Poland and the Catholic Church

Catholicism is generally considered the most vital ingredient of Polish identity. It is argued that during the last five centuries, the Polish state fought battles against the Russians (Orthodox Christians from the East), Ottomans (Muslims from the South) and Germans and Swedes (Protestants from the North and West), so defending Poland or defending the Catholic Church became one and the same and Catholicism formed the basis of Polish nationalism. Poland was partitioned between its neighbours in 1785 and did not exist as a state till 1918. During the nineteenth century, with the state gone, Church gained more importance. Catholic priests played a key role in Polish insurrections against occupiers. However, contrary to what is portrayed, Church was not the only expression of Polish resistance and, during the occupation, while priests supported the insurrections, the Holy See asked Poles to accept the Russian Tsar as their divinely anointed emperor. In 1945, its liberty was again compromised when it became a Communist state. During the post-1945 dark period, the Catholic Church was at the forefront, strengthening the myth that the Catholic Church was essential to Poland. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Archbishop of Warsaw (1948-81), was the undisputed leader of the resistance against Nazis and Communists for decades and the fall the Communist regime (1945-89) was aided by the selection of another Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II in 1978. The Catholic leadership, unsurprisingly, promoted the religious nationalism. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński once said that "nowhere else is the union between Church and nation as strong as in Poland." Pope John Paul II declared, "Without Christ, it is impossible to understand the history of Poland." The charismatic "Polish Pope" made the Church very popular and the linkage between Poles and their faith is still strong: 99% of the Polish children are baptised, 93% of weddings are also solemnized in Church and between 90% and 98% of the Poles will affirm their belief in the Catholicism. The national myth and the present demography helps make most Poles believe that Poland was always homogeneously Catholics, with few 'foreigners'. However, in reality, Polish state has always been ethnically and religiously heterogeneous. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Poland (or Poland-Lithuania) was a diverse nation, with Jewish, Orthodox, and Protestant communities. Ethnic Poles lived with Ukrainians, Belarusian, Prussians, Lithuanians, Jews and Livionians. It was only after the Counterreformation movement that Catholics established their hegemony and not only physically banish some non-Catholics from the Polish state but also expelled them from the state's historical narrative (See Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland). During the interwar years, when the Catholic Church again became dominant, it again tried to establish its hegemony and tried to restrict the religious freedoms of minorities.

Largest Catholic Church in Poland: Basilica of Our Lady of Licheń
Source: Christian Tourism

The present-day Poland is very homogeneous. Ninety eight percent of the population belong to Polish ethnicity and around ninety percent are Catholics. However, this homogeneity is a recent phenomenon. Even before the Second World War, Catholics only had a two-thirds majority in Poland.  In 1921, newly revived Poland, "Rome's most faithful daughter," had 62.5% Roman (Latin) Catholic, 11.8% Eastern Rite Catholic, 11% Greek Orthodox, 10.8% Jewish, and 3.7% Protestants citizens. The war, change of borders, and voluntary migrations and forced deportations bequeathed Poland its religious and ethnic homogeneity. Ukrainians and Belarusians became part of Soviet Union and Germans were either killed in the War or fled or were expelled later on. Jewish minority was either destroyed in the Holocaust or fled. The homogeneity of Poland was further aided by the migration of Poles from Kresy ((Eastern) Borderlands), an area that was part of pre-WWII Poland but was annexed to the Soviet Union after 1945. 

In the 1990s, after democratization and defeat of communism, Catholic Church's influence increased. For instance, abortion, which was legal since 1956, was made illegal, except for few exemptions, in 1993. The Polish law on abortion is one of the most restrictive in Europe. The Church vigorously campaigned for the bill. Even the Pope came from Rome to campaign for the bill. There was such emotional support for the bill that its opponents felt threatened but the religious right was even then not happy with the law: 

Lawmakers approved the measure in January after heavy lobbying by the Roman Catholic Church and in a climate of such emotion and intimidation that virtually all state hospitals had already stopped performing abortions. Gynecologists who perform the procedure say they are targets of threats and attacks by militant anti-abortion campaigners...

Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, the associate general secretary of the Polish Bishops' Conference, said that the church was unhappy with the law as passed because "the principle 'Thou shalt not kill' does not allow any exceptions."

