A victory for indigenous faiths in Indonesia

Indonesia's official ideology is Pancasila, which includes belief in one God but otherwise, it is quite secular. Indonesia officially recognizes only six religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism. Believers of other religions faced discrimination, particularly after the introduction of new legislation in 2006. The Indonesian Constitutional Court has rejected the new legislation.

Source: Religion in Indonesia

An excerpt from a news article explaining the change is given below:

Indonesia’s top court has overturned a law that denied recognition and legal rights to followers of indigenous faiths, in a surprise advance for religious freedom in the world’s most populous Muslim nation.

The Constitutional Court, in a unanimous ruling Tuesday (Nov. 7) from its nine-judge panel, said articles in the Civil Administration Law were discriminatory and violated the principle of equality before the law.

“These articles are not legally binding as they contradict the 1945 constitution,” presiding Judge Arief Hidayat told the court.

The ruling is an unexpected victory for moderates at a time when religious conservatives have demonstrated growing political influence and undermined the country’s reputation for tolerance.

The discriminatory articles, in place since 2006, effectively required followers of faiths not among the six recognized by the government to list one of the official religions on their national identity card or be denied basic rights such as marriage registration and land titles.

They also had the option of leaving the religion category blank but that would risk being accused of being an atheist, an offense under Indonesia’s blasphemy law, said Andreas Harsono, Indonesia researcher for Human Rights Watch.

Full article can be read here 

Is Theravada Buddhism more suited to religious nationalism?

There are two main branches of Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana. Theravada (meaning ‘Doctrine of the Elders’) is more conservative of the two branches. It emphasizes belief in historical Buddha and the original teachings in Pali language. The Theravada Buddhism scripture is the Pali Canon, which is divided into 3 baskets (Tipitaka). Mahayana Buddhism (meaning ‘Great Vehicle’) recognizes more than one Buddha and considers other sutras, besides Pali Canon, as religious scripture. Furthermore, Mahayana Buddhism does not emphasize the learning of Pali language and local languages are used as languages of religious instruction. In Theravada, rituals are not underscored as in Mahayana. Finally, Theravada Buddhists are asked to focus on meditation and self-liberation, while Mahayana Buddhists also believe in helping other beings, besides themselves. 

In short, Theravada is the more conservative and scriptualist form of Buddhism and thus is probably more prone to religious orthodoxy than Mahayana, the Buddhism for the masses. More detailed information on differences between the two can be read here. Some experts consider Tibetan Buddhism, not part of Mahayana branch, but a separate branch called Vajrayana Buddhism. This branch is also popular is Mongolia and Bhutan.

Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism

Source: Buddhism and Shinto (original ground and manifest traces) 

Mahayana is considered to have the largest number of followers among the two/three branches of Buddhism. Sometimes Mahayana is called Northern Buddhism and Theravada Southern Buddhism because of their popularity in countries of East and South-East Asia respectively. Most of the Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos belong to the Theravada branch while Mahayana Buddhists are concentrated in China, Japan, Korea, Bhutan, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. 

During the last few decades, religious nationalism has been popular in countries like Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand, leading some analysts to wonder about the elective affinity between Theravada Buddhism and religious nationalism. Following are the arguments given to support this thesis:

• Theravada Buddhism is more conservative and scriptualist than Mahayana Buddhism;
• Monks have a higher status in Theravada Buddhism which makes them wary of minority religions’ appearance/expansion and thus more ready to collaborate with political powers; 
• Most of the countries giving special status to Buddhism in state affairs are majority Theravada Buddhist;
• All three Buddhist countries (Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand) where religious nationalism has recently gained popularity are Theravada-majority countries. (See Connecting the Dots on Buddhist Fundamentalism)

I have written about Buddhist religious nationalism in Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar and also about Buddhist fundamentalism. And I find the above thesis problematic: 

