Does more democracy mean more Islam? A look at Pakistan’s constitutional history

Writing about post-invasion Iraq, Feldman and Martinez (2007) argued, 

as the constitutional process became increasingly participatory and democratic in the period from the fall of Saddam Hussein to ratification, the constitution itself became increasingly Islamic in orientation and detail…To put it simply, more democracy meant more Islam. 

If one reviews the political developments in other Muslim-majority countries (MMCs) during the last few decades, more democracy means more Islam (hereafter Feldman’s aphorism) seems to be true. Democratic advancement has resulted in more Islam in Jordan, Indonesia, Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Recently, Hamid (2014) also contended that democratic openings in the MMCs might lead to more Islamization and not to a more liberal polity. This blogpost reviews Pakistan’s constitutional history to see whether democratic progression in Pakistan has also led to more Islamization. It concludes that during the first thirty years of Pakistan (1947-77), more democracy did lead to more Islam in the constitutions but since then, Feldman’s aphorism is no longer true.  

Rest of the blog can be read at Calgary Centre of Global Community here

Religious nationalism: A new development in the Middle East

Nationalism is a concept linked with modernity and so are its numerous variants, including religious nationalism. Although Islam has been the dominant religion in the Middle East for the last 1500 years, religious nationalism is a recent phenomenon. Like European feudal states and empires, Muslim feudal states and empires of the pre-modern era did not propagate or even espouse religious nationalism.

Brian A. Catlos, the religious studies professor at the University of Colorado at Boulder, has written an excellent column in the Washington Post on religious nationalism in the Middle East. Following are some excerpts, but do read the Religious Nationalism finds a footing in the Middle East

With many reports of this violence come adjectives such as “barbarous” and “medieval,” along with the intimation that this sort of intolerance is particularly characteristic of Islam and antithetical to the enlightened and rational secularism of the West.

But brutal as this sectarian violence may be, the fact that there are so many religious minorities in the Middle East stands testament to the reality that, despite long-standing antagonisms, myriad ethnic groups and religious denominations have not only survived but even thrived in this region through some 1,500 years of Islamic domination. The richness of the culture, where many of the ancient sects and arcane languages — often surviving only in small, highly localized communities — predate Christianity, Islam and even modern Judaism, has no parallel in Europe. The Yazidi religion, for example, goes back to Mesopotamia; Aramaic, the language of Jesus, continues to be spoken in a clutch of villages near Damascus...

This reflects an entirely different model of political compromise than that which has developed in the West, and it may seem regressive to us. But it is an arrangement that developed organically and has functioned for about 14 centuries.

The breakdown of religious tolerance and plurality in today’s Middle East is not, then, a manifestation of some particularly Islamic barbarism or evidence of a return to the Middle Ages. Nor is it religious in motivation, although it may be in expression. It is a symptom of what we call modernization, and its political framework: nationalism...

Hamas and Islamic State

Ali Mamouri has written an article on why there is no love lost between Hamas and the so-called Islamic State (of Iraq and al-Sham) (see Why Islamic State has no sympathy for Hamas?). Ali argues that there are some doctrinal reasons why the IS does not support Hamas:

Salafists believe that jihad must be performed under legitimate leadership. This argument is advanced through the “banner and commander” concept, which holds that whoever undertakes jihad must follow a commander who fulfills the criteria of religious and political leadership and has raised the banner of jihad. Given that there is neither a legitimate leader nor a Salafist-approved declaration of jihad in Palestine, fighting there is forbidden.

In addition, for Salafists, if non-Muslims control Islamic countries and apostates exist in the Islamic world, the Islamic world must be cleansed of them before all else. In short, the purification of Islamic society takes priority over combat against non-Islamic societies. On this basis, Salafists see conflict with an allegedly illegitimate Hamas government as a first step toward confrontation with Israel. Should the opportunity for military action present itself in the Palestinian territories, Salafists would fight Hamas and other factions deemed in need of “cleansing” from the land and engage Israel afterward.

This approach has its roots in Islamic history, which Salafists believe confirms the validity of their position. Relevant points of historical reference include the first caliphate of Abu Bakr, which gave priority to fighting apostates over expanding Islamic conquests, which occurred later, during the second caliphate, under Umar bin al-Khattab. Likewise, Saladin fought the Shiites and suppressed them before he engaged the crusaders in the Holy Land.

