Pakistan, Sectarianism and Malik Ishaq's Death

Sectarianism has been on the rise for at least three decades as discussed in the last blogpost (See Rise of sectarianism and Pakistani Religious Nationalism). Due to the low capacity, ignorance or benign neglect of the Pakistani law enforcement agencies, the hydra of sectarianism got stronger and stronger and like in the case of mythical creature, banning one sectarian organization resulted in creation of two or more new ones. This is the story till 2015 which has the potential to be a game changer for Pakistan's fight against sectarianism.

However, before discussing what is happening in 2015, it is worthwhile to mention two developments that led to the changes that are witnessed in the current year. First, Nawaz Sharif, a right wing conservative and a sympathizer of Pakistani Taliban (mainly Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)) rhetoric, came to power in 2013 and tried to start talks with the TTP. After months of negotiations, the talks failed to take off ground as terrorist acts continued, making it clear to everyone, except the diehard supporter of the TTP, that the TTP are not interested in peace. Secondly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appointed General Raheel Sharif (no relation of Nawaz) as the new Chief of Army Staff in November 2013. Compared to  his predecessor General Kayani, General Raheel had a different opinion regarding how to react to the TTP's attacks on Pakistani state assets. General Kayani usually did not immediately react to the TTP attacks. However, soon after his appointment, General Sharif started responding to every major terrorist act by promptly bombing terrorist hideouts in the tribal areas. After it became clear that talks are useless, General Sharif started a large scale military action against the TTP in North Waziristan in June 2014. The TTP responded to this action by more terrorism. On 16th December 2014, seven TTP terrorists entered an army-administered school in Peshawar and killed 145 people, including 132 teenage students (See Peshawar School Massacre). 

The year 2015 thus started with a major change in Pakistani elite mindset. For the first time in nearly three decades, everybody agreed that religious extremism is a threat to Pakistan's existence. After this massacre, any sympathy for the TTP in the public space ended and even diehard TTP supporters, almost all religious parties, had to support strict action against Taliban. It was decided by the civilian and military leadership that a comprehensive National Action Plan (NAP) would be devised to end all kinds of terrorism, including sectarian violence. Special military courts were established under 21st Amendment in the 1973 Constitution to speedily convict and sentence those involved in religious terrorism. Under NAP, it was also decided to ban and take strict action against those making hate speeches and publishing hate pamphlets, books etc. (See Pakistan announces a national plan to fight terrorism, says terrorists’ days are numbered). Some specific points related to sectarianism in the NAP are reproduced below:

1. We will act against literature, newspapers and magazines that are spreading hate, [ideas of] beheading people, sectarianism, extremism and intolerance.
2. Banned organizations will not be allowed to operate under another name.
3. Action is being taken to stop religious extremism and to protect religious minorities.
4. The registration and regulation of seminaries (madrassas) is being planned.
5. Decisive action is being taken against elements that spread sectarianism.

However, while there were visible changes regarding NAP implementation in other areas, action against sectarianism was halfhearted at best. Gruesome sectarian violence resumed; banned sectarian organizations continued to operate; and hate literature remained available in print as well as on social media. Just one month after unveiling of the NAP, on 30th January 2015, more than sixty people were killed in Shikarpur, Sindh in a bomb blast inside Shia mosque (See At least 60 killed in blast at Shikarpur imambargah). Two weeks later, on February 13, twenty people were killed in an attack on a Shia mosque in Peshawar (See Pakistan Battles Rising Sectarian Violence). On May 13, forty three Shia Ismailis were killed in Karachi when gunmen attacked their bus (See 43 killed in attack on bus carrying Ismailis in Karachi).   

So, there was widespread skepticism about Pakistani state's commitment to stop sectarianism. It was argued that various political parties and the military continue to see sectarian militias as allies in promoting their agendas. For example, Arif Rafiq, an expert on sectarianism in Pakistan, said to German broadcaster DW (See Examining Pakistan's growing sectarian violence):

The military as well as civilian politicians need to ease out of partnerships with groups that foment hate toward Shiites and other minorities in the country. The longer Pakistan's leaders continue to directly or indirectly aid hate groups, the longer it will be struggling to put out the fires started with its own hands. 

Source: BBC

So, killing of Malik Ishaq in 29th July, one of the most notorious sectarian militant leader, who boasted of killing more than hundred Shias, was against the run of the play. Not only Malik Ishaq was killed but his two sons and his second-in-command was also killed by the police. Malik Ishaq was in and out of jail for most of the last fifteen years, accused of being involved in hundreds of sectarian incidents but he was not convicted as witnesses and judges were threatened by him and his organization. It is widely believed that Malik was killed in a staged fight by police as he could not be convicted in a court. (See Malik Ishaq: Pakistan Sunni militant chief killed by police).

