March 2021 Israeli elections and "fifty shades of right"

Israel is going to have its fourth national Knesset elections in two years in March 2021. Whether this election will result in a stable government is anybody's guess. However, one thing is certain, rightwing will dominate the Knesset and the new government, irrespective of how long they last. This will be a case of "fifty shades of right." This means that any meaningful solution to the Israel-Palestine issue is unlikely, to say the least.

Following are excerpts from my article Upcoming Israeli elections and its impact on Palestinians published in Naya Daur: 

National elections will be held in Israel in March 2021 and these elections will again be dominated by the rightwing, making a solution of the Palestinian issue unlikely or impossible. This article unpacks why Israel is having the fourth national election in two years. Later, it analyzes the politics of various rightwing leaders and parties regarding the Palestinian issue to see whether this election can lead to a solution to the Israel-Palestine conundrum...

Today, Israel’s political space is dominated by rightwing parties, which Eran Globus’s an Israeli analyst termed, “fifty shades of right.”  The major rightwing party is the Likud party. It has been in government since 2009, with Netanyahu as PM. This party is expected to win the most seats (28 or 29) in the coming elections. Most of the rightwing parties, except religious parties, have come out of Likud as their leaders have been part of Likud and served in Netanyahu administrations. The most recent and the most important breakaway party is called “New Hope” and is led by Gideon Sa’ar, who until last month was a Likud member for 17 years and was Netanyahu’s Minister of Education (2009- 13) and Minister of Interior (2013-14). New Hope is expected to win the second largest number of seats (17 or 18) in the Knesset.

 Source: hk3.news

 

Yamina, the party/coalition that is expected to win the third largest number of seats (between 12 and 14) is again led by someone who was tutored by Netanyahu for a number of years. Nafteli Bennet entered politics in 2006 as Chief of Staff to the then Leader of Opposition Netanyahu and served him until 2008. He then served as leader of an Israeli settler organization before forming his own political party and remained minister with different portfolios in Netanyahu-led governments.

 

Two key religious parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, expected to win seven or eight seats each, are also loyal allies of Netanyahu and are likely to support him in forming the next coalition government. Shas represents the Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewish people (from Middle Eastern and North African countries) while the United Torah Judaism represents Ashkenazi Jewish people (from European countries). While most of the supporters of these parties are Ultra-orthodox religious Jewish, some modern orthodox and secular Jewish people also support them.

 

Next, we have Yisrael Beytenu, a party led by Avigdor Lieberman, another Netanyahu protégé.  From 1993 to 1996, when Netanyahu was the party leader, Lieberman served as Director-General of the Likud. After the Likud party won the election and Netanyahu was the Prime Minister, Lieberman became the Director-General of the PM's Office for a year (1996-97). In 1999, he formed his own party, Yisrael Beytenu, and has been part of numerous rightwing governments under Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Netanyahu. Yisrael Beytenu is expected to win five or six seats in March. As the table below shows, the rightwing is going to dominate the March 2021 elections winning between 76 and 82 of the total 120 Knesset seats.

 

 

Public Opinion Polls for March 2021 elections: Expected number of seats

Party	Minimum	Maximum
Likud	28	29
New Hope	17	18
Yamina	12	14
Shas	7	8
United Torah Judaism	7	7
Yisrael Beytenu	5	6
Total Rightwing seats	76	82

 

 

Many people think that Netanyahu is the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East. It might be true in the past but now there are numerous obstacles to peace. The leadership of all the parties discussed above has at various times opposed giving any concessions to the Palestinians. Lieberman resigned numerous times whenever even a small concession was given to the Palestinians. He was dismissed by PM Sharon for his harsh opposition to Gaza disengagement in 2004 and resigned in 2008 for resuming peace talks with Palestinians and again in 2018 for ending the brutal Gaza War. He has also given many statements against Palestinians and Israeli Arabs which were considered racist by many analysts. Bennet, the leader of the Yamina party, as mentioned above, served as leader of an Israeli settler organization and has been opposed to a Palestinian state and to the freezing or uprooting of illegal Jewish settlements. Similarly, Gideon Sa’ar of the New Hope party has always been to the right of Netanyahu. He has been a recalcitrant opponent of the two-state solution (calling it once a two-state illusion) and has shown an inability to show genuine concern for Palestinian rights. Religious parties, Shas and United Judaism, do not have a clear policy on the two-state solution but are against the division of Jerusalem and the freezing of Israeli settlements, making them unlikely partners in a peace deal.