Salafists today see that their priority as fighting Shiites, “munafiqin” (dissemblers, or false Muslims) and apostates, whom they call the “close enemy.” During the current war in Gaza, a number of IS fighters have burned the Palestinian flag because they consider it a symbol of the decline of the Islamic world, which succumbed to national divisions through the creation of independent political states. In Salafist doctrine, the entire Islamic world must be united under a single state, an Islamic caliphate, which IS declared in late June.

So, there are two reasons:

• According to Islamic doctrine, jihad is only allowed under a legitimate leadership and Hamas is not the legitimate leadership because it fights for democracy and a Palestinian state (while IS fights for God and for an Islamic state)
• The IS has to fight the apostate Muslims first, before fighting the non-Muslims. Purification comes before the conquest. So, fighting Shias in Iraq and Syria comes before fighting Israel.

In a recent statement, the IS tried to deflect the criticism that it is not helping Palestinians in Gaza by reiterating its commitment to liberating Palestine and destroying Israel. It asked Gazans to be patient as the IS is working and is not interested in issuing empty statements like many Arab governments (See Gaza crisis: ISIS vows to help Palestinians fight barbaric Jews).

Source: Hamas Website

The IS spokesman, Nuseiri, also argued that it is following a systematic approach and has a plan (See ISIS Spokesman Explains Why 'Islamic State' Not Supporting Hamas) 

However, he pointed out that ISIS has been taking a systematic approach in its campaign, and outlined six specific stages it said needed to be fulfilled before taking on Israel.
Some of those "stages" - building a firm base for an Islamic state in Iraq, and using it as a springboard to wage war in Syria and Lebanon - have already been achieved. But he said a number of other criteria still needed to be fulfilled before challenging Israel directly.
Among them, Nuseiri said that the US - seen as Israel's greatest ally - needed to be weakened politically and economically via attacks on the American mainland, as well as US interests in Muslim countries. Additionally, the existing "Islamic State" needed to expand its borders to cover all of "Greater Syria" (which would include Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and possibly Gaza); such a state, he said, would then be in a position for a direct confrontation with Israel.

The IS statement can be taken as few practical considerations (which every successful movement has to take into account) in the expansion of the IS Caliphate and this is how the IS wants others to see it. However, these doctrinal and practical considerations can also be understood as a camouflage for nationalistic concerns. 

Doctrinally, the claim of legitimacy of IS is weaker than that of Hamas. Neither the IS leadership is more pious, nor it has support/baya of most of the pious Muslim leadership. Moreover, jihad needs legitimate leadership when Muslims are attacking. When Muslim lands, homes, and persons are attacked (as in Gaza), all Muslims are allowed/required to defend themselves, with or without legitimate leadership.

Source: Islamic State Threatens to Topple Hamas in Gaza

The argument about 'purifying' and killing apostate Muslims first and non-Muslims later is also weak. When Muslim women and children are being killed in hundreds, it is preposterous (and doctrinally indefensible) to not stop this massacre and focus on killing apostates. The fact of the matter is that IS's main enemies are Shias in both Syria and Iraq so it might also be a way to legitimize its own actions. Moreover, as Salafist groups are challenging Hamas in Gaza, the IS might want Israel to destroy Hamas so that more radical and doctrinally closer Gazan Salafists may take over.

Update: By mid-2015, the divisions between the IS and Hamas were public and the IS issued a threat to Hamas in a video statement as reported by YNet News:

The video statement, issued from an Islamic State stronghold in Syria, was a rare public challenge to Hamas, which has been cracking down on jihadis in Gaza who oppose its truces with Israel and reconciliation with the US-backed rival Palestinian faction Fatah.

"Eight years they control the territory, and have yet to enforce one Islamic teaching," the ISIS speaker said in the video.

"We will uproot the state of the Jews (Israel) and you and Fatah, and all of the secularists are nothing and you will be over-run by our creeping multitudes," said a masked Islamic State member in the message addressed to the "tyrants of Hamas".

