Iranian identity and nationalism: Shahnameh's Jamsheed or Biblical Cyrus

Professor Ali Ansari gave a very enlightening talk on Iranian identity at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver. He is a professor at St. Andrews and has written extensively on Iran, Iranian identity, Iranian nationalism, and Iran-US relations. He has written seven books on Iran: 

• Iran: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2014),
• The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
• Crisis of Authority: Iran's 2009 Presidential Election, (Chatham House, 2010), 
• Iran Under Ahmadinejad (Routledge, 2008), 
• Iran, Islam & Democracy - The Politics of Managing Change ( RIIA, London, 2000), 
• The History of Modern Iran Since 1921: the Pahlavis & After (Longman, Pearson Education, London, 2003), and 
• Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust, (C Hurst and co, 2006).

Professor Ansari starts his talk by criticizing the ahistorical approach of studying Iranian history through the lens of the 1979 Revolution. He laments that scholars start from the 1979 Revolution and then look back for reasons why it happened as if it was the most important event in modern Iranian history. He contends that it is actually the 1906 Constitutional Revolution that is the most significant event and if one wants to understand Iran, one has to prioritize the 1906 Revolution. 

Professor Ansari explains that his talk is not about the politics of nationalism but about the ideas and myths that formed the basis or have fashioned Iranian identity and nationalism. He argues that it is the national mythology that defines nations, informs people who they are. 

In his talk, Professor Ansari dismisses the usual five periods division of modern Iranian history that he has also used in some of his works: the Constitutional Revolution, Reza Shah and modernization, Second World War and Mussaddeq, Second autocracy under Muhammad Reza Shah, and the post-Islamic Revolution period. He divides modern Iranian history into three periods on the basis of ideas prevalent about Iranian identity:

1. The age of enlightenment (1890-1963?)
2. The age of extremes (1963-1989): the unhappy consciousness?
3. The age of contestation (1989-present)

The age of enlightenment was the key period, according to Professor Ansari. During this formative age, ideas about nation and nationalism were absorbed from the West and then applied to Iran. Surprisingly, the level of engagement between the two sides was pretty sophisticated and a small but influential group of Iranians was debating ideas and was not ready to accept everything Western. The key problem faced by these Iranians was how to disseminate the ideas of civic nationalism to the wider public. They understood that for a nation, both history and myth are necessary. The myth they choose was Ferdowsi's Shahnameh (The Book of Kings). 

Professor Ansari does not explain Shahnameh as most of the people interested in Iran already know what it is but many readers here may be ignorant of its importance, so here is a short introduction. Shahnameh is a long epic Persian poem, consisting of some 50,000 couplets (two-line verses). It was written by Ferdowsi at the turn of the first millennium (977-1010 CE). It is the national epic of Greater Iran. The British Library website has the following Ferdowsi quote and a very, very short synopsis of the epic (more details about Shahnameh on the website can be read here):

"The houses that are the dwelling of today will sink beneath shower and sunshine to decay but storm and rain shall never mar the palace that I have built with my poetry." Ferdowsi.

The Shahnameh, literally meaning 'Book of Kings,' is structured according to the mythical and historical reign of 50 Persian Kings. The epic can be roughly divided into three parts: the first part tells of the mythical creation of Persia and its earliest mythical past; the second part tells of the legendary Kings and the heroes Rostam and Sohrab; the third part blends historical fact with legend, telling of the semi-mythical adventures of actual historical Kings.

Shahnameh was chosen because it was known to the Iranians. For centuries, millions of Iranians had listened to the epic and debated about the qualities of Jamsheed, Rostam, and Sohrab even when there was no historical evidence of their existence.  Even the British recognized the importance of Shahnameh and were using it to seek ordinary Iranians support for allies cause in WWII. In the propaganda pamphlet (published in 1942) below, Kaveh (the mythical blacksmith in Shahnameh who led the popular uprising against the cruel foreign ruler, Zahak) leads, while Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin follow him and Hitler (shown as Zahak) is bound on a horseback.

Source: Alamy.com

It's better to listen to Professor Ansari's lecture for understanding his argument, however, following is a summary of the rest of the talk. 

During the second period, according to Professor Ansari, the focus shifts from Shahnameh to Biblical Cyrus. The change is the result of the affinity that Mohammad Reza Shah felt for Cyrus, the Great. He perhaps thought Cyrus, the Great more useful for his own projection as an enlightened, liberal monarch who would emancipate his people and others from darkness, cruelty, and subjugation. The change also prioritizes 'real' history over myth. During the third period, Cyrus was initially rejected and Shahnameh was again promoted by the state as the basis of Iranian identity but more recently, Cyrus has also seen a revival. Can we see a synthesis in the near future?

