It's not conservatism,religion or racism, only regular, common nationalism?

Mark Movsesian makes an interesting argument about events happening in 2016. He argues that local politics were important but what we saw is the rise of nationalistic anti-global movement (See The New Nationalism).

One can easily perceive nationalism’s role in the politics of 2016. Repeatedly, the side advocating a recovery of sovereignty from supranational bodies and a limit on immigration prevailed. In the Brexit campaign, the “Leave” supporters argued that Britain must take back control from EU bureaucrats and assert authority over its borders. Here, Trump famously called for withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership treaty and for renegotiation of other free-trade agreements, including NAFTA; for a wall to keep out Mexican immigrants; and for a temporary ban on Muslims entering the country.

Conservatism, racism and religion were contributing factors but cannot explain the movement:

To be sure, traditional conservatism played a role in these developments—but only an indirect one. Although the Right, broadly defined, achieved victories in the United States and Europe, what we think of as “movement conservatism” did not. In Britain, the leaders of the Conservatives opposed Brexit; in America, many conservatives opposed Trump. In France, the Republican Party has worked hard to distance itself from the National Front, which it views as an embarrassment. In Italy, the Five Star Movement declares itself non-aligned and draws votes from both the Left and the Right. 

Nor did Christian conservatism triumph in 2016. True, the majority of British Christians wanted their country out of the European Union and the majority of American Christians voted for Trump (the members of some denominations by wide margins). But both the Brexit campaign and the American election downplayed religious themes. Trump did not make Christian values a centerpiece of his agenda. Many Christians who supported him did so from a fear of what a Hillary Clinton administration would mean for their religious freedom rather than a belief that Trump shared their values. In France, the National Front’s Marine Le Pen strongly supports secularism. For an express appeal to Catholic values, one must turn instead to the Republican Party’s candidate, François Fillon. 

In short, although traditional conservatism has been on the winning side in recent political contests, it has been a junior partner in a larger project: the revival of nationalism.

Movsesian argues that this rise of nationalism does not necessarily mean that liberalism has been rejected. It is the liberalism tied with globalism that is rejected by many

The resurgence of nationalism upsets the conventional wisdom, which for some time has predicted the eclipse of the nation-state and the triumph of global, free market liberalism. Even Francis Fukuyama, who originated the idea of “the End of History” in 1989, has begun to reconsider. (Access to his article in the Financial Times is best from this link.) Why was the conventional wisdom wrong? Many observers argue that the financial rewards of global liberalism have been poorly distributed, with benefits going to a small number of elites within each country. Global liberalism may look great to cosmopolitans in New York and Los Angeles, who enjoy cheaper goods and services and higher returns on their investments, but to many in Middle America, who have lost well-paying factory jobs, and whose communities have been decimated by unemployment and other social ills, the advantages are harder to discern.

The lagging fortunes of what used to be called the working class are only part of the story, though, and not the most important part. As Fukuyama acknowledges, many well-educated Americans with reasonable professional prospects, who could expect to benefit from global liberalism, also supported Trump. For these Americans, too, the new world order of multiculturalism and ever-freer trade seemed lacking.

Does that mean these Americans reject liberalism itself? Maybe. Political scientist Yashca Mounk points to some worrying trends. But not necessarily—they may just want a liberalism tied to a coherent national community. Liberalism is not simply an abstract set of propositions; it is a tradition embedded in a particular political culture. Ultimately, it depends on a shared identity beyond markets and human rights, on a cultural and social unity that transcends cheaper prices and due process of law. A global liberalism divorced from local communities is a pale substitute for the deeper sources of belonging to which people naturally turn when they face a crisis. That, more than anything else, is the key political lesson of 2016.

The question I would like to ask Movsesian is about the basis of this new nationalism. Okay, it is anti-global and anti-immigrant but why? Is it economic nationalism or racial nationalism or religious nationalism or a combination of all of them. Secondly, nationalism is inherently divisive so a 'national' liberalism may not be benign in the end.

