Who are Wahhabis? What is Wahhabism? Is it different from Salafism?

Wahhabism is something controversial. Many of Wahhabis do not even like to be called Wahhabis as this term was initially used as an insult by the Wahhabi movement enemies. The following seminar video explains the different terms and the history of Wahhabism well in less than 40 minutes. 

The seminar was delivered by Dr. Cole Bunzel from Yale University at the Centre for Islamic and Middle East Studies (CIMS), Oslo University, Norway. The lecture was titled “Classical Wahhabism and Its Modern Revival” and was based on Dr. Cole's dissertation and forthcoming book. It took place at the University of Oslo on October 17, 2018

Here is an introduction about Cole from CIMS webpage:

Cole Bunzel is a postdoctoral research fellow in Islamic Law and Civilization at the Yale Law School, where his work focuses on the history of Wahhabism and the Jihadi Salafi movement in modern Islam. In 2017, he received the Porter Ogden Jacobus Fellowship, Princeton University’s top honor for graduate students. He is the editor of the blog Jihadica.

Cole talks about:

• What is Wahhabism?
• What are the two forms of Tawhid (monotheism) defined by ibn-Taymiyyah and how they were used to kill Muslims?
• What are the two types of Wahhabism?
• How Classical Wahhabism (from the 1740s to 1920s) is different from the Modern Wahhabism (after 1920s)?
• The three Saudi states (1740s-1818, 1823- 1891, 1902 - present)
• What was jihad in Classical Wahhabism? Hatred is not enough, show enmity, later violence
• How King Abdul Aziz tamed Wahhabis, reinterpreted doctrines of Al-Shiekh and entered into a settlement with Sunni Islam and the larger world?
• The revival of Classical Wahhabism under Al-Qaida and the Daesh (the ISIS)

Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh 

Source: Islamic Societies Review

The seminar video can be watched here

Wahhabism is often confused with Salafism as Wahhabis call themselves Salafis or Al-Muwahhidun (or monotheists). Following a commentary from S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore on the differences between Wahhabism and Salafism:

The terms Salafi and Wahhabi are often used interchangeably. Many confuse the two while others refer to them as one. What are the differences between the two? 

The study of modern Salafism will not be complete without looking into Wahhabism – a reference to the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and its relation to Salafism. In the current discourse on Islam, the term “Salafi” and “Wahhabi” are often used interchangeably. Many confuse the two while others refer to them as one.

Wahhabi is a label given to those who follow the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Wahhabis are always referred to as Salafis, and in fact they prefer to be called as such. As a rule, all Wahhabis are Salafis but not all Salafis are Wahhabis. The term Salafism did not become associated with the Wahhabi creed until the 1970s. It was in the early 20th century that the Wahhabis referred to themselves as Salafis. 

Who is a Salafi? 

The usage of the term Salafi today refers to those who embrace Salafism (Arabic: Salafiyyah). Salafiyyah is known to be the manhaj or way of the Salafis. The Salafis are Muslims who advocate literal and to some degree binary interpretation of Islamic teachings as enjoined by Prophet Muhammad and subsequently practised by the early pious predecessors known as the salaf al-salih. Following the salaf is the reason for their self-designation as Salafis. 

Linguistically, the term salafi is an ascription to the salaf. A Salafi is one who ascribes himself/herself to the way and teachings of the salaf. From the linguistic standpoint, if someone says, for example “ana Britani” (I am British), it means he comes from Britain or ascribing himself to Britain. 

The letter ‘i’ at the end of the word (e.g. Britani, Salafi) shows that the person saying the word is associating himself to the word. Hence, when a person says “I am a Salafi”, he is saying that he ascribes himself to the way/teachings of the salaf. 

Who is a Wahhabi? 

A Wahhabi is one who follows Wahhabism (Arabic: Wahhabiyyah) or the teachings of Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in Najd in 1703 in Uyainah, in present-day Saudi Arabia. He grew up in an atmosphere where there was widespread deterioration in the Muslim beliefs and practices. 

