The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism

This lecture by Dr. Reza Zia-Ebrahimi is based on his book, "The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the politics of dislocation," published in 2016 by Columbia University Press. An abstract of the book from Dr. Reza's page on King's College website is given below:

Reza Zia-Ebrahimi revisits the work of Fath'ali Akhundzadeh and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, two Qajar-era intellectuals who founded modern Iranian nationalism. In their efforts to make sense of a difficult historical situation, these thinkers advanced an appealing ideology Zia-Ebrahimi calls "dislocative nationalism," in which pre-Islamic Iran is cast as a golden age, Islam is reinterpreted as an alien religion, and Arabs become implacable others. Dislodging Iran from its empirical reality and tying it to Europe and the Aryan race, this ideology remains the most politically potent form of identity in Iran.

Akhundzadeh and Kermani's nationalist reading of Iranian history has been drilled into the minds of Iranians since its adoption by the Pahlavi state in the early twentieth century. Spread through mass schooling, historical narratives, and official statements of support, their ideological perspective has come to define Iranian culture and domestic and foreign policy. Zia-Ebrahimi follows the development of dislocative nationalism through a range of cultural and historical materials, and he captures its incorporation of European ideas about Iranian history, the Aryan race, and a primordial nation. His work emphasizes the agency of Iranian intellectuals in translating European ideas for Iranian audiences, impressing Western conceptions of race onto Iranian identity.

Dr. Reza introduces his talk at Stanford University by clarifying what he means by Iranian nationalism.  The (dislocative) Iranian nationalism, according to Dr. Zia, was constructed in the late 19th century and was based on the ideas of European orientalists, many of whom were Islamophobes. This nationalism was not accepted or even discussed in Iran before the late 19th century. He defines Iranian nationalism as a cluster of following three myths or ideas.

• Iran is the land of Aryans. The Aryans are defined as a race that is generally in conflict with the Semitic race. Here, there is an attempt to link Iran with Europe and present Iranians as a European race. Many influential historians, who subscribed to this myth under Pahlavis, wrote Iranian history to affirm this myth;
• Everything in pre-Islamic Iran was great. It was the golden age of Iranian/Aryan history. If one wants to study true Iranian culture, before its adulteration, then he or she has to study this age. The decline of Iran started with the invasion of Arabs;
• Arabs are barbaric, uncouth, illiterate savages. Everything related to Arabs is brutish or boorish, including their culture (if it exists), their language, Arabic, and their religion, Islam.

As one can see Dr. Reza is talking about a particular type or a specific strand of Iranian nationalism. This strand rejects Islam, Arab and Semitic influences, including sometimes Shia Islam. So, Dr. Reza is telling the story of nationalism that is not accepted by millions of Iranians and the current Iranian government today. Dr. Reza explains how the myths above are ahistorical and European imports.

Some pictures that Dr. Reza used to illustrate Iranian dislocative nationalism:

Popularity of Farvahar: Symbol of pre-Islamic Iran, Zoroastrianism, etc.

Crown Prince Abbas asking a European to explain (after Iran's defeat by Russians):

Golden age archaism:

Arab invasion: Arabs are not only brutal savages that are killing Iranians and raping Iranian women, they are also brown while Iranians are white:

Aryan race theory borrowed from the Europeans, part of the state discourse under Pahlavis:

To understand the tussle between religious and ethnolinguistic nationalism in Iran, here are some previous blog posts on Iranian nationalism: Iranian identity and nationalism: Shahnameh's Jamsheed or Biblical Cyrus, Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity, Shiite and Persian Nationalism are both myths, Afraid of Ahmadinejad,  Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?, and More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran.

Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?

The tussle between the Islamic/Shiite identity and the Persian ethnolinguistic identity has been a constant theme in the modern Iranian politics (See blog post Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity). Sometimes, one type of identity becomes so powerful that it seems that the other type has been completely evanesced. However, soon the apparently evanesced identity reappears and dominates the political scene, making the once primary identity vanish. For instance, the Persian identity remained dominant during the reigns of Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah and the Islamic identity was on the fringe and mostly invisible but, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Islamic identity became the paramount identity and Persian identity was nowhere to be seen.

During the last decade, it appears the Persian identity is gradually rising again. Former President Ahmadinejad was the first one from the top elite of the Islamic regime to acknowledge/lay claim on the Persian identity (See blog post Afraid of Ahmadinejad). For the first time after the Revolution, Ahmadinejad loaned the famed Cyrus Cylinder from the British Museum and exhibited it in Iran. His advisor Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei even linked Cyrus with the prophets of Islam, drawing severe censure from the conservative circles.

