Is Theravada Buddhism more suited to religious nationalism?

There are two main branches of Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana. Theravada (meaning ‘Doctrine of the Elders’) is more conservative of the two branches. It emphasizes belief in historical Buddha and the original teachings in Pali language. The Theravada Buddhism scripture is the Pali Canon, which is divided into 3 baskets (Tipitaka). Mahayana Buddhism (meaning ‘Great Vehicle’) recognizes more than one Buddha and considers other sutras, besides Pali Canon, as religious scripture. Furthermore, Mahayana Buddhism does not emphasize the learning of Pali language and local languages are used as languages of religious instruction. In Theravada, rituals are not underscored as in Mahayana. Finally, Theravada Buddhists are asked to focus on meditation and self-liberation, while Mahayana Buddhists also believe in helping other beings, besides themselves. 

In short, Theravada is the more conservative and scriptualist form of Buddhism and thus is probably more prone to religious orthodoxy than Mahayana, the Buddhism for the masses. More detailed information on differences between the two can be read here. Some experts consider Tibetan Buddhism, not part of Mahayana branch, but a separate branch called Vajrayana Buddhism. This branch is also popular is Mongolia and Bhutan.

Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism

Source: Buddhism and Shinto (original ground and manifest traces) 

Mahayana is considered to have the largest number of followers among the two/three branches of Buddhism. Sometimes Mahayana is called Northern Buddhism and Theravada Southern Buddhism because of their popularity in countries of East and South-East Asia respectively. Most of the Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos belong to the Theravada branch while Mahayana Buddhists are concentrated in China, Japan, Korea, Bhutan, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. 

During the last few decades, religious nationalism has been popular in countries like Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand, leading some analysts to wonder about the elective affinity between Theravada Buddhism and religious nationalism. Following are the arguments given to support this thesis:

• Theravada Buddhism is more conservative and scriptualist than Mahayana Buddhism;
• Monks have a higher status in Theravada Buddhism which makes them wary of minority religions’ appearance/expansion and thus more ready to collaborate with political powers; 
• Most of the countries giving special status to Buddhism in state affairs are majority Theravada Buddhist;
• All three Buddhist countries (Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand) where religious nationalism has recently gained popularity are Theravada-majority countries. (See Connecting the Dots on Buddhist Fundamentalism)

I have written about Buddhist religious nationalism in Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar and also about Buddhist fundamentalism. And I find the above thesis problematic: 

• Scriptualistism has never been a necessary condition for religious nationalism. For example, Hinduism, which is not scriptualist, has been used as the basis of Hindutva nationalism;
• Conservatism can be linked to religious nationalism but before one does that, one has to define conservatism. Religious traditions can be conservative in one way but liberal in another;
• The power of religious clergy given in the scriptures or in theology also has no relationship with religious nationalism. Quran, for example, does not even recognize a separate Muslim clergy but still Islam has been used for promoting religious nationalism;
• There are five countries in the world that give special status to Buddhism in their constitutions. These are Thailand, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Bhutan. The majority religion of first four countries is Theravada Buddhism but majority religion in Bhutan in Mahayana/Vajrayana Buddhism. Diluting the argument further is Laos, where the majority of the people are Theravada Buddhists, but it does not give any special status to Buddhism in its constitution.
• One might argue that a contested political environment (a struggling democracy/dictatorship) might be more susceptible to the use of religious nationalism. Religious nationalism is rising in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand not because of them being Theravada- majority countries but because of the fragility of their political set-up. Compare the fragility of their political set-up with the political stability in Mahayana/Vajrayana-majority countries, such as South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Taiwan.

My argument is that any religion can be used for supporting religious nationalism. To gauge the susceptibility of a country to religious nationalism, one has to study the history of that country, not the history of its majority religion. Hence, to explain religious nationalism in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand, it would be more useful to analyze the emergence of these countries in the last hundred years than to focus on the characteristics of different branches of Buddhism.

Separatist movements - the peaceful route to independence?

Scotland, in the end, decided not to be independent. However, it did encourage other separatist movements, many of which supported Scottish referendum. There is evidence that Catalonians from Spain helped the ‘Yes’ vote campaign and many Kashmiris in Scotland and England supported Mr. Salmond’s Scottish National Party, not for any love for an independent Scotland but for its positive implications for Kashmir region. Despite the negative results, referendum has shown that there is no need for fighting or killing for independence in the 21st century. As Jonah Blank, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, writes in the Foreign Policy after the Scottish referendum (See From Glasgow to Kashmir) :

Almost every modern nation has some sort of local separatist movement, and the international community views nearly all of them either with indifference or contempt. Merely to be considered a quasi-legitimate candidate for independence, a group generally has to suffer generations of brutality bordering on genocide. Even then, the odds aren't great. Just ask the Kurds.

