Jewish Civilizationism in Israel

 My article "Jewish Civilizationism in Israel: A Unique Phenomenon" as published in Religions journal in February 2023.

Abstract:

Populism and civilizationism have transformed the politics of many countries. Many scholars consider them the biggest challenges to democracy since the rise of fascism and communism in the first half of the last century. The close affinity between populism, civilizationism, and rightwing politics has also been analyzed and recognized in many countries from Turkey to India to the US. However, there are three areas that distinguish the appearance of civilizationism in Israel. First, in contrast to many other countries, civilizationism in Israel is not a new phenomenon. It has been an essential part of Israeli nationalism or Zionism since the early 20th century. Second, unlike many countries, Jewish civilizationism in Israel is an article of faith for all major Israeli political parties. It is not a slogan raised only by the rightwing, conservative part of the political spectrum. Finally, one observes an affinity between civilizationism and populism. Civilizational rhetoric is the mainstay of populist leaders, such as Trump, Erdogan, etc. In Israel, populism and civilizationism have no special relationship as civilizationism is mainstream politics. All politicians, populists and non-populists, have to pay homage to Jewish civilizationism; otherwise, they will not succeed. This paper analyzes the Israeli founding fathers’ statements, the Declaration of Independence, Israeli state symbols, the revival of the Hebrew language, the Law of Return, the first debate in the Knesset, and the more recent Nation-State Law to demonstrate how Jewish civilizationism is old, mainstream, and not exclusively populist.

Article

Recent years have seen a rise in civilizational rhetoric in several democratic societies across different continents. In April 2022, Turkish President Erdogan inaugurated the Islamic Civilizations Museum in Istanbul to showcase the versatility and superiority of Islamic civilization (Daily Sabah 2022). In November 2022, Jordan Bardella won the presidential election of the rightwing National Rally party, replacing Marine Le Pen, promising to defend French civilization (Associated Press 2022). In December 2022, Modi said, “India was the most refined idea of human civilisation, the most natural voice of humanity” (The Statesman 2022). While the focus of nationalism is territorial, the civilizational rhetoric prioritizes defending or saving a civilization based on religion, not a state. The state is considered a single manifestation of civilization that spans many territories and millennia. Both rightwing and leftwing populist leaders have used this rhetoric to win voters and elections by denouncing liberalism and established mainstream parties. For instance, in Europe, numerous rightwing populist European parties and leaders have fought and won elections based on the argument that Christian civilization or Judeo-Christian civilization and traditions are under threat from Islam, Muslims, and other refugees that do not belong to the White Christian civilization (Yilmaz and Morieson 2021; Ozzano and Bolzonar 2020; Brubaker 2016; Kaya and Tecmen 2019; Marchetti et al. 2022).

Yilmaz and Morieson (2022) have identified civilizationism as another thick ideology that populism, a thin ideology, attaches to itself to give itself a solid defensible argument. They define civilizationism in the following way:

Civilizationism is an idea which posits that the world and its peoples can be divided into several ‘civilizations’, most of them defined by religion. Adhered to populism, civilizationism defines self and other not primarily in national terms, but civilizational terms...

This article focuses on Jewish civilizationism in the state of Israel. Three aspects distinguish Israel from most other countries where civilizational rhetoric and politics have been successful. First, in most of the other countries, such as in the United States, Turkey, India, and Poland, civilizationism, linked with religion, was until a few decades ago a fringe phenomenon (Saleem 2023). Scholars link it primarily to the 21st century. This might be the case for other countries but, as this chapter will show, Israeli civilizationism is mainstream and as old as the Israeli state, if not older. Israeli nationalism or Zionism is based on Jewish civilizationism. From the First Zionist Congress in 1897 to the Nation-State Law passed in 2018, Jewish civilizationism has monopolized Israeli nationalism and defeated attempts by many Israeli scholars and leaders to make Israel a state honoring the histories and lives of all its citizens equally.

Second, in numerous countries, civilizationism is closely associated with rightwing nationalism and populism. It is the rightwing parties and movements that have raised the flag of civilizationism, and they are its key torch bearers. Whether it is the Republican Party in the US, the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, or the Bharatiya Janata Party in India, the rightwing conservatives spread religio-civilizational rhetoric and are the most impressed by it. This is not the case in Israel. It was the socialist, broadly secular leftwingers that raised the flag of Jewish civilizationism and created the state of Israel. Even after the creation of Israel, the broadly leftwing parties ruled Israel for thirty years and kept Jewish civilizationism alive.

Finally, when one studies other country cases, one observes an affinity between civilizationism and populism. Civilizational rhetoric is primarily the mainstay of populist leaders. Civilizationism has played a key role in making such leaders win elections and dominate the political arena. Erdogan and Modi, two populist leaders, have used civilizationism to completely change the politics of their countries. Now, even the opposition parties in Turkey and India have to resort to civilizational rhetoric to prove their authenticity. Populist leaders instrumentalize religion and religious identity to create a sense of fear that the national culture and identity are civilizational, and that it is under attack by people from foreign civilizations living not only outside the state but also inside the state. In Israel, this exclusive affinity between populism and civilizationism breaks down. As Jewish civilizationism is not limited to the left wing or right wing, similarly, it is not limited to populist or mainstream politics. Jewish civilizationism is Israeli nationalism as propagated by the state, and rejecting it means rejecting the basis of the state. Therefore, no political party, populist or non-populist, can succeed in Israel without bowing to this altar.

The rest of the article can be read here.

Vaccine for Holocaust survivors living in other countries but not for Arab Israelis & Palestinians living under Israeli occupation?

Israel is planning to provide Coronavirus vaccine shots to Holocaust survivors living anywhere in the world. Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Omer Yankelevich on 12th January announced this new policy. Erin Ben-Moshe in her article Israel explores plan to provide free vaccines to Holocaust survivors worldwide reports Yankelevich's statement:

“During this global crisis, we have an opportunity to support Holocaust survivors whose resilience continues to guide and inspire humanity today,” said Yankelevich. “It is our collective obligation to safeguard this treasured yet vulnerable population in the spirit of mutual responsibility.”

“Now is the time for all of us, Jewish institutions and leaders from across the world, to come together in this operation,” she said. “Together, we can ensure that Holocaust survivors are efficiently vaccinated, wherever they live.”

However, Ben-Moshe also informs that there are no definite plans yet on how to manage vaccination of around 130,000 Holocaust survivors outside Israel (around 200,000 are Israelis):

As of now, there is no definite plan to finance and manage the vaccination project, including the involvement of Jewish philanthropic networks. Solutions for other expected hurdles, such as obtaining permits from foreign governments and the purchase of vaccines by the ministry, are also being examined. The statement also notes that vaccines for this initiative will be acquired separately and in addition to Israel’s current supply.

Nathan Jeffay in his The Times of Israel article, Israeli group sparks debate with plans to vaccinate world’s Holocaust survivors, has collated other questions raised about this scheme. The first objection is from the agency that is supposed to distribute the vaccine:

Shalom Corps was set up a few months ago by Israel’s Diaspora Affairs Ministry and the Jewish Agency. While Diaspora Affairs Minister Omer Yankelevich has waxed lyrical about the plan, the Jewish Agency only learned about it through the media, and has not echoed her enthusiasm.

“It’s quite an undertaking,” a Jewish Agency spokeswoman told The Times of Israel on Wednesday. “We weren’t aware of it and haven’t had a chance to properly look into whether it’s feasible.”

Haaretz cited an anonymous source familiar with the Jewish Agency’s reaction saying that officials in the organization were “shocked” and “outraged” when they saw a story on the idea, which they called “abhorrent.”

 

... the source who spoke to Haaretz regarding discussions in the Jewish Agency said it would be “unfeasible, illegal, immoral, diplomatically disastrous and an absolute impossibility” to interfere with the way individual countries distribute vaccines by creating special provision for Jewish Holocaust survivors.