Head of state must be a member of a certain religion

In a factank article, Pew Research  Center lists the countries that require their heads of states to have a specific religion (See In 30 countries heads of state must belong to a certain religion). It found thirty countries (15% of all countries) that have such a requirement. The list shows that it is mostly the Muslim-majority countries that have religion-related restrictions on the selection of their heads of state. Out of the total thirty countries with restrictions, seventeen (17) are Muslim-majority. For example, Jordan, Tunisia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Mauritania have such a restriction. The article informs that only two countries each require their heads of state to be Christian (Lebanon and Andorra) and Buddhist (Bhutan and Thailand). However, this is obviously not true as the article later explains that there are other 19 Christian-majority countries that do the same. So, the true count should have been forty-nine (49) countries with restrictions, twenty-one (21) Christian-majority and nineteen (19) Muslim-majority:

In addition to the 30 countries in this analysis, another 19 nations have religious requirements for ceremonial monarchs who serve as their heads of state. Sixteen of these, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, are members of the Commonwealth of Nations with Queen Elizabeth II – also known as the Defender of the Faith – as their head of state. The other countries in this category are Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 

Most of the world’s countries (85%) allow citizens of any religious affiliation to be head of state. In the United States, the Constitution specifically prohibits any kind of “religious test” as a qualification for holding federal or state public office. At the same time, a number of states still have laws on the books prohibiting nonbelievers from holding office. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that First Amendment’s prohibition on the establishment of religion clearly prohibits states from requiring office-holders to profess a belief in God.

Source: In 30 countries heads of state must belong to a certain religion

Several comments on the Pew's website questioned the validity of the analysis. For example, some commentators considered Pew's coding of Pancasila (nationalist philosophy of Indonesia) as a religion was considered strange. Others commented on the absence of the Vatican state from the analysis. I also found the analysis problematic and posted the following comment:

If the focus of the article is whether the position of head of state is restricted to members of a specific religion, then all countries that have such restrictions should be listed first. The distinction between the ‘ceremonial monarchs’ and other heads of state, if need be, should have been made later. The way article is organized, it gives a distorted picture. 

The headline says, ‘In 30 countries, heads of state must belong to a certain religion’ and these 30 countries are listed and shown on the graph. This gives the impression that other countries do not have such restrictions. It is only later that the author remembers that there are some other countries that also restrict head of state to a certain religion. The obvious question is why these countries are not included in the headline count or the first list? The answer is not clearly given but the implicit suggestion is that these heads of state do not have real power. 

This distinction is false as many countries included in the first list also have heads of state that do not have real power. One pertinent example is that of Malaysia. Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy, just like Australia, Canada, New Zealand etc. The Malaysian king (head of state) does not have real power, like the British monarch. But still Malaysia is not in the same list as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Similarly, Pakistan’s presidency (though not a monarchy) is also a ceremonial position with no real powers but still Pakistan is in the first list. 

The issue discussed in the article was whether head of state has to be a member of a certain religion. Unfortunately, from the very start, this specificity was lost and other factors like power and type of political system influenced the choices/results of analysis.

Modi's victory: Do we need public religion today?

There will not be many people who would deny the important role of religion in human lives. However, a public role of religion is controversial. As religion comes out of the shadows and is embraced not only publically but also enthusiastically, the debate has increasing relevance. The most recent triumph of public religion came on May 16 when Hindu nationalist party BJP won a landslide election victory in India (See Landslide for Modi).

 

An overtly religious party winning in secular India is new. Though BJP had won in late 1990s too, in at least two ways this win was different. First, in late 1990s, BJP was led by the intellectual, poet, 'soft' team player Vajpayee who is world away from the current leader Narendra Modi (NaMo) who is brash, street-wise and domineering (See The fact remains, Narendra Modi can never be a Atal Bihari Vajpayee). While Vajpayee's religion was closer to Gandhian model, Modi has been accused of being anti-Muslim and (although not proved) is widely implicated in 2002 riots when around two thousand people were killed (mostly Muslims) under his watch. Secondly, in late 1990s, BJP government was dependent on other parties as it didn't have simple majority in Lok Sabha. In 2014 election, however, BJP won a landslide victory and is not dependent on anyone. So, it can implement its agenda of Hindutva, if it wants (See Will Modi be India’s Putin?)     