To understand the tussle between religious and ethnolinguistic nationalism in Iran, here are some previous blog posts on Iranian nationalism: Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity, Shiite and Persian Nationalism are both myths, Afraid of Ahmadinejad,  Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?, and More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran.

Religious hardliners and President Rouhani spar again

Iranian President Rouhani reacted to the harsh criticism of protestors by religious hardliners by informing them (hardliners) that everybody was accountable and could be questioned and criticized, even Imam Mahdi, the final Shiite Imam. Imam Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Mahdī is the last of the twelve Imams of the Twelver Shia Muslims and is also known as Imam Zaman (Imam of the present/time). Somewhat similar to Christian millenarianism, Imam Mahdi is considered to be the ultimate savior of the humankind, bringing peace and justice to the world. Unsurprisingly, the hardliners were not amused as the infallibility of all imams is a key part of the belief system of the Shiite Muslims. To question or criticize imams is deemed blasphemous. 

On Jan. 13, Tehran Friday prayer leader Kazem Sedighi, a hard-liner, reacted to the protests, saying, “The nation’s gathering [against the unrest] turned into a sea and cleaned the rubbish.” This description of the protesters as rubbish led to a series of criticisms from moderate and Reformist figures and consequently the president. 

“A number of people protested in the streets; whoever protests is ‘dirt and dust’ or cows or calves or rubbish? Why do you speak like this? Why do you insult and treat society rudely?” Rouhani said in a direct reference to Sedighi on Jan. 14. 

The Iranian president added, “You should speak accurately. Our nation is a big nation. There was a protest and it ended.”

Of note, following his disputed re-election in 2009, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad provoked protesters by dismissing those who alleged vote fraud as "dirt and dust."
Meanwhile, Rouhani has come under attack for his remarks that no one is above criticism, not even the 12th Shiite imam, the Mahdi. 

Twelver Shiite Islam holds that the Mahdi is in a state referred to as the "greater occultation" and is waiting to reappear to rule the world.  

In a speech believed to have been influenced by the protests across Iran, Rouhani sought not to dismiss the protesters, saying Jan. 8, “Everyone should be criticized and there is no exception [to this principle]. All the officials in the country can be criticized. No one in the country is infallible. If one day the Hidden Imam [Mahdi] reappears, then we can criticize [him] too. … The Prophet [Muhammad] allowed [others] to criticize him. We don’t have anyone above the prophet in history.” 

Following these remarks, hard-line clerics said that criticizing Shiite imams, who are deemed infallible, would in effect mean that they are not in fact infallible. Rouhani’s defenders, however, said the president was trying to say that people can question imams in order to get an answer, just as the president and other officials in Iran can be questioned. Moderate Ayatollah Mohsen Gharavian said Jan. 15, “The goal of Mr. Rouhani in his recent remarks involving the critique of the infallible imams wasn’t equivalent to rejecting them, but rather meant the possibility of questioning them.”

Source: Reuters

In marked contrast, the influential Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, headed by powerful cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, issued a statement Jan. 14 saying the rejection of Muhammad and the imams’ infallibility "is in explicit opposition to Islam and the Shiite faith. … We strongly recommend that some officials refrain from entering issues related to [people’s] beliefs in their speeches.”  

Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, considered to be the spiritual father of the hard-liners — including conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi, who lost to Rouhani in the 2017 presidential election — tweeted Jan. 15, “They are saying that people can criticize the infallible imams. … They said this not in [a distant country] but in the capital of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Now, with the presence of such [figures on the public stage], how much more should the Hidden Imam [Mahdi] suffer?”

Other hard-line and conservative clerics have joined the attacks on Rouhani. Mohsen Araki, a hard-line cleric, said Jan. 14, “Apparently, you have forgotten what you studied [at the seminary] when you were young. It is better now for you to focus on politics. When you don’t have the necessary knowledge, it is better to leave people’s beliefs alone.”

Following the ruckus over his remarks, the president’s office issued a statement Jan. 15 saying he never said the Shiite imams must be criticized. ( see Confrontation between Rouhani, hard-line clerics heats up)

Shiite and Persian nationalism are both myths

An interesting article by Kaveh Mousavi in which he presents the similarities in Shiite and Persian nationalism in Iran. He explains that both these nationalisms are flawed and, although considered antagonistic, they share a distrust of minorities, promote exclusivism and use myths and selective reading of history to glorify emperors and religious leaders who were responsible for the deaths or misery of millions of average Iranians. Some of the excerpts of the article are reproduced below.

