Five stages of Kurdish nationalism

M. Hakan Yavuz divides the rise of Kurdish nationalism into five stages and argues that

The state's policies are the determinant factors in the evolution and modulation of the Kurdish ethno-nationalism. The major reason for the politicization of Kurdish cultural identity is the shift from multi-ethnic, multi-cultural realities of the Ottoman empire to the nation-state model.

Yavuz contends that there is nothing natural about the development of Kurdish nationalism as is true of other nationalisms. Kurdish nationalism has an 'ethnie' that Smith seems necessary for any nationalisms and this ethnie has been used by Kurdish ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize Kurds. The Kurds are, however, divided along the tribal, linguistic, region,al and religious lines. These divisions, which have been sustained due to rugged, mountainous geography, have been a major reason for weakness in Kurdish nationalism.

Yavuz declares the tribal structure as the core depository of Kurdish identity and argues that it has both helped and harmed Kurdish nationalism.

This tribal structure played a dual role: it prevented the formation of a Kurdish unity by keeping them fragmented, and preserved a heightened Kurdish particularism vis-a-vis the Turks, Persians, and Arabs.

Kurdish nationalism started to take shape due to the centralization policies of the Ottoman empire (1878-1924); it acquired an ethnic bent/consciousness under Kemalist reforms (1925-61); later influenced by the broader Turkish political struggles, class consciousness, and leftist dominated it (1962-83); the 1980 coup led to a military struggle (1983-99); and finally the capture of Ocalan and end of Kurdish insurgency has moved it to its present/last stage.

Stage 1: Anti-centralization Revolts and Politicization of the Islamic Identity

Centralization and modernization of the Ottoman empire led to revolts in Kurdish areas. However, one should be cautious in calling them national revolts as they were primarily local. As modernization reforms decreased the hold of tribal ties/loyalties, Sufi networks, like Naksibendi and Kadiri, increased their influence and Kurdish ethnic awareness rose in the forms of Islamic consciousness. While putting revolts against its policies, the Ottoman state also decided to use Kurds (and their Islamic consciousness) and Sultan Abdulhamid II formed the Hamidiye Regiments to counter Russians and Armenians. However, Islam didn't become a crucial part of Kurdish nationalism as it is part of Turkish nationalism.

Stage 2: National Secularization (1925-61)

The way the Ottoman empire was partitioned and the annulled Treaty of Sevres has left deep scars on the collective memory of Turks. British support for the Kurdish state and the inclusion of Kurdish autonomy in the unfair treaty is not forgotten.

After the war, Turkey became a predominantly Muslim nation and cosmopolitan Ottomanism gave way to secular nationalism that abhorred diversity. Ottoman legacy, however, resulted in a paradox that is still unresolved:

Due to the Ottoman legacy, Turkey embodies an irresolvable paradox in the foundation of the Republic in the 1920s. On the one hand, the state, formed as a result of demographic Islamization of the country, used Islam to unify diverse ethnolinguistic groups; on the other hand, it defined its 'progressive' civilizing ideology, known as Kemalism, in opposition to Islam.

However, the Turkish state wanted to promote its own brand of Islam that was not acceptable to both Turks and Kurds. The end of Caliphate in 1924 was one of the main reasons for the first Kurdish rebellion, known as the Sheik Said rebellion, and so it was based on ethnoreligious nationalism. Due to the authoritarian approach of the Turkish state and its promotion of Turkish ethnic nationalism, there were two more Kurdish revolts (the revolt of Agri in 1930-31 led by Ihsan Nuri Biltis and  Zaza/Alevi Kurds revolt in 1937-38 around Dersim).

Stage 3: Secularization of the Kurdish Question through Socialism (1961-83)