Recently, there is more evidence of the growing influence of the Persian identity in Iran. During recent years, more and more Iranians are visiting the Tomb of Cyrus in Pasargadae on October 29, the internationally designated day of Cyrus the Great. In October 2016, there was an unprecedented traffic jam near Pasargadae as thousands of Iranians tried to reach the tomb and President Rouhani also joined the celebrations via Instagram:

The number of people who showed up at Pasargadae was surprising. The event fell on a Friday, which is a weekend in Iran, and reportedly saw a traffic jam in a 30- to 40-kilometer (19- to 25-mile) radius on the roads leading to the tomb. Those who had witnessed similar get-togethers say they had never seen such a large gathering. The locals, including those dwelling in the nearby Pasargadae village, were also quite amazed by the sheer number of visitors. Reports say people started gathering in the area, especially around the Tomb of Cyrus, from as early as the evening before and that there was heavy traffic on roads to the site. As such, the main entrance to Pasargadae was closed the night before, with no more cars allowed to enter. On Oct. 28, social media users shared widely circulated videos and pictures of the gathering of Cyrus devotees, showing some of them shouting slogans praising the Achaemenid king.

President Hassan Rouhani even published a picture of himself next to the nearby Achaemenid capital of Persepolis on his Instagram page, with the caption: “Persepolis is one of the invaluable and unique remains of the ancient history of this land, which demonstrates the antiquity of the civilization, the ingenuity, the wisdom, and the management skills of the great people of Iran, as well as their monotheism.” (See ‘Cyrus the Great’ enters Iranian politics)

Source: The rise of nationalist fervour in Iran

Not surprisingly, this gathering was criticized by the conservatives. Ayatollah Hossein Nouri-Hamedani, one of the most senior clerics, said on October 30th: 

"People rose and brought about the revolution and allowed the emergence of a true Islamic system. The shah used to say, ‘O Cyrus, sleep in peace as we are awake.’ Now, a group of people have gathered around the Tomb of Cyrus and they are circumambulating it and have taken their handkerchiefs out and cry [as they do for Shiite Imam Hussein]. In the time of Imam [Ruhollah] Khomeini, too, a group of people started commemorating Cyrus. The imam [Khomeini] said that these people have gathered and are crying because we have brought Islam to this country.” He added, “These are the same [people]; they are counter-revolutionaries. I am amazed that these people get together around the Tomb of Cyrus, shouting the same slogans for him that we shout in support of the supreme leader, and yet we are sitting here, alive and well, and just watching this...Who in power has been so negligent to allow these people to gather? We are in a revolutionary and Islamic country, and this revolution is the continuation of the actions of the prophet and the imams, and their point was to create a perfect populace."(See ‘Cyrus the Great’ enters Iranian politics)

After this statement, the local officials sprung into action and some organizers of the gathering were arrested. However,  Rohollah Faghihi (See What Iranian clerics really think of Cyrus the Great) argues that it would be wrong to think that conservatives are united in disowning Cyrus. Many Iranian clerics consider Cyrus, the Great, Dhul Qarnayn, an ancient king praised in Quran:

In verses 83 and 98 of the chapter Kahf, the Quran narrates a story revolving around an individual named Dhul-Qarnayn, who is praised as a believer and ruler: “Indeed, we established him upon the earth, and we gave him to everything a way.” Allameh Muhammad Hossein Tabatabai, one of the most prominent thinkers of philosophy and contemporary Shiite Islam, cautiously identifies Cyrus as Dhul-Qarnayn in his 20-volume work of Quranic exigesis, the "Tafsir al-Mizan." Other scholars engaged in Quranic exigesis, such as Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi — one of the most senior clerics in Qom — have also described Cyrus as Dhul-Qarnayn.

Faghihi also quotes an anonymous Shiite scholar:

In an interview with Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, a Shiite scholar and cleric who has been teaching at the Qom seminary for the past two decades said, “Islam doesn’t seek to take away national pride from people. What is currently happening is a political issue.” He added, “The seminary and religion do not dismiss Cyrus and the ancient history of Iran at all. Some who are expressing their opposition to Cyrus aren’t speaking on behalf of the whole seminary. I should say that even those who have voiced their opposition regarding this issue do not hold an opinion against Cyrus. For instance, Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani criticized the tears the crowd there [in Pasargadae on Oct. 28] shed, not Cyrus himself.”

Are things going to change soon? Is there a coming together of the two Iranian identities? Not likely. Clerics consider nationalism as unislamic, Western import and the advocates of Persian ethnolinguistic identity consider clerics and their rule un-Iranian:

Like many other pious Muslims, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, viewed the concept of nationalism as un-Islamic. He thought nationalism was in opposition to the concept of ummah (Muslim worldwide community), which fundamentally rejects borders that divide Muslim societies. He asserted that “nationalism is designed by the plotters to create discord among the Muslims and it is being propagated by the agents of imperialism.”