And I reject both of these identities and consider them equally shitty. Here’s why:

1) Both of them are false myths.
Neither the Arab colonized Iran nor the Zoroastrian Iran before it were good periods.
In Iran, there’s a great tendency among the chauvinists to be proud of the nation’s cultural heritage. They proudly mention how great the country’s culture and civilization is, and what a great role Iranians had in the past. Whether they are in favor or against the current regime this fictional utopia in the historic past changes its time. To Islamists the period after the Arab Invasion on Iran and to Chauvinists (Pan-Iranists) the period of the Emperors of the ancient Persia are the epitomes of Iran’s cultural climax. But the truth is both the said historical periods are bleak and are marked with immense hardships for average folks, and at that time Iran was a colony of Muslim Empires, And both empires before and after the Arab Invasion were repressive bloodthirsty conquerors. Therefore we can say that the greatness of Iran’s culture is a lie. The Iranian “civilization” is nothing but a blank page on the wall, and the Iranian nation is a blind stupid old man praising himself (and indeed the Iranian nation is a “he”) for something which isn’t there.
Cyrus was an emperor conqueror. His “human rights declaration” only grants religious freedom to the people he’s conquering, provided they kneel before him and pay him money. While religious freedom might sound appealing to Iranians under theocracy, Cyrus is far from a democratic model and no person in 21st century should aspire to him.
But apart from that, both of these “identities” are equally equally divorced from the reality of people’s lives. There is no Iranian or Persian culture without Islam. Islam is so entrenched in every aspect of our culture that it can’t survive without Islam. And that is why they go back and create a fictional Persia in pre-Islamic era that no one cares or remembers. And the Islamists make the same mistake. Their own Islam has been Iranianized more than they think. Not only we are Shiites and not Sunnis but our Shiism is designed during the Safavid Dynasty and has nothing to do with Arab or global Islam. Nationalism and religion cannot be separated from each other.

2) Both of them come at the expense of excluding “Others”.
Islam excludes all non-Muslims. It excludes some non-Muslims in a way harsher manner than other non-Muslims. This is well documented. But the nationalists are no better.
Even if we ignore the prevalent anti-Arab and anti-Kurd racism that exists in many of nationalists, which we shouldn’t, the fact remains that Iran is a multicultural country with Arabs and Kurdish and Turkoman and Armenians and Turks and many other minorities. Even at its most benevolent and benign shape, Persian nationalism marginalizes other ethnicities because it makes Persian and Persian culture the “main” and the “real” culture of Iran, and it doesn’t matter if those minorities don’t share our culture and language. But oftentimes the racism is not benign or benevolent, it’s straight up hatred.
Iranian nationalists pay lip-service to democracy and human rights. But they support many policies that are outright fascist.
Personally, I have no problem with rejecting both. I’m an atheist, and I am also an internationalist, and I think both religion and nationalism are poisonous and immoral. I want to live in a world with no religion and one global democracy. That is my ideal and I fight for it.
There is Muslim prayer I like very much. It says Allah, let oppressors be busy in war with other oppressors. Indeed.

Although there are some parts of the article that I would not agree with (such as the following sentences), overall Mr Mousavi is presenting some uncomfortable truths and the article is elucidative.

Therefore we can say that the greatness of Iran’s culture is a lie. The Iranian “civilization” is nothing but a blank page on the wall, and the Iranian nation is a blind stupid old man praising himself (and indeed the Iranian nation is a “he”) for something which isn’t there.

The whole article Islamic Identity vs. Persian Identity in Iran, and Why I Reject Both can be read at Patheos.com. 

A rare combination of Persian and Shiite nationalism at the state level (one side of the 1950s coin depicts the last Shah and his queen while the other side has the invocation lā fata ʾillā ʿAlī; lā sayf ʾillā Ḏū l-Fiqār (Trans. There is no hero like Ali; There is no sword like Dhu-l-Fiqar), praising the first Shiite Imam (Ali) and his sword (Dulfiqar or Zulfiqar).

Source: Unicoinz

Some of the previous blog posts on Iranian nationalism are Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity, Afraid of Ahmadinejad,  Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?, and More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran.

More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran

The tussle between the Islamic/Shiite identity and the Persian ethnolinguistic identity is continuing. Since the 19th century or even before, Iranians are debating which of their two identities is real and authentic and which one is affected and false or which one is dominant and which one is recessive. The Iranian state also sways, sometimes moving in one direction and then in the opposite direction. During the time of Pahlavi dynasty (1925-79), the Persian identity remained the ascendant and principal identity but since the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic identity became the paramount identity while Persian identity became recessive and invisible.