As Kurds became more educated, the tribal and religious leaders slowly lost their power and intellectuals became the new leaders. The Turkish state was always aligned with the West but, during the 1950s, it became a partner by joining NATO and sending its forces to support the US forces in the Korean War. The Kurdish intellectuals, like many other university students in the West, were disillusioned with the West and expressed their Kurdish grievances in socialist idioms. With the Turkish state in the Western camp, socialism seemed to be an apposite ideology for all those oppressed by the Turkish state, including the Kurds. Kurds, particularly Alevi Kurds, took a leading part in Leftist magazines (such as bilingual Turkish-Kurdish Deng and Dicle-Firat), political parties (such as Labor Party), and groups (such as Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (DDKO is its Turkish acronym)). After the 1970 coup, the Labor Party and DDKO were outlawed. The repression continued as well as the ambush and sabotage in the 1970s. In November 1978, Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK) was formed, with Abdullah Ocalan as its head. The 1980 coup declared radical Islam, the Left, and Kurdish nationalism as key threats to the Turkish state. Repression increased and all avenues of cultural expression were blocked. The terrorist activities of the PKK moved even outside Turkey as a Turkish consulate in France was bombed in November 1980. The key achievement of the PKK during this period was taking tribe and Islam out of Kurdish nationalism.

Stage 4: Emergence of PKK (1983-99)

The return of (partial) democracy did not change the state repression and the PKK militant campaign. The PKK during this time got help from other countries. Syria allowed it to establish training camps and Western European countries gave space for organization and propaganda. The PKK attacked not only the hybrid regime and its supporters but also Turkish nationalism. This increased Kurdish consciousness and politicization of Turkish nationalism. The killings and terrorist activities of PKK continued in the 1980s and 1990s. The target was not only the Turkish state but also Turkish civilians and Kurdish civilians who did not identify with the PKK. There were some unilateral ceasefires by the PKK but they did not last long. Later, Syria stopped its support for the PKK and the Turkish military used the Regional State Emergency Governorate (OHAL) which included almost all the Kurdish majority provinces to take special measures, ignoring normal constitutional protections, to defeat the PKK which even used children and female suicide bombings to fight them. The Turkish state also helped create Islamic Kurdish hit squads which killed PKK supporters in broad daylight, with state support. The scars of this conflict were deep and affected every person in the region.

PKK Flag

Source: Wikipedia

Stage 5: Kurdish problem as a European problem (2000- )

In 1998, Turkey increase its pressure on Syria and threatened to retaliate militarily if it did not completely stop helping the PKK. Turkey was emboldened by close support from the US and Israel and the Syrian military's problems because of old equipment and the non-availability of spare parts after the collapse of the USSR. Syria caved in and an agreement was signed with Turkey ending support to the PKK. Ocalan was forced out of Syria and Lebanon and was eventually captured from Kenya, with the US support. The PKK tried to up the ante and increase violence but it failed. Ocalan during his trial praised Ataturk and said that he was ready to serve the Turkish state and termed democratic struggle as the only feasible solution to the Kurdish question. He was awarded a death sentence that was later commuted to a life sentence. In its 7th Extraordinary Congress, the PKK gave up armed struggle and several of its members surrendered to Turkish authorities. After being declared a "candidate state" by the EU in December 1999, the pressure on the Turkish state also increased. It had to implement several decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had given several decisions against its brutal tactics against Kurds and it also had to be more concerned about human rights, rule of law, and minority rights. This led to a series of measures to allow cultural expression of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. The PKK also toned down its secularism and accepted Islam as part of Kurdish nationalism to increase its support.

Source: BBC

Yuvaz's article was written in 2001 so it ends with the hope that the situation will improve. With the arrival of the AKP and Erdogan on the scene, initially things improved but soon there was another insurgency in 2004. In 2009, Erdogan initiated a new social contract with the Kurdish minority ("Kurdish Opening") and took several measures to recalibrate the Kurdish-Turkish relations. However, relations again deteriorated and in 2015, the Turkish state and the PKK was fighting each other again. The misery of the Kurdish people is continuing. 

Rising Religious Nationalism in Turkey

It has been argued that Turkish nationalism has three different strands: civic nationalism based on Turkish constitution; ethnolinguistic nationalism based on Turkish language and ethnicity; and religious nationalism based on Sunni Islam. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Turkey, mainly meandered between the first two types. He tried to bring all groups living in Turkey together and develop an inclusive nationalism based on his modernist rhetoric. But he also promoted Turkish language and Turkish ethnicity and supported research that tried to promote Turks as the group that brought civilization to other groups in the world. To add to the complexity, despite his aggressive secularism, modernism and persecution of Islamic groups, Ataturk (and his allies) implicitly supported Sunni Islam as one of the markers of Turkish identity. So, it is not difficult to find support for all three strands of Turkish nationalism in the founding fathers' decisions and early day of Turkish Republic.