 

The discussion above clearly shows that the new Israeli government will not be supportive of the two-state solution, so the ordeal of the Palestinians is, unfortunately, going to continue. The election campaign will force these parties to move more to the right to outflank each other, resulting in extreme and intransigent positions regarding a Palestinian state. 

Growing Jewish Nationalism in Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the pushback

Scholars have been warning about the rising influence of the religious nationalists in the IDF. Not only the number of religious nationalists (or national-religious or religious Zionists as they are called in Israel) is rising in the IDF but they are also serving in more combat roles and rising in ranks. Conversely, the secular Israelis that had been the backbone of the IDF since the 1940s have been reluctant to serve after their mandatory military service in the IDF. Yagil Levy, in his 2014 article in Armed Forces and Society Journal, wrote about the theocratization of the IDF. He gives four reasons why there has been a significant increase in religious influence in the Israeli military:

At the center of this process stands the national-religious sector, which has significantly upgraded its presence in the ranks since the late 1970s. It is argued that four integrated and cumulative processes gradually generated this shift toward the theocratization of the Israeli military: (1) the crafting of institutional arrangements that enable the service of religious soldiers, thereby (2) creating a critical mass of religious soldiers in many combat units, consequently (3) restricting the military command’s Intra-organizational autonomy visa`- vis the religious sector, and paving the road to (4) restricting the Israel Defense Forces autonomy in deploying forces in politically disputable missions.

A Christian Science Monitor report by Christa Bryant in 2015 highlighted the same issue. 

In the early 1990s,...Orthodox men accounted for 2.5 percent of graduates of infantry officer training courses; since then, it’s grown to more than 25 percent, according to a 2013 book. In some combat units, they make up as much as 50 percent of new officers – roughly quadruple their share of Israel’s population. The upward trend, coupled with a parallel decline in the number of combat soldiers and officers coming from secular families, is dramatically changing the face of the IDF. Many Israelis respect religious Zionists like Fund – Orthodox Jews who see the state as playing a part in the prophesied redemption of Israel ­– for their willingness to defend the nation.

But some worry that their worldview could change the character not only of the army – traditionally a secular “people’s army,” where youngsters of all stripes forged lasting bonds during their mandatory two- to three-year service – but the state of Israel itself. One of the most cited concerns is that if Israel agreed to a peace deal with Palestinians, the outsized influence of religious soldiers could complicate the IDF’s evacuation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

An investigative report by Reuters in April 2016 also points towards the same phenomenon and argues that religious nationalists have now reached the highest echelons of Israel's powerful security sector:

The community, sometimes referred to as the ‘national religious’, has increased its presence in both government and the civil service. This year, for the first time ever, the heads of the national police, the Mossad spy agency and the Shin Bet domestic security service are all Religious-Zionists.

Nowhere, though, has the shift been more pronounced than in the military. Most soldiers in the Israeli army are secular or observant Jews, though Druze and Bedouin Arab citizens serve as well. But over the past two decades, academic studies show, the number of Religious-Zionist officers in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has seen a huge increase. The military has also felt the growing influence of rabbis who have introduced matters of faith and politics to the battlefield.