 

So, religion is not going anywhere. Ok, but can we justify or understand religion's powerful existence in this modern age? Habermas, possibly the most celebrated intellectual/philosopher of our current age provides some answers. His detailed views are available in his many books and lectures. Here is a small tasting discussion by Michele Dillon on his views of post-secular society and religion (See Enter the Post Secular).

Among other points, Habermas noted that the Enlightenment project of modernization had gone somewhat awry, has become derailed. In particular, as he had previously elaborated, he noted that globalizing economic markets defy the control of consensual rational judgments, and he lamented not only the extent of global socioeconomic inequality but the mass political indifference toward it. This indifference is part of a longer depoliticization process resulting from modernization and increased affluence and consumerism, highlighted by Habermas decades earlier. For Habermas, the threat posed by current globalizing forces to potentially “degrade the capacity for democratic self-steering,” both within and across nations, makes the need for public communicative reasoning all the more necessary. He thus looks to discover new (i.e., underappreciated) political cultural resources for the democratic revitalization project. Hence, “a contrite modernity,” one characterized by several social pathologies that need fixing, may benefit, Habermas argued, from religious-derived norms and ethical intuitions. He conceded that these religious resources can help human society deal with “a miscarried life, social pathologies, the failures of individual life projects, and the deformation of misarranged existential relationships.”

Many sociologists have elaborated on the perils of globalization and the increased polarization between classes and regions as the profit logic of capitalist markets inexorably trumps normative considerations. Yet only Habermas looks to the religious domain rather than pushing for attentiveness to a rearticulated political ideology of, for example, global social democracy, as a way of reorienting societal thinking about modern socioeconomic pathologies. In his view, “The translation of the likeness of the human to the image of the divine into the equal and absolutely respected dignity of all human beings” offers a way of using religious values to reorient society’s values toward principles of economic and social justice. Clearly, Habermas’s new affirmation of the relevance that religious ideas and ethics have for contemporary political debate marks a major transformation in his thinking. I very much welcome this more inclusive view of religion as a potentially emancipatory political and cultural resource, a resource that can open up and enhance rather than retard public discourse, and energize the creation of more deliberative and more participative social institutions.

A Habermas's article on the solution of the 'problem' of religion in public sphere can be read here ( See Religion in the Public Sphere). 

 

  

Egyptian Politics, Islam and Muslim Brotherhood

This week an Egyptian academic and journalist Atef Said posted a blogpost on Immanent Frame: Secular, Religion and the Public Sphere. The blogpost is about the current impasse in Egyptian politics and Muslim Brotherhood future (See Three Observations on Religion, Politics and the Muslim Brotherhood).

Said made three observations. Commenting on 'Religion and Politics', he argued that religion is not out of Egyptian politics because General Sisi is himself arguing that he is saving moderate Islam from extremism and has tried to woo Salafi Al-Nour party; Sisi has also received religious endorsements; and despite somewhat less than the Constitution approved in 2012, Islam remains part of new constitution. Secondly, Said does not see an explicit participation of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in electoral politics in the near future. Said argues that although MB was banned under Mubarak too, it is different than under general Sisi because of anti-MB hysteria promoted by the current military regime; alienation and (possible) dissatisfaction of MB youth with electoral politics because of recent severe repression; and absence of any negotiations between MB and regime, a contrast to MB's negotiated electoral participation under Mubarak. Finally, Said called for a new theoretical framework to explain the four paradoxes of MB politics. MB is both an organization and a movement; it is both religious and political; it is working for both a democratic state and a Islamic state; and it is dogmatic internally and pragmatic externally.

My comments on the post are reproduced below.