A book that discusses the three strands of Turkish nationalism

Source: The Top Hat, the Grey Wolf, and the Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic

The above discussion should, however, not be construed as proclaiming the equal importance of all three strands. Civic nationalism was dominant in the early 1920s but this period did not last long. Ataturk imagined a socially engineered nation out of the motley of groups present in Turkey. The state told the people how they should speak; how they should dress; how they should pray; how they should write; and even what they should call themselves. People were forced to accept these edicts and not surprisingly many rebelled, especially those who lived on the margins of Turkish society, away from the main Anatolian heartland. Kurds and Alevis took part in these rebellions and bore the brunt of an increasingly repressive response from the Turkish state. Ethnic nationalism became dominant as the state decided to suppress any kind of individuality, whether it was ethnic, linguistic or religious. There was only one nation in Turkey and its characteristics were determined by the state. These characteristics were obviously much closer to what the dominant group (ethnic Turks) had or believed in. So, minority ethnic groups, minority religion and minority sects all lost their constitutional and legal freedoms. This situation continued till the late 1970s and resulted in much polarization, instability, and violence. Left-wing/communist and right-wing nationalist paramilitaries fought each other in all regions of Turkey, with almost twenty fatalities each day.  This made the state or deep state (as the powerful military establishment was called) realize that they cannot control all the societal fissures and resulting violence.

The military took direct control in 1980 through a coup and decided to make changes. To decrease the support of communism and left, it was decided to increase religious education and to accept it part of Turkish identity. However, the public role of religion was still abhorrent and more restrictions were introduced such as the ban on hijab in public universities. Despite these restrictions, this era is remembered as the start of religious nationalism in Turkey. Sunni Islam was always an implicit marker of Turkish national identity but after the 1980s, it started becoming more explicit. This change was called the 'Turkish-Islam Synthesis'. As William Armstrong writes in Hurriyat (See The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey)       

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was originally formulated by the right-wing nationalist Intellectual Hearths (Aydınlar Ocakları) in the 1970s, but after the 1980 coup it rose to become the de facto state ideology. In practice, this meant more than just General Kenan Evren reciting Quranic verses during public speeches. It also meant huge budget increases for the Religious Affairs Directorate, rapid building of new mosques and opening of Quran courses, the introduction of mandatory religion classes in state schools (only on Sunni Islam), more tolerance for religious bureaucrats, active encouragement of religious organizations, and a widening of opportunities for graduates of religious imam hatip high schools.

Military hoped to manipulate Islam without letting it go out of its control but the socialization of masses in a religious environment, supported and funded by the state itself, led to changes beyond military's  imagination. Merton's law of unintended consequences came into play and Sunni Islam gradually became a very important part of the Turkish identity. Right-wing and Left-wing parties gradually gave way to the winning of election by an Islamist party in 1996. Although that party was forced out by the military within a year, the power of religious nationalism continued to grow due to increase in Islamic-oriented media, foundations and businesses. Eventually, AK Party, whose leadership had been trained in Islamist parties, came to power.

AK Party (Freedom and Justice Party) win brought the reformed Islamists to power. They claimed to be like Christian conservative parties of the Western Europe and pledged to work with the secular establishment, consisting of the President, judiciary and the military. Although, in their initial years, AKP didn't take an overtly religious step, the very presence of AKP at the helm gave confidence to media, educational institutions and businesses run by the religious Anatolian Turks. Good economic management helped AKP win elections repeated eventually controlling the presidency, judiciary and military.

Religious nationalism implies that national identity is now based on religion. This logically means that religion is now not only a personal matter (between a person and her God or gods) but a matter of law and state. Therefore, who is a (true) member of the state religion becomes a big issue. Tellingly, defining a true Muslim is a big issue in Turkey now. While there is hope that Kurdish issue (which is mainly an ethnolinguistic issue) will be resolved soon, Alevi issue is raising its head. The state defines Islam to include Alevis as deviant Sunni Muslims but Alevis consider themselves as members of different sect/religion. Everybody from Prime Minister to opposition leaders to religious leaders is weighing in (See What does Erdogan mean by 'Alevis without Ali'?)

Moreover, there is fighting between AKP and Gulanists, followers of an influential preacher Fethullah Gulen, one-time allies of the AKP. The witch-hunts and inquisitions mean that religious nationalism is rising (See Turkey’s intra-Islamic witch hunt).      

