the reader about the Catholic struggle for equal rights in Protestant-majority Canada and previously in the British Empire that was based on Anglican nationalism. Roman Catholic Church was the main part and defender of Quebec's culture. However, during the 1960s, many long-term developments and events lead to the "Quiet Revolution" that considerably weakened the link between Catholicism and Quebec nationalism. The religious nationalism declined and became more implicit after the end of Maurice Duplessis era (Quebec's Premier 1936-39 and 1944-59).

Source: Francophone Nationalism in Québec


David Seljak in his article "Why the Quiet Revolution was “Quiet”: The Catholic Church’s Reaction to the Secularization of Nationalism in Quebec after 1960" explains the secularization of the Quebec identity. However, it is important to note that the secularization was not complete:

One of the most important issues was the Church’s acceptance of the secularization of French-Canadian nationalism. If the Quebec state had the power to make the reforms of the 1960s “revolutionary,” then the Church had the power to make the revolution “quiet” – or not. Its reconciliation to the new nationalism has helped to determine the shape of Quebec culture and society after 1960.

While the British North America Act implicitly gave the Catholic Church a semi-established status in the province of Quebec, the two most important motors of modernization, democratic political structures and capitalist economic institutions, remained outside of its control. Consequently, despite its important role in Quebec society, the Church was most often in the position of reacting to social change. From 1900 to 1930, the Church responded to industrialization and modernization with what Guindon has called an “administrative revolution,” an unprecedented campaign tocreate new institutions and bureaucracies to meet the needs of French Catholics in every realm of modern urban life. Besides multiplying its institutions which provided education, health care, and social services, the Church promoted the growth of Catholic labour unions, farmers’ cooperatives, credit unions, pious leagues, newspapers, radio and television shows, films, and Catholic Action groups for workers, students, women, farmers, and nationalists. This project was encouraged by Pope Pius XI, who founded the Catholic Action movement to encourage Catholics to form “intermediary bodies” or voluntary associations to mediate between individuals and the state apparatus. Conservative Catholics dreamed that these bodies would eventually reclaim all those functions in society that had been wrenched from the Church’s control.

While other peoples met the challenges of industrialization and modernization with programs of what sociologist Karl Deutsch has called “nation-building,” French-Canadian nationalists embarked on an aggressive programme of “church-building” with the goal of creating an “Églisenation” (nation-Church) rather than a nation-state. While they encouraged state intervention in specific projects (such as the colonisation of the hinterlands of Quebec), French Canadian nationalists usually preferred to resolve conflicts by creating religiously inspired social structures rather than appealing to state power. For example, in the Church’s corporatist response to the Depression, the actions of the state were limited to those realms where the first agents of society (the family and the Church) were as yet incapable of fulfilling their responsibilities. Typically, French-Canadian nationalism was marked by a certain anti-étatisme and apolitisme. Because it was rooted in a profoundly conservative, clerical, Catholic triumphalism, this nationalism could be xenophobic, intolerant, and repressive, as evidenced by its crusades against Jews, socialists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses in the name of religious and national solidarity. Despite the anti-modern discourse that its authors employed, this bureaucratic revolution ironically promoted the modernization of French Quebec society including that of the Church itself and French-Canadian nationalism. This modernization was certainly problematic. Critics drew attention to the gulf between the modern, multicultural, urban, industrial reality of Quebec society and a conservative Catholic ideology centred on rural values, ethnic solidarity, religion, and a rejection of politics and the state. These critics, including those who participated in the Catholic Action movements, grew suspicious of the traditional nationalism and some even rejected nationalism altogether.

The rapid changes of the 1960s, known as the Quiet Revolution, grew directly out of the type of society that was formed in Quebec after 1867. After World War II, a “new middle class” of university-trained bureaucrats increasingly occupied important positions in the immense bureaucracy that the Church had created. While educated in Catholic culture and values, members of this clerically dominated bureaucracy were simultaneously socialized into modern, rational and democratic values. Thus, they were uncomfortable with the conservative, undemocratic practices of the Duplessis regime and with the complicity of the Church in those practices. They demanded the rationalization of the bureaucracy that oversaw education, health care, and social services. They also demanded its democratization and protested against its “clericalism,” understood as the best positions being reserved for Church officials. Consequently, the new nationalism was defined as much against the Catholic Church as the Anglophone business elite.

The ascent to power of these elites was assured when the Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ) took power in June of 1960. Inspired by a secular and modernizing nationalism, the Lesage government introduced a number of measures that radically redefined the role of the state. It took over the functions of the Church in education, healthcare, and social services. Through the nationalization of hydro-electric utilities and the creation of crown corporations, the PLQ sought both to expand the influence of the government in the economy and to increase the presence of French Canadians in the upper levels of that economy. The state bureaucracy increased at a tremendous rate, growing by 42.6 percent between 1960 and 1965. While the changes adopted by the Lesage government mostly satisfied the interests of the new middle class and francophone business people, some sought to promote a more democratic, humane, and participatory society. The Liberal government introduced more progressive labour legislation and important social welfare reforms. Supporters of the government’s reforms attacked both traditional religious nationalism and laissez-faire liberalism. In doing so they created a new political nationalism that was adamantly secular, state-centred, and optimistically oriented to Keynesian liberalism or even social democracy. 

While accepting these reforms, Catholics attempted to find ways of adapting Church structures and Catholic thinking to the new context. Given the history and theology of the Catholic hierarchy in the 1950s, this reaction was by no means the obvious route to take. Even in the early 1960s, the bishops condemned the attack on traditional French Canadian nationalism in the very popular book, Les insolences de Frère Untel. Even though, led by Cardinal Paul-Émile Léger, they had accepted the urbanization of Quebec society and reluctantly had given up the strategies of colonization and corporatism, the bishops’ traditional paternalistic attitude, obedience to Rome, moralizing spirit, and confusion between Catholicism and conservative ideology had remained intact. Yet by 1970, the bishops had largely reconciled themselves to the autonomy of the state, the liberty of individual consciences in political questions, and the legitimacy of the new nationalism. The early opposition and later reconciliation of the bishops was paralleled in many sectors in the Church.

This reconciliation would have been impossible without the coincidence of the Quiet Revolution with the Second Vatican Council. In Quebec, the Church’s redefinition of its relationship to modernity had three immediate consequences. First, it took the wind out of the sails of the conservative rejection of the new society. It made the project of the traditional nationalists impossible – since the Church hierarchy now refused its designated role as spiritual and cultural leaders of the attack on modernity. Second, it allowed Catholics – and even clergy and bishops – to support some projects of the Quiet Revolution in spite of their “laicizing” agenda. Finally, it inspired a new concern for development and social justice among Quebec Catholics. The Council affirmed the new direction of Catholic social teaching laid out by Pope John XXIII. Catholics sought to remain relevant to Quebec society and to participate, as Christians, in the important struggles of their society.

This new social teaching, along with the reflections of the Catholic Church in Latin America, would lead to the emergence of a faith and justice movement in the 1970s. Influenced by this teaching, the Church in Quebec could develop a sustained ethical critique of the new society and the new nationalism while affirming their liberating aspects. Taken together these three developments meant that Quebec society avoided the painful cultural schism between Catholics and modernizers (both liberal and radical)that has marked other Catholic societies

First of these two events was the