A Quest for Identity: The Case of Religious Populism in Pakistan

Pakistani Identity

 Source: BBC

Abstract:

Since its founding, both civil and military Pakistani governments have used religious populism to consolidate support and legitimize their actions. This has paved the way for religious populism to become a part of the nation’s cultural imagination and identity. During the country’s “infant” or “fragile” democratic phase, religious populism was repeatedly used to consolidate support. Religious parties and groups hold great political sway in the county. Through the use of religious populism, these factions have been allowed to nurture their own “people” who are partisan towards “others.” The weak level of governance, political turmoil, and distrust in institutional capabilities has pushed the public into the arms of religious populists. 

The article can be read at European Center for Populism Studies

Role of non-religious parties in Islamization of Pakistan

Nadeem Farooq Piracha (NFP) has written a very detailed and excellent article on non-religious parties' role in Islamization of the government (Role of non-religious parties in fanning religious extremism). He calls it "fanning religious extremism" but the examples he gave and the speeches he cited cannot all be termed as religious extremism. NFP starts with the 1953 Ahmadi riots in Punjab that were covertly supported or encouraged by the then Chief Minister Mumtaz Daultana, who was not religious but wanted to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Others have argued that this instrumentalization of Islam for political ends in Pakistan much earlier than 1953. Some scholars point towards the passage of Objectives Resolution in March 1949 as the first instance of using Islam for political ends by non-religious parties and non-practicing leaders. Most Indian scholars, of course, term the whole independence movement of Pakistan as an example of using Islam to fan division, hatred, and communalism, all for mundane political objectives. 

The "selling of religion for political ends," as Pakistan's first President Iskander Mirza termed it while abrogating Pakistan's first (1956) constitution, continues unabated from 1953 onwards. General Ayub's tenure (1958-69) is considered by many as the apex of Islamic modernism. The article also hints at agreeing with this idea especially before 1965. However, digging a little deep, one can see that Ayub was not really against using Islam for his own political ends. Islamic modernism was employed by Ayub Khan to promote the development agenda of his regime. The fact that he included, not one (as in the 1956 Constitution) but two constitutional bodies to research on Islamic history, law, philosophy, etc., and to advise the government in the 1962 Constitution (articles 199 to 207) bespeaks of his willingness to instrumentalize Islam. We can agree that Ayub was not fanning extremism but he was also instrumentalizing Islam. Bengalis would also point out to his using of Islam to denigrate them and to deny them their political, democratic, and civil rights in Pakistan. Ayub infamously wrote in his book, Friends, Not Masters, "In addition, they [East Pakistanis] have been and still are under Hindu cultural and linguistic influence." Inferior Muslims (Bengalis) were, of course, not allowed to rule superior Muslims (West Pakistanis), even if the inferior ones are in majority. 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's story of caving in to religious parties or his unfortunate attempt to steal their thunder is often told as a modern-day replication of a Greek tragedy. Bhutto is proclaimed as a non-religious hero, who started with a secular vision, but was eventually defeated by the nefarious Islamist forces. The reality is, as always, more complex. Bhutto did pay homage to religious sentiment from the start, much before he came to power. The slogan of "Islamic socialism" was used by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Bhutto himself during the 1970 election campaign. Furthermore, as NFP informs in his article, Bhutto was forced to adopt religious clauses in the new 1973 Constitution and later other Islamization measures, including declaring Ahmadis non-Muslim, not only by the religious parties but also by non-religious parties which allied with religious parties in order to dent Bhutto's popularity and defeat him.

Source: Role of non-religious parties in fanning religious extremism

The 1990s saw Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League led the charge towards Islamization. Islam was used to browbeat and defeat PPP. Not surprisingly, the name of the opposition alliance, cobbled together by the military and led by Sharif, was Islami Jamhori Ittihad (Islamic Democratic Alliance). Benazir was portrayed as Western and not truly Muslim. She was linked with India and Israel.

After the restoration of democracy in 2008, using Islam for political purposes by the non-religious parties declined a bit. However, this changed when the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, and many other parties decided to support religious parties protest against an amendment in the Finality of Prophethood declaration by the electoral candidates. The PTI continued to smear Sharif, even after the amendment was taken back and the law minister resigned, of not really believing in the finality of prophethood. In addition to the help of the military, this usage of Islam to defame its opponent was crucial in its win in Punjab.

Hence, NFP is right. Non-religious parties have been using Islam to get a political or electoral advantage. The million-dollar question is why they are doing it? And why they have succeeded at least in some cases? Is it because of Pakistan's religious nationalism?

Pakistan: Religious nationalism in retreat from 1947 to the mid-1970s

Pakistan was formed on the basis of religious nationalism but in its initial years,  Islamic modernism was the dominant paradigm as Nadeem Farooq Paracha explains in his article. The ruling elite, from 1947 to the mid-1970s, wanted to implement Islamic principles, not Islamic punishments. The mullah and the cleric did not have much to do with the affairs of the state.

Source: Smokers' corner: Curbing the mullah

In Questioning the Authority of the Past historian Dr Ali Usman Qasimi explains how from 1947 till about the mid-1970s, the state and subsequent governments consciously kept the ulema away from directly influencing government legislation.

Usmani adds that this was not due to the fact that those who ran the state and governments between the mentioned years were secular. Instead, their idea of faith and its role in the formation of Pakistani nationalism was different from those held by the ulema and the clerics.

The civil-military establishment which was at the helm of state and government affairs from 1947 till the early 1970s was an extension of the idea of faith and Muslim nationalism developed and evolved by the likes of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Syed Amir Ali, Chiragh Ali, Ahmaduddin Amritsari, Muhammad Iqbal, Ghulam Ahmad Parvez, Dr Khalifa Abdul Hakim, and to a certain extent, Dr Fazalur Rehman Malik.

These scholars were the main shapers of ‘Islamic Modernism’ in South Asia. As an idea it encouraged the acquirement of universal sciences and philosophies to facilitate a rational, practical and informed reading of Islam’s holy scriptures beyond the ‘dated’ interpretations penned by ancient ulema or contemporary clerics.

From the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries, these scholars, through hefty scholarly treatises and philosophical discourses, urged the snatching away of matters of faith from the clutches of clerics and ‘dogmatic ulema.’

They advocated addressing the faith’s ‘stagnant’ and ‘retrogressive’ state through modern scholarly, scientific and cultural means so that its ‘true form’ (which was vibrant and supple) could be brought back to life. To them this recouped form was to become the engine empowering the rejuvenation of South Asia’s Muslims into becoming an enlightened and dynamic polity.

The founders of Pakistan led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah were very much a part and parcel of this narrative and of the evolving tradition of Islamic Modernism in South Asia.
For example, just a few months after the country’s creation in August 1947, Jinnah green-lighted the creation of the Institute for the Reconstruction of Islam (IRI) headed by the celebrated Jewish-journalist-turned-Muslim-scholar, Muhammad Asad.

Ishtiaq Ahmad in 1987’s The Concept of Islamic State quotes IRI’s first scholarly initiative as a detailed treatise which suggested that “no specific form of government had been prescribed by Muslim scriptures and it was up to the Muslims of every age to agree on one that suits their conditions.” The report emphasised that no matter what form of government Muslims decide to enact, it needed to be run on one of the central Islamic principles of “socio-economic justice.”

Even though the 1949 Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly declared that Pakistan was to become an ‘Islamic Republic’, Usmani reminds his readers that the Resolution did not envision any special authority for the ulema. (see Smokers' corner: Curbing the mullah for full article)