The vote in Scotland shows what modern-day secessionism should look like. What if an ethnic group didn't have to justify its bid for a separate state through a saga of historical oppression, or seek to achieve it through a violent insurgency? What if the standard for independence were nothing more than the statement: "We want out." London agreed to take aye for an answer.

Rest of the blog can be read http://www.calgarycgc.org/blog/separatist-movements-the-peaceful-route-to-independence

Buddhist Violence: Is it possible?

In a recent family gathering at my home, a friend talked about the peaceful message of Buddhism as compared to the monotheist religions. I acknowledged that Buddhism has a very peaceful message and it does not insist on being the 'only' right path as religions like Christianity and Islam do. However, I argued that religions are multivocal and can be used for all kinds of purposes. Almost all religions promote peace and reject violence even against non-believers but there are also religious teachings and histories that can be used to incite killings, even of fellow believers. Buddhism is no different. It can be and has been used for inciting violence. I have discussed this issue at length in a blog (See Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka and Burma).

An article in Huffington Post in May 2014 discusses the same issue and links it to three countries, Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand (See Asian Buddhism's Growing Fundamentalist Streak Signals Growth Of Religious Nationalism In Several Countries). Authors Anuradha Sharma and Vishal Arora refer to what was discussed at my home; the contrast between what Buddhism teaches and how it is usually perceived and what is happening in majority Buddhist countries, where it is used as a tool of the state. Authors first cited some examples of Buddhist violence:

In Sri Lanka, where about 70 percent of the population is Theravada Buddhist, a group of monks formed the Bodu Bala Sena or the Buddhist Power Force in 2012 to “protect” the country’s Buddhist culture. The force, nicknamed BBS, carried out at least 241 attacks against Muslims and 61 attacks against Christians in 2013, according to the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress.

In Myanmar, at least 300 Rohingya Muslims, whose ancestors were migrants from Bangladesh, have been killed and up to 300,000 displaced, according to Genocide Watch. Ashin Wirathu, a monk who describes himself as the Burmese “bin Laden,” is encouraging the violence by viewing the Rohingya presence as a Muslim “invasion.”

And in Buddhist-majority Thailand, at least 5,000 people have died in Muslim-Buddhist violence in the country’s South. The country’s Knowing Buddha Foundation is not a violent group, but it advocates for a blashemy law to punish anyone who offends the faith. It wants Buddhism declared the state religion and portrays popular culture as a threat to believers.

Later, authors contrast the views of  Maung Zarni, an exiled Burmese who is a visiting fellow at London School of Economics and who writes regularly on the violence in Burma/Myanmar and Sri Lanka, with the views of Wirathu and other Buddhists, who advocate militancy.

Zarni argues:

No Buddhist can be nationalistic...There is no country for Buddhists. I mean, no such thing as ‘me,’ ‘my’ community, ‘my’ country, ‘my’ race or even ‘my’ faith...For sure, Thailand has its own brand of ‘Buddhist’ racism towards non-Buddhists...But, I am not sure the Thai society will go the way of those two genocidal Theravada Buddhist societies (Sri Lanka and Myanmar) — where racism of genocidal nature has enveloped the mainstream ‘Buddhist’ society.

Zarni warns that there are links among the fundamentalist 'anti-Dharma Buddhist networks' in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Thailand that are 'toxic, cancerous and deeply harmful to all humans anywhere.' Zarni is also concerned about the demand for an anti-blasphemy law in Thailand and considers it a distortion of Buddhism, a religion that is against allowing any 'organization that policies or regulates the faithful’s behavior or inner thoughts.

But Buddhist fundamentalists supported by the state argue that Buddhism needs protection and point toward the past when Buddhists were persecuted and their institutions destroyed. They demand laws and argue that state should promote knowledge of Buddhism to protect Buddhist culture which is again under threat. And they are proud to be called 'radical' by the West.

Sounds familiar, right?

Michael Jerryson, the co-author of the book Buddhist Warfare, with Mark Juergensmeyer, also had difficulty acknowledging that Buddhists could be violent. He called it a "bittersweet experience" that started with researching about peaceful Buddhism but culminated in writing about the "dark side" of Buddhism.

Jerryson, in an article, talked about military monks and why people have trouble accepting monks with guns:

One day after teaching an English class for Buddhist novices at a monastery a young monk came over and pulled back the folds of his robe to reveal a Smith & Wesson. I later learned that he was a military monk—one of many covert, fully ordained soldiers placed in monasteries throughout Thailand. To these monks, peacemaking requires militancy.