Does this means Pakistani state has finally decide to take on sectarian militants? It is too early to come to definite conclusion. However, things and events are snowballing. Army action in North Waziristan led to the Peshawar massacre which led to action against religious militants all across the country. While attacks by the TTP decreased, sectarian militancy continued, making the NAP a mockery as far as sectarian violence was concerned. There was pressure from public and media to punish sectarian militants. So, Malik Ishaq was killed. The cycle is continuing as according to many analysts Malik Ishaq's killing has led to the death of Punjab Home Minister Shuja Khanzada in a terrorist attack on 16th August (See Punjab home minister Shuja Khanzada killed in terror attack). Khanzada was not an ordinary minister. He was a close confidant of Prime Minister's brother Shahbaz Sharif, who is the Chief Minister of the Punjab province. He was also close to military hierarchy as he was himself an retired army officer, who had served in Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence. His death was widely condemned and both political and military authorities promised to bring his murderers to justice. 

Rise of Sectarianism and Pakistani Religious Nationalism

Religious nationalism often leads to sectarianism. As explained in a previous blogpost (See Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism), when religious affiliation  defines citizen from a non-citizen, sectarian issues attain a political, economic and social significance. Far from being the concern of few theologians and zealots, they became the concern of everyone. For example, if religious law is not the law of the state and there is no chance it ever becoming state law or source of state law, few care how the rival sect differs in interpreting a certain Biblical or Quranic verse or hadith. However, once religious law is considered to be the source of state law, then everybody is concerned as there is a chance that one's religious beliefs maybe declared illegal or these beliefs maybe legal but would not entitle one full citizenship rights. 

An example would clarify. In 1978, General Zia introduced zakat (annual alms tax) system in Pakistan and ordered compulsory deduction of 2.5% from bank accounts that have amounts above a certain minimum level. Beliefs of Shia and Sunni sects about who can collect zakat differ. Sunnis believe state can collect zakat, Shias do not. Not many people, Shias or Sunnis, thought this difference was important before 1978. However, when Zia introduced the new system, Shias immediately protested and when Zia ignored them, they took control of some of the important government buildings in Islamabad and vowed to fight. In the end, Zia gave in and Shias were exempted from compulsory deduction of zakat by state.

So, a sectarian or confessional bias is inherent in a religious nationalist state. If state adopts religious laws, it has to choose between different interpretations. For example, in Saudi Arabia, state has adopted a particular religious interpretation about how women should appear in public. This particular interpretation has been rejected by most Muslims but Saudi state has enforced it. In Israel, marriage registration is controlled by the Orthodox Chief Rabbinate. If rules set by the Orthodox rabbinate are not followed, state would not register a marriage. Even a marriage under Reform or Conservative Judaism (rules), two other major streams in modern Judaism, is not kosher for the state. 

In Pakistan, sectarianism became an issue after General Zia started Islamizing the government. Before General Zia, there were sects and differences and sometimes violence would happen but such instances were few and far between. The knowledge of sectarian differences and the animosity that one saw in the 1980s and later was not present before. Rise of sectarianism was primarily because of General Zia's Islamization program but not all reasons of this rise were internal. Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which made Saudi Arabia a very important player in Pakistan's religious landscape, also helped the rise of sectarianism.

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal as given at Who is killing Pakistan's Shias and why?

Sectarianism continue to increase and become more violent after Zia due to the following reasons:

• Madrassas and religious nationalism: Mushrooming of madrassas, which promote religious nationalism and train students along sectarian lines, under Zia started to have its effect on Pakistan in the 1990s. Madrassas provided recruits to religious parties and sectarian militias but were also proponents of Pakistani religious nationalism that Pakistani state was also promoting so taking action against them was difficult. Moreover, religious parties, which had overlapping membership with sectarian militias and leadership of both were trained in the same madrassas, made any strict action against sectarian militias difficult as it was termed as an action against Islam and against Pakistan;
• Political instability in the 1990s: The nineties decade was highly unstable, with average tenure of Prime Minister being a year (nine Prime Ministers from 1990 to 1999). It not only undermined democratic development but also affected economic growth and law and order. A long term coordinated action against sectarian militias was not taken. Military sometimes used religious parties, which were supported by sectarian militias, to counter politicians' attempt to stabilize their rule and reduce military's power;
• Sectarian militias as tools to promote religious nationalism abroad: Sectarian militias were used by military (particularly ISI) as tools for promoting religious nationalism in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Any attempt to take strict action against sectarian militias by the civilian governments was undermined by this link;
• Rise of Taliban: Taliban and Pakistani Sunni sectarian militias had close links as Taliban also believed in same violent sectarian ideology and many members of Pakistani militias and Taliban had studied at the same Pakistani madrassas and fought alongside each other in Afghanistan. Therefore, Taliban rise and success in Afghanistan not only increased the confidence of Pakistani sectarian outfits but also provided them a sanctuary. 