Source: Reuter's Report

The author of the Reuter's report, Maayan Lubell, however, argues that there are signs of pushback from the secular decision-makers that are still a majority in both civilian and security sectors of Israel. Their criticisms are mainly focused on the power of the Military Rabbinate and it's Jewish Awareness Branch that have tried relentlessly, according to many secular Jews, to promote a right-wing, ideological, and religious agenda and to make the IDF an army with a religious mission, instead of a national mission. In 2012, the State Comptroller of Israel criticized the pamphlets circulated among soldiers by the Rabbinate during the 2008-09 Gaza war in which it was written that 'not one millimeter' of land should be ceded to the Palestinians and cruelty to the Palestinians was sometimes necessary. In January 2016, the IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot announced he would remove the Jewish Awareness Branch from the Military Rabbinate. In his letter to the IDF officers, he argued that a military divided over religion and politics could hardly fulfill its mission:

The IDF is the people’s army and includes a wide spectrum of Israeli society...A change is needed with the aim of keeping the IDF a stately army in a democratic country, nurturing that which unites its soldiers.

His decision was severely criticized by the religious nationalists, who are a majority in the current ruling coalition, and they planned to reverse it. More recently, Israel's deputy military chief Major-General Yair Golan’s Holocaust memorial speech touched a nerve when compared behavior of some of the Israelis to the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s:

If there’s something that frightens me about Holocaust remembrance it’s the recognition of the revolting processes that occurred in Europe in general, and particularly in Germany, back then - 70, 80 and 90 years ago - and finding signs of them here among us today in 2016.

This was in reference to the killing of an incapacitated Palestinian by an Israeli soldier in cold blood in Hebron in March 2016. However, General Yair was castigated for making this comparison and in the end, because of the political power of the religious nationalists, the IDF had to issue a clarification.

Can the secular Israelis stop the growing Judaization/theocratization of the IDF? The jury is still out but this will surely be the last stand of the secular Israelis.

Hamas and Islamic State

Ali Mamouri has written an article on why there is no love lost between Hamas and the so-called Islamic State (of Iraq and al-Sham) (see Why Islamic State has no sympathy for Hamas?). Ali argues that there are some doctrinal reasons why the IS does not support Hamas:

Salafists believe that jihad must be performed under legitimate leadership. This argument is advanced through the “banner and commander” concept, which holds that whoever undertakes jihad must follow a commander who fulfills the criteria of religious and political leadership and has raised the banner of jihad. Given that there is neither a legitimate leader nor a Salafist-approved declaration of jihad in Palestine, fighting there is forbidden.

In addition, for Salafists, if non-Muslims control Islamic countries and apostates exist in the Islamic world, the Islamic world must be cleansed of them before all else. In short, the purification of Islamic society takes priority over combat against non-Islamic societies. On this basis, Salafists see conflict with an allegedly illegitimate Hamas government as a first step toward confrontation with Israel. Should the opportunity for military action present itself in the Palestinian territories, Salafists would fight Hamas and other factions deemed in need of “cleansing” from the land and engage Israel afterward.

This approach has its roots in Islamic history, which Salafists believe confirms the validity of their position. Relevant points of historical reference include the first caliphate of Abu Bakr, which gave priority to fighting apostates over expanding Islamic conquests, which occurred later, during the second caliphate, under Umar bin al-Khattab. Likewise, Saladin fought the Shiites and suppressed them before he engaged the crusaders in the Holy Land.

Salafists today see that their priority as fighting Shiites, “munafiqin” (dissemblers, or false Muslims) and apostates, whom they call the “close enemy.” During the current war in Gaza, a number of IS fighters have burned the Palestinian flag because they consider it a symbol of the decline of the Islamic world, which succumbed to national divisions through the creation of independent political states. In Salafist doctrine, the entire Islamic world must be united under a single state, an Islamic caliphate, which IS declared in late June.

So, there are two reasons:

• According to Islamic doctrine, jihad is only allowed under a legitimate leadership and Hamas is not the legitimate leadership because it fights for democracy and a Palestinian state (while IS fights for God and for an Islamic state)
• The IS has to fight the apostate Muslims first, before fighting the non-Muslims. Purification comes before the conquest. So, fighting Shias in Iraq and Syria comes before fighting Israel.