An interesting article that highlights the present paradoxes and contradictions of Egyptian politics but shies away from taking sides, a difficult task in the current polarized atmosphere.

I would, however, like the author to use his detailed knowledge of Egyptian society and wider Muslim world in a more clear way. For example, while talking about religion and politics in the current Egypt, he ignores the similarities of what is happening in Egypt now with what happened under other authoritarian regimes in the past. What Sisi is doing is nothing new. Starting from Reza Shah Pahlevi of Iran (1925-41), authoritarian regimes have often posed as defender of moderate/real Islam against extremism (i.e. Islam of their enemies). They have often gotten endorsements from some religious authorities and Islam has remained part of constitutions/national identities. Other rulers that followed this trend were Afghanistan’s King Amanullah Khan (1919-29), Pakistan’s General Ayub Khan (1958-69), Iran’s Muhammad Reza Pahlevi (1941-79), Qaddafi (1969-2011), General Musharraf of Pakistan (1999-2008) and of course Egypt’s Nasser and Sadat.

Nasser’s absence is particularly conspicuous as author is himself Egyptian and we can learn a lot about what is happening now to MB from what happened to MB under Nasser. Author’s second observation offers three reasons why politics were possible under Mubarak but are not possible under Sisi:

• There is anti-MB hysteria

• MB’s youth are alienated because of repression and may opt for violence instead of electoral politics

• MB’s political participation under Mubarak was negotiated

All three of these elements were present under Nasser in the late 1950s and 1960s. Supporters of General Sisi compare him to Nasser and while Sisi is different from Nasser (due to the absence of vision, ideology and other endearing features), he is a Nasser redux in terms of his relationship with MB. Nasser banned MB; used extreme repression against them; and courts under him sentenced hundreds of MB supporters to death, including Sayyid Qutb.
Author is right to call for a new theoretical framework to analyze MB and its politics. This framework can learn from research on West European Communist parties. These ‘anti-system’ parties faced all the four paradoxes that MB faces today:

• West European Communist parties were both parties and movements as becoming a member had strict requirements and some negative consequences;

• West European Communist parties were both ideological and political. Doctrinal purity regularly clashed with the reality of politics.

• Communist ideology had some anti-democratic features so these parties were both for and against democracy. They were trying to bring a worker’s revolution while running in elections;

• West European Communist parties were internally dogmatic but had a pragmatic behavior externally. Internal debate was not encouraged in these parties but their leaders were ready to form coalitions with other political parties.

In ‘When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics’, Nathan J. Brown explores the contradictions in Islamist organizations and compares them with Communist and Green parties.

Is Religious Nationalism in Malaysia an end in itself or just a mean to continue the erstwhile Malay Nationalism?

Michael D. Barr and Anantha R. Govindasamy discuss this issue in their article 'The Islamisation of Malaysia: religious nationalism in the service of ethnonationalism' in Australian Journal of International Affairs (2010). The abstract is copied below.

The relationship between religious, ethnic and national identities in Malaysia has long been fraught with uncomfortable tensions especially for the 50 percent of Malaysians who are outside the dominant Malay- Muslim communal grouping. Until the accession of Dr Mahathir to the prime ministership at the beginning of the 1980s, it was clear that ethnic identity trumped religious identity, even though being Muslim was already intrinsic to being accepted as Malay. Being a non-Malay Malaysian was to accept a subordinate, but not a drastically uncomfortable role in the nation. Since the 1980s, however, religious identity appears to have replaced ethnicity as the central element of nation identity as the society has been systematically even aggressively Islamised. Yet appearances can be deceiving, and there is a strong case to be made that Islamisation in Malaysia is basically a variation of the original Malay ethnonationalism, using the nearly complete symbiosis between Malay and Muslim identity as the point of articulation that allows religious nationalism to serve as a cipher for ethnonationalism but a version of ethnonationalism that is much less accommodating of minorities than was traditional Malay nationalism. This article places contemporary events in a historical context and then focuses on just one aspect of Malaysia’s program of Islamisation that is both contemporary and central to national identity developments in the education system, and particularly within the secondary school history curriculum to demonstrate that in this instance at least, religious nationalism is operating as a surrogate for ethnic nationalism and has, in fact, intensified ethnic nationalism by raising the stakes for the communities that are outside the core national group.