Halina Nowina-Konopka, a member of Parliament from the Christian National Party, said the law did not go far enough.

"It just regulates when you can kill and when you can't," she said. "It devalues human life in that it makes one life worth less than another. It's like ancient Sparta where they threw individuals who were less fit off the cliffs." ( See Tough Abortion Law Provokes Dismay in Poland)

Not only this law is still on the books, but there also have been attempts to ban abortion completely.

In 1993, the Polish state signed a concordat with the Church. This agreement was declared as a model for other post-communist countries by the Pope. The important thing to note was that the concordat was agreed and signed before the new constitution. Therefore, the Polish Constitution (1997) had to conform to the concordat, not the other way round. In fact, several drafts of the constitution had to be adjusted to conform it to the concordat. The concordat has been criticized for various reasons. Once signed, the concordat ended any possibility of constitutional separation of church and state. It also ended the equality of all religions before the state. The Catholic Church acquired a special position within the state because of its special relationship. Under concordat, the state promised to provide Catholic religious education in state schools if requested. The Church also made state declare seven religious days as public holidays. The state also accepted the role of Catholic military chaplains, administered by the (Catholic) military bishopric, in the Polish military forces. The controversial rightwing Radio Marya was also protected under the concordat (See Polish concordat (1993): Text and criticism)

The 1997 Constitution also shows several elements of religious nationalism. The preamble mentions God twice and the following sentence emphasizing Christian heritage of Poland:

Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values, 

The following articles go against the principle of the secularity of state:

Article 25(4): The relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by the international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute. 

Article 53(3): Parents shall have the right to ensure their children a moral and religious upbringing and teaching in accordance with their convictions. The provisions of Article 48, para. 1 shall apply as appropriate.

Article 53(4): The religion of a church or other legally recognized religious organization may be taught in schools, but other peoples' freedom of religion and conscience
shall not be infringed thereby. 

Article 104(2): Deputies, before the commencement of the performance of the mandate, shall take the following oath in the presence of the Sejm:
"I do solemnly swear to perform my duties to the Nation diligently and conscientiously, to safeguard the sovereignty and interests of the State, to do all within my power for the prosperity of the Homeland and the  well-being of its citizens, and to observe the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Poland."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God."

Article 130: The President of the Republic shall assume office upon taking the following oath in the presence of the National Assembly:
"Assuming, by the will of the Nation, the office of President of the Republic of Poland, I do solemnly swear to be faithful to the provisions of the Constitution; I pledge that I shall steadfastly safeguard the dignity of the Nation, the independence and security of the State, and also that the good of the Homeland and the prosperity of its citizens shall forever remain my supreme obligation."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God." 

Article 151: The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and ministers shall take the following oath in the presence of the President of the Republic:
"Assuming this office of Prime Minister (Deputy Prime Minister, minister) I do solemnly swear to be faithful to the provisions of the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Poland, and that the good of the Homeland and the prosperity of its citizens shall forever remain my supreme obligation."
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God." (See The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997)

What is Religious Nationalism?

This blog will focus on religious nationalism and its effects on the politics of diverse countries. I will mostly write about countries where religious nationalism is strong, such as Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, etc. However, other countries where religious nationalism is increasing (e.g. Turkey, Poland and the US) or decreasing (e. g. Nepal and Ireland) will also be discussed.

But before discussing the effects of religious nationalism, let's first define it.


Scholars have difficulty agreeing on how to define nationalism and religion so, unsurprisingly, efforts to come up with a universal definition of religious nationalism have been unsuccessful. Atalia Omer and Jason Springs (2013) in their book Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook argue that religious nationalism is the situation when ‘political and religious objectives are conflated and interwoven’. Later, they coin the term ethnoreligious nationalism which not only adds another complex concept, ethnicity, to the mix but also excludes states, such as Pakistan, where ethnicity works against religious nationalism, from the ambit of the definition.

