Pakistani deep state again using Islamists?

Though religious nationalism was, for a large part, responsible for the creation of Pakistan, Pakistan has seen ebbs and flows of religious nationalism. For instance, Pakistani state tried to limit religious nationalism to symbolism in the early part of Pakistani history. The leadership, like in many other Muslim-majority countries, was generally secular and did not want religious law implemented in Pakistan. 

However, after the separation of East Pakistan, the state leadership decided to use Islam. The instrumentalization of Islam led to Islamization in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The main culprit in this area was General Zia who used Islamists to kill, maim and threaten the democrats. The militancy he introduced and the violence he allowed the Islamists to do, both inside and outside Pakistan, was unmatchable. He not only changed the society but also the military (he is the longest-serving chief of Pakistan Army, from 1976-88), making it more religious and adept at using Islamists for achieving their institutional objectives. 

One of Pakistan military's main institutional objectives is to control Pakistan's defense and foreign policies and intervene in any other area they like until Pakistani democrats are mature (notwithstanding its own efforts to not let the politicians attain maturity). Two other institutional objectives are keeping the Kashmir issue alive and working for a friendly government in Afghanistan. For all these objectives, Islamists come in handy. Because Islamists have difficulty collectively winning more than 10% of popular elections, they do not like democracy and are usually ready to destabilize democratically elected governments. Two examples of such destabilizations are in 1977 and 1996. Not surprisingly, they are also ready to support the military-led governments to implement their agenda as coming to power through the ballot box is a long shot dream. They supported both General Zia and General Musharraf martial laws and were rewarded with unprecedented power. Islamists also share Pakistani military's suspicions about India and think that "Hindu" India and "Muslim" Pakistan can never be friends. Both of them want India out of Kashmir. Therefore, Islamists are used by the Pakistani military to create problems for India in Indian-held Kashmir. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the interests of the Pakistani military and Islamists are aligned. The Pakistani military wants a friendly government, which accommodates Pashtuns. Islamists want the Taliban in power who are mostly Pashtuns. The Taliban are also against "Hindu" India, like the Pakistani military. 

Currently, Pakistan is going through another period of visible civil-military tensions. Both the civilian government and the military are looking for allies and support. When the military started its military operation, Zarb-e-Azb,  against militant Islamists in June 2014, there was a hope that the more than three decades old alliance between the military and the Islamists have finally been broken. This notion gained strength after the Army Public School massacre in which around 150 children died at the hand of Islamist militants in a military-managed school. However, currently, it appears that military has again decided to use Islamists to destabilize/defeat the civilian government. What has changed is that along with the old Islamists, the military is now working with some newly created or refurbished Islamist outfits. 

Milli Muslim League (MML) is the latest incarnation of the Jamat-ud-Dawa (JD) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). It is a new political party. Its creation was announced in August 2017. Ostensibly, the reason for the creation of this new party is to make Pakistan a real Islamic state. The MML president Saifullah Khalid said to the reporters on the MML launch, “We have decided to make a new political party, so that Pakistan is made a real Islamic and welfare state” (See JuD launches political party to contest upcoming polls).

The creation of the MML, however, also serves two objectives, both close to the heart of Pakistan's military. First, it promotes the legitimization of the JD and LeT as a legitimate political party and decreases pressure on Pakistan to ban all its activities. Second, it divides the vote bank of PML(N) which is the ruling party as well as leading center-right party in Pakistan and which is currently in a tussle with the military for civilian ascendency.

Poster of Milli Muslim League clearly showing the picture of Hafiz Saeed

Source: Ibcurdu.com

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan (TLP) is a sign of increasing Barelavi militancy. In Pakistan's history, Deobandis have long been linked with extremism and militancy but Barelvis, which also follow Imam Abu Hanifa and hence belong to the same Hanafi sect as Deobandi Muslims, were considered to be more mellow, syncretic, acquiescent and peaceful. Barelvis were thought to be folkish, believers in local spirits and saints and less interested in power as compared to Deobandis, who were considered dogmatic, believers in high religion and interested in implementing Sharia. This is, of course, a general description and at the individual level, there were always militant Barelvis as well as amenable Deobandis in Pakistan.

Barelvi militancy showed its strength in the anti-Ahmadi movement in the 1950s and then again reared its head in the mid-1970s when anti-Ahmadi movement 2.0 was in full swing. However, with the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslim, the militancy again decreased. The third resurgence of Brelavi militancy was mostly concentrated in and around Karachi in the 1990s. The organization leading it was Sunni Tehrik or Sunni Tehreek. The ST, which was recently renamed the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek, was formed in 1990 to prevent the mosques and madrasas of the Barelvi school of thought in Karachi from being “captured” by Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups.

Analysts believe Barelvi groups; especially the ST, have started politically exploiting the issue of blasphemy and the execution of Qadri has provided them with an opportunity to show their strength to counter the growing influence of Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups in the country. The ST's slogan was ‘Tauheen rasalat ki ek saza, sar tan se juda."(See Ditching the tag of mysticism, Barelvi militancy rears head in form of Sunni Tehreek).