"The rule of sharia (Islamic law) will be implemented in Gaza, in spite of you. We swear that what is happening in the Levant today, and in particular the Yarmouk camp, will happen in Gaza," he said, referring to Islamic State advances in Syria, including in a Damascus district founded by Palestinian refugees. (See Islamic State Threatens to Topple Hamas in Gaza)

Muslim yearning for caliphate and ISIS caliphate

ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) or ISIL (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) has declared itself a Caliphate and named its leader as Caliph of all Muslims. The group spokesman said:

He is the imam and khalifah (Caliph) for the Muslims everywhere.......Accordingly, the "Iraq and Sham" (Levant) in the name of the Islamic State is henceforth removed from all official deliberations and communications, and the official name is the Islamic State from the date of this declaration.......It is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to (him) and support him...The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khalifah's authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.( See ISIS Declares Islamic 'Caliphate' And Calls On Groups To Pledge Allegiance)

Powerful words indeed. While president of Indonesia or Prime Minister of Pakistan, democratically elected leaders of around 200 million Muslims, would find it difficult to call themselves caliph of around 1.5 billion Muslims, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, commander of fewer than fifteen thousand fighters, has claimed the coveted title. As Al-Qaida's rejection of ISIS shows, al-Baghdadi is not even an accepted leader of militant,trans-national, anti-West extremist Muslims in Iraq or Syria.  

Huff post quotes John Esposito, one of the most eminent scholars of Islam in the West, defining Caliphate in the following way (See What Is A Caliphate? ISIS Declaration Raises Questions) :

Historically, the caliph was the successor to the prophet, the political leader of the community, and therefore the head of the early transnational Islamic empire. That's important -- the idea of it being a transnational empire, that reflected the ummah, and transcended national boundaries.

Does it matter that al-Baghdadi has declared himself caliph? Some have argued that now more Muslim militants would be attracted to him. Fair point. But others have argued that this might be a disastrous outreach (See Jihadis in Iraq and Syria declare a caliphate? Why that's good).

Yesterday's declaration of a caliphate by the leading jihadi army in Iraq and Syria – and its demand that Muslims swear oaths of fealty to its leader – could prove the most disastrous piece of jihadi overreach since Al Qaeda in Iraq's routine use of torture and beheadings spurred a Sunni Arab backlash in 2006. 

The formerly Al Qaeda-linked jihadis are generally reported as going from strength to strength in Iraq, taking and holding cities like Mosul and Tikrit from the central government. But the success of the uprising in Iraq in the past month has rested heavily on the backs of Sunni Arab tribes and former Baathists with formal military training. And the grandiose announcement – a telegraphed intent to impose a harsh and regressive vision of Islam on as much territory as possible – is unlikely to make them happy.

I personally think this announcement does not matter much. Does al-Baghdadi become more legitimate or get more recruits? Some recruits but not much else. ISIS is a like a fringe of a fringe. Al-Baghdadi is a brutal callous killer and it is difficult to find many Muslims, except for the militants, giving his message any serious thought. As an NPR reporter described, even in his own country Iraq, he is considered a nut job. Most of the Muslim probably do not know who he is and those, who have heard of him, would most likely try to keep as much distance from him as possible. In conclusion, ISIS caliphate has not changed much on the ground or elsewhere. As Juan Cole explains in his brief history of Caliphate, hundreds of fringe groups have been claiming caliphate for probably more than a thousand years (See The Debacle of the Caliphates: Why al-Baghdadi’s Grandiosity doesn’t Matter).

What is a more interesting question is why Caliphate still mesmerizes many Muslims today. Why pine for a medieval government/empire? 

Nowadays, the Caliphate has captured the imagination of many Muslims worldwide mainly because they are concerned about the abject condition of the Muslim Ummah today. Despite a plethora of resources and around fifty independent Muslim-majority states in the world, Muslims are followers/lackeys, not leaders. Decisions about Muslims and Muslim-majority states are made by others in Washington, Moscow or Beijing and Muslim leaders (with a few exceptions) kowtow to these capitals, instead of charting their own independent course for the benefit of their own people.

Many Muslim relate these circumstances to the lack of unity among Muslims and hark back to the times when Muslims were successful and leading the world. It is commonly believed that under the erstwhile caliphate, Muslims were united as one nation, within one political state and that was why they were so successful. There is also the notion that caliphate is blessed by Allah. Many Muslims, therefore, desire a new caliphate so that there would be an Islamic renaissance and Islamic civilization would reach another apogee by the blessings of Allah. The message of Hizb-ul-Tahrir, one of the most prominent organizations trying to establish caliphate (Khilafah) today, shows the allied themes of current humiliation; success in the past; and renaissance under a new caliphate (See Hizb-e-Tahrir: About us)

Hizb ut-Tahrir is determined to work within the Ummah in order to implement Islam and achieve its objective by endeavouring to gain the leadership of the Islamic Ummah so that she could accept it as her leader, to implement Islam upon her and proceed with it in her struggle against the Kuffar and in the work towards the return of the Islamic State as it was before, the leading superpower in the world.....

The rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir was in response to Allah (swt)’s saying: T.M.Q. “And let there arise from amongst you a band that calls to the good and commands what is right and forbids what is evil and those are the ones who will attain felicity.” in order to revive the Islamic Ummah after the severe decline to which she has sunk, to liberate her from the thoughts, systems and rules of Kufr, its systems and from the hegemony and influence of the Kufr states,  and  in order to work towards establishing the Islamic Khilafah State so that the rules by what Allah (swt) has revealed returns to the realm of life.

While not denying that erstwhile caliphate was a big Muslim state and a big Muslim state now would probably be more powerful than numerous small Muslim states, the notion that all Muslims were united under caliphate is historically not true. Muslims were only under one caliphate for a quarter of a century during the time of first three Rasidun Caliphs and then again for some decades under Umayyads. The whole period of one united caliphate is less than one century compared to more than thirteen centuries of many Muslim states/caliphates constituting the Muslim ummah. So thinking that just because there is a caliphate, Muslims are united under it, is false.   

Ottoman Sultan and Caliph Suleiman, the magnificent (1494 - 1566)

Source: Poetic Voices of the Muslim World

Linking the glory of Islam/Muslims with caliphate is also problematic. It can be true, partially true or false depending on how glory is defined. Is it the military success or the social development or the cultural refinement or the control over maximum territory? In terms of military successes, united caliphate of the seventh century is unparalleled in Muslim history. However, the height of (comparative) social development and cultural refinement was achieved by the Muslims in the times of early Abbasids when the caliph ruled majority of Muslims but not all Muslims. There were many independent Muslim emirs/king/rulers, alongside Abbasid caliphate. Comparing Muslim history on the basis of territory under control, probably 16th and 17th centuries can be considered the height of Islamic grandeur, a time of more than dozen Muslim states/empires (not one united caliphate). 

As Dr Muhammad Iqbal (poet par excellence,  Muslim philosopher and one of the founding fathers of Pakistan) wrote supporting the decision of Ataturk to abolish caliphate, for most of its history caliphate has worked more as an empire than as an Islamic state. Therefore, its religious sanction is doubtful, to say the least:  

In its essence Islam is not Imperialism. In the abolition of the Caliphate which since the days of Omayyads had practically become a kind of Empire it is only the spirit of Islam that has worked out through the Ataturk. In order to understand the Turkish Ijtihad in the matter of the Caliphate we cannot but seek the guidance of Ibn-i-Khaldun—the great philosophical historian of Islam, and the father of modern history. I can do no better than quote here a passage from my Reconstruction:

Ibn-i-Khaldun, in his famous Prolegomena, mentions three distinct views of the idea of Universal Caliphate in Islam: (1) That Universal Imamate is a Divine institution and is consequently indispensable. (2) That it is merely a matter of expediency. (3) That there is no need of such an institution. The last view was taken by the Khawarij, the early republicans of Islam. It seems that modern Turkey has shifted from the first to the second view, i.e., to the view of the Muttazilla who regarded Universal Imamate as a matter of expediency only. The Turks argue that in our political thinking we must be guided by our past political experience which points unmistakably to the fact that the idea of Universal Imamate has failed in practice. It was a workable idea when the Empire of Islam was intact. Since the break-up of this Empire independent political units have arisen. The idea has ceased to be operative and cannot work as a living factor in the organization of modern Islam.

  

         

Arab Nationalism: The end?

Adeed Dawisha's article remember's Arab nationalism (See Requiem for Arab Nationalism), once a powerful force, aiming to revive the glory of Arab nation.

He talks about Nasser, the undisputed leader of Arab nationalism, and the effect of 1967 defeat.

It took some time for the light to go out on Arab nationalism, but its power generator went down in June 1967. After the Six-Day War, the slide of Arab nationalism toward political marginality became irreversible. And what finished it was the fact that Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser, lost the war. Egypt's devastating defeat was Arab nationalism's mortal loss, for the fate of Arab nationalism during the struggles, triumphs, and reversals of the 1950s and 1960s was inexorably linked to Egypt and its charismatic president.