Source: University of Manitoba

Before the 1970s, academic literature primarily portrayed nationalism as a new religion replacing the old religion so religious nationalism was an oxymoron. Nationalism developed in the 17^th and 18^th centuries in Europe and was predominantly based on ethnic and/or linguistic affinity. It was argued that as nationalism slowly gained strength, the power of religion waned and the nation became the primary or core identity of the people. Nationalism, like the old religion, had myths, symbols and heroes and expected similar undivided loyalty. Naturally, this led to a tussle between religion and nationalism and, in many states, nationalism and religion became competitors. Religious leaders criticized nationalism as a liberal or Western imposition that was intolerant of religion and promoted differences within the religious flock. Many modernist scholars agreed with these religious leaders that nationalism is linked with modernity and is detrimental to religion. Peter van der Veer in his seminal book, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India, rejects this dichotomy between nationalism and religion:

The claim that something like religious nationalism exists will be rejected by many students of nationalism for the simple reason that both nationalism and its theory depend on a Western discourse of modernity. This discourse constitutes the traditional as its antithesis and interprets difference as backwardness. A crucial element of the discourse of modernity is the opposition of the religious to the secular. One point I want to make in this book is that leading theories of nationalism tend to ignore the importance of colonialism and orientalism in the spread of nationalism. To understand religious nationalism in India we need both an analysis of tradition that is not prejudiced by the discourse of modernity and a theory of the impact of colonialism and Orientalism that does not deny agency to colonial subjects. (van der Veer 1994, x)

van der Veer argues that nationalism is not always the result of the demise of tradition/religion. Sometimes, it may be the result of the diffusion of tradition/religion and modernity as was the case in India:

Nationalism is generally assumed to belong squarely on the modern side of the great divide. It is the result of the demise of traditional society and is therefore a sign of modernity. But there is a tension between this view and the observation that, in many societies, nationalism is the product of diffusion. In the latter case, the modern is not the result of a historical transition; rather, the modern invades the traditional. According to Dumont, this leads to a period of uneasy combinations, as exemplified by Indian communalism, which combines religion and nationalism. (van der Veer 1994, 17)

Both Steve Bruce, in his book Politics and Religion (2003), and Roger Brubaker, in his article Religion and nationalism: four approaches (2012), have tried to explain different relationships between religion and nationalism or nationalists. Bruce has identified four types of relationships between religion and nationalists. 

1. Nationalists mobilize strong religious identities: In these countries, nationalism and religion are deeply enmeshed. It is difficult to separate the two. National identity is based on religious identity and, usually, the major rival country of these countries has a different sect or religion, which helps strengthen the relationship between religion/sect and the nation. Pakistan, Israel and Iran are examples of such countries. 
2. Nationalists mobilize and re-ignite weak religious identities: In countries exhibiting this relationship, changing boundaries and religious diversity has hindered in forging a strong religious identity with the nation. Bruce gives the example of Russia and Ukraine where nationalists are now trying to revive and possibly unite these weak identities. 
3. Nationalists reject strong religious identities: Usually, this rejection is due to national elite’s repudiation of any role of religion in public affairs after a period of tussle with the religious establishment. France, Mexico, etc. are examples of such a relationship. 
4. Nationalists again reject religious identities but the reasons are different: Bruce identifies most sub-Saharan African countries as examples of this type of relationship. The reason why African elite reject religious identities as the basis of nationalism is not only religious diversity in their countries but also the inability of the Christianity, the majority religion in most African countries, to provide the myths necessary for forging a strong nationalism. Christianity is further impaired by its complicity in the horrors of slavery and colonialism.

Roger Brubaker, in his article referred above, presents four ways to analyze religion and nationalism connection but these may also be considered to be four types of relationships between religion and nationalism. In the first case, religion and nationalism contest each other. Each tries to become the primary identity of a group of people, to the exclusion of the other. Nationalism is considered a modern religion that is trying to replace the old one. 

Second, religion explains some aspects of nationalism. Usually, these aspects are the origin and early development. Religion is an implicit part of the nationalist ideology of a large number of countries. Third, religion contributes to nationalism and is a visible part of the national identity. Some national myths and symbols maybe religion-based. 

Finally, Brubaker defines a much stronger relationship between religion and nationalism. In this case, it is difficult to separate the two. This relationship can be identified as religious nationalism but Brubaker is reluctant to call this type as nationalism as according to him nationalism is related to a polity existing within other polities and this type of religious nationalism downplays polities and nations. In this relationship, the majority religion and nationalism are so intertwined that the nation supposedly owes its existence to the religion. Nationalisms of Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia can be presented as examples of such nationalism. 