Strict regulations, which vary from country to country, govern medical procedures, and while experts say some do permit private vaccination for select individuals, the plan could run into legal issues in other jurisdictions.

While Israel is planning to vaccinate Holocaust survivors that are citizens of other countries and most of them are most likely vaccinated by their governments in the next few months (most of the Holocaust survivors live in the rich Western countries, which have advanced health systems and already secured large amounts of vaccine doses, and are prioritizing vaccination of their older population, which also includes Holocaust survivors), it has shown far less concern about Palestinians under its occupation or even its own Arab Israeli population:

In the midst of the fanfare surrounding Israel’s vaccine campaign, Palestinian activists and rights groups have criticized Israel for not offering the vaccine to the millions of Palestinians living under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. 

Under Article 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is required as an occupier to “ensure the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics” — in this case, the COVID-19 vaccine. 

Israel has deflected such criticisms, saying the obligation to vaccinate Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza lies in the hands of the Palestinian Authority (PA). 

Meanwhile, Israeli leaders insist that they are vaccinating all Israeli citizens, regardless of race or ethnicity, equally and fairly — including the state’s 2 million Palestinian citizens. 

But that just might not be true, human rights advocates have pointed out. 

While Palestinians citizens of Israel qualify, just as Jewish Israelis do, to receive the vaccine and would not be turned back at a clinic simply because they are Palestinian, rights groups are claiming that there are other sinister mechanisms of discrimination at work when it comes to Israel and its distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. 

Adalah — The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel has slammed Israel’s emergency medical service for failing to provide vital COVID-19 information, including facts relating to the vaccine, available in Arabic. 

The website of Magen David Adom (MDA), the emergency service responsible for informing the Israeli citizenry on everything from COVID-19 guidelines and updates, how and where to get tested, and vital information regarding the vaccine, currently only provides information and updates in Hebrew and English.

This, Adalah says, is unacceptable, and marginalizes millions of Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up 20% of the population and primarily speak Arabic. 

“In Israel, Magen David Adom is basically the equivalent of the Red Cross,” Adalah attorney Sawsan Zaher told Mondoweiss. “All of the essential information that they provide is not available at all in Arabic.”

Zaher told Mondoweiss that she believes, as someone who has been documenting and fighting against discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel for years, the failure to provide vital information regarding COVID-19 and the vaccine in Arabic is “not a coincidence.”

“There is a policy of systematic racial discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel,” Zaher said, and the failure of official bodies like MDA to cater to all citizens is just one small example of that policy. 

Zaher pointed to Israel’s 2018 Nation State Law, which among other provisions declared that only Jews have the right to self-determination, as a template for discrimination against Palestinians “on all levels.”

“Having the Jewish Nation State Basic Law… which stated that Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people, excluded the Palestinian citizenry from the preamble and the definition of who the citizens are,” Zaher said.

“This exclusion is providing constitutional legitimacy to discrimination of Palestinians on all levels,” she said, including, for example, “not providing a very important website in Arabic which is vital.

“Unfortunately this [discrimination] is seen not only on high level policies, but basic policies and decisions like providing information in Arabic or making sure all campaigns on COVID-19 awareness are provided equally in Palestinians and Arab towns,” Zaher said. 

The implications of not having accurate COVID-19 information in Arabic are potentially devastating and far-reaching for Palestinian communities in Israel, where reports have indicated widespread misinformation regarding the virus and the vaccine. 

With no official Arabic-language platforms to educate people on the vaccine and combat existing misinformation, advocates fear that it could lead to significant cases of Palestinians in Israel refusing to get vaccinated, therefore putting the community at greater risk. 

The implications of such discriminatory practices when it comes to the coronavirus, Zaher says, are “a matter of life and death.” (Israel says vaccine equally available to all citizens. But is that really the case?)

What is Post Zionism?

Before we define post-Zionism, let's talk a little bit about Zionism. Zionism is Israel’s national ideology. Zionists believe that Jews have a special relationship with Zion, a synonym of Jerusalem in the Bible. Zionists define Zion broadly as the area of the (Mandate) Palestine. They claim that Judaism is not only a religion but also a nationality, so Jews deserve their own state and because of their special two millennia-old connection, Zion should be that state. Zionists discount and disregard the presence and majority of Palestinians in erstwhile Palestine before the creation of Israel. The slogan, "A land without a people for a people without a land" explains the Zionist idea.

If Zionism is about particular -- a particular land for a particular people at a particular time -- post- Zionism concerns universal -- humans coming together after acknowledging their differences and idiosyncrasies. If Zionism is based on denying Palestinians existence, suffering, and exclusion, post- Zionism is known for acknowledging Palestinians' trauma and called for their inclusion. If Zionism is about hegemony, post-Zionism cherishes harmony. If Zionism gave birth to Israel, post-Zionism was, many intellectuals thought, to give it maturity. If Zionism prefers the tribe, post-Zionism promotes trade-offs. If Zionism is about Jews who can fight for their own rights, post-Zionism prioritizes Jews that can fight not only for themselves but also for others. 

Zionism rose to prominence is the 1890s; post-Zionism became a thing, hundred years later, in the 1990s. There is no agreed definition of post-Zionism. Most of its detractors and some of its proponents claim that it is not much different from more than a century old anti-Zionism. However, while anti-Zionists are by-definition against Zionism, many of the post-Zionists are not. A large number of post-Zionists appreciate the necessity of Zionism for bringing Jews together and for creating the state of Israel. What unites most post-Zionists is the belief that Zionism has well past its expiry date. 

While the heydays of the post-Zionist movement were the 1990s and 2000s, its origin can be traced to the late 1960s. For instance, publicist Uri Avnery published a book in 1968 titled Israel without Zionists. Others have associated post-Zionism with the 1940s and 1950s cultural movement of the Mandate Palestine Jews who dreamed of a "Hebrew" nation, a nation that would be composed of Middle Eastern people (both Arabs and Jews), who have rejected their religious (Islamic and Judaic) pasts. Post-Zionism started as an academic movement. Its first proponents were Israeli academics who are usually referred to as “New Historians.” These historians, in the 1980s, used Israeli government declassified documents, interviews, and objective rigorous research to unpack and highlight the massacre and dislocation of the Palestinians before but primarily after the 1948 War. Tom Segev, Ilan Pappé, Benny Morris, and Avi Shlaim were prominent New Historians. Gradually, in the 1990s, these revisionist historians became the pioneers of a much larger movement. However, this movement never became popular. Ordinary Israelis continued to believe in the official nationalist ideology of Zionism.

Source: Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (2006)

Journalist Neri Livneh, who was part of the movement, defined post-Zionism in her Haaretz's article Post-Zionism Only Rings Once (September 20, 2001):

In the wider sense, if the term post-Zionism is meant to describe every attempt to examine the injustices perpetrated by Zionism and to reassess Israel's history from a standpoint that is different from the standard version, all those who are identified in this article as "post-Zionists" will undoubtedly agree to be included in the list. 

But in the narrower, and more precise, sense, post-Zionism is a political attitude that recognizes the legitimacy of Zionism as a national movement of Jews, but specifies a certain date, a kind of watershed, from which point on Zionism concluded its historical role or lost its legitimacy because of injustices it did to others (not only to Arabs but also, for example to Holocaust survivors from Europe, Yiddish speakers, Jews from Arab and Islamic countries, ultra-Orthodox Jews and women). 

This viewpoint also gives rise to a political conclusion, according to which Israel must disengage itself from its Zionist elements, which are the foundation of its Jewish character, because they are preventing it from being a democratic state. In the eyes of its opponents, this conclusion by the post-Zionists places them in a saliently anti-Zionist camp.