Had Syria or Jordan, or even both, lost the war, it would not have been the unmitigated disaster for Arab nationalism that it proved to be. But Arab nationalism could not survive the abject humiliation inflicted on its acknowledged prophet, who, through his shrill and overzealous propaganda machine, had promised a fabled triumph in al-Ma'raka al-Masiriya, the battle of destiny.

Arab countries and their flags 

Source: Islam and Arab Nationalism الإسلام و العربية الجنسية in the 21st century

The main competitor of Arab nationalism was, of course, individual country/territorial nationalisms. Arab nationalism was all about unity and indivisibility of the proud Arab nation but gradually borders between Arabs became important. 

Part of the reason for this "sanctification" of borders was that Arab political and economic elites developed a vested interest in the survival of each particular state. Not surprisingly, these elites were loath to put themselves at risk for the sake of Arab unity.So they argued that Arab nationalism was really just a license for some elites to browbeat others. The advocates of territorial nationalism also relied on geo-political and cultural arguments in making their case. They insisted that Arab nationalists had failed to understand that while various Arab states might accept an overarching Arab identity, geographic and even cultural differences were real enough to preclude an organic unity. And they were right: the decline of Arab nationalism from 1961 validated their argument.

But territorial nationalisms were not the only enemy. Many sub-state and supra-state identities also damaged the Arab nationalist's cause. Tribal loyalties, argues Adeed, were powerful in many Arab countries and didn't disappear as Arab nationalism and territorial nationalisms fought for the primary loyalty of the Arabs.

In some states, tribal affiliations formed the backbone of popular support that shielded local leaderships from the advancing tide of revolutionary Arab nationalism. Such was the case in Saudi Arabia, where the tribal-based demographic structure contributed to the stability of the political order.Successive Saudi monarchs, in the process of shifting the loyalty of the Bedouin from tribe to state, made sure to act and be perceived as tribal overlords.

Bedouin military personnel were also responsible for the survival of Jordan's young King Hussein, in the face of seemingly impossible odds. Jordan's "Arab Legion" was initially formed to combat Bedouin anarchy in the new country. In a stroke of genius, the Arab Legion's founder, the British officer John Bagot Glubb, decided to harness the warlike qualities of the Bedouins by recruiting them into the army. Very quickly, the Arab Legion became the Arab world's most disciplined fighting force. But one thing that Glubb did not change was tribal solidarity, which he nurtured every step of the way to make the Arab Legion "the Bedouin prop of the Hashemite polity.

Source: Arab League, Wikipedia

Coming to the focus of this blog, religious identities also didn't allow Arab nationalism to take hold. Sectarian loyalties divided Arabs and in many countries, especially when they were politicized as in Iraq. These loyalties were weakened and laid dormant during the heyday of Arab nationalism and Nasser but they were back with a vengeance in the 1970s.

Iraq's sectarian divisions formed another hurdle in the Arab nationalist march. The country's Shi'ite majority never overcame its suspicion of Arab nationalism as a Sunni project. Shi'ite grievances against the Sunnis were primarily political, pertaining to Sunni dominance over Iraq's political order. The Shi'ites would point to the paucity of their numbers among the decision-making elite and in the ranks of the administrative and military institutions.

It is not that the Shi'ites did not believe in Arab nationalism, or that they did not consider themselves to be Arabs. Shi'ite men of letters penned some of the marvels of Arabic literature. Iraqis of all religions and denominations flocked to the Arab nationalist cause under Abdel Nasser's leadership in the 1950s and 1960s. But that did not mean that tribalism and sectarianism were erased. They were too deeply ingrained to disappear; they simply retreated into the recesses of people's consciousness. Once Arab nationalism began to suffer reverses and setbacks, and Abdel Nasser's ability to work his magic came into question, all the particularistic, anti-national tendencies reemerged and even surged to the forefront.

Although Adeed talks about 'radical Islam', as the last competitor of Arab nationalism, how he explains it, this 'radical' Islam is closer to what others have called political Islam or religious nationalism ('Radical' Islam is usually used to describe militant Islam). Political Islam and Arab nationalism share many myths. The glory and grandeur of Arab nation happened after Arabs accepted Islam and Islam is empty without Arab contribution.