Phillips Barker in his book Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God be for Us (2009) argues that there are two aspects of religious nationalism, although the first is much more important than the second. Religion’s role in national identity defines religious nationalism. According to Barker, ‘Religion must be central to national identity and to conceptions of what it means to belong to a given nation. If religion is not the central feature of the national identity, it is at least one of the several features. In addition, these other features will nearly always be coterminous with religious identity. In other words, a religious nationalism may focus equally on religion and language, but the individuals engulfed by the religious and linguistic markers are one and the same.’ The second aspect of religious nationalism is political religion i.e. religious influence on state laws, policies etc. Barker explains it as ‘the extent to which identification translates into action.’

Roger Friedland in his article Money, Sex, and God: The Erotic Logic of Religious Nationalism (2002) argues that religious nationalism has to be understood on the basis of institutional logic, structure and metaphors and not in terms of (Marxist) class conflict or quest for power by clerics:

Religious nationalism cannot be explained and hence interpreted in terms of class-specific material or status injury~Simpson 1983:201–02!. Neither can it be understood as a project of religious inclusion, of group representation. Nor is it merely a clerical power-play. Religious nationalist movements are often led by the laity, not the clerics...

Religious nationalism seeks to extend the institutional logic of religion into the domain of the democratic nation-state, deriving authority from an absolute divine writ, rather than a subjective aggregation of the demos. The nation’s history is seen as a cosmic drama that pushes toward redemption, not progress. Agency is located in a disciplined self bound by faith in God, not a sacralized, self-interested monad. Society is constituted not by abstract, disembodied individuals in markets but through the gendered flesh of the family bound together by faith.

Friedland defines religious nationalism in terms of four constitutive elements:

A specific chain of four elements can be found in the symbolic order of all contemporary religious nationalisms. First, religious nationalism configures the territorial collectivity asa sacred space and a divinely invested subject. Religious nationalisms all focus on the penetration and permeability of the boundaries of that territorial space, whether by foreign investment, civil or foreign war, immigration, or a global commodified culture. The defense of the integrity of the territorial space, as in all nationalist projects, is the medium through which the coherence, identity, and power of the collective subject is known and narrated. In every case of religious nationalism, there is an acute sense that that boundedness is at risk. Second, religious nationalists direct the bulk of their attention to the bodies of women—covering, separating, and regulating their erotic flesh. Third, religious nationalists accord considerable symbolic importance to money, to foreign money, to money out of control. And fourth, religious nationalists submit lovingly to God. 

Barbara-Ann Reiffer in her article Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship (2003) argues that the relationship between religion and nationalism has not received due importance. In the writings of scholars of nationalism, religion is ignored completely or receives a cursory mention. Citing the writings of Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawm, she argues that although religion contributed significantly to the Western European nationalisms, only economic factors are highlighted or religion’s contribution is diluted by presenting it as part of the culture. She attributes this trend to the propensity in the scholars studying nationalism to present nationalism as a modern movement/concept. Reiffer contends that religious nationalism often results in religion’s precepts ‘institutionalized in laws and procedures governing the nation.’

Reiffer also offers a categorization of the different types of interaction between religion and nationalism. The first category, religious nationalism, refers to the situation where religion and nationalism are inseparable. According to Reiffer, ‘it is a community of religious people or the political movement of a group of people heavily influenced by religious beliefs who aspire to be politically self-determining.’ The second category is ‘instrumental pious nationalism’ where religion is part of nationalism but it is not nationalism's most cardinal aspect. Mostly, such nationalism is used by the political elite to provide an additional layer of national cohesion on the core based on other characteristics such as ethnicity, language etc. The third category is ‘secular/anti-religion nationalism’ where religion does not form any part of nationalism or nationalism is defined on the basis of the fight against the dominant religion. 

So, what is religious nationalism? As the above discussion shows, it is difficult to come up with a definition that encompasses all aspect of this complex phenomenon. I find Barker's definition better than others:

Religion must be central to national identity and to conceptions of what it means to belong to a given nation. If religion is not the central feature of the national identity, it is at least one of the several features. In addition, these other features will nearly always be coterminous with religious identity. In other words, a religious nationalism may focus equally on religion and language, but the individuals engulfed by the religious and linguistic markers are one and the same.