After 9/11, sectarian outfits were banned and there were some attempts to limit them but these attempts were halfhearted at best. Internationally, General Musharraf was fighting against Muslim extremism but in Pakistan, Musharraf was in alliance with religious parties (Muthidda Majlis-e-Amal) that had a soft corner for the sectarian militias and publically supported Taliban's struggle in Afghanistan. Later, rise of Pakistani Taliban provided Sunni militias confidence, support and sanctuary inside Pakistan.

Benazir Shah writing in Foreign Policy in August 2014 (See The Trouble Convicting LeJ's Malik Ishaq) writes about these links between Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, one of the most notorious sectarian militias: 

In Pakistan’s toxic mix of terrorist organizations, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi maintains ideological and operational links with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda. When need be, its foot soldiers have not hesitated to take their mission of sectarian strife across the border. In 2011, an offshoot of the radical group claimed responsibility for killing 55 Shiites in Kabul, possibly in cahoots with al Qaeda. Other jihadist groups, including Jaish-e-Muhammad, espouse its mission of establishing a Sunni state. More than 600 Shiites were killed in Pakistan in 2013, and over 1,000 were injured in a troubling uptick in sectarian attacks.

Shah also asked the question, will the state act against sectarian militias as it had started acting against Taliban?

For now the state is engaged. On June 15, it launched a comprehensive military operation in North Waziristan, long considered a deadly crucible of local and foreign terrorists. But there is a sectarian face-off brewing in the Punjab heartland, where Jhangvi is firmly rooted. But when the state’s gaze will turn to that fight remains to be seen.

All this history brings us to the recent killing of Malik Ishaq, his sons and other leaders of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. This will be discussed in the next blogpost.

Arab Nationalism: The end?

Adeed Dawisha's article remember's Arab nationalism (See Requiem for Arab Nationalism), once a powerful force, aiming to revive the glory of Arab nation.

He talks about Nasser, the undisputed leader of Arab nationalism, and the effect of 1967 defeat.

It took some time for the light to go out on Arab nationalism, but its power generator went down in June 1967. After the Six-Day War, the slide of Arab nationalism toward political marginality became irreversible. And what finished it was the fact that Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser, lost the war. Egypt's devastating defeat was Arab nationalism's mortal loss, for the fate of Arab nationalism during the struggles, triumphs, and reversals of the 1950s and 1960s was inexorably linked to Egypt and its charismatic president.

Had Syria or Jordan, or even both, lost the war, it would not have been the unmitigated disaster for Arab nationalism that it proved to be. But Arab nationalism could not survive the abject humiliation inflicted on its acknowledged prophet, who, through his shrill and overzealous propaganda machine, had promised a fabled triumph in al-Ma'raka al-Masiriya, the battle of destiny.

Arab countries and their flags 

Source: Islam and Arab Nationalism الإسلام و العربية الجنسية in the 21st century

The main competitor of Arab nationalism was, of course, individual country/territorial nationalisms. Arab nationalism was all about unity and indivisibility of the proud Arab nation but gradually borders between Arabs became important. 

Part of the reason for this "sanctification" of borders was that Arab political and economic elites developed a vested interest in the survival of each particular state. Not surprisingly, these elites were loath to put themselves at risk for the sake of Arab unity.So they argued that Arab nationalism was really just a license for some elites to browbeat others. The advocates of territorial nationalism also relied on geo-political and cultural arguments in making their case. They insisted that Arab nationalists had failed to understand that while various Arab states might accept an overarching Arab identity, geographic and even cultural differences were real enough to preclude an organic unity. And they were right: the decline of Arab nationalism from 1961 validated their argument.