Ayatollah Khomeini further remarked that “the plan of the great powers and their affiliates in the Muslim countries is to separate and divide the various strata of Muslims, whom God, the Blessed and Exalted, has declared brothers. … Those who, in the name of nationalism, factionalism, etc., create schism and disunity among Muslims are armies of Satan, opponents of the Holy Quran, and helping agents of the superpowers.”

Additionally, the conservatives view nationalism – essentially a secular movement that advocates separation of state and religion – as a serious threat to the foundation of the state’s ideology, which is based on the guardianship of the Islamic jurists. During the 28 October gathering, one of the slogans chanted was “freedom of thought cannot take place with beards,” a reference to the figures in power. (See The rise of nationalist fervour in Iran)

Iran and Israel: Changing Places?

Being two states based on religious nationalism and also critical for world peace and economy, Israel and Iran have been focus of this blog. So, it is fascinating to read a comparison of these two states. 

Two academics, one Iranian and the other Israeli, from the prestigious Stanford University have penned a wonderful op-ed in New York Times Sunday Review (See Are Iran and Israel trading places?). They argue that Iran and Israel are trading places in terms of religious nationalism, democracy, human rights and international acceptance. Iran is now considered undemocratic, authoritarian, radically religious nationalist and international pariah while Israel is considered democratic, liberal and is internationally accepted. Soon, however, Iran can become today's Israel and Israel today's Iran, if Israelis and Iranians do not change their current trajectories. 

Message of the authors is clear. While Israelis should change their trajectory, Iranians should stick to it.

After first listing the similarities between Iran and Israel (old civilizations; primarily non-Arab states in a mostly Arab region; and bastions of secular nationalism in the 1950s), Milani and Waismel-Manorapril contend that a critical cultural and demographic shift is happening and Israelis and Iranians are changing both inside their countries and outside. 

Iranian intellectuals, previously supporting religious authoritarianism, are now voicing their dissent against the regime. The argument that democracy and human rights are against Islam has been rejected. The patriarchal society established by the ruling elite, disproportionately old and male, has been challenged by Iranian women, who make up almost two-third of country’s science and engineering graduates. Gender apartheid has failed and Iranian women are asserting themselves. Birthrate in Iran is falling. Most of the Iranians are under thirty and believe in individual liberty. The rise of Mr. Rouhani and the current pragmatism is the consequence of these major changes. So, expect more pragmatism, democracy and better relations with the West. These trends inside Iran are supported by Iranian diaspora that is strong, liberal and increasingly successful.

Milani and Waismel-Manorapril then contrast this situation with Israel. While Iranian elite are moving toward West/US, Israeli elite are increasingly antagonistic as seen by their recent statements. These changes are again based on an underlying cultural and demographic shift. Orthodox Jews are gradually controlling the state that was once more liberal. Demographically, they have grown much faster as their average birthrate of 6.5 children per family is much more than the 2.6 children per family for the rest of Israelis. This change has obvious political consequences. Orthodox Jewish parties hold about around one-fourth of Knesset seats. They want to make Israel less democratic and more Jewish, with not many rights for its Arab population. Most of them are also against any agreement with the Palestinians and support settlements. Their support has been critical for continued expansion of settlements and rejection of any real peace deal. Internationally, these Israeli policies have led to increasingly strong support for the boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israeli companies and institutions, an existential threat to Israel. Jewish diaspora is also changing and is becoming less religious and less uncritically pro-Israel. European and American Jews are mostly liberal and have difficulty accepting Israel's attitude toward Palestinians and its refusal to end occupation.

While I agree with much of Milani and Waismel-Manorapril's argument, there are few observations I want to make:

• Both Israel and Iran were not bastion of secularism in 1950s. Muhammad Reza Shah was for modernization but if secularism means separation of religion from politics, Shah clearly didn't want secularism. He used to pray at religious shrines; tell stories about how he had dreams in which he met Shia Imams; used to seek supplications from Tehran's prayer leader before going to foreign visits; and had no problems with the ascendancy of Shia sect. While his father (Reza Shah)'s regime can be called a 'bastion of secularism', his cannot. 
• Israel was even less of a bastion of secularism. Although, it was ruled by secular Jews, Judaism had a special place in Israel from the start. Israel's national anthem, language and flag and more particularly establishment of Chief Rabbinate clearly showed a tendency against secularism. Interestingly, it was in the 1950s that religious courts established their control over matters of marriage and divorce in Israel. So, while both countries have become more religious, they were not secular in 1950s.
• It is true that Iranians want a more liberal and open society but do they want a Western society? There is a difference and it should be recognized. Iranians maybe against their ruling clerics but they are also strongly nationalistic and this nationalism is largely based on West's injustice and its efforts to control Iran since 1850s. Therefore, expect better Iranian relations with the West but if Iranian felt they are being unjustly humiliated (again), then all bets are off. The recent refusal of the US government that it would not give visa to Iran's designated ambassador to the UN is one example how things can go the 'other' way.