Source: Early Malay nationalism

As the title and abstract shows, authors think that the current Islamization is just a way to promote Malay nationalism which has been diluted over the years because two of its main pillars, Malay language and adat, have been widely adopted and are not the distinguishing features anymore. So, Islam is the only distinguishing feature of Malay identity and so it is being used to keep the Malay ascendancy intact and promote the centrality of Malay identity in the national identity.  As authors contend:

It should rather be regarded as a tool in the service of that ethnic agenda -- a program of hegemony designed to reinforce Malay occupation at the heart of Malaysia’s nation-building project and to condition non-Malays and non-Muslims to accept their assimilation into the Malaysian nation as subordinate, peripheral partners. We also argue that this project has had the entirely predictable effect of reducing the comfort levels of the non-Muslim minorities.

To prove their point, authors trace the history of Malaysia and show that Islam was previously only a part of Malay identity and was not given much prominence. Since Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981, however, Islamization of state has made great strides. Islamic diet, dress, architecture etc. have been promoted by the state. There also have been changes in laws and constitution and non-Malay partners of UMNO have been unable to stop these changes which make them peripheral partners in the national project. Authors also present a detailed analysis of history books of two grades that show how Islam is prioritized.

That Malaysia has been more Islamized since the 1980s is, without doubt, true and almost all of the article gives evidence of that. However, the evidence that authors give for it being a facade for continuing Malay dominance is not strong. Evidence from many Muslim-majority countries shows Muslims societies being more concerned about religious practice and behavior and governments enacting laws to promote them. Why cannot Malaysian elite be following this global trend? Why the change in Malaysian state is not the result of the change in society which is now more religious than thirty years ago? Why is it not the result of identity issues becoming more important for Malays (the main voting bloc for UMNO) as they become more prosperous, making previously dominant economic issues recede in significance?  

What is Religious Nationalism?

This blog will focus on religious nationalism and its effects on the politics of diverse countries. I will mostly write about countries where religious nationalism is strong, such as Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, etc. However, other countries where religious nationalism is increasing (e.g. Turkey, Poland and the US) or decreasing (e. g. Nepal and Ireland) will also be discussed.

But before discussing the effects of religious nationalism, let's first define it.


Scholars have difficulty agreeing on how to define nationalism and religion so, unsurprisingly, efforts to come up with a universal definition of religious nationalism have been unsuccessful. Atalia Omer and Jason Springs (2013) in their book Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook argue that religious nationalism is the situation when ‘political and religious objectives are conflated and interwoven’. Later, they coin the term ethnoreligious nationalism which not only adds another complex concept, ethnicity, to the mix but also excludes states, such as Pakistan, where ethnicity works against religious nationalism, from the ambit of the definition.

Source: University of Manitoba

Before the 1970s, academic literature primarily portrayed nationalism as a new religion replacing the old religion so religious nationalism was an oxymoron. Nationalism developed in the 17^th and 18^th centuries in Europe and was predominantly based on ethnic and/or linguistic affinity. It was argued that as nationalism slowly gained strength, the power of religion waned and the nation became the primary or core identity of the people. Nationalism, like the old religion, had myths, symbols and heroes and expected similar undivided loyalty. Naturally, this led to a tussle between religion and nationalism and, in many states, nationalism and religion became competitors. Religious leaders criticized nationalism as a liberal or Western imposition that was intolerant of religion and promoted differences within the religious flock. Many modernist scholars agreed with these religious leaders that nationalism is linked with modernity and is detrimental to religion. Peter van der Veer in his seminal book, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India, rejects this dichotomy between nationalism and religion:

The claim that something like religious nationalism exists will be rejected by many students of nationalism for the simple reason that both nationalism and its theory depend on a Western discourse of modernity. This discourse constitutes the traditional as its antithesis and interprets difference as backwardness. A crucial element of the discourse of modernity is the opposition of the religious to the secular. One point I want to make in this book is that leading theories of nationalism tend to ignore the importance of colonialism and orientalism in the spread of nationalism. To understand religious nationalism in India we need both an analysis of tradition that is not prejudiced by the discourse of modernity and a theory of the impact of colonialism and Orientalism that does not deny agency to colonial subjects. (van der Veer 1994, x)

van der Veer argues that nationalism is not always the result of the demise of tradition/religion. Sometimes, it may be the result of the diffusion of tradition/religion and modernity as was the case in India:

Nationalism is generally assumed to belong squarely on the modern side of the great divide. It is the result of the demise of traditional society and is therefore a sign of modernity. But there is a tension between this view and the observation that, in many societies, nationalism is the product of diffusion. In the latter case, the modern is not the result of a historical transition; rather, the modern invades the traditional. According to Dumont, this leads to a period of uneasy combinations, as exemplified by Indian communalism, which combines religion and nationalism. (van der Veer 1994, 17)

Both Steve Bruce, in his book Politics and Religion (2003), and Roger Brubaker, in his article Religion and nationalism: four approaches (2012), have tried to explain different relationships between religion and nationalism or nationalists. Bruce has identified four types of relationships between religion and nationalists. 

1. Nationalists mobilize strong religious identities: In these countries, nationalism and religion are deeply enmeshed. It is difficult to separate the two. National identity is based on religious identity and, usually, the major rival country of these countries has a different sect or religion, which helps strengthen the relationship between religion/sect and the nation. Pakistan, Israel and Iran are examples of such countries. 
2. Nationalists mobilize and re-ignite weak religious identities: In countries exhibiting this relationship, changing boundaries and religious diversity has hindered in forging a strong religious identity with the nation. Bruce gives the example of Russia and Ukraine where nationalists are now trying to revive and possibly unite these weak identities. 
3. Nationalists reject strong religious identities: Usually, this rejection is due to national elite’s repudiation of any role of religion in public affairs after a period of tussle with the religious establishment. France, Mexico, etc. are examples of such a relationship. 
4. Nationalists again reject religious identities but the reasons are different: Bruce identifies most sub-Saharan African countries as examples of this type of relationship. The reason why African elite reject religious identities as the basis of nationalism is not only religious diversity in their countries but also the inability of the Christianity, the majority religion in most African countries, to provide the myths necessary for forging a strong nationalism. Christianity is further impaired by its complicity in the horrors of slavery and colonialism.

Roger Brubaker, in his article referred above, presents four ways to analyze religion and nationalism connection but these may also be considered to be four types of relationships between religion and nationalism. In the first case, religion and nationalism contest each other. Each tries to become the primary identity of a group of people, to the exclusion of the other. Nationalism is considered a modern religion that is trying to replace the old one. 

Second, religion explains some aspects of nationalism. Usually, these aspects are the origin and early development. Religion is an implicit part of the nationalist ideology of a large number of countries. Third, religion contributes to nationalism and is a visible part of the national identity. Some national myths and symbols maybe religion-based. 

Finally, Brubaker defines a much stronger relationship between religion and nationalism. In this case, it is difficult to separate the two. This relationship can be identified as religious nationalism but Brubaker is reluctant to call this type as nationalism as according to him nationalism is related to a polity existing within other polities and this type of religious nationalism downplays polities and nations. In this relationship, the majority religion and nationalism are so intertwined that the nation supposedly owes its existence to the religion. Nationalisms of Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia can be presented as examples of such nationalism. 