In one sense, this competition is surprising. The vast majority of Arabs are Muslims, and the most glorious periods of Arab history occurred during the dazzling medieval Islamic empires. Similarly, all Muslims, moderates or radicals, could not but admit the central role of the Arabs in their religion. After all, Islam was born in the Arabian Peninsula, the Prophet Muhammad was Arab, and God's message was revealed in Arabic. One would think that the two social movements would share a cooperative relationship.

Instead, it was downright hostile. Arab nationalists, from Husri to Abdel Nasser and Michel Aflaq, founder and philosopher of the Baath Party, accepted the special place that Islam occupied within the Arab nationalist movement. But they stressed only those aspects of Islam that were moral and spiritual in nature. They resolutely rejected Islam's political and constitutional implications and insisted on its complete subordination to Arab nationalism. The nationalists vehemently argued that it was not religious but linguistic and historical ties that would knit the Arab nation into a cohesive whole.

Religious nationalists, of course, could not accept religious loyalty being relegated by ethnolinguistic loyalty. They denounced Arab nationalists and claimed Arab nationalism means denying the primacy of Islam/God/Prophet. Adeed, in the following section, only talks about militants but there were many more Arab Muslims who silently disliked Arab nationalism than those who attacked it militarily.

This was sheer blasphemy to the radical Muslim groups, and nationalists became the target of these groups' jihad. The concept of jihad, holy struggle, was central to the lexicon of Islamic militancy. Jihad was to be waged against the perceived enemies of Islam—i.e., all those who would try to infuse Muslim society with alien and blasphemous ideas, imported primarily from the West. To the Muslim radicals, perhaps the greatest offenders were the secular nationalists, who propagated ethnicity at the expense of religion and advocated the separation of Islam from politics.

Adeed then talks about causes of Arab nationalism failure. But let's leave it for some other time. 

Government Restrictions on Religion and Violence

In January 2014, Pew released its annual report on restrictions on religion around the world. It showed that religious hostilities reached a six-year high in 2012, the year in-focus (See Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High).

One of the interesting aspect was comparing the countries that scored high on social hostilities based on religion index and countries that scored high on high restrictions on religion index in 2011 and 2012. One would think that an increase in restrictions on religion would lead to more social hostilities based on religion, resulting in same countries scoring high on both indices. Not true. Although, many countries score high in both  areas (understandable as religion is very important in these countries), it appears different factors drive the two indices.

Take a look at the top ten countries on the government restrictions on religion index in 2011 and 2012. What drives this index? It appears one of the main factors is a perception in the decision-making elites of these countries that they can defy international norms of religious liberty and equal rights for religious minorities with impunity.  There are three types of countries in this list:

1.     Countries that are too small. Elites might think that what they are doing will not be detected and discussed on international media i.e. they are flying under the radar. So, there would be no repercussions. Maldives and Eritrea are examples of such countries.

2.     Countries that are too important. Elites in these countries might think they can get away with murder because international community needs them. Saudi Arabia, China and Egypt  are examples of such countries. Afghanistan can also be added in this list because international community desperately wants to show Afghanistan as a success after wasting thousands of lives and spending billions of dollars.

3.     Countries that are not considered proper members of international community. They are pariah states, often under international sanctions. Iran, Syria and Somalia are examples of such countries. North Korea would also be in this list but it was not included in the Pew survey because of lack of reliable, verifiable data. 

Government Restrictions on Religion

	2011	2012
1	Egypt	Egypt
2	Saudi Arabia	China
3	Iran	Iran
4	China	Saudi Arabia
5	Indonesia	Indonesia
6	Maldives	Maldives
7	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
8	Algeria	Syria
9	Syria	Eritrea
10	Somalia	Somalia

One odd-man out is Indonesia. How come a nation which prides itself on its civic nationalism of Pancasila have so many religious restrictions? I think most of these restrictions are at the local level or third tier of government, below federation and provinces. The upper levels more or less continue to follow a less religious line. This may be the reason why such high restrictions on religion have not become an issue both inside and outside Indonesia.

Now, take a look at the top ten countries on the social hostilities based on religion index in 2011 and 2012.  What drives this index? Two main factors are state’s monopoly over use of means of violence and decision-makers’ lack of courage and/or subterfuge. Based on these factors, one can divide the countries in the list into two groups of countries, though it should be clear that these factors are not mutually exclusive.