However, during the last decade, it appears the pendulum has changed direction again. The Persian identity is rising and there has been an attempt by the elite to appropriate it, without rejecting the Islamic identity. Former President Ahmadinejad was the first one from the top elite of the Islamic regime to also acknowledge/lay claim on the Persian identity (See blog post Afraid of Ahmadinejad). He loaned the famed Cyrus Cylinder from the British Museum in 2014 and exhibited it in Iran,  taking pride in ancient Persian history, while not discarding his Islamic identity (He claimed, without much evidence, that Cyrus was mentioned in the Holy Quran). Last year, there was more evidence that the people and political elite are embracing the Persian identity and do not consider it contradictory to their Islamic identity. In October 2016, thousands of Iranians visited Cyrus's tomb and President Rouhani joined the celebrations via Instagram, “Persepolis is one of the invaluable and unique remains of the ancient history of this land, which demonstrates the antiquity of the civilization, the ingenuity, the wisdom, and the management skills of the great people of Iran, as well as their monotheism.” (See blog post Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?). The last part of the message establishes a link between Cyrus and Islam (i.e. monotheism) and makes sure that Rouhani is not accused of rejecting Islam. This embracing of both identities is new for the elite but many Iranians have no problem doing it. As explained in a previous blog post, in the Iranian society, many groups embrace both religious and ethnolinguistic identities:

However, it would be a mistake to consider both groups as mutually exclusive and some scholars, even partisans, do not completely reject the arguments of their rivals. Except for the opinionated, the difference between the two groups is whether the emphasis is placed on religion or ethnolinguistic characteristics as the primary constituent to the Iranian identity.

For example, many Persian nationalists claim that Islam in its true form is only practiced (i.e. Shia/Twelver sect Islam) in Iran and Islam was saved from Arabs and others only by Iranians. So, they view Islam as part of Iranian identity but do not accept that Islam gave Iranians a new identity. Instead, they claim that it was Iranians, a group at a much higher level of civilization than Arabs, that saved Islam by adopting it, otherwise, Islam's achievements would have been few and it would have been far less successful. 

Similarly, Islamic nationalists accept that Iranian Islam (Twelver sect) is superior and give homage to ethnolinguistic identity perspective by arguing that Iranians have a special affinity with the true religion, Islam, as they are special, seekers of what is true and right. For them, the Aryan/Iranian/Shiite Islam was and is the real Islam while the Semitic/Arab/Sunni Islam is the adulterated false version, despite Prophet Muhammad being an Arab. (See blog post Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity)

Source: Shrine of Sahabi Salman Al Farsi (The Persian)

Amir Taheri's article informs us how efforts to bring Iran and Islam closer has led to the renovation of the tomb of Salman Farsi (Salman, the Persian), who was a Persian and one of the earliest non-Arab converts of Islam and a confidant of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). He also talks about the recent popularity of non-Islamic names in Iran:

The current new fascination that many in Iran feel for Salman is part of the movement for “Iranian Islam” which has been gaining ground in the past few years. Iranian history in the past 15 centuries has often see-sawed between religion and nationalism. The rise of one has often been accompanied with the decline of the other and vice versa.

“Partly because of dissatisfaction with the role of (Shi’ite) clerics in politics, Iran is experiencing a growing anti-religious trend,” says Mehrangiz Bayat, a Tehran researcher.
That analysis is backed by some prominent clerics. For example, Grand Ayatollah Shubeir Zanjani, one of the top clerics in Qom, warned last week that involvement in politics had contributed to the decline of the authority and popularity of the Shi’ite clergy in Iran.

Ultra-nationalists, including pan-Iranists who dream of reviving the Sassanid Empire in one form or another, have seized the popular disaffection with the ruling clergy as template for attacking Islam as “an alien Arab religion imposed on Aryan Iranians by the sword.” They ignore the fact that the mass of Iranians converted to Islam long after the 80-year-old Arab occupation of parts of Iran had ended. The concept of the “Iranian” or ”Aryan Islam” has been launched to counter the claim of “alien Islam”....

According to reports, which cannot be independently verified, the “brain” behind the idea of an “Aryan Islam” is an obscure cleric named Hassan Yaaqubi who, although he has never been seen or heard in public, is supposed to have authored more than 40 books.
Other clerics have tried to promote the idea of an “Aryan Islam” by claiming that Hussein Ibn Ali, son of Ali Ibn Abitaleb and Fatimah, married Bibi Shahrbanu a daughter of the last Sassanian King Yazdegerd, initiating a fusion of Islam and Iran. “All descendants of Hussein have Iranian blood in their veins,” says Ayatollah Sobhani. “This means an unbreakable human bond exists between Islam and Iran.”