In a recent statement, the IS tried to deflect the criticism that it is not helping Palestinians in Gaza by reiterating its commitment to liberating Palestine and destroying Israel. It asked Gazans to be patient as the IS is working and is not interested in issuing empty statements like many Arab governments (See Gaza crisis: ISIS vows to help Palestinians fight barbaric Jews).

Source: Hamas Website

The IS spokesman, Nuseiri, also argued that it is following a systematic approach and has a plan (See ISIS Spokesman Explains Why 'Islamic State' Not Supporting Hamas) 

However, he pointed out that ISIS has been taking a systematic approach in its campaign, and outlined six specific stages it said needed to be fulfilled before taking on Israel.
Some of those "stages" - building a firm base for an Islamic state in Iraq, and using it as a springboard to wage war in Syria and Lebanon - have already been achieved. But he said a number of other criteria still needed to be fulfilled before challenging Israel directly.
Among them, Nuseiri said that the US - seen as Israel's greatest ally - needed to be weakened politically and economically via attacks on the American mainland, as well as US interests in Muslim countries. Additionally, the existing "Islamic State" needed to expand its borders to cover all of "Greater Syria" (which would include Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and possibly Gaza); such a state, he said, would then be in a position for a direct confrontation with Israel.

The IS statement can be taken as few practical considerations (which every successful movement has to take into account) in the expansion of the IS Caliphate and this is how the IS wants others to see it. However, these doctrinal and practical considerations can also be understood as a camouflage for nationalistic concerns. 

Doctrinally, the claim of legitimacy of IS is weaker than that of Hamas. Neither the IS leadership is more pious, nor it has support/baya of most of the pious Muslim leadership. Moreover, jihad needs legitimate leadership when Muslims are attacking. When Muslim lands, homes, and persons are attacked (as in Gaza), all Muslims are allowed/required to defend themselves, with or without legitimate leadership.

Source: Islamic State Threatens to Topple Hamas in Gaza

The argument about 'purifying' and killing apostate Muslims first and non-Muslims later is also weak. When Muslim women and children are being killed in hundreds, it is preposterous (and doctrinally indefensible) to not stop this massacre and focus on killing apostates. The fact of the matter is that IS's main enemies are Shias in both Syria and Iraq so it might also be a way to legitimize its own actions. Moreover, as Salafist groups are challenging Hamas in Gaza, the IS might want Israel to destroy Hamas so that more radical and doctrinally closer Gazan Salafists may take over.

Update: By mid-2015, the divisions between the IS and Hamas were public and the IS issued a threat to Hamas in a video statement as reported by YNet News:

The video statement, issued from an Islamic State stronghold in Syria, was a rare public challenge to Hamas, which has been cracking down on jihadis in Gaza who oppose its truces with Israel and reconciliation with the US-backed rival Palestinian faction Fatah.

"Eight years they control the territory, and have yet to enforce one Islamic teaching," the ISIS speaker said in the video.

"We will uproot the state of the Jews (Israel) and you and Fatah, and all of the secularists are nothing and you will be over-run by our creeping multitudes," said a masked Islamic State member in the message addressed to the "tyrants of Hamas".

"The rule of sharia (Islamic law) will be implemented in Gaza, in spite of you. We swear that what is happening in the Levant today, and in particular the Yarmouk camp, will happen in Gaza," he said, referring to Islamic State advances in Syria, including in a Damascus district founded by Palestinian refugees. (See Islamic State Threatens to Topple Hamas in Gaza)

India-Israel ties under Modi: Can Jewish and Hindu nationalism fraternity help?

San Diego Jewish World yesterday published an article on the excellent prospects of Indo-Israel relationship after the recent coming to power of the BJP government (See India and Israel strengthen ties. Indian commentators have also agreed with the predictions. See India 2014 Elections: Narendra Modi, Israel's Best Friend In South Asia). Several reasons were given by author Sean Savage as to why the bilateral relations could see an upsurge under Prime Minister Modi.