Since my initial realization in 2004 [about Buddhist violence], I began to look critically at my earlier perspective on Buddhism—one that shielded an extensive and historical dimension to Buddhist traditions: violence. Armed Buddhist monks in Thailand are not an exception to the rule; they are contemporary examples of a long historical precedence. For centuries monks have been at the helm, or armed in the ranks, of wars. How could this be the case? But more importantly, why did I (and many others) hold the belief that Buddhism=Peace (and that other religions, such as Islam, are more prone to violence)?

It was then that I realized that I was a consumer of a very successful form of propaganda. Since the early 1900s, Buddhist monastic intellectuals such as Walpola Rahula, D. T. Suzuki, and Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, have labored to raise Western awareness of their cultures and traditions. In doing so, they presented specific aspects of their Buddhist traditions while leaving out others. These Buddhist monks were not alone in this portrayal of Buddhism. As Donald S. Lopez Jr. and others have poignantly shown, academics quickly followed suit, so that by the 1960s U.S popular culture no longer depicted Buddhist traditions as primitive, but as mystical.

Although the book only arrived at bookstores last month, it apparently touched some nerves in the academic community before its release. Some have objected to the cover, which they feel is not an appropriate subject for Buddhism. Ironically, that is the very reason this collection of essays is so important: to address the apparent and widespread inability to acknowledge the violent side to religious traditions. It is this inability that robs its adherents of their humanity.

In a way, I wish I could return to that dream of Buddhist traditions as a purely peaceful, benevolent religion that lacks mortal failures and shortcomings. But I cannot. It is, ultimately, a selfish dream and it hurts other people in the process.

Buddhism, like other religions, is multivocal and can be used, like other religions, to commit atrocities. What is happening to Rohingyas in Myanmar is inconceivable for many but it is not rare or unusual.

Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka and Burma

Ian Harris in his book, Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth Century Asia, argues, Buddhist religious estblishment (Sangha) is as interested in politics as other religious orders. He writes:

Buddhism has often been characterised as an entirely other-worldly religion with a Gnostic distaste for the worldly order. Furthermore, the intensely individualistic flavour of the Buddha's spiritual message has led some to suppose that its attitude towards the political order should be lukewarm, to say the very least. Such views are well-attested in the scholarly community, as well as among Buddhist themselves. From this perspective, Buddhism presents a passive and detached face to worldly affairs in stark contrast to the Semitic religions, such as Christianity and Islam, which are both 'strongly oriented to the reconstruction of the world and very militant in this pursuit' (Eisenstadt 1993, 22). However, this stereotyped cannot be further than the truth. Of course, there are, and always have been, Buddhist ascetics who shun the settled world...But most members of the monastic order have decided to live close to regions of permanent settlement....Under these conditions, the temptation to influence the political process in a direction conducive to the continued well-being of the Buddha's teaching and the maintenance of stable Buddhist institutions have always seem attractive to some.

Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka was discussed in a previous blog. Here, we compare and discuss the links between Sri Lankan and Burmese Buddhist nationalism. Both these nations are showing a change in Buddhist nationalism recently. 

As Burma or Myanmar is opening itself to the world and possibly liberalizing and democratizing, religious nationalism is gaining ground. Buddhist Sangha had good relations with the U Nu governments, who was the first Prime Minister of Burma (U Nu was Prime Minister of Burma from 1948 to 1956, from 1957 to 1958 and from 1960 to 1962). So, when there was a military coup d'état, led by General Ne Win, in March 1962, Sangha protested. The Burmese military suppressed these protests and controlled the Buddhist order during its rule, making it largely apolitical till the late 1980s. From 1988 to early 1990s, there were again large scale anti-regime protests attended by monks and others but after that brief activity, there was again an apolitical period for Sangha as it was tightly controlled by the military government. Now, again there is a period of activity but the focus of hatred has changed from the military government to Muslims, particularly Rohingyas who are considered non-Burmese, in addition to being non- Buddhist. 

In Sri Lanka, Buddhist nationalism considers itself triumphant on having won a long war. It has been proven 'right' in its stand of not giving concessions to the Tamils as Lord has given victory to the 'Buddhist' nation. With the vanquished Tamil Hindus, not much of an enemy, the new target is Muslims. 

In an interesting blog on This Is the Modern Axis of Buddhist Hate, Jake Scobey-Thal gives us an update on newly emerging links between the Buddhist nationalists of Sri Lanka and Burma. He particularly focuses on Ashin Wirathu, the Burmese monk called the 'bin Ladin of Buddhism' and Gnanasara, the Sri Lankan monk heading the campaign against Muslims.