Many Muslims had fallen into acts considered shirk (associating Allah with others), and returned to the days of jahiliyyah (ignorance or pre-Islamic period). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to reform the Muslims under the banner of “true” Islam and get rid of these acts which he considered heretical. 

Wahhabis do not prefer the term Wahhabiyyah or being called as Wahhabis. They prefer to be called Al-Muwahhidun (the people of monotheism) or Salafiyyun (the Salafis) in reference to the pious predecessors (salaf al-salih). But over time Ibn Abd al-Wahhab followers prefer the more generic term salafiyyun which signifies adherence to the faith and practices of the Prophet and the first three generations of Muslims. 

Unlike “Salafi” which is both a label and self-designated term, the term “Wahhabi” is a label given to the followers of the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, from whose name the term “Wahhabi” originates. Wahhabism simply means the way of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab which also denotes his ideology. Hence, linguistically, a Wahhabi is one who subscribes to Wahhabism. 

The main reason why Wahhabis have rejected the term Wahhabism is because it provides the impression that the teachings propagated by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is a new doctrine or belief within the Islamic faith, whereas they believe that it is merely a reflection and an extension of the teachings of the Prophet, his companions and the salaf al-salih. 

Due to the importance of following the footsteps of the salaf, Wahhabism has always been a form of Salafism. It subscribes to the methodology of the salaf in theology and law. In fact, the teaching spreads in the modern Muslim world under the banner of Salafism instead of Wahhabism. As Khaled Abou El-Fadl, a professor of Islamic law from the US observes, “the attachment of Wahhabism to Salafism was indeed needed as Salafism was a much more ‘credible paradigm in Islam’; making it an ideal medium for Wahhabism”. 

Ideology of Salafism and Wahhabism 

The ideology of Salafism and Wahhabism is built upon a narrowly defined religious text. Methodologically, they are literalist and puritanical in their approaches to Islamic theology and law. 

In matters of jurisprudence, Salafis and Wahabbis subscribe to the Hanbali mazhab (school of thought) and law. However, many of them claim no specific affiliation to any particular mazhab. Instead, they claim to follow the stronger opinion among the Salaf based on the Quran and the Sunnah (the Prophet’s Traditions). 

But one who studies their views in jurisprudence will find their origins in the Hanbali school of fiqh. Even Ibn Taimiyah, a famous Islamic theologian in the medieval period and his student, Ibn Qayyim, the two scholars most referred to by the Salafis and Wahhabis, adopted the methodology of the Hanbali school. 

To maintain the purity of Islam, Salafis and Wahhabis attempt to combat what they view as deviant and heretical practices such as offering prayers at tombs, glorifying ‘holy places’ and ‘saints’. Such are classified as shirk, kufr (infidelity), riddah (apostasy), and bid’ah (innovation). They strongly reject any belief and practices that are not enjoined by the Quran and the Prophet. 

For example, Salafis and Wahhabis claim that Sufi practices such as tawassul (intercession between man and God) which had accrued over the centuries since the pristine period of Islam threatens tawhid (monotheism or the belief in the oneness of God). They believe that bid’ah resulted from the adoption of local cultures by Islamic missionaries in their attempts to attract new converts. However, this blend of Islam and customs helped significantly the conversion process to Islam by making it accessible to wider audiences. 

Ideologically, Salafism is wider than Wahhabism. Salafi thought has existed for hundreds of years and has spread throughout the Muslim world and beyond. Wahhabism only existed from the mid 18th century. While it is true that Wahhabism is Salafism, it is only one of Salafism’s many orientations. Salafi and Wahhabi are not two sides of the same coin. 

About the Authors
Mohamed Bin Ali is Assistant Professor and Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University Singapore. Both studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and are counsellors with the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG).

In 2016, Cole Bunzel has written about the contest between the third Wahhabi state (Saudi Arabia) and what he calls the fourth Wahhabi state (ISIS) for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Following are the conclusions. The whole paper can be read here.