First, there is a talk of similarities between the two countries: 

Differences in size and culture aside, India and Israel have many modern and historical similarities. Hinduism and Judaism are among the world’s oldest existing religions, and both share ethno-religious components that set them apart from other major faiths. At the same time, both religions have complicated systems of laws, purity codes, and dietary restrictions that define their communities. In modern times, both India and Israel achieved independence from Great Britain during the late 1940s, after long internal struggles and bloody partition plans.

But these similarities didn't initially result in close ties as Nehru and later Congress Party governments thought Israel as a sign of Western imperialism (colonial policy of divide and rule) and supported Palestinian struggle. So, due to Congress Party's 'mentality', India supported Palestinians from the 1940s to 1980s. However, during the last two decades, both countries have not only become close trading partners but also joint collaborators in military research.

Source: India & Israel Partner To Strengthen Startup Ecosystem

The reasons given for the improvement in relations under Modi are mostly related to the religious nationalism of BJP (particularly of Modi) and its affinity with Israel and Bibi's Jewish nationalism. The author argues that Modi gives importance to his religion as Bibi does.

One of Modi’s first public gestures as prime minister was to visit the Ganges River, one of holiest places in Hinduism, where he promised to restore the heavily polluted river to its former glory. Over the years, Netanyahu has taken a similar approach, focusing on securing Israel’s Jewish heritage sites and insisting that Jerusalem remain under Jewish sovereignty.

Due to this attitude, both and Modi are criticized in the West, which may bring them closer.

Modi, meanwhile, has garnered significant attention for his strong Hindu nationalism, resulting in criticism from the West—especially for Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002. Yet his views in that area may also allow him to form an ideological bond with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is similarly chastised in some Western countries.

It is also mentioned that Israel supported India during its Kargil conflict with Pakistan in 1999 and Israeli companies invested billions of dollars in Gujarat when Modi was Chief Minister there. Modi's foreign policy team is also considered Israel friendly. What is not directly mentioned, although implied, is the fact that the main enemies of both Hindu and Jewish nationalism are Muslims. Internally, Hindu and Jewish nationalism want to deny basic civil rights to their Muslim minorities and externally they have difficult relations with their Muslim neighbors and face terror attacks. These are probably the 'ideological affinities' mentioned in the article.

The new Indian prime minister “might warm up considerably to Benjamin Netanyahu, say, driven by ideological affinities on some issues,” said Jawaharlal Nehru University’s Ningthoujam.

So, does it matter for Indo-Israeli relations that Modi is a Hindu nationalist?

I think yes it matters but probably not much. Where it matters i.e. in security/military affairs, Indo-Israeli relations are already very close as accepted by Ningthoujam in his own article (See India-Israel Defense Cooperation). Incremental improvements aside, the next level of bilateral relations in these sectors can be a defense pact but that is never on the cards because of India's need for Middle Eastern 'Muslim' energy resources. So, the close cooperation will continue and increase but under wraps.  

Economic ties, despite efforts, have not been very close to the potential of improvement is greater there. Can Modi's regime be a game changer? Yes, it is possible and odds-on but does it has something to do with Modi being a Hindu nationalist? Probably not. 

Netanyahu: Need of a Jewish State

It seems I prematurely jettisoned the idea of a Jewish state (See End of prospects of a Jewish state?). Prime Minister Netanyahu, on Israel's independence day, announced that he is preceding to make the Jewish state a reality by amending Basic Law of Israel (that serves as Israel's Constitution) to highlight the Jewish character of Israel. He argued:

Israel gives full equal rights to all its citizens, but it is the nation-state of one people – the Jewish people – and no other. To fortify Israel's standing as the nation-state of the Jewish people, I intend to spearhead the legislation of a Basic Law that will enshrine this status.