Livneh explicates that many scholars, who are identified as post-Zionists rubbish the label. Professors Raz-Karkutzkin and Shenhav do not want to be called post-Zionists, although they were called post-Zionists. Poet, novelist, and essayist Yitzhak Laor self-identified as an anti-Zionist also did not like the term:

"Post-Zionism," says Dr. Amnon Raz-Karkutzkin, from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Be'er Sheva, "is actually a kind of general term that was invented in order to stuff into one basket and denounce everyone who does not identify completely with the establishment, or who has anything critical to say about the way history is taught in Israel, or who see the huge damage that Zionism has done to the Palestinians or the Mizrahim" - referring to Jews whose origins lie in Middle Eastern countries. 

"Post-Zionism is an empty label," asserts Prof. Yehouda Shenhav from Tel Aviv University. "I think we have to stop using the category of `post-Zionism,' because people invoke it confusingly. Not everyone who calls for an end to the occupation is necessarily a post-Zionist. People who want to return to the 1967 lines can be Zionists through and through, because they are convinced that nationhood cannot exist without borders. On the other hand, you could say that the settlers are post-Zionists, because their very existence is harmful to nationhood within clear boundaries." 

"Post-Zionism is a term I abhor," Raz-Karkutzkin states. "I am absolutely not a post-Zionist..." 

"Post-Zionism is a kind of convenient bag into which all kinds of people can be stuffed," he[Laor] says. "On the one hand, it allows anti-Zionists to come out of the closet without calling themselves anti-Zionists, and on the other hand, it allows all the ideological establishment Zionists to throw them all into that bag so they can kick it around."

Professor Uri Ram, in his book Israeli Nationalism: Social conflicts and the politics of knowledge (2011, 118), contends that post-Zionism has a great impact on Israeli academia, art, and culture:

In fact, the post-Zionist critique on what may be called “nationalist epistemology” (or nationalist point of view) is felt today in all disciplines of knowledge and creative arts in Israel (even if not always explicitly under the post-Zionist heading). This is the situation in the field of history, where the “new historians” or “revisionist historians” had a lasting impact on history writing and on historical memory...The presence of post-Zionism in Israeli culture in general and of post-Zionist studies of Israeli society in particular is pervasive and unequivocal.

Ram also identifies many branches of post-Zionism. Feminist post-Zionists, for instance, argue that post-Zionism is about rejecting the nationalistic, militaristic, and masculine traits of Zionism which reinforce each other. Diasporic post-Zionism is more concerned about the effects Zionism on non-Israeli Jews and aims to "de-Israelize" the Jewish diaspora.

For Zionists, there is not much difference between anti-Zionists and post-Zionists. Scholars, such as Shlomo Avineri and Meyrav Wurmser, who ascribe to the official Zionist paradigm, unpack the negative and disastrous agenda of the post-Zionists in the following section:

Avineri notes that post-Zionists contend that Zionism is a colonial phenomenon rather than a national movement in conflict with another national movement over their claim to the same territory. “At the same time,” he says, “those who are careful not to accept the Zionist narrative sometimes accept the Palestinian narrative without question. To them it is clear that there is a Palestinian people, that what happened in 1948 is exactly what the Arabs say happened, and that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there is, on the one hand, a Zionist ‘narrative,’ and on the other, ‘facts’ that are precisely identical to the Palestinian narrative.” Avineri calls this “absolute folly...” 

[Wurmser argues] At its essence, post-Zionism holds that the State of Israel is an immoral phenomenon because it was established on the basis of the destruction of another people—the Palestinians. It presents the problem as transcending the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967; hence, its solution does not lie in a simple Israeli withdrawal from those territories. To the contrary, post-Zionists now tend to disparage left-wing Zionist groups for what they refer to as the “Peace Now Syndrome,” a cherishing of the period before 1967 as flawless while attributing all of Israel's wrongdoing to the 1967 occupation. Post-Zionists are much more radical: from their perspective, the problem has to do with the very existence of Israel. They deem Zionism a colonialist, racist, and evil phenomenon that stole another people’s land by force and continues to oppress them... 

Avineri says that “post-Zionists are simply anti-Zionists” who believe “that there is no Jewish people, that Zionism is an ally of imperialism and that the Palestinian Arabs are victims of Zionist aggression….They do not see Zionism and the State of Israel as a reality that has come to pass, but rather as something that is not legitimate from the outset and that must be eliminated down to its very foundations.” 

Wurmser observes that the intention of post-Zionists “is wholly negative; not to improve Zionism but to destroy it. Post-Zionist writers openly aspire not to create a new Israeli historiography free of all ideological biases, but rather seek to inject an anti-Israel bias into them.” (Zionism: “New Historians” and Post-Zionists)

These views are, of course, rejected by the post-Zionists. They claim to love their country and assert that they are trying to save their country from an impending disaster.  

The hegemony of Israel's political right in Knesset elections

In How Israel’s religious right is now in the driving seat, Jonathan Cook argues that right dominates Israel's politics and is going to win most seats in the coming Knesset elections. The key fight is between the camps that fuse ultra-nationalism and religion, with the secular right trying to find a place for itself. The center-left, including the once-powerful Labor Party that dominated Israeli politics for decades, is going to remain marginal and insignificant. 

Will the secular right emerge with enough political weight to act as a power-broker in the post-election negotiations, or can the religious right form a government without any support from the secular parties? That is what the election will determine. 

An earlier election in April, which failed to produce a decisive result between these two camps, nonetheless confirmed the right’s absolute dominance. The Zionist centre-left parties, including the founding Labor party, were routed, securing between them just 10 seats in the 120-member parliament.

Source: How Israel’s religious right is now in the driving seat

Cook argues that Israel's is getting more religious and, therefore, the political center is continuously moving towards right. 

The secular right is going to vote for two parties, the new Blue and White party and Yisrael Beiteinu party, led by Avigdor Lieberman:

Much of the rest of the secular right has deserted Netanyahu’s Likud party. At the last election, they mostly found a political home in the new Blue and White party, led by a former military chief of staff, Benny Gantz. 

Polls suggest Lieberman may also attract a larger share of these voters after his recent stand-off with Netanyahu. He has demanded an exclusively secular right-wing government, comprising Likud, Blue and White, and his own Yisrael Beiteinu party. Blue and White has presented itself chiefly as a vehicle for protest against Netanyahu...

Blue and White has been misleadingly labelled as centrist by some observers. But it tied with Netanyahu’s Likud, at 35 seats each, in April by appealing to a largely secular strain of right-wing nationalism that three decades ago was the domain of the Likud party.

The religious right camp can be divided into three blocs as described by Cook below:

The religious right itself is characterised by three main blocs. All believe that the occupied territories belong exclusively to the Jewish people, and are united in their unabashed support for the settlements and the entrenchment of the occupation. Political differences relate chiefly to matters of how quickly and brazenly the occupied territories should be annexed and how the Palestinian population there should be dealt with. 

More significant than ideological differences, however, are the varied religious constituencies that each bloc represents. Netanyahu’s Likud party is the largest, and draws primarily on the support of religious traditionalists – Israeli Jews who are generally observant and socially conservative. Likud, Gurvitz noted, has moved more firmly into the religious camp since 2005... 

The second bloc comprises two ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, which look to their respective chief rabbis for political direction. Between them they won 16 seats in April. 

The main difference between the two relates to ethnicity. United Torah Judaism represents the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox community, whose recent ancestry is traced to Europe. Shas, meanwhile, represents the Mizrahim, Jews whose families hailed mostly from the Arab world. The third bloc comprises various small far-right parties representing what are known in Israel as the national-religious camp – those who subscribe to the ideology of the settler community... 