Iranian nationalists, however, reject that idea and claim that Bibi Shahrbanu, whose shrine near Tehran attracts millions of pilgrims every year had been taken a captive and never converted to Islam.

Another cleric, Ayatollah Husseini Qazwini, claims that Iran’s Islam bond was strengthened by the Twelfth Imam, known as the Hidden Mahdi al-Montazar, emerged from his Long Absence in secret and married a girl from Tehran, ensuring the continuation of the “sacred line of Ali” with generation after generation of people with “Iranian blood in their veins.”

However, the traditional Iranian conflict between nationalism and religion seems set to intensify. According to government sources, more and more Iranians now use non-Islamic names for their new-born children. That has led to a decision by the Central Registration Office at the Ministry of Interior last Thursday to toughen rules for using “non-Islamic” names.

Spokesman for the registration office Seyf-Allah Abutorabi told a press conference that the ministry would also help those who wish to replace their non-Islamic names to do so with a minimum of bureaucratic hassle. (See Iranians Debate the Reality of ‘Aryan Islam’)

Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?

The tussle between the Islamic/Shiite identity and the Persian ethnolinguistic identity has been a constant theme in the modern Iranian politics (See blog post Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity). Sometimes, one type of identity becomes so powerful that it seems that the other type has been completely evanesced. However, soon the apparently evanesced identity reappears and dominates the political scene, making the once primary identity vanish. For instance, the Persian identity remained dominant during the reigns of Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah and the Islamic identity was on the fringe and mostly invisible but, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Islamic identity became the paramount identity and Persian identity was nowhere to be seen.

During the last decade, it appears the Persian identity is gradually rising again. Former President Ahmadinejad was the first one from the top elite of the Islamic regime to acknowledge/lay claim on the Persian identity (See blog post Afraid of Ahmadinejad). For the first time after the Revolution, Ahmadinejad loaned the famed Cyrus Cylinder from the British Museum and exhibited it in Iran. His advisor Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei even linked Cyrus with the prophets of Islam, drawing severe censure from the conservative circles.

Recently, there is more evidence of the growing influence of the Persian identity in Iran. During recent years, more and more Iranians are visiting the Tomb of Cyrus in Pasargadae on October 29, the internationally designated day of Cyrus the Great. In October 2016, there was an unprecedented traffic jam near Pasargadae as thousands of Iranians tried to reach the tomb and President Rouhani also joined the celebrations via Instagram:

The number of people who showed up at Pasargadae was surprising. The event fell on a Friday, which is a weekend in Iran, and reportedly saw a traffic jam in a 30- to 40-kilometer (19- to 25-mile) radius on the roads leading to the tomb. Those who had witnessed similar get-togethers say they had never seen such a large gathering. The locals, including those dwelling in the nearby Pasargadae village, were also quite amazed by the sheer number of visitors. Reports say people started gathering in the area, especially around the Tomb of Cyrus, from as early as the evening before and that there was heavy traffic on roads to the site. As such, the main entrance to Pasargadae was closed the night before, with no more cars allowed to enter. On Oct. 28, social media users shared widely circulated videos and pictures of the gathering of Cyrus devotees, showing some of them shouting slogans praising the Achaemenid king.

President Hassan Rouhani even published a picture of himself next to the nearby Achaemenid capital of Persepolis on his Instagram page, with the caption: “Persepolis is one of the invaluable and unique remains of the ancient history of this land, which demonstrates the antiquity of the civilization, the ingenuity, the wisdom, and the management skills of the great people of Iran, as well as their monotheism.” (See ‘Cyrus the Great’ enters Iranian politics)

Source: The rise of nationalist fervour in Iran

Not surprisingly, this gathering was criticized by the conservatives. Ayatollah Hossein Nouri-Hamedani, one of the most senior clerics, said on October 30th: 

"People rose and brought about the revolution and allowed the emergence of a true Islamic system. The shah used to say, ‘O Cyrus, sleep in peace as we are awake.’ Now, a group of people have gathered around the Tomb of Cyrus and they are circumambulating it and have taken their handkerchiefs out and cry [as they do for Shiite Imam Hussein]. In the time of Imam [Ruhollah] Khomeini, too, a group of people started commemorating Cyrus. The imam [Khomeini] said that these people have gathered and are crying because we have brought Islam to this country.” He added, “These are the same [people]; they are counter-revolutionaries. I am amazed that these people get together around the Tomb of Cyrus, shouting the same slogans for him that we shout in support of the supreme leader, and yet we are sitting here, alive and well, and just watching this...Who in power has been so negligent to allow these people to gather? We are in a revolutionary and Islamic country, and this revolution is the continuation of the actions of the prophet and the imams, and their point was to create a perfect populace."(See ‘Cyrus the Great’ enters Iranian politics)