The Islamic State, which draws on the teachings of the Wahhabi school of Islam, finds inspiration in the example of the first Saudi-Wahhabi state (1744–1818), which engaged in expansionary jihad and cultivated a sectarian animus toward the Shia.

The Islamic State has declared three so-called provinces in Saudi Arabia and carried out some fifteen attacks there since November 2014.

The Islamic State’s rise has reignited a debate in Saudi Arabia over the intolerant and aggressive nature of Wahhabism. Liberals have called for a revisionist movement, as they describe it, to expunge certain doctrines from Wahhabism.

In some ways the Islamic State’s claim to the Wahhabi heritage is not unfounded. The early Wahhabis advanced an exclusivist version of Sunni Islam that was universally seen as a heresy, founded a state that waged expansionary jihad against fellow Sunni Muslims, and killed Shia Muslims because they were seen as hopeless idolaters. The Islamic State has done the same on all three counts.

Other features of the Islamic State’s ideology—from the declaration of a caliphate to the use of extraordinary violence to the group’s apocalyptic fervor—do not find a mainstream Wahhabi precedent.

The Islamic State’s campaign in Saudi Arabia has slowed considerably since October 2015. Despite concerted propaganda efforts, the group appears to be making little headway against a state outfitted with one of the most advanced counterterrorism infrastructures in the world. But given the substantial Islamic State following in Saudi Arabia, more attacks, however occasional, can be expected.

Saudi Arabia is a long way from pursuing meaningful reforms of Wahhabi doctrine. Saudi liberals’ criticism of Wahhabism is tolerated as of early 2016 more than ever before, despite the kingdom’s religious scholars who would prefer the government silence them. But the new political leadership is busy consolidating power, while the religious leadership is defensive and mired in conspiracy theories.

Can Mohammad bin Salman win?

Yury Barmin, who is a Russian Middle East and North Africa expert, has highlighted the dangers of Prince Mohammad bin Salman's reforms as the prince is going against Saudi history, practice and nationalism of more than two hundred years:

"We are returning to what we were before - a country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions and to the world," MBS said to international investors in Riyadh in October 2017. 

Explaining his ambition to "return" Saudi Arabia to the path of moderate Islam, the crown prince told the Guardian that "what happened in the last 30 years is not Saudi Arabia." He explicitly blamed the kingdom's turn towards ultraconservatism on the Iranian revolution in 1979 and Tehran's attempts to spread the revolution across the Middle East. 

These comments are remarkable for two reasons: first, because they acknowledge that moderation is lacking in the interpretation of Islam that the Saudi state has followed; second, because they reflect the notion that the religious system currently in place hinders socioeconomic development and is not compatible with the demands of the young generation. 

Yet they are also somewhat misleading as they try to deflect responsibility for the situation inside Saudi Arabia to external factors, namely the 1979 Islamic Revolution. But was it really revolutionary Iran that pushed Saudi Arabia towards ultraconservatism?

Source: Can Mohammed bin Salman break the Saudi-Wahhabi pact?

Mr. Barmin rightly argues that it was the seizure of Grand Mosque (Holy Kaaba) by ultra-conservative Wahhabis in 1979, not the Iranian Revolution, that was the main reason for the return to the ultraconservatism of pre-Faisal era. However, even Kaaba's seizure was secondary to the orthodox, hide-bound dictates of Wahhabi nationalism on which Saudi Arabia was founded in the 18th century. 

Wahhabism, cited as the official Saudi religious doctrine for which the country's leadership has been so vehemently criticised and which MBS is looking to rebrand, is based on the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). 

Abd al-Wahhab was an Islamic scholar from the Nejd region of the Arabian Peninsula, an avid traveller and the author of The Book of Unity, which was rejected by most of his contemporaries in Mecca and Medina. Abd al-Wahhab preached returning to the Quran and the Hadith, rejected religious innovation (bidaa) and advocated eliminating practices (such as Sufi rites and veneration of saints) that are not grounded in the Quran. He even accused other Muslims of being infidels for following practices that were, in his opinion, un-Islamic and called for strict adherence to traditional Islamic law (sharia). 