• Scriptualistism has never been a necessary condition for religious nationalism. For example, Hinduism, which is not scriptualist, has been used as the basis of Hindutva nationalism;
• Conservatism can be linked to religious nationalism but before one does that, one has to define conservatism. Religious traditions can be conservative in one way but liberal in another;
• The power of religious clergy given in the scriptures or in theology also has no relationship with religious nationalism. Quran, for example, does not even recognize a separate Muslim clergy but still Islam has been used for promoting religious nationalism;
• There are five countries in the world that give special status to Buddhism in their constitutions. These are Thailand, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Bhutan. The majority religion of first four countries is Theravada Buddhism but majority religion in Bhutan in Mahayana/Vajrayana Buddhism. Diluting the argument further is Laos, where the majority of the people are Theravada Buddhists, but it does not give any special status to Buddhism in its constitution.
• One might argue that a contested political environment (a struggling democracy/dictatorship) might be more susceptible to the use of religious nationalism. Religious nationalism is rising in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand not because of them being Theravada- majority countries but because of the fragility of their political set-up. Compare the fragility of their political set-up with the political stability in Mahayana/Vajrayana-majority countries, such as South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Taiwan.

My argument is that any religion can be used for supporting religious nationalism. To gauge the susceptibility of a country to religious nationalism, one has to study the history of that country, not the history of its majority religion. Hence, to explain religious nationalism in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand, it would be more useful to analyze the emergence of these countries in the last hundred years than to focus on the characteristics of different branches of Buddhism.

Bhutan: A religious nationalist state??

Bhutan is a small kingdom in Himalayas, between India and China. Not many people know it exist and for a long time, Bhutanese elite were happy for being hidden/separate from the world. Darius Lee discusses Bhutan's constitution and calls it a constitutional theocracy (See Here There be Dragons! Buddhist Constitutionalism in the Hidden Land of Bhutan). For us, it is interesting because it is another example of how national identity and religious identity gets mixed up, giving rise to religious nationalism.

Lee argues that written constitutions are meant to stop power concentration but some countries, which he calls constitutional theocracies, have mixed religion and constitutionalism and damaged the very purpose of constitutions.

The goal of constitutionalism is limited government, which is opposed to any form of absolutism, whether religious, cultural or secular. In an age of human rights, untrammeled government power is circumscribed through constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights, including religious freedom. 

But constitutional theocracies turn it upside down, Lee argues, and use constitutions to legalize curtailment of religious and other freedoms. These constitutional theocracies are different from common theocracies.

Unlike a ‘pure’ theocracy, power in a constitutional theocracy is not drawn directly from divine text or a governing priesthood but lies in political figures operating within the bounds of a written constitution. Constitutional theocracies adhere to the core elements of modern constitutionalism, such as constitutional supremacy but enshrine religion as a source of public law.

The key differences between a secular state and a constitutional theocracy in terms of state structure, as identified by Lee, are given below:

          Secular state                                Constitutional theocracy

    Separation of religion and state                                                State recognition of a particular religion as privileged

Benevolent neutrality; accommodates religion                                 Not neutral, favors one religion over others

   Religion is not a source of public law                                                      Religion is a source of public law

In terms of religious freedom, the key differences are as follows:

           Secular state                                  Constitutional theocracy    
State holds no monopoly over religious belief                                                 Religion is tied with national identity

    Does nothing to control religious doctrine                                     Legal sanction for propagation of unorthodox beliefs

Accommodates practices of religious minorities                                          Limited protection for religious minorities

Lee declares that Bhutan is a constitutional theocracy, like Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, although its 2008 constitution commits to separation of religion and politics and does not declare Buddhism as state religion. In comparison with other Buddhist-majority states, Bhutan falls between Cambodia and Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar and Laos.  

Although article 3(3) of Bhutan constitution prima facie supports separation of religion and politic, its justification shows that this separation is rooted in Buddhism. Article 3(3) reads:

It shall be the responsibility of religious institutions and personalities to promote the spiritual heritage of the country while also ensuring that religion remains separate from politics in Bhutan. Religious institutions and personalities shall remain above politics.