Turkish Secularism or State Islam?

Two articles contesting Turkish secularism are summarized below. Both articles claim convincingly that there is no secularism in Turkey, if secularism means separation of state and religion.

So, what is it then ? David Boyajian argues that Turkey has a state religion, Sunni Islam.  Orhan does not go that far but accepts that Turkish state promotes Islam. The argument for promoting Islam was, however, to control it. Nominal Islam was to be instrumentally used as a unifying ideology to create a modern, homogeneous nation.  

David Boyajian writes in dissident voices (See The Myth of Turkish Secularism) that ‘In civilized, democratic countries, secularism means not only a respectful separation between church and state but also freedom of religion. As we shall demonstrate, Turkish policies have long been the antithesis of secularism’.

He argues that Turkish system might be more properly considered ‘state Islam’ as Turkish government supports and funds Sunni Islam and discriminates and represses other religions and sects. Many people would think that he is talking about changes brought about under Prime Minister Erdogan but this not true. He contends that Turkish state has been promoting Sunni Islam for decades and some of the discrimination against religious minorities can be traced back to Ataturk. 

His main arguments for calling Turkish system as State Islam are the existence and reach of Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and persecution of religious minorities for the last ninety years. 

Diyanet, a powerful department, was established in 1924 under Article 136 of Turkish Constitution. It has a $2 billion annual outlay and is the employer of all Sunni clergy. Until recently, it also wrote the sermons for Friday prayers all over Turkey. It also controls all (around 80,000) Sunni mosques in the country. Diyanet is involved in religious activities outside Turkey too. It funds Sunni Islam projects in other countries such as building mosques and paying imam salaries.

Boyajian also points out to the long history of religious persecution of minorities in Turkey to claim that secularism of Turkey is a myth. Christians have persecuted and not allowed to propagate their religion. Even maintenance of Christianity is difficult as many sects are not allowed to train clergy or establish foundations to fund religious activities and hundreds of churches have been seized by the state during the last ninety years. Non-Muslim have also been discriminately taxed, such as the infamous capital tax during World War II. Even non-Sunni Muslims, such as Alevis, are discriminated. Their prayer halls(cem evi) are not accepted as religious places.

Boyajian concludes by saying:

If Turkey is ever to be secular, it must allow the free exercise of all religions – including Islam – and guarantee the rights of the faithful to be free from harassment and compulsion. The Turkish government’s acknowledgement of its past and present wrongs, especially to the non-Turkish and non-Muslim communities, and making genuine amends, must be part of this process. Until then – particularly in the West – mainstream media, governments, religious leaders, academicians, and political analysts should cease swallowing Turkey’s fraudulent claim of secularism.

Boyajian makes powerful arguments and certainly there is no separation of religion and state in Turkey. Secularism, as commonly understood, is not present in Turkey. 

While Boyajian points out the contradictions or absence of Turkish secularism, Özgüç Orhan takes the next step and unpacks why these paradoxes were there in the first place and why they continue to exist today (See The Paradox of Turkish Secularism). Orhan explains that Turkish secularism is more about the control of Islam by state rather than the separation of state and religion or neutrality of state toward all religions, two characteristics that define the US secularism. Some scholars have linked Turkish secularism with French secularism (e.g. Kuru calls US secularism as passive secularism, while French and Turkish secularisms are called assertive secularisms). However, Turkish secularism goes much beyond the French model. 

Orhan unpacks origins of unique Turkish 'secularism' by claiming that Kemalists perceived religion/Islam as having a grip on Turkish society. This grip had to be broken to bring Turkey at par with the modern world. So, state independence from Islam was not considered sufficient. State was made to regulate Islam to free the minds of people from old, archaic precept and practices. Using a narrative of enlightenment and modernization, it was decided that state had to continue prescribing  (and later teaching and promoting) good Islam. Islam, according to this view, was inherently political and if allowed to function independently, it would invade the public sphere again and threaten modernization.

Using Constitutional Court ruling from 1971, Orhan explains the official understanding of the laiklik principle in the constitution:

(1) Religion should neither influence nor dominate the state affairs; (2) With respect to the part of the religious faith pertaining to the spiritual life of the individuals, religions are protected by constitutional guarantees giving them unlimited freedom without any discrimination; (3) With respect to the part of the religious faith pertaining to the actions and behavior of the individual affecting social life beyond the spiritual life, restrictions can be made to protect public order, security, and interest; and the abuse and exploitation of religion is prohibited; (4) As the guardian of public order and rights, the state has supervisory authority over religious rights and liberties. 

