The Kahol Lavan is not an alternative in Israel

Kahol Lavan, Blue and White party, has projected itself as an alternative to Netanyahu's Likud. It claims it has solutions to Israel's problems but its policies are not much different from Bibi's. Its leadership is less corrupt than Bibi and they may change some social policies here and there but on the key issues of rights of Israeli Arabs and the Palestinian state, they want to continue the failed policies of brutality,  force, status quo, and settlements. This was made obvious once again when the chairman of the Joint (Arab) List, Arab-Israeli parliamentarian Ayman Odeh said in an interview that, on some conditions, he would be willing to join a center-left government, led by the Kahol Lavan. The conditions were as follows:

• "Planning and Construction: Freeze demolition of buildings in privately owned territories, repeal the Kaminitz Law that exacerbated the penalty for building offenses, build an Arab city.
• Violence: Gather weapons from the public, establish anti-crime organizations and an inter-agency team to combat crime.
• Welfare: Construct a public hospital in an Arab city, raise old-age pensions, disburse extra budget for dormitories for battered women.
• Political: Resume negotiations with the "Palestinians", abolish nationality law."

This was a historic shift, something which Kahol Lavan should have considered seriously. They could have negotiated and rejected one or two conditions but its leadership immediately rejected this peaceful overture. 

Gideon Levy in Haaretz takes Kahol Lavan to task on 25th August and appeals Israelis to reject this "nothing" party in the coming elections:

Vote left, vote right, just don’t vote nothing. The nothing of Kahol Lavan isn’t merely nothing, it’s an actively destructive nothing. It suffocates any possibility of providing an alternative and eliminates any hope for change. 

The leaders of this nothing threaten that the next round of warfare in the Gaza Strip will be “the last round” and avoid the most moderate of Israeli Arab leaders as if he were the plague. If that’s the alternative to the right-wing government, then we’re better off with the original. 

It’s true that they are nice and less corrupt, that they would undoubtedly introduce a few changes that would improve the atmosphere in Israel. But they’ve already proven beyond all doubt that whenever a position must be taken not on a populist issue like the need for more hospitals, but rather on a controversial topic such as war and peace, they will always choose a right-wing stance. The daylight between them and Likud when it comes to core issues can be measured in microns. Kahol Lavan will only rush more quickly to lead Israel into another pointless, criminal war.

The disgraceful response of the heads of Kahol Lavan to the statement of Joint List Chairman Ayman Odeh offered definitive proof of their cowardice or their right-wing credentials, and it’s not clear which is worse. It’s safe to assume that the heads of Kahol Lavan seemingly agree with most of Odeh’s theoretical conditions for joining the government; only their fear of being painted in a too-left light pushed them into a response that pushed them to the right of Kahanist party Otzma Yehudit. When Yair Lapid and Gabi Ashkenazi treat Odeh as if he were contagious, their incitement affects centrist voters, not the “hilltop youth” hard-core activist settlers. 

The hollow talk of “the last round” and “the restoration of deterrence” has also proven that the nothing of Kahol Lavan is right and more right. Their next round in Gaza won’t be the last or even the antepenultimate round, because exactly like Likud, all they are offering is force and more force, with a few bones tossed in to assuage the hunger. The rounds of warfare will continue into infinity. The leaders of Kahol Lavan know what is the only solution for the Gaza Strip, but it's something which they don’t have the courage to propose. A few of them killed more than a few people, they have Palestinian blood on their hands; they know where all of that has led in the past, and where it will always lead in the future. 

They also know just how hollow the talk of deterrence is, when desperation is the main driving force. When a young Palestinian man places a bomb at a spring that was robbed from his village, he knows that he is ruining his own life and that of his family — and he is not deterred. And there is nothing that could deter him, apart from hope for a different reality. Pronouncements about deterrence are for cowards and populists, like those of Kahol Lavan. Courageous people would speak about a genuine solution, about lifting the siege on Gaza and ending the occupation of the West Bank. Save for these, there are no solutions. But that’s a few sizes too big for Kahol Lavan. 

Kahol Lavan offers a government of generals. Having spent the majority of their lives in barracks, they know only one language, the language of force, and only two kinds of Arabs, the terrorist and the collaborator. They also know very little about life in Israel. They were too busy with wars and policing. Not one of the three leading generals in Kahol Lavan has broadened his view of the world beyond that. Their clumsy way of speaking only underlines this. The addition of Yair Lapid, the civilian, only detracts from the party: He is the most populist politician in Israel today. “Deterrence you build through force, through a lot of force and through disproportionate force,” the off-brand macho boasted on Friday, sizing up the chances for achieving change in Israel at zero. If the choice is Netanyahu or Ahmad Tibi, then it's Tibi, without hesitation. Bibi or Benny Gantz of Kahol Lavan? Bibi, with hesitation.