But territorial nationalisms were not the only enemy. Many sub-state and supra-state identities also damaged the Arab nationalist's cause. Tribal loyalties, argues Adeed, were powerful in many Arab countries and didn't disappear as Arab nationalism and territorial nationalisms fought for the primary loyalty of the Arabs.

In some states, tribal affiliations formed the backbone of popular support that shielded local leaderships from the advancing tide of revolutionary Arab nationalism. Such was the case in Saudi Arabia, where the tribal-based demographic structure contributed to the stability of the political order.Successive Saudi monarchs, in the process of shifting the loyalty of the Bedouin from tribe to state, made sure to act and be perceived as tribal overlords.

Bedouin military personnel were also responsible for the survival of Jordan's young King Hussein, in the face of seemingly impossible odds. Jordan's "Arab Legion" was initially formed to combat Bedouin anarchy in the new country. In a stroke of genius, the Arab Legion's founder, the British officer John Bagot Glubb, decided to harness the warlike qualities of the Bedouins by recruiting them into the army. Very quickly, the Arab Legion became the Arab world's most disciplined fighting force. But one thing that Glubb did not change was tribal solidarity, which he nurtured every step of the way to make the Arab Legion "the Bedouin prop of the Hashemite polity.

Source: Arab League, Wikipedia

Coming to the focus of this blog, religious identities also didn't allow Arab nationalism to take hold. Sectarian loyalties divided Arabs and in many countries, especially when they were politicized as in Iraq. These loyalties were weakened and laid dormant during the heyday of Arab nationalism and Nasser but they were back with a vengeance in the 1970s.

Iraq's sectarian divisions formed another hurdle in the Arab nationalist march. The country's Shi'ite majority never overcame its suspicion of Arab nationalism as a Sunni project. Shi'ite grievances against the Sunnis were primarily political, pertaining to Sunni dominance over Iraq's political order. The Shi'ites would point to the paucity of their numbers among the decision-making elite and in the ranks of the administrative and military institutions.

It is not that the Shi'ites did not believe in Arab nationalism, or that they did not consider themselves to be Arabs. Shi'ite men of letters penned some of the marvels of Arabic literature. Iraqis of all religions and denominations flocked to the Arab nationalist cause under Abdel Nasser's leadership in the 1950s and 1960s. But that did not mean that tribalism and sectarianism were erased. They were too deeply ingrained to disappear; they simply retreated into the recesses of people's consciousness. Once Arab nationalism began to suffer reverses and setbacks, and Abdel Nasser's ability to work his magic came into question, all the particularistic, anti-national tendencies reemerged and even surged to the forefront.

Although Adeed talks about 'radical Islam', as the last competitor of Arab nationalism, how he explains it, this 'radical' Islam is closer to what others have called political Islam or religious nationalism ('Radical' Islam is usually used to describe militant Islam). Political Islam and Arab nationalism share many myths. The glory and grandeur of Arab nation happened after Arabs accepted Islam and Islam is empty without Arab contribution.

In one sense, this competition is surprising. The vast majority of Arabs are Muslims, and the most glorious periods of Arab history occurred during the dazzling medieval Islamic empires. Similarly, all Muslims, moderates or radicals, could not but admit the central role of the Arabs in their religion. After all, Islam was born in the Arabian Peninsula, the Prophet Muhammad was Arab, and God's message was revealed in Arabic. One would think that the two social movements would share a cooperative relationship.

Instead, it was downright hostile. Arab nationalists, from Husri to Abdel Nasser and Michel Aflaq, founder and philosopher of the Baath Party, accepted the special place that Islam occupied within the Arab nationalist movement. But they stressed only those aspects of Islam that were moral and spiritual in nature. They resolutely rejected Islam's political and constitutional implications and insisted on its complete subordination to Arab nationalism. The nationalists vehemently argued that it was not religious but linguistic and historical ties that would knit the Arab nation into a cohesive whole.

Religious nationalists, of course, could not accept religious loyalty being relegated by ethnolinguistic loyalty. They denounced Arab nationalists and claimed Arab nationalism means denying the primacy of Islam/God/Prophet. Adeed, in the following section, only talks about militants but there were many more Arab Muslims who silently disliked Arab nationalism than those who attacked it militarily.

This was sheer blasphemy to the radical Muslim groups, and nationalists became the target of these groups' jihad. The concept of jihad, holy struggle, was central to the lexicon of Islamic militancy. Jihad was to be waged against the perceived enemies of Islam—i.e., all those who would try to infuse Muslim society with alien and blasphemous ideas, imported primarily from the West. To the Muslim radicals, perhaps the greatest offenders were the secular nationalists, who propagated ethnicity at the expense of religion and advocated the separation of Islam from politics.