Gurvitz [a researcher] estimates the camp numbers close to one million – or about one in seven of Israel’s Jewish population. About half live in the settlements of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The majority are religious, but not all of them. The camp has proved fractious, but its three main parties established an electoral coalition last week called United Right, which polls currently suggest may win up to 14 seats... 

The three parties have minor differences over their approaches to annexation of the West Bank, likely the biggest issue facing the next parliament. Shaked’s New Right and Peretz’s Jewish Home demand formal annexation of most of the West Bank, denying Palestinians there equal rights and imposing apartheid-style rule over them. 

Since Donald Trump became US President, Likud has moved closer to openly adopting this as its policy. Smotrich [of Tkuma], meanwhile, would prefer to annex the entire West Bank and has been more explicit in suggesting it would be necessary to ethnic cleanse Palestinians as part of that annexation process... 

The fact that Likud and the United Right compete for largely the same pool of voters had fuelled even more extremist positions on the right, he [Gurvitz] added. “The national-religious parties need to offer more extreme policies to distinguish themselves from Likud, otherwise they will lose votes to Netanyahu,” he said. “But that then encourages Netanyahu to take more extreme positions to ensure he doesn’t look less nationalist than his rivals. It ends up creating a spiral of extremism.”

Israel: More messianic and more religious

Akiva Eldar, the veteran Israeli journalist and best-selling author, has written an article for Al-Monitor, "Israel at 71, more religious, messianic and extreme." On Israeli Independence Day, May 8-9, Mr. Eldar reminds Israelis and others of the Declaration of Independence. He compares the language in the declaration with that in the newest Basic Law, the Nationality Law or the Nation-state Law, passed last year. The language in the declaration is liberal, inclusive and democratic, with only a hint of Jewish ascendency in the new state. This is a world apart from the language in the 2018 basic law, which is exclusive, supremacist and illiberal. It shamelessly informs the world and the Israeli non-Jewish citizens that only Jewish Israeli are the true citizens, rest of the Israelis should not expect equality. Mr. Eldar writes:

What will a civics teacher answer a student who asks how the values of justice promised in the Declaration of Independence to all citizens — irrespective of religion, race and sex — square with a law stipulating “the right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people”? What will the teacher tell a student who asks how the promise of equality and the call to Israel’s Arabs to fulfill their role in state-building based on full and equal citizenship go hand-in-hand with a law stipulating “the State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value and will act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation”? 

These questions relate, of course, to the Nationality Law, anchoring the Jewish nature of the State of Israel, adopted in 2018 by the previous Knesset and received by the incoming Knesset as a fait accompli. The alienation of Israel’s 21% Arab minority that is inherent in the legislation gives off a stench of nationalism, if not outright racism, and contradicts the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. The clause on self-determination, while hurtful to the feelings of Israel’s non-Jewish citizens and undermining their affinity for the state, does not have practical meaning. On the other hand, the clause stipulating that the state will only develop Jewish settlement constitutes a direct blow to the property rights of millions of Palestinians and undermines their affinity for the land of their forefathers. The previous Knesset translated this clause into action when it legislated the so-called Regularization Law, which retroactively legalized all buildings erected in West Bank settlements in contravention of the law.

President  Rivlin, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Supreme Court president Esther Hayut on Israel’s 71st Independence Day, on May 9, 2019

Source: The Times of Israel

Mr. Eldar then compares the views of Mr. Herzl, the father of modern Zionism, with present-day Israel. While Mr. Herzl was against any role of rabbis in the state affairs, the current government depends on clerics for its existence (as almost all Israeli governments of the past decade) and, therefore, no important policy question can be decided without their approval:

The Declaration of Independence extols the visionary of the modern-day Jewish state, Theodor Herzl, who declared the right of the Jewish people to national revival in their land. Herzl also envisioned that clerics would seek to control institutions of the Jewish state. In his road map “The Jewish State,” Herzl wrote, “We shall therefore prevent any theocratic tendencies from coming to the fore on the part of our priesthood. We shall keep our priests within the confines of their temples in the same way as we shall keep our professional army within the confines of their barracks. Army and priesthood shall receive honors as high as their valuable functions deserve. But they must not interfere in the administration of the state which confers distinction on them, else they will conjure up difficulties without and within.” 

Israel’s next government will depend more than ever on ultra-Orthodox clerics, among them eight members of Yahadut HaTorah and eight of the Shas Party, as well as an identical number of national religious lawmakers who will all serve in the newly sworn-in 21st Knesset. As Shuki Friedman, director of the Center for Religion, Nation and State at the Israel Democracy Institute notes, religion dictates all facets of life in Israel of 2019. It controls how we shall be schooled and how we will marry; whether we will have public transportation on the Sabbath (usually not) and how we will spend our day of rest; what level of Kosher certification we consume; and will we be stuck in endless traffic because road and rail works cannot be carried out on the Sabbath, only during the work week. For the ultra-Orthodox parties, Jewish law is above state law. They are against the drafting of young ultra-Orthodox to the army, they discriminate against women and they incite against the progressive Judaism stream. All that, in complete contrast to the commitment made by the founders of Israel (in the Declaration of Independence) on equal rights to all citizens; religion, race or gender making no difference.

The article brilliantly details the differences between the 1948 and 2019 Israel but most of these differences existed only on paper. The declaration neither stopped the Nabka from happening, nor it could save the Israeli Arabs from the 70-year discrimination and the Palestinians from occupation. Since its independence in 1948, the Israeli state has never treated Israeli Arabs or Palestinians fairly, irrespective of what was written in the Declaration of Independence. The only difference between the 1948 Israel and 2019 Israel is that the mask is now off.

Is White nationalism Christian or religious?

Three articles debating whether white nationalism is Christian? Murali Balaji's articles support the contention while John W. Morehead's article negates it.

Source: The way of improvement

Behind New Zealand Terror Attack Is a Problem Bigger Than Islamophobia

Mar 18, 2019, 3:21pm Murali Balaji

Even as advocates point to growing Islamophobia as the cause of the attack, the larger issue seems to be white Christian nationalism.

As a white terrorist from Australia emptied clips of his M16 into the Al Noor and Linwood mosques in New Zealand, killing 49 innocent worshippers, his manifesto revealed the depths and scope to which Christian nationalism has entrenched itself into white majority countries.  

Even as advocates point to growing Islamophobia as the cause of the attack, the larger issue seems to be a reactionary—and almost theological—white Christian nationalism that has taken hold over the past decade. And it can’t just be whitewashed away with the “economic displacement” trope.

Indeed, white Christian terrorists like Anders Breivik in Norway, Dylann Roof in South Carolina, and now Brenton Tarrant, are self-styled (and self-described) soldiers in a fight against greater threats: secularism and pluralism.

While white Christian nationalism has its roots in the United States during Reconstruction, it grew in the 1960s as the evangelical movement attracted new congregants fearful of racial and gender equality activism. Over time, these congregants conflated their racial resentment with religiosity, and viewed the idea of a secular country—and a pluralistic one—as tantamount to their extinction.

This Christian nationalism found its way to other parts of the globe, and weren’t necessarily tied to evangelical movements. The resentment-bred, reactionary politics of the National Front in France and far-right movements across Europe were tied to insecurities about what it meant to be a citizen of a particular country. Breivik weaponized that sentiment in 2011 with his terror attack, and Roof cited similar sentiments after slaughtering congregants of an African American Church in 2015.

We are distracted by incidents of mass murder and terror, and assume white Christian nationalism is a series of one-offs, rather than an increasingly pandemic problem across white majority nations in demographic transition. It’s growing in our own backyards, too, and not just because of Trumpism and social media.

To blame Trump, Facebook posts, and rambling manifestos for carnage overlooks our failure to confront the grievances fueling white Christian nationalism. Assuming secular values and pluralism will win out in the end does nothing to prevent the ideological violence of Christian nationalism from spreading. Just as Wahhabism spread as a grievance-based movement against ostensibly secular Pan-Arab dictatorships in the 1960s before morphing into a powerful global threat, white Christian nationalism is a tinderbox.