After this statement, the local officials sprung into action and some organizers of the gathering were arrested. However,  Rohollah Faghihi (See What Iranian clerics really think of Cyrus the Great) argues that it would be wrong to think that conservatives are united in disowning Cyrus. Many Iranian clerics consider Cyrus, the Great, Dhul Qarnayn, an ancient king praised in Quran:

In verses 83 and 98 of the chapter Kahf, the Quran narrates a story revolving around an individual named Dhul-Qarnayn, who is praised as a believer and ruler: “Indeed, we established him upon the earth, and we gave him to everything a way.” Allameh Muhammad Hossein Tabatabai, one of the most prominent thinkers of philosophy and contemporary Shiite Islam, cautiously identifies Cyrus as Dhul-Qarnayn in his 20-volume work of Quranic exigesis, the "Tafsir al-Mizan." Other scholars engaged in Quranic exigesis, such as Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi — one of the most senior clerics in Qom — have also described Cyrus as Dhul-Qarnayn.

Faghihi also quotes an anonymous Shiite scholar:

In an interview with Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, a Shiite scholar and cleric who has been teaching at the Qom seminary for the past two decades said, “Islam doesn’t seek to take away national pride from people. What is currently happening is a political issue.” He added, “The seminary and religion do not dismiss Cyrus and the ancient history of Iran at all. Some who are expressing their opposition to Cyrus aren’t speaking on behalf of the whole seminary. I should say that even those who have voiced their opposition regarding this issue do not hold an opinion against Cyrus. For instance, Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani criticized the tears the crowd there [in Pasargadae on Oct. 28] shed, not Cyrus himself.”

Are things going to change soon? Is there a coming together of the two Iranian identities? Not likely. Clerics consider nationalism as unislamic, Western import and the advocates of Persian ethnolinguistic identity consider clerics and their rule un-Iranian:

Like many other pious Muslims, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, viewed the concept of nationalism as un-Islamic. He thought nationalism was in opposition to the concept of ummah (Muslim worldwide community), which fundamentally rejects borders that divide Muslim societies. He asserted that “nationalism is designed by the plotters to create discord among the Muslims and it is being propagated by the agents of imperialism.”

Ayatollah Khomeini further remarked that “the plan of the great powers and their affiliates in the Muslim countries is to separate and divide the various strata of Muslims, whom God, the Blessed and Exalted, has declared brothers. … Those who, in the name of nationalism, factionalism, etc., create schism and disunity among Muslims are armies of Satan, opponents of the Holy Quran, and helping agents of the superpowers.”

Additionally, the conservatives view nationalism – essentially a secular movement that advocates separation of state and religion – as a serious threat to the foundation of the state’s ideology, which is based on the guardianship of the Islamic jurists. During the 28 October gathering, one of the slogans chanted was “freedom of thought cannot take place with beards,” a reference to the figures in power. (See The rise of nationalist fervour in Iran)

Afraid of Ahmadinejad?

On June 4, Al-Monitor correspondent in Tehran reported about a possible return of former Iranian President Ahmadinejad (See Is Ahmadinejad plotting a comeback?).

On June 3, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made his first major speech since leaving office last year. He praised Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who died 25 years ago on June 4, and said that Iran’s enemies have not yet realized that Iranians would defend the Iranian revolution “until the last breath.” Ahmadinejad, however, did not speak about the one thing that has been a source of speculation: his political return.On May 31, his brother Davoud Ahmadinejad said that the chances of the former president running for the presidency again were “very high.”while Davoud’s comments did not receive the usual Ahmadinejad-type attention, it seems that other forces in Iran are taking his return to politics seriously, and are intent on preventing it.The arrest of two political figures with close ties to Ahmadinejad, as well as the constant criticism directed at the former president by some of his own former ministers, indicates that the possibility of Ahmadinejad returning to the political arena is being taken seriously by the country's right-wing political elite.

Source: Is Ahmadinejad Coming Back In From The Cold?

However, correspondent also reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to give importance to Ahmadinejad.

Although Ahmadinejad's faction was eliminated from politics following the presidential elections, Khamenei appointed Ahmadinejad as a member in the Expediency Discernment Council. Also, last fall, during the mourning ceremony of Ashoura, he was sitting next to the supreme leader. Two months ago, other images were published showing Ahmadinejad and Khamenei next to each other during the second night of the mourning ceremony of "Fatimiyah."