As Boyajian above, Orhan asserts that Diyanet was (and is) the main instrument of control used by Turkish state. Founded a year after Republic,  Diyanet mission was to ‘execute matters related to Islam’s beliefs, prayers and morals, educate society about religion and administer prayer locations’. Secularizing mission of Diyanet moved further in 1940s with state training and employing Imams, ironically making Turkey less of a secular state. 

Orhan links Diyanet mission to efforts of the Turkish state to create a new national identity. Although, this identity was based on Turkish ethnicity and language but Islam was an implicit component of this identity. So, to bring all the people together and form a homogeneous modern nation led to another contradiction: state began propagating Sunni Islam (the religion of vast majority of Turkish citizens) to secularize people, thus undermining rights of religious minorities. Attempts to nationalize Islam or coming up with a Turkish Islam resulted in something that was close to state religion.

Islam has remained a part of Turkish identity from the start, despite pronouncements to the contrary. In Lausanne Treaty and later debates in the Grand National Assembly, Islam was accepted as a crucial component of Turkish identity. Non-Turkish Muslims from rump empire could become Turks but not Turkish-speaking Christians or Jews who have lived in Anatolia for centuries. Orhan explains:  

So “even under staunch secularism” Islam was an indispensable instrument of the nationalist project of Turkifying the Muslim minorities. 

Using this foundation, later democratic governments made Islam a more explicit part of national identity. A major change came in 1980, when Turkish military (a staunchly secularist institution that had defended Kemalist project many times, even toppling elected governments) allowed the use of Islam to defeat the communists/radical left. ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ was not throwing in of towel by Turkish military as claimed by many scholars. According to Orhan, it was more ‘an outcome of political conjuncture’ and an instrumental use of Islam, something that Turkish leaders have done for the last hundred years atleast. 

Mahathir and Erdogan: Similarities and use of nationalism

A lot has been written about the superb economic stewardship of both leaders and it has certainly been crucial for their popularity and electoral success. However, not many people know of another key ingredient behind their success – their management of ‘nationalism’.

My article published on Express Tribune Blog. A portion is reproduced below, rest can be read at Will Sharif be able to follow Mahathir and Erdogan?

Like Pakistan, the basis of nationalism is still open for debate in both Malaysia and Turkey. There are ethnic nationalists, religious nationalists and a large group of civic nationalists fighting over the raison d’être of their respective countries.

Mahathir and Erdogan both used this disagreement to their advantage and led coalitions of different nationalists at different times in their careers. Both adopted civic, ethnic or religious nationalism as the situation demanded.

Source: Will Sharif be able to follow Mahathir and Erdogan?

Mahathir began his career as an ethnic nationalist but later won popularity and even premiership as a Malay nationalist. He wrote a controversial book, The Malay Dilemma, to promote special policies for the people of Malaysia. However, once he attained power, he moved to the centre and tried to win overall Malaysians. And by the end of his rule, he started propagating a form of ethnoreligious nationalism, highlighting the special role of Malays and Islam in the creation of Malaysia.

On the other hand, Erdogan began his political career as a civic nationalist and despite his Muslim roots, presented himself as a leader for all Turkish people. He disparaged discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender or religion. However, in order to curtail the power of the Turkish military, he later became an ethnic nationalist and unashamedly claimed to be the redeemer of the ethnic nationalism of Ataturk and the early Turkish Republic.

His current stance is that of an ethnoreligious nationalist fighting against the world for his country, just like Mahathir near the end of his career.

Erdogan, Gulen and Power of Nationalism?

Not long ago, Turkey was an island of stability with Europe facing financial collapse on one side and Middle East experiencing revolutions on the other. Not any more. Since Gezi Park protests last year, Turkey has been rocked by regular protests and scandals that have made people worry about Turkey's political and economic stability. Erdogan's support and his ability to win elections has been questioned by analysts both outside and inside Turkey. This year is particularly crucial with local, presidential and possibly general elections happening before December. What might also be decided this year is whether Turkey would have a parliamentary or presidential system and whether the Kurdish 'problem' will be resolved after almost eighty years. Not surprisingly, this year is being called Turkey's year of destiny (See 2014: Turkey's year of destiny).