Why street protests work in Pakistan?

Daniel Markey recently wrote an article on the success of street protests in Pakistan?' (See Why street protests work in Pakistan?). His main arguments is that democratically elected leaders in Pakistan face such protests not only because they face very difficult challenges and weak political institutionalization but also because of their own tendencies to centralize power.

By rights, however, Sharif (and Zardari before him) should not face such a high deficit of popular legitimacy as the one that loomed over Musharraf's tenure. Whatever the flaws of national elections in 2008 and 2013, they were better than what came before, or at least no worse. It is hard to accept that the motivating energy behind the latest round of protests is truly a consequence of voting irregularities. No, today's opposition leaders Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri are opportunistically latching on to whatever charges can be leveled against Prime Minister Sharif and company. Vote rigging, like corruption, is a perennially effective club to wield against most Pakistani politicians and their parties. 

Part of Sharif's present vulnerability to popular protests can be explained by his own policy missteps that have dissipated enthusiasm for his rule. His dealings with the army, for instance, have been rife with tensions over the Musharraf case and the timing of negotiations and military operations against the TTP. In addition, although Pakistan's economy is no worse off than it was before Sharif assumed office (and by many measures, it is probably stronger), the common Pakistani has seen little material benefit. To be fair, even the best schemes for new power plants and Chinese-financed infrastructure cannot be realized overnight, but decades of unfulfilled promises by Pakistani politicians have jaded the public. The summertime heat and persistent power outages undercut Sharif's appeal as a can-do businessman, his calling card in the last election. 

 Yet lots of democracies face setbacks; the anti-incumbent theme of "throwing the bums out" is a universal rallying cry. In countries where democratic institutions are firmly entrenched, however, opposition parties work through parliamentary and electoral systems to accomplish those ends. It is primarily in democratic systems where institutions are weak and ineffective that unconventional forms of political participation, like street protests, are the norm. At least, this is the principal finding of an insightful political analysis comparing democratic states across Latin America by the Inter-American Development Bank in 2009.

By this logic, Nawaz Sharif's main failing -- the one that makes him most vulnerable to street protest today -- is his lack of investment in the institutionalization of democratic politics. That deficit is indeed glaring. Sharif's critics are right to chastise his do-nothing parliament and hyper-centralization of political authority in the hands of a tiny group of cronies.

I argued in my comments that what Markey is saying is right but the role of Pakistan's military cannot be ignored. It is one of the main reasons why such protests (with proportionally very small number of people) succeed:

A more pertinent question is why such SMALL street protests work in Pakistan. The current protest marchers in Islamabad  are around fifty thousand. Pakistan's population is more than 180 million. So, the question is why 0.003% of population can topple a government. Governing through parliament is important and there is no doubt that Nawaz Sharif' has centralized power but many other world leaders have a similarly centralized power and faced big protests and still continue to rule. Two prominent examples are Erdogan and Putin. Both these leaders have a centralized style of governance and faced proportionally bigger protests but still continue to rule. 

It is true that in countries where democratic institutionalization is weak, unconventional forms of political participation (e.g.  street protests) are the norm but do they topple governments? A pertinent example in that of Mexico where in 2006, there were large protests against vote rigging, similar to what is happening in Pakistan now. What was the end result? The Mexican government patiently waited and eventually protests ended.
There is also no need to resort to ruthless force as the Mexican example shows. Protesters in Mexico city camped for months. Pakistani government has to just wait and there is every reason to believe that Imran Khan supporters (who have a more valid case for protest) would fizzle out.
So, why Pakistani government is worried? The answer is history of military involvement in politics and the perception in Pakistan that military is not happy with Nawaz Sharif. This perception of military's displeasure emboldens Sharif's opponents and makes many others to hedge their bets or go against Sharif to protect their interests. For example, most of the news channels in Pakistan report news with a clear bias against Sharif government. They hardly question the legitimacy of having 0.003% of people demanding dissolution of national assembly, using undemocratic means.
Perhaps looking at Turkey in 1997 and in 2013 will clarify my contention. In 1997, a democratically elected government was toppled one year after being elected only by a memorandum by the Turkish military. In 2013, a democratically elected but much more centralized (and maybe more corrupt too) are not toppled. The main difference in 1997 and 2103 was the absence of military's political power in 2013.