What these images might mean is that, in spite of his disagreements with Ahmadinejad, Khamenei still views him as an influential political figure or that at least Ahmadinejad is not yet completely removed from the list of people close to Khamenei.

Given this tacit support by Khamenei, neither Ahmadinejad nor his supporters seem deterred. Davari said in April, “I assure you that currently we do not have an organized plan for the next elections. However, this might change in the future.” He continued, "If these anti-people policies of the current administration continue, then I think Ahmadinejad will restart his political activities to defend the people's rights."

That right-wing clerics, ministers and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e-Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami) are against former president's return is understandable. Though a loyal protege of the Supreme Leader during his first term, Ahmadinejad became increasingly independent in his second term and tried to chart a more nationalistic and less religious course (See Missing Mahmoud?). He even tried to defy the Supreme Leader and contested his authority. The final act of Ahmadinejad's betrayal was trying to get his chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, elected as President in 2013 presidential elections. Mashaei was intensely disliked by the right wing because of his promotion of Iranian territorial nationalism, among other things (Mashaei was eventually disqualified by the right wing Guardian Council that vets all presidential candidates) (See Who's Afraid of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?).

The question is why the Supreme Leader is giving importance to Ahmadinejad thereby giving confidence to his supporters and fueling rumors while also ordering (or at least consenting to) the arrest of Ahmadinejad's supporters. Judiciary and police are in control of the Supreme Leader so the arrests could not have happened without his knowledge. Some analysts argue that the Supreme Leader is supporting Ahmadinejad to keep the pressure on the new Rouhani government:

As BBC Persian analyst Hossein Bastani noted, it's highly unlikely that former President Mohammad Khatami would be allowed to sit near the supreme leader in public. Khatami, a reformist, was never considered to be close to Khamenei, who publicly expressed support for Ahmadinejad's anti-Western stances. 

Bastani believes that Khamenei could use Ahmadinejad to put pressure on Iran's new government team, which has been accused by hard-liners of giving in to the West and the United States.(See Is Ahmadinejad Coming Back In From The Cold?)

However, there are many other ways to keep the Rouhani government on the "straight path." The reason Khamenei is courting Ahmadinejad perhaps lies in what Ahmadinejad represents. He has impressive nationalist credentials and is also religiously devout. The question is why Iranians need the rule of the clergy (velayat-e-faqih doctrine) when they can elect people like Ahmadinejad? The whole argument that only clergy can save Iran and Islam from external threats becomes doubtful. Ahmadinejad has not helped his case by claiming to be in communication with the Hidden Imam (thus debunking clergy legitimacy because they claim to rule in the name of the Hidden Imam) and also promoting pre-Islamic Iran (thus trying to harness the votes of those who believe in territorial/Persian nationalism). 

So, the Supreme Leader is perhaps trying to impress on the former president that he can enjoy a leisurely secure retirement during which he would be feted at the state functions and given due respect (even perhaps consulted) or he can think of running again and make his and his friend's lives difficult. The choice is yours. Ahmadinejad!       

Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity

In religious nationalist states, the basis of national identity is usually contested. As religious nationalism is a dominant theme, a large number of groups claim a specific religion or sect as the basis of national identity. However, this view is always contested by others who claim the ethnic, linguistic or simply territorial basis of national identity.

The debate about Iranian identity has always featured two broad groups: the Persian nationalists and the Islamic nationalists. The Persian nationalists claim that Iranian identity has an ethnolinguistic basis. Iranians were Iranians long before Islam came to Iran. In contrast, the Islamic nationalists contend that Islam has become the primary constituent of Iranian identity since Iran was conquered by Arabs in the 7th century. 

However, it would be a mistake to consider both groups as mutually exclusive and some scholars, even partisans, do not completely reject the arguments of their rivals. Except for the opinionated, the difference between the two groups is whether the emphasis is placed on religion or ethnolinguistic characteristics as the primary constituent to the Iranian identity.

For example, many Persian nationalists claim that Islam in its true form is only practiced (i.e. Shia/Twelver sect Islam) in Iran and Islam was saved from Arabs and others only by Iranians. So, they view Islam as part of Iranian identity but do not accept that Islam gave Iranians a new identity. Instead, they claim that it was Iranians, a group at a much higher level of civilization than Arabs, that saved Islam by adopting it, otherwise, Islam's achievements would have been few and it would have been far less successful. 

Similarly, Islamic nationalists accept that Iranian Islam (Twelver sect) is superior and give homage to ethnolinguistic identity perspective by arguing that Iranians have a special affinity with the true religion, Islam, as they are special, seekers of what is true and right. For them, the Aryan/Iranian/Shiite Islam was and is the real Islam while the Semitic/Arab/Sunni Islam is the adulterated false version, despite Prophet Muhammad being an Arab.