1.     Countries where state does not have monopoly over usage of mean of violence. Violence by different types of groups is common and one of these groups are religious groups. Examples of such states are Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Palestinian Territories, Nigeria and many parts of India.

2. Countries where decision-maker do not have courage and maybe using subterfuge. Such decision-makers can again be divided into two types. Those who agree with discrimination and violence against religious minorities but cannot only say or support such action as this will go against their/state’s international image so they allow illegal actions to continue while publically condemning them. The other type of decision-makers are those who support equal rights of religious minorities but cannot openly act against majority religious groups because of fear of political backlash. Examples of countries that fall into this group are Israel, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and maybe Iraq.

Social Hostilities

	2011	2012
1	Pakistan	Pakistan
2	India	Afghanistan
3	Russia	India
4	Israel	Somalia
5	Indonesia	Israel
6	Iraq	Iraq
7	Nigeria	Palestinian Territories
8	Somalia	Syria
9	Sudan	Russia
10	Palestinian Territories	Indonesia

From religious nationalism aspect, while Iran and Saudi Arabia are high on the list in the government restriction on religion list, Israel and Pakistan are high on the social hostilities list. What does it tells us about these states?

All these states give importance to religion and give preference to the dominant religious group. Whether these state fall in the first or second list depends on their control of violence in their own territory and their relationship with the international community, or more accurately, international powers. For states based on religious nationalism, following matrix maybe an accurate picture.

Religious nationalist states, government restrictions and social hostilities

	Control violence	Cannot control violence
Defy international community	Government restrictions: High Social hostilities: Moderate	Government restrictions: High Social hostilities: High
Cannot defy international community	Government restrictions: Moderate Social hostilities: Moderate	Government restrictions: Moderate Social hostilities: High

Is religious nationalism a necessary condition for state Islamization?

Defining Islam’s role in state affairs is an issue that has bedeviled most Muslim majority countries (MMCs) since their independence from colonial rule. Debates about how Islam/sharia relate to constitutional provisions, policies and penal laws polarize the populace in thee countries and national consensus on this issue is a rarity. Sometimes it appears that a consensus has emerged about state Islamization in an MMC and the country has moved on to more mundane and less polarizing issues. However, soon events bring the issue back to the fore. As more MMCs democratize, new parties and social classes assume power and take a fresh look at their country’s problems. Public debates become more open in these fragile democracies and new constitutions, laws and policies are approved. Islamic precepts are part of these debates, implicitly or explicitly, because Islam is a powerful social force in these societies. Governments cannot ignore it even if they want to.

Yet, despite the similarity of circumstances in many MMCs, the success of state Islamization is varied. In some countries, it has succeeded to transform the state but in others, it’s conspicuous because of its absence. Some analysts have argued that this variance is due to differences in the popularity of Islamic movements/parties in the MMCs. They contend that popular Islamic parties cause state Islamization directly by implementing it after coming to power or indirectly by pressurizing those in power. Others have countered these arguments by pointing out that most of the successful state Islamization projects have been completed under autocratic regimes. They argue that authoritarian regimes use state Islamization to acquire legitimacy.

Source: The Islamization of Pakistan

Both these propositions have weak support. Recent news coming from the Middle East also does not support the argument that Islamic parties’ victories necessarily lead to state Islamization as Islamic parties have largely failed to Islamize the state even after winning elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey. Similarly, linking autocracy with state Islamization is difficult as most autocratic regimes in the MMCs have brutally suppressed Islamists and rejected state Islamization. So, what are the causes of state Islamization? Why, in some MMCs, Islam plays a large role in state affairs, while in others it has almost no influence on state laws and policies? 

It can be argued that it is Islam’s role in the nationalism of an MMC that influences the extent of state Islamization in that country. Scholars have pointed out that the relationship of religion with nationalism and religion’s role in the state may be closely linked. Successful state Islamization by authoritarian regimes or by Islamist parties may be possible only in MMCs where nationalism and Islam are intertwined. Even in non-Muslim countries, religion plays a much larger role in the public sphere and in the governmental affairs of countries where national identity is linked with a particular religion than in countries where nationalism is based on ethnolinguistic ties or has a civic character. Religious leaders in countries like Israel, Malta and Ireland have regularly influenced political issues and legitimized this intervention on the basis of their religion’s special relationship with the state.