The two reasons given for its inclusion are not related to human rights or freedoms but to Buddhism. This article was included in the constitution first, because Lord Buddha separated religion and politics and secondly, because under the first king of Bhutan, religious and political affairs were separate. 

Other reasons for declaring Bhutan a constitutional theocracy are given below:

1. Preamble of constitution pays homage to the three gems of Buddhism. 
2. King must be Buddhist, although he is declared protector of all religions (Article 3(2)). 
3. Article 3(6) establishes the Dratshang Lhentshog (Commission for the Monastic Affairs) and Buddhist religious bodies are funded by the state. 
4. Some part of the ecclesiastical structure of the Dratshang Lhentshog and the qualifications for religious office are given in the Bhutan Constitution, reflecting the privileged position of Buddhism.
5. In Bhutan, Buddhism is considered a major part of Bhutanese culture and the state considers it its responsibility to defend it. For example, article 4(1) asks the state to ‘preserve, protect and promote the cultural heritage of the country, including… religion’.
6. Article 9(20) of the Constitution asks the state to ‘create conditions that will enable the true and sustainable development of a good and compassionate society rooted in Buddhist ethos and universal human values.’ 

Using examples from penal code and other laws, Lee further demonstrates the close link between state and majority religion, negating the notion that Bhutanese state is neutral in matters of religion or that religious minorities are not discriminated.  

While Lee's arguments about Bhutan not being a secular state are strong, his definition of constitutional theocracies needs more elaboration because if we define constitutional theocracies only on the basis of how much privilege the constitutional clauses grant to majority religion in these countries then many other (quite liberal and secular) countries have to be called constitutional theocracies which they are not. For example, as Lee acknowledges, many West European democracies have established churches. Their constitutions privilege majority religion. Can we call them constitutional theocracies, like Iran? I think Lee would not agree.

On the other hand, if we  give importance to not only constitutions but all the other factors (like Lee does in case of Bhutan) in defining constitutional theocracies then is it right to call them constitutional theocracies? 

Buddhist Violence: Is it possible?

In a recent family gathering at my home, a friend talked about the peaceful message of Buddhism as compared to the monotheist religions. I acknowledged that Buddhism has a very peaceful message and it does not insist on being the 'only' right path as religions like Christianity and Islam do. However, I argued that religions are multivocal and can be used for all kinds of purposes. Almost all religions promote peace and reject violence even against non-believers but there are also religious teachings and histories that can be used to incite killings, even of fellow believers. Buddhism is no different. It can be and has been used for inciting violence. I have discussed this issue at length in a blog (See Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka and Burma).

An article in Huffington Post in May 2014 discusses the same issue and links it to three countries, Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand (See Asian Buddhism's Growing Fundamentalist Streak Signals Growth Of Religious Nationalism In Several Countries). Authors Anuradha Sharma and Vishal Arora refer to what was discussed at my home; the contrast between what Buddhism teaches and how it is usually perceived and what is happening in majority Buddhist countries, where it is used as a tool of the state. Authors first cited some examples of Buddhist violence:

In Sri Lanka, where about 70 percent of the population is Theravada Buddhist, a group of monks formed the Bodu Bala Sena or the Buddhist Power Force in 2012 to “protect” the country’s Buddhist culture. The force, nicknamed BBS, carried out at least 241 attacks against Muslims and 61 attacks against Christians in 2013, according to the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress.

In Myanmar, at least 300 Rohingya Muslims, whose ancestors were migrants from Bangladesh, have been killed and up to 300,000 displaced, according to Genocide Watch. Ashin Wirathu, a monk who describes himself as the Burmese “bin Laden,” is encouraging the violence by viewing the Rohingya presence as a Muslim “invasion.”

And in Buddhist-majority Thailand, at least 5,000 people have died in Muslim-Buddhist violence in the country’s South. The country’s Knowing Buddha Foundation is not a violent group, but it advocates for a blashemy law to punish anyone who offends the faith. It wants Buddhism declared the state religion and portrays popular culture as a threat to believers.