Israel is a Jewish and democratic state. Our Basic Laws give full expression to the democratic aspect of the state. We do this by giving full equal rights to each and every citizen. The Basic Laws do this by means of two main laws – the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. It will define the national right of the Jewish people to the state of Israel, without infringing on the individual rights of any citizen of Israel. It will fortify the standing of the Law of Return as a Basic Law, it will anchor in the Basic Laws the standing of the national symbols – the flag, the national anthem, the language and other components of our national being...These components are under relentless and increasing attack from abroad, and even at home.

Of course, there are those who don't want Israel to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people...They want to see a Palestinian nation-state arise alongside us, and for Israel to gradually become a bi-national, Arab-Jewish state, within its narrow borders. But I say one simple thing: You can't hold the national stick by both ends. You can't say that you want to separate from the Palestinians in order to avoid a bi-national state, an argument that has a certain logic to it, and meanwhile sanctify a bi-national, Jewish-Arab state in Israel's permanent borders. (See Netanyahu: Israel is home to one people - Jewish)

Changing of Basic Law and giving preferential treatment to Jewish over democratic character of Israel would, of course, establish an overtly Jewish state. Let's look at the arguments. Is Israel's flag, anthem and language increasingly under attack? No. Is Israel itself increasingly under attack for being a Jewish state? Not so. The world's focus on Israel is because of Israel-Palestine conflict. Yes, there are concerns about the treatment of Arab minority but treating minorities badly is common in the Middle East and around the world so that is not the issue. Even being a religious nationalist state is not an issue because the Middle East has many such states. Netanyahu would like us to believe that it is anti-Semitism but it is not true. Increasingly Jewish people themselves are realizing, this is just a way to legitimize occupation of Palestinian lands.

1947 Zionist poster

Source: Zionist Postcards

The second argument is again problematic. Those, who promote a separate Palestinian state, also accept Israel's right to exist. They want both states to give rights to their minorities. Those, who favor the two-state solution, do not demand or accept an Islamic state in Palestine while denying Jews to establish a Jewish state in Israel. What many people are arguing for is two states for two communities, not two faiths. But the world can also live with two states for two faiths (i.e. states based on religious nationalism), if they are separate. What world, I think, is wary of is the conflict and Israel has tended not to resolve the conflict for at least the last twenty years. And this is jeopardizing Israel's Jewish character itself.  

End of prospects of a Jewish State?

It's so obvious. Hard to fathom how they cannot see it. Jewish settlers and religious nationalists are the most ardent supporters of a Jewish state and yet they are the ones who are bent on ending the hope of establishing a Jewish state for next many centuries. Can it be more ironic? A Jewish state established after thousands of years of persecution, destroyed by its most passionate Jewish supporters! 

The failure of latest peace process led by Secretary Kerry was expected as Israeli government had no intention of changing the status quo. What was astounding were the accusations hurled toward Kerry for speaking, sorry whispering, the truth about the future apartheid state, by Israeli ministers and other supporters of Jewish state (See Kerry's warning to Israel lost in furor over 'apartheid' ). 

How is it possible for these people to establish a Jewish and democratic state, if they are not ready to deal and give Palestinians their own state? A state half Jewish and half Muslim cannot be a Jewish and democratic state. It will be a liberal democratic state or an apartheid state as Secretary Kerry said. Currently it is a Jewish state, with half of the population having fewer rights. In a decade or two, it will be a state where majority will be ruled by a ethnic/religious (Jewish) minority, a classic apartheid state. 

Considering those opposing two-state solution rational, it appears they maybe be thinking:

• The apartheid state would be acceptable to the world, the US and the Israelis as it is not much different than what is the situation now. If it is acceptable now, it will be acceptable in future
• Palestinians would migrate to other Arab countries and elsewhere as they feel more pressure from settlers.

Both these scenarios are improbable. The current situation is acceptable because the dream of two-state solution is alive and the present situation is considered temporary. Once this mirage ends, it will be clear to everyone that Israel is an apartheid state. Even many Israelis would not accept it, what to say of Americans and the world at-large. And Palestinians are not going to vanish or migrate. Infact, they are going to increase their number and demand their basic human rights. For many Palestinians and Israelis, one state would a best case scenario as extremists movements from both sides can never dictate in one unified state. 