We have to have the tools to snuff the fire before it lights.

White Christian Nationalism May Not Be Religious, But It Is Christian

Mar 21, 2019, 4:26pm Murali Balaji

White Christian nationalism’s foot soldiers don’t necessarily connect their racial resentment with their devotion to the Bible, yet they're often trying to retake what they presume to be lost: white and Christian dominance. 

After my recent post on the terror attack in New Zealand, several Christians reached out to Religion Dispatches and directly to me asking why I conflated white terrorism with Christian nationalism.

They eloquently noted that the shooter (whose name I shall not use) did not use Christian theology, but espoused anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant views that seemed disconnected from religion. But in making that argument, they might be missing a larger point: white Christian nationalism isn’t religious (or even grounded in religious scripture), but its adherents nearly always frame their grievances in terms of endangered white Christian societies.

Following Charlottesville, I wrote that white nationalism does have theological roots, with evangelicals like Bob Jones standing firmly in the way of civil rights. In modern iterations, white nationalism and Christian fundamentalism have converged with folks like Tony Perkins, Steve King (who is at it again), and David Duke.

But for the most part, white Christian nationalism’s foot soldiers don’t necessarily connect their racial resentment with their devotion to the Bible. Many aren’t religious, and in fact that’s generally beside the point. Instead, their resentment towards Others (generally non-white and non-Christian populations) is built up over time, largely through online portals that function as echo chambers for the blend of history, conspiracy theory, and racism that produces and sustains white Christian nationalism.

And we should note that it’s really a resentment movement that wears religion like a hood ornament or team colors. In such a definition, these nationalists are trying to retake what they presume to be lost: white and Christian dominance. 

In a larger context, none of the nationalist and exclusivist movements—Jewish nationalism in Israel; Islamism in parts of Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia; Hindu nationalism in parts of India; Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand—that have grown in recent years are grounded in theology. They’re all connected by a shared sense of grievance and an imagined community based on assumed shared ideals.

The New Zealand terrorist might not have been religious per se, but he was 100 percent devoted to the divine providence of white (Christian) nationhood.

Misdiagnosing Nationalism as ‘Christian’ Exacerbates the Challenges of Islamophobia: A Response to Murali Balaji

Mar 29, 2019, 12:59pm John W. Morehead

Christian nationalism and White nationalism have some common concerns, but they shouldn’t be conflated in their differing narratives and responses to Muslims and other immigrants.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on two Muslim mosques in New Zealand by Brenton Tarrant, many are looking to address the motivations and influences underlying the violence. In two RD posts, one from March 18 and another from March 22, Murali Balaji argues that the attacks were rooted in white Christian nationalism. But is Balaji defining Christian nationalism correctly, and is it the best way to characterize Tarrant’s ideological narrative? I will argue below that the answer is “no” to both questions.

To the question of defining Christian nationalism, there is a helpful body of academic research in political science and the social sciences relevant to this. The lead researchers in one study argue that “the conservative strain [of American civil religion] views America as holding a unique covenant with God, which requires it to be protected from outsiders and those who would do it harm. We refer to these ideas more generally as Christian nationalism.” Contrary to Balaji’s assertions in his second essay, Christian nationalism is religious, and it incorporates theological elements. This results in perceptions of “divinely anointed” Christian ingroup members vs. “theologically condemned” outgroup members like Muslims. This fusion of religious and national identities is noteworthy among white American evangelicals, where being Christian is very important to being truly American. This was the Christian nationalism that was a significant factor for white evangelicals who voted for Trump in 2016.

By contrast there are other forms of nationalism. The type associated with white supremacy, sometimes called white nationalism, is concerned with ethnocentrism and the superiority of the white race. Both white nationalism and Christian nationalism have shared concerns about “cultural displacement,” and involve prejudice toward immigrant populations, sometimes seen as “invaders,” manifested in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes. But these two forms of nationalism, even with some shared fears, are not the same thing. So Balaji does not define Christian nationalism correctly and conflates it with other forms of nationalism.

To the second question, what type of nationalism did Tarrant espouse? Before his attacks, Tarrant posted a 74-page document on the internet. According to J.M. Berger, an expert in online extremism, Tarrant’s manifesto is “clearly a statement of ideology,” described as white nationalist, and the author “is a white supremacist, and anti-immigration and anti-Muslim.” There is no indication in Berger’s analysis that Tarrant included statements that would characterize his ideology as a form of Christian nationalism.

If Christian nationalism is not the proper way to understand Tarrant’s nationalism, but instead a form of white supremacist nationalism is more accurate, where did the major anti-immigrant influences come from? According to Sasha Polakow-Suransky and Sarah Wildman at Foreign Policy, Tarrant draws upon the work of Renaud Camus, a French anti-immigration writer. They note that while Tarrant was in France at a mall watching immigrant “invaders,” the idea came to him to use violence against nonwhites. Polakow-Suransky and Wildman quote from Tarrant’s manifesto illustrating the emotional impact this had on the soon-to-be mass murderer: “I found my emotions swinging between fuming rage and suffocating despair at the indignity of France, the pessimism of the french [sic] people, the loss of culture and identity and the farce of the political solutions offered.”

It would seem that Balaji has identified the wrong type of nationalism in connection with the New Zealand terrorism. White nationalism provided the ideological narrative, not Christian nationalism.

In the interests of full disclosure, I identify as a Christian. But my disagreement and critique of Balaji’s thesis should not be interpreted as a failure to accept criticism of those in my religious tradition. For the last four years I have been pursuing a grant from the Louisville Institute that has brought social psychology into conversation with American evangelical theologies of opposition to religious others, particularly Muslims. Among the contributing factors, our research indicates that Christian nationalism is a significant predictor of negative attitudes toward Muslims. I accept this, and advocate strategies to counter this narrative so as to foster more positive forms of multifaith interaction.

Christians have behaved badly, and pursued violence toward others, in the name of their religion. That’s beyond dispute. But whether Christian nationalism was the ideological narrative underlying New Zealand’s attacks, that’s another question. And it’s one that I think Balaji misidentified. If we misdiagnose the challenges we face we will create inappropriate strategies to counter them, and possibly foster even more tensions between Christians and Muslims.

***

Murali Balaji responds:

Following my first and second pieces in Religion Dispatches, several evangelical leaders have offered thoughtful critiques of my position that the New Zealand terrorist (whom I will not name) is a white Christian nationalist.

John Morehead writes in his response that I mislabeled anti-immigrant white nationalism as “Christian nationalism,” asserting that “White nationalism provided the ideological narrative, not Christian nationalism.”

I respectfully disagree.

For starters, I emphasized that a white Christian nationalist doesn’t necessarily have to be “religious” in the traditional sense. I would argue that Donald Trump and Mike Pence are both white Christian nationalists, though the former hardly has any attachment to the actual theology of Christianity.

In this regard, white Christian nationalists draw upon and reference a pure white Christian ideal—one that arguably never existed anywhere. If we reference Benedict Anderson’s notion of imagined communities, the white Christian ideal becomes an affinity that helps to build a collective identity.

The terrorist’s manifesto also makes reference to Pope Urban II and the First Crusade, implying that he fancied himself part of a holy war against Muslims and other invaders. While Morehead’s argument seeks to clearly distinguish between white nationalism and Christian nationalism, the terrorist’s own words seem to undercut this attempt.

“We are coming for Constantinople and we will destroy every mosque and minaret in the city,” the terrorist wrote in his manifesto. That’s not subtle in its call for Christian supremacy and destruction of Islam.