What has particularly made the coming local elections on March 30 a wide open contest is the rift within the pro-Islam or pro-religious camp. Gulen/Hizmat movement and Erdogan's AKP supported each other from 2002 to 2012, despite some differences. They won local elections, general elections and constitutional referendums together and defeated the political force that had dominated Turkey since independence, the Turkish military. AKP promoted organizations linked with Hizmet and these organizations in turn delivered money, support and votes.

So, how important are March 30 election results? To bring down the hype, following are the percentages of votes AKP got in the local and general elections since 2002.

General election 2002:  34.3%

Local election    2004:  42.2%

General election 2007:  46.6%

Local election    2009:  38.8%

General election 2011:  49.8%

Looking at the these figures, it is obvious that a dip in AKP votes on March 30, while important and certainly disheartening for AKP and invigorating for the opposition, does not means the end of Erdogan. AKP lost support in 2009 local elections and its vote remained below 40% mark but it still won big in 2011 general election. For my wish (i.e. Gul takes over AKP from Erdogan) to be granted, the dip in votes would have to be big, maybe around 30% with the loss of municipalities of Ankara and Istanbul.  

The situation is, of course, different now than in 2009 when last local elections were held. Two groups, youth and the religious, that supported AKP before are now divided. What is perplexing for many is Erdogan's strategy to win in 2014? 

One can disagree about Erdogan's morals or corruption but not about whether he wants to win this year. Again, very few will argue with the statement that Erdogan is one of the most intelligent and savvy political leaders of the Turkish Republic. So, if most analysts can understand that a little humbleness, a little less confrontational talk, and a little sympathetic attitude toward opposition can help him win again, why can't he understand this simple equation? Moreover, this is not a new strategy for him; he practiced it from 2002 to 2010. 

One way to make sense of this situation is to argue that Erdogan has changed. He has become arrogant after all these years in power. We have seen this happening before, haven't we? Popular leaders, at the height of their power, making stupid mistakes and sinking into obscurity and oblivion.

Another way to make sense of this situation is to see a method in the madness of 'prince of Istanbul'. As a student of Turkish nationalism, what I find pretty interesting was Erdogan's reference to a 'second war of independence'. Add it to his constant refrain about conspiracies/foreign powers and one can clearly see that Erdogan is trying to use 'Sevres Syndrome' (the fear of dismemberment of Turkey by foreign powers as they did in the Treaty of Sevres [1920] after World War I). For an Erdogan supporter, and maybe many other Turks, it can be seen as a coded message, a dog-whistle. Add to it the fact, how Erdogan policies during the last decade map Turkish history hundred year before Sevres. Maybe it is a figment of my imagination but do read.

The 19th century Ottoman history was all about Westernization and 'modernization'. Even Sultan Abdul Hamid II (Reign: 1876-1909), who is usually considered an Islamist, did not stop the Westernization project. Ottomans gradually gave Christian minorities in Europe more rights in the hope that they would not rebel and Empire will remain intact. However, most of the Christians did rebel and the West supported them. Ottomans were left with only their Asian/African possessions by the end of Balkan Wars. Ottomans/Committee of Union and Progress then tried to save this rump empire but Arabs, despite being Muslims, revolted and again Western powers supported them. Ottoman Turks were only left with Anatolia. However, outside powers were not ready to even allow Turks to have Anatolia and invaded Turkish mainland and forced the Ottomans to sign the Treaty of Sevres. It was Ataturk who then fought with the West and saved the current Turkish state. 

Now, relate this history to Erdogan's twelve year rule. He first tried to cozy up to Europeans/West. Although he was an Islamist, he introduced many reforms that to Westernize the country so that Turkey could join the European Union (EU). However, despite his efforts, French and Germans made it clear that Turkey could not join EU. Then, Erdogan changed his direction and tried to have good relations with Muslim countries. He was berated and castigated by the 'White Turks' as well as by the West, but he continued to try to have good relations with Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Libya etc. However, he was also rejected by the Muslim Arabs and Iran. His outstretched hand was rejected by the 'outside powers' both in the West and the East, just like Ottomans were rejected a century before. And now, like at the time of independence, as Erdogan keep saying in his speeches, foreign powers are not ready to leave Turkey to Turks and are trying to destroy Turkey financially. 