Adeed then talks about causes of Arab nationalism failure. But let's leave it for some other time. 

Shiaphobia: Is there evidence of millennium-long tradition of Shia persecution in South Asia?

National identity is mainly about setting boundaries and creating two groups, ‘us’ and ‘them’. ‘Us’ are the good guys, having all the noble qualities and inheritors of a marvelous civilization. ‘They’ are the bad guys, always cheating and scheming to defeat the good guys. Obviously, these two groups cannot be alike (otherwise there is no need of a separate nation), so their differences are highlighted. Complex world of interactions spread over centuries between the two groups is simplified. Narratives expounding the differences go into great lengths in telling people how these two groups were always very dissimilar. This focus on differences sometimes leads to politics of purity (or as according to Freud, the ‘narcissism of small differences’) and even ‘us’ group is scrutinized and some people are declared not pure or worthy enough to be part of ‘us’. 

Not surprisingly, in states based on ethnic nationalism, the focus of scrutiny is on ethnicity while in states based on religious nationalism, religion is center of emphasis as it is the main marker of national identity. This issue was discussed in this previously (See Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism)

Pakistan, being a state based on religious nationalism, has to deal with sectarianism.  

Kunwar Khuldune Shahid wrote an interesting article on Shiaphobia (See Shiaphobia). In this article,  he presents the evidence of a ‘millennium-long tradition of Shia persecution in this region’. Please read the article and following are my comments. 

Before commenting on the article, I want to clarify that I am against the persecution of minorities in Pakistan and ashamed of how Pakistani state has collaborated with militant groups involved in the harassment and oppression of minorities, including Shias. So, I share author’s concern about the recent upturn in horrible incidents against Shias.

However, as a budding historian, I feel it necessary to point out that (as senator Moynihan said) author is entitled to have his own opinion but not his own facts. I suppose author does not like creating long narratives by picking and choosing facts as he starts his article with the phrase, ‘When Muhammad bin Qasim was busy becoming the first Pakistani 1,200 years before the country actually came into being’, however, he commits the same mistake.

Let’s start with Mahmud of Ghazni. In his history of Mahmud’s reign, Persian Shia historian Mahmud Qasim Hindu Shah Ferishte, while giving account of Mahmud’s one of the earlier attack on Multan, writes that Mahmud decided to attack Multan’s Ismaili ruler Abul Fateh because he failed to pay tribute as Abul Fateh’s father and grandfather used to do. Later, when Mahmud was about to defeat Abul Fateh, Abul Fateh pleaded and Mahmud went back to Ghanzi with the promise of twenty thousand gold mohurs, enforcement of sharia and renouncement of Ismaili faith. It was only in a later expedition that he captured Multan and killed Ismailis. Sultan Mahmud also fought with other Sunni Muslims rulers during his lifetime and killed many Muslims, so it is difficult to prove that he was killing people because of their religion or because he wanted power and gold. The account by Ferishte shows loss of tribute was certainly a big part of what Mahmud was doing. So, author’s claim that it was a pre-mediated Shia genocide seems to be somewhat exaggerated.

Again claim that Shias were persecuted from 16th to 19th century is difficult to accept. Except for Aurangzeb, there is not much evidence that other Great Mughals (1526-1707) were trying to systematically persecute Shias. As Humayun was helped by Iranian Shias regain his throne, it is difficult to think he would persecute Shias and Akbar was certainly not persecuting any major religion.

After Aurangzeb, Mughals generally lost their power and were unable to pursue any policy in the whole of their empire as provincial governors became the main decision-makers in their own areas. So, claim for systematic persecution is improbable in the later Mughal period (1707-1856), although some individual rulers/governors might be doing it.

I also find it difficult to believe that there was a campaign against Shias during the 1950s to 1970s. There were some incidents but the proof of a campaign is not there. I personally think most of the groups that later on led the anti-Shia front were busy against Ahmedis. However, if author has more evidence to prove his theory, everyone would be happy to consider it.

Since 1980s, I agree that Shia phobia has increased in strength in both state and society and this is reprehensible. Moreover, involvement of Pakistan in Syria would be disastrous for country to say the least. We have enough troubles already. We should return the few billion dollars and say, ‘Thanks, but no thanks’.

However, there is not much evidence of ‘millennium-long tradition of Shia persecution in this region’.

Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism

When a state argues to be based on religious nationalism, religion becomes important in defining who are full citizens of that state. It is a case similar to countries based on ethnic nationalism. Japanese, Turkish, Korean or German nationalisms are based on specific ethnicities and those ethnicities are sometimes consciously and blatantly and sometimes unconsciously prioritized. Not long ago, a Russian, having German ancestry, who could not speak German and had never lived in Germany had a stronger claim to German citizenship than a Turk, who had not only been born in Germany but had lived in Germany all his life.

In such 'ethnic' nations, it becomes very important to clearly define who has the 'correct' ancestry and who has not. It becomes important for the state to know, for example, whether both your parents of a citizen were born in the country or not, even if both of them are also citizens. These defining markers are controlled by the state as means of informing the masses who they are and what should be important to them and punishing those who ignore these markers. Recently, the highest court of Dominican Republic court stripped thousands of people of citizenship because their parents had entered the country illegally decades ago (see Haitian-descended residents of Dominican Republic stripped of citizenship by high court). 

In case of religious nationalism, the focus is on religion or sect so defining who is a Muslim, Jew or Catholic becomes important. An Irish joke makes this point clear. In Northern Ireland, a car is stopped at a checkpoint and policeman asks the driver, 'Are you a Catholic or a Protestant?' The driver answers, 'I am an atheist.' The policeman thinks for a few seconds and then asks, 'A Catholic-atheist or a Protestant-atheist?'

The first nationality marker is of course whether one is a member of the national church. This marker discriminates against those who are not members but states with religious nationalism usually ignore this criticism as many states based on ethnic nationalism also do when they discriminate against those not belonging to prioritized/majority ethnic group.

However, as citizenship comes with significant social, cultural and economic benefits, markers of nationalism (ethnic or religious) are contested. Minorities try to dilute these markers to be part of the mainstream while diverse social groups within the titular group try to narrow them to get a larger share of benefits. As a result, in case of ethnic nationalism, the titular group experiences more ethnic fragmentation and infighting. And in states with religious nationalism, sectarianism rages unless state decisively intervenes. Readers of this blog will remember that Malaysian lawmakers from ruling party UMNO recently suggested that Islam should be limited to Sunni sect. A much horrible aspect of sectarianism is visible in Pakistan where there are attacks on religious places and leaders of rival sects (Sectarian killings soar in Pakistan, raising fears of regional spillover).

Source: The Various Strands of Shiite-Sunni Discord

Can religious nationalists stop sectarianism? I personally think the answer is no.

Controlling the religious content in states based on religious nationalism

Controlling religious content is a key issue for states based on religious nationalism. There was a time when many governments either ignored this content or used it for their own political benefit or denied its link with religious violence. Now it's different. Most governments have realized extremist religious material is highly dangerous, so religious books, pamphlets, and speeches have to be regulated. Whether it is media or schools, religious states are increasingly trying to define what is right and what is wrong 'religion' or 'religious content'. 

In 2014, Hassan bin Salem talked about how Saudi Arabia is limiting access of religious preachers to schools (See Saudi Arabia tries to stop religious lectures in schools). Salem argues that it is not the first time it is done.

The move of the Ministry of Education is not the first of its kind, as the call has been reiterated over the past years. Sometimes, schools were compelled to obtain official approval prior to any lecture, and other times the ministry would specify the scholars who are allowed to give lectures without prior permit. These would be members of the Council of Senior Scholars. Other scholars would first have to obtain an official permission from the relevant authorities.

The goal of all of these steps, procedures and reservations is to protect students from being affected by any extremist theses or militant opinions that may be raised by some preachers. It is an important goal that the ministry ought to give enough attention.

Pakistan also tried to regulate the public diffusion of religious content that it considers extremist and aiding sectarianism and terrorism. The following four points of the 20-point National Action Program (NAP) , issued after the Peshawar massacre in December 2014, are reproduced below: 

11. Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organisations through print and electronic media.

13. Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely.

14. Concrete measures against promotion of terrorism through internet and social media.

18. Action against elements spreading sectarianism.

However, it appears that efforts of both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have not been successful. Similarly, in Israel, extremist views have become more and more kosher and mainstream, despite some efforts by the government to restrict the downward slide. The reason is clear. While some parts of these states are working to regulate and control religious content, other parts are working to spread them. Furthermore, when state itself is publishing and promoting discriminatory content, it is difficult to decide where to draw the line. One solution frequently prescribed is to draw the line when the content calls for violence. However, this apparently easy solution is actually not so easy as it is difficult to define what is a call for violence.