I sympathize with Morehead’s position, but the terrorist seems to make both implicit and explicit references to a dream that many white Christian nationalists share: a return to white Christian dominance over its non-white, non-Christian others.

Israel is not a country of all its citizens

Religious nationalism in Israel or Zionism achieved a new high on March 10, 2019. A sitting Prime Minister, who many expect to be sworn in again after the Knesset elections and become the longest-serving Israeli Prime Minister in history, publicly declared, " Israel is not a country of all its citizens." He was denying equal citizenship or full citizenship of Arab Israelis who make almost one-fifth of the Israeli population. Many would argue that most countries in the world do prioritize one religious, ethnic, or linguistic community over other communities so the statement was not something rare or surprising. Others would argue that Israel has never given equal rights to its Arab citizens in its 71-year history so the only people baffled by Benjamin Netanyahu's statement were the ignorant morons. Bibi's critics would point to his statement on the previous election day in March 2015 when he appealed to the rightwing voter by demonizing Arabs. He said that “the rule of the right is in danger” because "Arab voters were coming out in droves to the polls," bused by the left-wing NGOs. This appeal was decisive in winning him the last Knesset elections.

Source: Jerusalem Post

But the statement was stupefying because we live in a world where microaggressions are frowned upon and Israel claims to be a democracy. In fact, it prides itself as the only democracy in the Middle East. A former Prime Minister and Chief of Staff Ehud Barak said Israel was "a villa in the jungle," i.e. an outpost of civilization amidst the barbarism of the Middle East. Do other democratic leaders use Netanyahu's kind of rhetoric to win elections? No. Even dictators would not use this rhetoric today. So, it was astonishing for Netanyahu to write it and then he doubled down it and defended his statement before a cabinet meeting. 

Here is what prompted Netanyahu to proudly declare that Israeli Arabs are second-class citizens. Rotem Sela, a popular Israeli model and TV host, watching Miri Regev, the Israeli Culture Minister being interviewed by Rina Matsliah. Rotem became upset by Miri's racist attitude and wrote on her Instagram: “Miri Regev is sitting and explaining to Rina Matsliah that the public needs to beware, because if Benny Gantz is elected he will have to create a government with the Arabs. Rina Matsliah is silent. And I ask myself: why doesn’t Rina ask her in shock: ‘And what’s the problem with the Arabs???’ Dear God, there are also Arab citizens in this country. When will anyone in this government tell the public that this is a country of all its citizens, and all people are born equal.” The actress said that “the Arabs are also human beings. And also the Druze, and the gays, and the lesbians and... gasp... leftists.” 

Netanyahu responded on Facebook, "Dear Rotem, an important correction: Israel is not a state of all its citizens. According to the Nation-State Law that we passed, Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people – and its alone. As you wrote, there is no problem with the Arab Israeli citizens – they have equal rights like everybody and the Likud government has invested in the Arab sector more than any other government."

Israeli President Rivlin criticized Netanyahu's “entirely unacceptable remarks about the Arab citizens of Israel” without naming him and added, "“There are no first-class citizens, and there are no second-class voters. We are all equal in the voting booth. We are all represented at the Knesset.” 

But Bibi was unapologetic and reaffirmed his anti-Arab stance before Sunday's Cabinet's meeting as Guardian reported:

As the comments caused waves in Israel, Netanyahu again spoke of the issue at the start of a cabinet meeting. He called Israel a “Jewish, democratic state” with equal rights, but “the nation state not of all its citizens but only of the Jewish people”.

Netanyahu has been accused of demonising Israeli Arabs, who make up about 17% of the population, in an attempt to boost rightwing turnout in elections due on 9 April. He has continually warned that his opponents will receive the support of Arab parties and that they will make significant concessions to the Palestinians.

Wonder woman star, Gal Gadot, supported her friend Rotem Sela:

“Love thy neighbor as thyself,” Gadot wrote in Hebrew on her own Instagram account in response. “It is not a matter of right or left, Jewish or Arab, religious or secular. It’s a matter of dialogue for peace, equality and tolerance for one another. It is our responsibility to plant hope and light for a better future for our children. Rotem, you are an inspiration for us all.” (See ynet news)

The "othering" of Israeli-Arabs continues

Two articles detailing how Israeli-Arabs face racism in the Israeli society and how many officials of Israeli state encourages this racism. A recent statement by the Israeli Defense Minister demonstrates how Israeli-Arab are not considered part of the Israeli nation and how Isreali politicians, working at the highest level, have no moral or political compunctions in helping propagate and promote the 'othering' of around 20% of Israeli citizens (Israeli-Arabs) and brazenly working for an exclusive Jewish nationalism.

Akiva Eldar's article Israeli defense minister's comments highlight 'plague of racism' gives a general overview of racism and bigotry in the Israeli society and state's promotion of it:

In a Dec. 12 interview with my colleague Mazal Mualem, Liberman proudly held up a poll indicating that 93% of Israelis who had emigrated from the former Soviet Union in recent decades (one of his party’s main constituent groups) support his call to boycott businesses in Wadi Ara. 

If this poll is really accurate, the migrants are not alone. According to a comprehensive study conducted last year by the Pew Research Center, the cancer of racism has spread to Israelis of all stripes. The poll found that almost half the Jews in Israel, 48%, think Israel should expel its Arab citizens, who constitute some 20% of the country’s population. Eight out of ten Arab Israelis (79%) said there was widespread discrimination of Muslims by Israeli society. 

A study presented in July to Knesset members indicates that academia, one of the institutions expected to uphold democratic values, is not immune to racism, either. About half the Arab students said they encounter manifestations of racism and discrimination in colleges and universities they attend, and 40% reported expressions of racism by faculty members. One-third of the students reported that the institutions in which they were enrolled did not give them any leeway to help their integration — not even taking into consideration Muslim holidays and fasts, and 30% said they could not apply for scholarships they wanted because they had not served in the military (unlike Israeli Jews who are required to perform military service). 

In a September 2016 report, State Comptroller Josef Shapira wrote, “We have been experiencing the harsh phenomena of hatred, racism, violence, factionalism and intolerance.” The chief government watchdog went on to cite the disastrous results of historic racism against the Jewish people. “Human society, wherever and whenever it is, has no guarantee that the underbrush of racism will not turn into a dense forest,” he warned. Shapira upbraided the Education Ministry — the state arm tasked with eradicating racism, xenophobia and factionalism — for failing to turn education into a bridge between the various segments of Israeli society. The ministry only addresses these issues sporadically, on a case-by-case basis, and then only following extreme displays of racism, Shapira wrote. 

President Reuven Rivlin said in response that the report reflects the extent to which racism had become an acute and strategic issue for Israeli society. He complained that “the state is not doing enough to uproot severe phenomena of racism and hatred among youth.” Several months prior to the report, Education Minister Naftali Bennett derailed a program for the development of a “racism index” initiated by the ministry’s chief scientist, professor Ami Volansky, after the July 2014 murder by Jews of Palestinian teen Mohammed Abu Khdeir. The index was designed to allow schools to assess the level of racism among its students and to seek appropriate remedies. 

Bennett subsequently ordered his office to sever ties with the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, which runs programs for the prevention of racism, among its other activities. This week, his ministry ordered a high school in the northern town of Nesher to cancel a planned annual event with members of bereaved Israeli and Palestinian families, the Parents Circle Family Forum. The ministry forced the mayor, himself a bereaved father, and the school’s frightened teachers to prevent the students from meeting with six Jews and Palestinians who devote their lives to the struggle for peace and against racism. 

A Knesset committee is currently deliberating an article that would officially allow segregation, part of a proposed law that would define Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. It authorizes the state to “permit a community, including the members of a single religion or the members of a single nationality, to establish separate localities.” In an editorial titled “Israel’s Attempts to Preserve a Racist Heritage," the liberal Haaretz newspaper wrote: “It would be interesting to see Israel’s response if some other country passed a constitutional amendment letting communities that exclude Jews be established.… ‘Judaism’ isn’t a synonym for racism and elitism.”