Later, authors contrast the views of  Maung Zarni, an exiled Burmese who is a visiting fellow at London School of Economics and who writes regularly on the violence in Burma/Myanmar and Sri Lanka, with the views of Wirathu and other Buddhists, who advocate militancy.

Zarni argues:

No Buddhist can be nationalistic...There is no country for Buddhists. I mean, no such thing as ‘me,’ ‘my’ community, ‘my’ country, ‘my’ race or even ‘my’ faith...For sure, Thailand has its own brand of ‘Buddhist’ racism towards non-Buddhists...But, I am not sure the Thai society will go the way of those two genocidal Theravada Buddhist societies (Sri Lanka and Myanmar) — where racism of genocidal nature has enveloped the mainstream ‘Buddhist’ society.

Zarni warns that there are links among the fundamentalist 'anti-Dharma Buddhist networks' in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Thailand that are 'toxic, cancerous and deeply harmful to all humans anywhere.' Zarni is also concerned about the demand for an anti-blasphemy law in Thailand and considers it a distortion of Buddhism, a religion that is against allowing any 'organization that policies or regulates the faithful’s behavior or inner thoughts.

But Buddhist fundamentalists supported by the state argue that Buddhism needs protection and point toward the past when Buddhists were persecuted and their institutions destroyed. They demand laws and argue that state should promote knowledge of Buddhism to protect Buddhist culture which is again under threat. And they are proud to be called 'radical' by the West.

Sounds familiar, right?

Michael Jerryson, the co-author of the book Buddhist Warfare, with Mark Juergensmeyer, also had difficulty acknowledging that Buddhists could be violent. He called it a "bittersweet experience" that started with researching about peaceful Buddhism but culminated in writing about the "dark side" of Buddhism.

Jerryson, in an article, talked about military monks and why people have trouble accepting monks with guns:

One day after teaching an English class for Buddhist novices at a monastery a young monk came over and pulled back the folds of his robe to reveal a Smith & Wesson. I later learned that he was a military monk—one of many covert, fully ordained soldiers placed in monasteries throughout Thailand. To these monks, peacemaking requires militancy.

Since my initial realization in 2004 [about Buddhist violence], I began to look critically at my earlier perspective on Buddhism—one that shielded an extensive and historical dimension to Buddhist traditions: violence. Armed Buddhist monks in Thailand are not an exception to the rule; they are contemporary examples of a long historical precedence. For centuries monks have been at the helm, or armed in the ranks, of wars. How could this be the case? But more importantly, why did I (and many others) hold the belief that Buddhism=Peace (and that other religions, such as Islam, are more prone to violence)?

It was then that I realized that I was a consumer of a very successful form of propaganda. Since the early 1900s, Buddhist monastic intellectuals such as Walpola Rahula, D. T. Suzuki, and Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, have labored to raise Western awareness of their cultures and traditions. In doing so, they presented specific aspects of their Buddhist traditions while leaving out others. These Buddhist monks were not alone in this portrayal of Buddhism. As Donald S. Lopez Jr. and others have poignantly shown, academics quickly followed suit, so that by the 1960s U.S popular culture no longer depicted Buddhist traditions as primitive, but as mystical.

Although the book only arrived at bookstores last month, it apparently touched some nerves in the academic community before its release. Some have objected to the cover, which they feel is not an appropriate subject for Buddhism. Ironically, that is the very reason this collection of essays is so important: to address the apparent and widespread inability to acknowledge the violent side to religious traditions. It is this inability that robs its adherents of their humanity.

In a way, I wish I could return to that dream of Buddhist traditions as a purely peaceful, benevolent religion that lacks mortal failures and shortcomings. But I cannot. It is, ultimately, a selfish dream and it hurts other people in the process.

Buddhism, like other religions, is multivocal and can be used, like other religions, to commit atrocities. What is happening to Rohingyas in Myanmar is inconceivable for many but it is not rare or unusual.