For those who still fantasize about two-states solution, please see Reza Aslan's vlog (See The One State Solution). He argues that one state might not be the best solution and it might not be a favorite of most Israelis and Palestinians (as well as many others around the world) but it is 'the only solution' and 'it is already happening'. So, whether we like it or not, it is a done deal.

However, many still hope against hope, like The Economist. It accepts that time is not on Israel's side but argues that disaster would not follow immediately after the collapse of negotiations with Palestinians and sees a solution in future (See Take a break: Two state solution still the only one that makes sense. But it won't happen this time round). As more settlers find homes in the future Palestinian state, the probability of two-state solution is decreasing fast. BDS movement shows that apartheid state would not be acceptable so the only option left is a democratic state. The support of Jewish Americans for Israeli policies is declining as discussed in this blog before (See US Jews less committed to Israel because of their religiosity or because of Israel's politics). 

I agree with Reza, two-states solution is dead, long live the one-state reality.

When two religious nationalisms fight, is it different?

There are many examples of intractable world conflicts where it appears that two religious nationalisms are fighting each other. India- Pakistan, Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine conflicts immediately come to mind. It has been argued that resolution of these conflicts has been more difficult because of the presence of religious nationalisms. The main reason given is that as religious nationalists (believing they are following God's orders or believing that even if they suffer now, they would get big rewards later) are less ready to make compromise, resolution of conflicts in which they are fighting each other is improbable, if not impossible.

Are these conflicts different than those conflicts where ethnic nationalisms are fighting each other or a civic nationalism is fighting with a religious nationalism? 

This question is important because to resolve conflicts, one has to first understand them. However, to answer it, one has to believe or at least accept that religious nationalisms are different and distinct from other types of nationalisms. Looking around, one can see most of the religious nationalisms have developed an ethnic dimension, if they didn't had it from the start. Jews have always been proud of a separate ethnic identity. There are Jews who think themselves only ethnically Jewish, so is their identity religious or ethnic? (See how this issue confounded researchers surveying American Jewry Who counts as a Jew?) Similarly, Irish and Scots have strong attachment to their ethnicities and religious identity has been the dominant collective identity for Iranians more recently but a belief in Persian/Iranian identity is not far from surface.

It is more like there are many ethno-religious nationalisms, rather than pure religious nationalisms as Omer and Springs in Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook (2013)

Another related issue is mixing of territorial nationalism and religious nationalism. Many conflicts that were initially only territorial later developed religious justifications because the two combatants belonged to different religions. 

Was Northern Ireland conflict religious/sectarian from the start and always remained so? Keeping in view that both Israelis and Palestinians were initially led by secular leaders/parties/organizations for decades, it can questioned whether the initial conflict between them was defined by their religions? Similarly, India has always claimed to be a secular entity, so claiming that the Indo-Pakistan conflict is between rival religious nationalisms does not seem right.

I personally think that religious identity is just like other collective identities. When conflicts become entangled with identities, they become difficult to resolve. A long-term conflict between two groups links the identities of the groups with the conflict and an explanation of the bad behavior of the 'other' becomes part of both collective identities. These collective identities are difficult to change. Leaders and elites, who might (or might not) have once promoted the social construction of 'other', would find that re-interpretation or re-orientation of collective identity based on mutual respect was not easy as Dov Waxman argues in Democracy and Conflict Resolution: The Dilemmas of Israel's Peacemaking (2014)

National identities cannot just be revised at will. Attempts by policymakers and political elites to redefine national identities from above are by no means always successful and risk provoking fierce domestic opposition, as Rabin’s assassination tragically demonstrates.

One can also give the example of Mahatma Gandhi who was killed by a Hindu nationalist when Mahatma was perceived to be working against Hindus interests. Benazir Bhutto can also be thought of the victim of religious nationalists who thought Bhutto was trying to change/damage their interests/identity.