Source: Wikimedia Commons 

Afshin Matin-Asgari gives a detailed account of the debate within the Persian nationalist camp in her chapter, 'The Academic Debate on Iranian Identity: Nation and Empire entangled' in Iran Facing Others, edited by Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani (2012). 

Matin-Asgari's chapter gives a comprehensive overview of the different authors and their positions on Persian nationalism, I will try to give a summary here. Matin-Asgari contends that from the late 19th to late 20th century, Persian nationalists -_ the ethnolinguistic camp__ was the dominant thesis in Iranian identity debate. This camp was influenced by Orientalists (such as German Ernst Herzfeld and British Edward Granville Browne) who linked Iranians with Aryans and old Persian empires with the modern state of Iran and claimed a continuity over centuries/millennia. Archaeological discoveries in the 19th century also helped in the strengthening of this thesis. Called the 'Aryan Neo-Achaemenid nationalism', its proponents believed:

1. Iranian identity is ancient, with an archaic core existent for thousands of years. 
2. The Persian language is at the center of Iranian identity. Persian language has been dominant in Iranian territory for centuries and has a major contribution in making non-Iranian inhabitants, immigrants, and conquerors, Iranians. 
3. Since at least Achaemenid times (6th century-4th century BC), Iranian and Persian identities are synonymous. The Persian language has preserved Iranian identity and/or 'the spiritual unity of Iranian history'. 
4. Iranian identity has a racial component based on (Aryan) racial affiliation. 
5. The 'national religion' of Iran was Zoroastrian and Islam is an imposition but Iranian have changed Islam to make it fit their 'Persian Psyche'.

Iranian Flag with Ahura Mazda(God of Zoroastrianism)

Source: Wikimedia Commons

Based on the ethnolinguistic superiority of Iranians and taking pride in ancient 'Persian' empires, this paradigm __ not surprisingly __ takes a dim view of Arabs. Arabs are considered inferior and uncivilized. For example, Abbas Ashtiyani, a 20th century nationalist wrote:

The Iranians spent a hundred years of severe humiliation under the yoke of Arab domination...Yet he did not give up on acquiring knowledge, something that Arab then lacked..

This Persian nationalist thesis, an orthodoxy in the field of Iranian Studies according to Matin-Asgari, has been challenged lately.

1. Mostafa Vaziri rejected the notion of ancient Iranian identity and claimed that pre-modern usage of term 'Iran' referred to a geographic entity only.
2. Austrian scholar Bert Fragner argued that the Persian language is central to Iranian consciousness but Persian was initially a language of the elite and a small portion of people living in today's Iran. It was more a ' Persian linguistic hegemony as crafted and sustained via dominant elite cultures, and not as a "national" heritage shared by a homogeneous Iranian people'. 
3. Italian scholar Gherardo Gnoli argued that 'Iran' as a political concept was an imperial project started by Sassanids( 3rd century -- 7th century).
4. Tavakoli-Targhi contended that Iran was re-imagined in the 19th century in line with the rising consciousness. Various terms like millet, siyaset, and Iran were 're-articulated'. The 'Iranzamin' of ancient texts has quite different boundaries from modern Iran. He also challenged Persian language link with today's Iran.

These challenges forced the at least some of the Persian nationalists to moderate their thesis and they accepted that many dynasties ruling Iran, including the Greeks and Parthians, were not Iranian so there is no seamless continuity from ancient to modern. There is also some acceptance of the argument that 'Iran' in pre-modern times was an imperial, not a national, conception and Persian might not be the language of most people living in Iran in the past. However, most Persian nationalists have not been able to accept the new research and so their thesis continues to suffer from contradictions.

Matin-Asgari suggests the issues in Persian nationalist thesis can be resolved by abandoning the essentialist 'continuity' aspect and accepting that

1. Pre-modern Iran was an imperial concept and imperial Iran was multi-lingual and multi-ethnic, with a shifting heartland.
2. Persian linguistic hegemony did not create ethnic and national homogeneity across history.

An interesting article. Author's position on Iranian nationalism is close to Smith's argument about nationalisms in general i.e. nationalism is neither strictly primordial nor wholly imagined. It appears both Persian nationalist and religious nationalist Iranians are moderating their positions and accepting that the other side is not completely off base. Moderation of Persian nationalist thesis has been discussed above and religious nationalists moderation could be seen in Ahmadinejad's politics in his second term, discussed in this blog on 8th February, 2014.