Source: Liberman: 'Joint Arab List is a fifth column'

Mazal Mualem's article Liberman intensifies campaign against Israeli Arabs focuses on Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman. He is determined to become the next Prime Minister of Israel and is willing to throw Israeli-Arabs and Israel's peace and stability under the bus to fulfil his dream. 

At the request of Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman, his associates prepared for him several lists concerning Israeli Arab Knesset members. These lists, containing details of past comments made by those members condemning Israel and also data on terrorist attacks perpetrated by Israeli Arabs, appeared on his desk in the Knesset on Dec. 11. He used this information in a speech to the Knesset attacking the Joint Arab List, even calling them "war criminals.” 

Among the people featured in Liberman's lists was former Knesset member Azmi Bishara. Appearing beside his name was the charge against him: "Accused of high espionage: making contact with a Hezbollah agent." There was Knesset member Jamal Zahalka who "while in the 12th grade was arrested and sent to prison for two years for membership in an illegal PLO group.'' Then there was former Knesset member Basel Ghattas, "a cousin of Bishara, who smuggled 12 cell phones to prisoners." Chairman of the Joint Arab List and Knesset member Ayman Odeh was listed as having "refused to attend the funeral of President Shimon Peres, calling Peres 'the murderer from Kafr Kanna.'" There were also quotes such as "within us, we Arabs refuse to recognize Israel as a Jewish state," which was attributed to a speech delivered by Knesset member Zahalka in December 2007 and later quoted by the website Checkpoint. 

Liberman's assertive speech came just a day after he used interviews with Army Radio and Reshet Bet radio to call for a consumer boycott of Arab businesses in the northern Israeli-Arab Wadi Ara region. Actually, this was a new stage in his longstanding campaign against the Israeli Arab community over the past few election cycles. This time, his attack was triggered by the violent demonstrations in Wadi Ara, which broke out in response to US President Donald Trump's Jerusalem proclamation on Dec. 6. During the course of these protests, Arab youths hurled rocks at police cars, private vehicles and buses throughout the Sabbath on Dec. 9. 

"Simply impose a consumers' boycott and don't go in there. Don't enter their restaurants or their businesses. Don't get your cars fixed there. The residents of Wadi Ara must understand that they're unwanted and that they're not part of us. They’re working from within to harm the State of Israel," said Liberman, adding fuel to the flames in an already tense atmosphere. 

All at once, Liberman removed the mantle of formality that he had donned upon entering the office of the minister of defense in May 2016. He went back to being chairman of a right-wing nationalist party Yisrael Beitenu who would rather exacerbate tensions instead of restoring calm. Politicians on both the left and right expressed their reservations about his remarks, including co-leader of the Zionist Camp Tzipi Livni, Internal Security Minister Gilad Erdan of Likud and Education Minister Naftali Bennett. It was exactly what Liberman expected. It was what he had hoped to achieve.

From Jerusalem of Gold to Gold-plated Jerusalem?

A Jewish professor highlights the flaws in the religious arguments proclaiming Jerusalem the capital of the Jewish people or the eternal capital of Israel. Two excerpts from the essay are reproduced below:

From the halls of the Israeli Parliament to the fresh cut lawns of American Jewish summer camps, one hears the refrain that Jerusalem is the capital of “the Jewish people.” This is an interesting assertion. First, as my colleague Liora Halperin noted in a Facebook post, the Jewish people do not have a capital because the Jewish people are not a nation-state. Israel is not the state of the Jewish People, even if you maintain it is a Jewish state, largely because about half of the world’s Jews choose not to live there. Like every nation-state, Israel is state of its citizens. Second, Jerusalem is certainly the holiest site of the Jewish people, the center of its homeland, and the place of its longing. But as Hannah Arendt noted in her 1947 essay “To Save the Jewish Homeland,” a homeland is not a state and, in fact, a state may undermine a homeland. Homelands too are aspirational, states by definition often destroy aspirations. As Franz Rosenzweig suggested, homelands, or holy lands, are places of longing. In states longing too often is buried in the messiness of injustice and inequality. Finally, Jerusalem in the Jewish imagination was not limited to a place, much less a state, but also traditionally functioned as a marker of robust Jewish life in the Diaspora. Thus Vilna was called “The Jerusalem of Lithuania,” and Lublin “The Jerusalem of Poland,” etc. If you look at the “real” Jerusalem, the city behind the theology, which is, as Israeli poet Yehudah Amichai so pointedly put in his poem, “Tourists,” the place where “A man buys fruits and vegetables for his family,” Jerusalem is a divided city where a significant portion of its inhabitants (not of all whom are even citizens) do not even recognize the sovereignty which that capital represents. What drives the rhetoric of “Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel” is the erasure of a divide separating aspirational theology and Realpolitik...

The tragedy in President Trump’s Jerusalem decision is that its ostensible obviousness belies its destructive potential, and not only in regards to violent protest or political fallout. Rather, it undermines the sacrality of Jerusalem for three religions, essentially relegating it only to one. As Isaiah saw it, that exclusivity undermines Jerusalem’s sacredness. As a lover of gold, Trump has inadvertently undermined Shemer’s song and given us a cheaper version: a gold-plated Jerusalem. Shemer saw a vision of the future even though it was still an illusion; Trump abandoned any spiritual vision for the cheaper shininess of the now.

I affirm all Judaism’s religious claims to Jerusalem. And I affirm all Islam’s religious claims to Jerusalem. And Christian claims. And I reject all of them as leverage to the modern secular nation-state called Israel. I can live with my prayer and my hope as having two separate objects. Jerusalem, a city divided, and the Jerusalem that aspires one day to be unified. But I can only tolerate the “unification” of my prayer and my hope if such unification maintains the object of my prayer as an integral part of the object of my hope. The U.N. Partition Plan made “internationalization” an exercise in pragmatism. They likely did not have Isaiah 56 in mind. But I do. And it is my prayer and my hope that moving forward, Isaiah’s words will once again be heard from the City of Peace, not as a triumphalist claim of sovereignty but as a true call for “unification.” Only then can the holy city of Jerusalem truly be a capital of anything.

Source: Tripadvisor

Rest of the article Gold-Plated Jerusalem can be read at Contending Modernities.

Israel's Shirat Hayam registry: Making it easier to decide who is Jewish and who is not

Isreali Chief Rabbinate issues certificates to hotels. restaurants and other food outlets confirming that kosher food is being sold there. The Rabbinate does not issue a kashrut certificate to a place where a non-Jew has unmediated access to food preparation. This policy restricts non-Jews' employment in the large service industry.  Recently, the policy was made more strict as now non-Jews cannot even serve food in establishments having the Rabbinate certificate. This, of course, means problems for thousands of people who have emigrated to Israel as Jews but are not recognized as Jews by the Israeli Rabbinate.

The bigger problem, according to Seth Farber, is, however, the two-year old Shirat Hayam registry of the Rabbinate which will check employees data and ensure that only Jews are employed in food establishments with their certificate. Following is an excerpt from the article (read the whole article Big Brother and the Rabbinate): 

In the context of the Knesset hearing, the question of “how do you know someone is Jewish” was put to the Religious Affairs Ministry. Unabashedly, the representative of the Carmiel (where some 40% of the population are immigrants from the FSU [former Sovet Union]) religious council said that the prospective worker is asked to present his or her identity number and then it is run against the “Shirat Hayam” national marriage registry. “The worker isn’t spoken to,” said the representative.

“The regulations say that the person with authority to look at this information” is charged with checking if the worker is Jewish. If someone isn’t certified by the rabbinate as Jewish, the establishment may be denied a kashrut certificate.