There was nothing new in Abd al-Wahhab's teachings which were based on some old ideas and constituted a revival of the Hanbali doctrine in the most ultraconservative form. It was, however, his religious zeal that ultimately drove him close to the Saud family. 

Muhammad ibn Saud ruled over the area of al-Diriya, today on the outskirts of Riyadh, around the time when Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was unsuccessfully preaching in Mecca and elsewhere across the Middle East. In 1744, fleeing from Medina, Abd Al-Wahhab arrived in al-Diriya and sought protection from ibn Saud. The two formed an alliance dividing power and responsibilities: ibn Saud ruling over the military and political matters and Abd al-Wahab over the religious ones. Armed with religious legitimacy, ibn Saud expanded his rule beyond al-Diriya, establishing the first Saudi state. 

The death of Abd al-Wahhab did not impact the power-sharing arrangement that had been solidified during his lifetime. The descendants of Abd al-Wahhab (the Sheikh family) remained in charge of religious affairs under Saudi rule. To this day, they legitimise the political power of the House of Saud by approving succession and endorsing the king's decisions. In exchange, the Sheikh family enjoys a privileged position in the state structures and plays a key role in the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs.

Mr. Barmin contends that what Prince Mohammad bin Salman is doing is dangerous as it goes against what was normal for so long and he is making many enemies:

The Wahhab-Saud pact survived more than 250 years, guaranteeing religious legitimacy for Saudi power in the Arabian Peninsula. So has its time finally come? Has it run its course and is no longer needed by the House of Saud? 

In the past few years, the Saudi authorities have been gradually and cautiously limiting the extent of the Sheikh family's power. In August 2010, for example, the late King Abdullah issued a decree that only state-vetted scholars were allowed to issue fatwas.
Under King Salman, and his son - MBS, more drastic measures have been taken. In April 2016, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice was stripped of arresting powers which curbed its policing functions. In December 2016, the king appointed more moderate clerics to the Council of Senior Scholars, the highest religious body in the country. And in 2017, music concerts were allowed, mixed public events for both genders were held, and cinemas were scheduled to reopen after 35 years. 

However, the most monumental shifts are yet to take place in the Saudi power structure. The country's legal system operates within Islamic law, which is the ultimate source of legislation in Saudi Arabia. Strictly abiding by traditional interpretations of Islamic law is a crucial element of the worldview Abd al-Wahhab introduced. This is why, in simplified terms, breaking the Saudi-Wahhabi pact would mean breaking up with this traditional interpretation and potentially codifying law rather than relying on judges to interpret it. 

A more important question at this point is whether the country needs to part with its Wahhabi roots at all in order to implement reforms and open up to foreigners. The diminishing significance of religious authorities is a general trend across Gulf monarchies and it seems that Saudi Arabia is set to slowly embrace a similar model. 

The Saudi religious establishment has been publicly supportive of the crown prince's war on corruption and the weakening of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice even if they feel disadvantaged as a result of these developments. The centuries-old monolithic religious structure might turn out to be a paper tiger whose fate is in the hands of the monarch. 

Yet, MBS breaking up with the decades-long policy of cosying up to the religious elites in favour of modernisation, could provoke some to call it corruption and an embrace of Western influence again. It is also likely that the policies MBS is introducing would force a lot of dissenters among the clerics underground. Discontent could simmer for years before surfacing in some form or another. 

MBS's policies are catering to young Saudis, but they do not hold the key to power. It is the older generation that has lived through decades of conservative rule, the disenfranchised princes whose access to power has shrunk and the vast religious elites who are now in a position of vassals that legitimise the Saudi royal family.

Many of them feel marginalised which could drive them to extremes and bring about a repeat of 1979. (see Can Mohammed bin Salman break the Saudi-Wahhabi pact?)