As governments of both these countries are weak and not interested in challenging the radical brand of Buddhist nationalism propagated by Wirathu and Gnanasara, Scobey-Thal thinks their militant politics are here to stay. 

It is difficult not to see the commonalities between the Buddhist nationalisms discussed and other militant religious nationalisms. One can recognize the holy land (Burma) and the peaceful majority  (Buddhist Burmese) that is under threat from a tiny but 'vicious' militaristic minority (Muslim Rohingyas).    

A report on a recent conference on Burmese media discussed the issue of Buddhist nationalism and its consequences for Muslims. Mon Mon Myat, an investigative journalist, highlighted the role of powerful military, monks, and media (Burmese journalist beseeches brethren: Stop with the Muslim hate speech)

Besieged by a fear that Muslims will take over Myanmar, Buddhist nationalists as well as some monks have urged people to boycott Muslim-owned businesses and successfully lobbied the government to draft controversial laws, including one that will restrict Buddhist women from marrying Muslim men. No similar restrictions are being planned for Buddhist men.“The two strongest institutions in our country - the military and monk organisations - are driven by men, and promote nationalism and religion. That influences our media coverage,” Mon Mon Myat said on Tuesday at the second day of an international media conference organised by Hawaii-based East-West Center.“I found that in the local media coverage, there are few voices on Muslims’ view. I think some owners worry their circulation may decrease if they are seen as sympathetic to the Muslims.” 

Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka

In an interesting article about Sri Lanka, Tisaranee Gunasekara explains how the Rajapaksha siblings are using Sinhala Buddhist nationalism to keep people from uniting against them (Only A Pawn In Their Game). The economy is in doldrums and unemployment is very high __ youth unemployment between 20% to 25% __ but Sinhalese are overwhelmingly optimistic about the future. Sinhalese believe that as Rajapaksa siblings delivered militarily and won the civil war, they will also eventually deliver economically. Perhaps, Sinhalese will wake up in a couple of years but by then, the author argues, the virulent discourse against minorities would have done enough damage.

Tisaranee informs us that Rajapaksas are playing a game that has been played before in Sri Lanka. In the 1950s, politicians, realizing that they cannot win power on the basis of real economic or social issues, decided to divide the Sri Lankans. The 1953 hartal was against rulers and united Sri Lankans of all shades and outlooks. However, within two years, ethnic/religious/linguistic issues came to the forefront. (Perceived) preference for minorities by the state became the main issue and linguistic-religious nationalism dominated the minds of both Sinhalese and Tamil Sri Lankans and the rest is history.

It is difficult to think how violence can be committed in the name of Buddhism but in many countries, extremism is on the rise and Sangha leadership and monks are in the forefront of fight to subdue minorities (see The Rise of Extremist Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar).  

What I found interesting is that most militant nationalists -- whether civic, ethnic or religious -- today believe that  they are fighting a defensive war. As violence is unacceptable, the only way for nationalists to justify their militancy against minorities is arguing that they are fighting a defensive war. Minorities, even when are in very small numbers, are presented as overpowering, controlling and secretly trying to destroy the country with the assistance of foreigners. They are shown to be in cahoots with the enemies and bent on country's destruction. This scenario then demands action from majorities to save their nation, their country and future of their children. 

In June 2014, Aluthgama, a peaceful tourist resort in southwest Sri Lanka, where Muslims and Buddhists have lived side by side peacefully for generations, became a scene of mob communal violence primarily because of a rally by hardline Buddhist nationalist monks:

The rally, organized by the far-right Buddhist group Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force), was called in response to an alleged altercation in the area between a group of young Muslims and a Buddhist monk and his driver on an important Buddhist religious holiday days earlier.

Addressing the crowd of thousands Sunday, the BBS's leader, Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, gave an inflammatory speech.

Video footage from the event shows the orange-robed monk using derogatory terms for Muslims and, to approving roars from the crowd, vowing that if any Muslim laid a hand on a member of the Sinhalese majority -- let alone a monk -- that would "be the end" of them.

 Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, far-right Buddhist group Bodu Bala Sena's general secretary

 Source: Fear, shock among Sri Lankan Muslims in aftermath of Buddhist mob violence

After the rally, Buddhist mobs marched through Muslim neighborhoods, torching and destroying dozens of homes and shops, witnesses told CNN.

Following consecutive nights of violence, in which local medical staff say at least four people were killed and sixteen seriously injured, those made homeless by the rioting were sheltering in the town's main mosque Tuesday, shell-shocked and fearful of what may come next. (See Fear, shock among Sri Lankan Muslims in aftermath of Buddhist mob violence)