The Shirat Hayam registry is a relatively new phenomenon. It has only been in use for about two years, and was meant to ease the registration process for couples whose parents were married in Israel by making their parents’ ketubot, or Jewish marriage contracts, accessible. This in turn would allow the rabbinate to register couples for marriage without them having to produce additional paperwork (letters of Jewishness, etc).

But what is abundantly clear is that the Shirat Hayam registry – which by plan will be adopted by all of the local religious councils within the coming year or two – is essentially a tool meant to track everyone’s status. 

What’s even worse is that the information in the Shirat Hayam system extends well beyond whether you are registered as a Jew. It also identifies whether there was ever a conversion, divorce or adoption in your family, whether questions related to your personal status have ever been raised by a rabbinical court, or whether you have ever been married before. And all of this information is available to a clerk, who – going unchecked – is using it for purposes that you never agreed to or that were never intended. Indeed, Big Brother is here and he is sitting at the desk of your local religious council.
The evidence provided by the testimony in the Knesset highlights the fact that the rabbinate has launched a campaign to weed out anyone who has struggled to prove his or her Jewishness (and perhaps those who haven’t yet bothered). The information in the system is already – after two years – being abused, and it’s clear that this is only the beginning.

Databases which contain personal information about all of us are dangerous in the hands of criminals, but they might even be more dangerous in the hands of ideologues who believe that it is acceptable to use the information to advance their agenda. I’m worried about people stealing our personal information from the rabbinate’s database, but I’m even more worried about those who have access to it already.

The most intriguing part of 1984 and the fact that “Big Brother is watching” is that everyone goes about their business as if this is a good thing for society.

A Kashrut Certificate

Source: High Court strikes a blow to Chief Rabbinate's Kashrut-licensing monopoly

One would tend to agree with Seth Farber (that registry is a bigger problem) also because the Israeli  Supreme Court decided in September 2017 to allow other organizations to issue its own certificates about food preparation according to Jewish laws(though not Kashrut certificates which can still only be issued by the Chief Rabbinate). So, the authority of the Rabbinate on food establishments has decreased a bit (See  High Court strikes a blow to Chief Rabbinate's Kashrut-licensing monopoly).

Haredi Conscription: Battle between the Knesset and the Supreme Court continues

Two previous blog posts document the fight of the mainly secular Israelis to force Haredi Israelis to serve in the military. In the first blog post ( See Is studying religion a service to the state?), the history of the conflict is traced from the independence of Israel to 2012. In the second blog post (See Going to jail for studying Torah), the passage of the 2014 law, which was a compromise, was discussed.

The March 2014 law made room for multiple but opposing perspectives. Neither secularists nor Haredi liked it. Secularists did not like it because it did not have strict penalties for forcing the Haredi youth to serve in the military. The Haredi were unhappy because it had some weak injunctions for people who refuse to serve:

The new legislation sets annual quotas for drafting yeshiva students for military or national service, and mandates criminal penalties against draft evaders. However, the law doesn’t entail complete Haredi conscription, instead calling for a gradual annual increase in the number of ultra-Orthodox 18-year-olds drafted, and still allowing for small numbers of exemptions until 2017. (See Israel passes ultra-Orthodox draft law)

The Haredi parties vowed to change the 2014 law whenever they had the power to do so. In late 2014, there were policy disagreements within the government and elections were held in March 2015. The Likud Party won big in the elections and Netanyahu decided to form a government with primarily religious-right parties and not with centrist Yesh Atid, who was the main force behind the 2014 law. 

Source: Two new Supreme Court justices named

In November 2015, the ruling coalition, including Haredi parties Shas and United Torah Judaism, passed amendments to the 2014 law. These amendments diluted the original law and gave Haredi students more exemptions besides delaying the implementation of the law:

The amendment to the law for Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) conscription that was passed yesterday postpones the implementation of obligatory enlistment for full-time yeshiva students until 2020, though it was originally supposed to come into effect in 2017. It also gives the Defense Minister the authority to exempt yeshiva students after that date if he so wishes, “while bearing in mind” goals established by the government under the 2014 law. (See Analysis: Haredi parties wipe out Lapid's IDF draft law - but for how long?)

The crucial question was, however, will the Supreme Court accept it? Unlikely:

In this regard, it is worth looking back at the Tal Law, which provided a legal framework for haredi men to indefinitely postpone their military service until they reached the age of exemption, and at the reasons why the High Court declared it incommensurate with Israel’s basic laws.
The court said in 2012, that while there had been an increase in the number of haredi men enlisting to military or civilian service, the rate of increase was insufficient given the legal inequalities the Tal Law generated.
“Legislation that perpetuates the gaps and flaws of the lack of equality, to the extent which they currently exist, cannot be upheld,” wrote then-Supreme Court president Dorit Beinisch in the 2012 ruling.
In 2011, the last full year for which the High Court could see haredi enlistment statistics for their 2012 ruling, 1,282 ultra-Orthodox men enlisted to the IDF and 1,089 enlisted to the civilian service, totaling 2,371 haredi military or civilian service recruits.
This was just under 30% of the potential draft.
Bearing in mind the 30% rate of haredi enlistment in 2012 when the Tal Law was declared unconstitutional and the 33% rate of enlistment today, it seems highly unlikely that the High Court will deem the new amendment – which to all intents and purposes removes the legal obligation for haredi men to perform national service – commensurate with the requirements of equality before the law. (See Analysis: Haredi parties wipe out Lapid's IDF draft law - but for how long?)

In September 2017, the inevitable happened and the Supreme Court stuck down the law as unconstitutional and unreasonable.

The dramatic ruling on Tuesday set a one-year deadline to implement a different framework for handling the ultra-Orthodox draft.
The court was responding to four separate appeals — three of which claimed the current arrangement discriminated against non-Haredi Jews, and a fourth that argued it discriminated against Haredi Jews, who are being asked to increase their military draft rate while other minorities, especially Israeli Arabs, are not required to serve at all.
Eight justices, led by Chief Justice Miriam Naor, ruled that the current arrangement was increasing the inequality in the “draft burden,” rather than reducing it, which was the law’s stated purpose and the grounds for its constitutionality. That made it an “unconstitutional law,” the justices ruled.
One dissenter, Justice Noam Solberg, argued that the law had not been in effect long enough to determine its effect on the military draft, and therefore no determination could yet be made about its constitutionality. (See High Court strikes down law that postponed ultra-Orthodox draft)

The Haredi parties' leaders are furious and calling this decision unacceptable and dictatorial. Ya’acov Litzman, Israel's health minister and United Torah Judaism chairman said that the decision was "the worst and most wretched decision in the history of terrible decisions in the Jewish world." One of his party members, Yisrael Eichler,  called it "part of an all-out war on Judaism"(See Israel’s religious military exemption law is unconstitutional – Supreme Court and High Court strikes down the law that postponed ultra-Orthodox draft)). Religious Affairs Minister David Azulai and Shas party member claimed that the Supreme Court was fighting with the Jewish people, "In the Supreme Court ruling yesterday, the court said in effect that it wants to continue the dispute with the Jewish people. It chose to say it precisely a few days before Rosh Hashanah." The religious parties are now calling for passing a law to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction:

The time has come to make a legislative change and tell the High Court of Justice that you are not elected, but nominated" he said. Stop making disagreements with the Jewish people and ruling against the Knesset. (See Haredi MKs focus their rage on the Supreme Court)

Another way for religious parties to resolve this issue is to change the composition of the Supreme Court. The Justice minister, Ayelet Shaked, though not a member of a Haredi party, is working on making the court more conservative and more nationalist. She was able to bring two conservative judges on the Supreme Court in 2017. However, the change can take a long time. This means the issue will continue to bedevil Israeli leadership in the next few years.