Phillips Barker in his book Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God be for Us (2009) argues that there are two aspects of religious nationalism, although the first is much more important than the second. Religion’s role in national identity defines religious nationalism. According to Barker, ‘Religion must be central to national identity and to conceptions of what it means to belong to a given nation. If religion is not the central feature of the national identity, it is at least one of the several features. In addition, these other features will nearly always be coterminous with religious identity. In other words, a religious nationalism may focus equally on religion and language, but the individuals engulfed by the religious and linguistic markers are one and the same.’ The second aspect of religious nationalism is political religion i.e. religious influence on state laws, policies etc. Barker explains it as ‘the extent to which identification translates into action.’

Roger Friedland in his article Money, Sex, and God: The Erotic Logic of Religious Nationalism (2002) argues that religious nationalism has to be understood on the basis of institutional logic, structure and metaphors and not in terms of (Marxist) class conflict or quest for power by clerics:

Religious nationalism cannot be explained and hence interpreted in terms of class-specific material or status injury~Simpson 1983:201–02!. Neither can it be understood as a project of religious inclusion, of group representation. Nor is it merely a clerical power-play. Religious nationalist movements are often led by the laity, not the clerics...

Religious nationalism seeks to extend the institutional logic of religion into the domain of the democratic nation-state, deriving authority from an absolute divine writ, rather than a subjective aggregation of the demos. The nation’s history is seen as a cosmic drama that pushes toward redemption, not progress. Agency is located in a disciplined self bound by faith in God, not a sacralized, self-interested monad. Society is constituted not by abstract, disembodied individuals in markets but through the gendered flesh of the family bound together by faith.

Friedland defines religious nationalism in terms of four constitutive elements:

A specific chain of four elements can be found in the symbolic order of all contemporary religious nationalisms. First, religious nationalism configures the territorial collectivity asa sacred space and a divinely invested subject. Religious nationalisms all focus on the penetration and permeability of the boundaries of that territorial space, whether by foreign investment, civil or foreign war, immigration, or a global commodified culture. The defense of the integrity of the territorial space, as in all nationalist projects, is the medium through which the coherence, identity, and power of the collective subject is known and narrated. In every case of religious nationalism, there is an acute sense that that boundedness is at risk. Second, religious nationalists direct the bulk of their attention to the bodies of women—covering, separating, and regulating their erotic flesh. Third, religious nationalists accord considerable symbolic importance to money, to foreign money, to money out of control. And fourth, religious nationalists submit lovingly to God. 

Barbara-Ann Reiffer in her article Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship (2003) argues that the relationship between religion and nationalism has not received due importance. In the writings of scholars of nationalism, religion is ignored completely or receives a cursory mention. Citing the writings of Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawm, she argues that although religion contributed significantly to the Western European nationalisms, only economic factors are highlighted or religion’s contribution is diluted by presenting it as part of the culture. She attributes this trend to the propensity in the scholars studying nationalism to present nationalism as a modern movement/concept. Reiffer contends that religious nationalism often results in religion’s precepts ‘institutionalized in laws and procedures governing the nation.’

Reiffer also offers a categorization of the different types of interaction between religion and nationalism. The first category, religious nationalism, refers to the situation where religion and nationalism are inseparable. According to Reiffer, ‘it is a community of religious people or the political movement of a group of people heavily influenced by religious beliefs who aspire to be politically self-determining.’ The second category is ‘instrumental pious nationalism’ where religion is part of nationalism but it is not nationalism's most cardinal aspect. Mostly, such nationalism is used by the political elite to provide an additional layer of national cohesion on the core based on other characteristics such as ethnicity, language etc. The third category is ‘secular/anti-religion nationalism’ where religion does not form any part of nationalism or nationalism is defined on the basis of the fight against the dominant religion. 

So, what is religious nationalism? As the above discussion shows, it is difficult to come up with a definition that encompasses all aspect of this complex phenomenon. I find Barker's definition better than others:

Religion must be central to national identity and to conceptions of what it means to belong to a given nation. If religion is not the central feature of the national identity, it is at least one of the several features. In addition, these other features will nearly always be coterminous with religious identity. In other words, a religious nationalism may focus equally on religion and language, but the individuals engulfed by the religious and linguistic markers are one and the same.