Many have described all this talk of 'outside powers', which now includes even foreign airlines, as nonsense.

Erdogan has called it a second “independence struggle,” invoking the real war that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk fought to prevent Greece, France, Britain and Russia from carving up the heart of the collapsed Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s. He’s even hinted that the U.S. ambassador in Ankara is behind an international conspiracy to unseat him. Nonsense of this sort threatens Turkey’s most important security relationship -- and who will it convince in any case? The investigators may be politically motivated, but the evidence they’ve collected is reaching the public and the wrongdoing they seem to have uncovered can’t be so easily dismissed.(See Turkey Needs Erdogan’s ’Master Period’ to End)

However, it is important remember that Sevres Syndrome is still powerful in Turkey. Turkish society have been described as ultra-nationalist. Surveys have consistently shown that a majority of Turks believe that Western powers are trying to dismember Turkey as they have done in the past (See Turkey: A Conspiratorial State of Mind and Sevres Syndrome). Who are these Turks who believe in these conspiracy theories? Are they voters of CHP, AKP or MHP? Clearly, majority of AKP voters and most of the MHP voters belong to this group. So, Erdogan is trying to mobilize his base. People do not come to vote in local elections and economy is also not doing that well so how to get your people to come out to vote--you play to people's innate/instinctive fears. 

So, how can Hizmet outplay Erdogan? It cannot change the Sevres Syndrome in the next few months, so it can highlight its Turkish and Islamic credentials to show that it is not part of a foreign conspiracy. So, are interviews/articles in Western media the best strategy, considering the fact that majority in Turkey do not read them and probably mistrust them? I do not know. What do you think? Here is what Erdogan said about foreign media a few days ago, clearly implying conspiracy:

My dear brothers, these [media] organizations have always stolen the will of this country. They are stealing the resources and energy of our country...Is it only the BBC? Also The Wall Street Journal. Who are the bosses of these newspapers? Who owns these newspapers? (See Troubled Turkey Looks to Conspiracy Theories for Answers)

What about the power of nationalism and the national myths, such as Sevres Syndrome? How can these be countered? Turkey is, of course, not unique. Many in India and Pakistan also believe other countries have set their minds to destroy them. Putin uses nationalism and fear of West/foreigners to continue to rule. As Emre Erdogan writes 

This situation is not unique to Turkey. You can replace “Turkey” and “Turks” with another nationality’s name in the region; the meaning does not change. A historical narrative based on a highly exploited trauma and the close proximity of potential enemies seems to be the norm for nation states, particularly in this part of the world. (See The Unbearable Heaviness of of Being a Turkish Citizen)

Place of Islam in Turkish Nationalism

In his book, Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?, Soner Cagaptay unpacks the role of Islam in Turkish nationalism. He argues that there were three overlapping categories of Turkishness. The first category and the most inclusive one is based on territory. Anybody living in Turkey is Turkish as given in 1924 Constitution. The second category is based on religion and it can be traced back to Ottoman millet system as articulated in the 1930s textbooks and ruling party (CHP) documents. The third and the most exclusive category was based on ethnicity or a combination of religion and ethnicity.

Cagaptay also explain these categories as three concentric circles.

The above circles, however, hide many complexities. While Islam was an important marker of Turkish nationalism, it was a highly controlled Islam. Turkish government privileged only nominal Islam over other religions. Similarly, while Turkish ethnicity was prized, Turkish language was also important and non-Turks were told to learn Turkish language, if they want to be part of the inner-most circle. So, the inner-most circle can also be described as ethno-linguistic. 

All non-Muslims living in Turkey were also not equal. All kinds of Christians were considered beyond assimilation so they were in the exterior part of the outer-most circle. Armenians were considered the most anti-state so they maybe considered at the edge of outer-most circle. Jews were, however, considered loyal and not beyond assimilation. They were asked to learn Turkish (and adopt Turkish names) so that they can join the inner circles. There were also differences between non-Muslim Turks. Arabs, because of their 'treachery' during World War I, and Kurds, because they resisted assimilation, were ranked lower in termed of Turkishness as compared to Bosnians, Albanians. Bulgar Muslims, Tartars etc.  

The probable vision of future in the minds of Kemalists might be