The TLP is a new Islamist political party but is very similar to the ST. It has made its name for inciting violence and promoting militancy. The TLP claims on its website that it will work to make Pakistan an Islamic state through gradual and legal struggle:

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan also known as TLP is an Islamist political party. Its objective is to make Pakistan an Islamic state, governed by Shariat e Mohammadi, through a gradual legal, and political process. (See TLP website)

But its actions and statements belie such claims. The TLP was formed in 2015 in Karachi but gained support in 2016 after the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri, who had killed Punjab province's governor in 2011. Since then, it has been involved in protests, rallies and sit-ins, the most famous of which was in front of parliament (Who is leading this sit-in?)  in March 2016. Another of their rallies, in January 2017, disrupted traffic in Lahore.

TLP poster/banner

Source: Tehreek Labbaik Official (facebook page)

The nexus of military intelligence agencies and the TLP or Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasoolullah appears to have formed or strengthened after the disappearance of five bloggers in January 2017. These bloggers were liberal men who were critical of religious extremism and military's involvement in the political affairs of Pakistan. They were not involved in any kind of blasphemous activities. However, when they were picked up by the security/intelligence agencies, they were decried on the social media as anti-Islam bloggers who also wrote or promoted blasphemous ideas/writings. The abductors find it convenient to link the bloggers with blasphemy as in Pakistan, more than sixty people, who were accused of blasphemy, have been killed by vigilantes. Once one is accused of blasphemy in Pakistan, one is a sitting duck. As expected, the TLP immediately came out in support of jailing or killing bloggers. The chastened bloggers were released after a few weeks but the secret alliance of military with TLP appears to become closer. In recent elections, there were reports that TLP candidates were supported by the intelligence agencies. At present, in November 2017, the TLP has again resorted to "dharna politics" and have cut-off one part of Islamabad from the other for the last ten days.

Are Taliban religious nationalists or Pukhtun nationalists?

This issue has bedeviled analysts for a long time. The question keeps popping up as the solution of the Taliban insurgency in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is linked to it. Are they Pukhtun or Pashtun nationalists fighting to liberate their homeland or are they holy warriors fighting for the pristine Islam of the 7th century? Or if they are are a combination of both, which is the dominant ideology for the Taliban, Pukhtun nationalism or Islam/Islamism/pan-Islamism? 

In 2009, this issue was discussed with different shades of opinion making their case. Some claimed that Pukhtun nationalism was dominant and contended that the Taliban were the 'latest incarnation of Pukhtun nationalism' and 'the radical Islamist insurgency is itself a reassertion of the concept of Pushtunistan on both sides of the  Afghanistan-Pakistan border' as Kaplan did here (Saving Afghanistan). Others, and certainly the Taliban themselves, claim that they are Islamist or pan-Islamist i.e. believers in religious nationalism (like I Didn't Want To). Others have been more nuanced opinion as Michael Totten discussed this issue in 2009 (The Taliban and Pashtun Nationalism).  

The Taliban are more than an expression of Pashtun nationalism, of course. They represent a reactionary movement that idealizes the simplicity and extreme conservatism of 7th century Islam. By burnishing this ideology, the Taliban is able, absurdly, to attract support beyond its Pashtun base. 

The ethnic component, though, is a formidable one. It all but guaranteed a certain degreeof success by the Taliban in all of “Pashtunistan,” in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Yet all the while, the ethnic map imposes constraints, if not limits, on how far the Taliban can expand.

While many would argue that the Pakistani Taliban are different from the Afghan Taliban, the debate about their ideology does not change much. There is a popular perception in Pakistan that Pakistani Taliban were noble savages living in the blissful 'state of nature' before Pakistan army on the directives of the US entered tribal areas and destroyed the heaven. Imran Khan, leader of the party getting the second largest number of votes in last elections, believes in this theory of Pukhtun nationalism and claimed recently that sharia imposition was never one of Taliban demands, thus rejecting religious nationalism of Taliban ( Imposition of shariah is not Taliban demand: IK). His party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf won the provincial elections in the Pukhtunkhwa province, the province having Pukhtun majority and bordering Afghanistan. However, his coalition partners Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist party, believes otherwise and considers the Taliban as fellow religious nationalists, fighting to revive the glory of Islam. 

The current peace talk going on between the umbrella group of Taliban organizations, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has again focused attention on this issue. While Government of Pakistan (GOP) has tried to localize them and claimed that negotiations are about the specific tribal areas where Taliban are mostly based, Taliban and their negotiators have argued that the fight of Taliban is about Islam and so negotiations are about how to implement Shariah in the whole of Pakistan (Govt's committee waiting for Taliban's response).

One of the ways to tackle the issue will be to look whether the Taliban are ready to give up their tribal customs (or what they think as their culture) for Islam or vice versa? For instance, almost all Muslims believe that women education is recommended in Islam and this includes education of non-religious subjects. While the Taliban have tried to dodge the issue in the recent past, it is clear from their conduct and policies adopted during their five-year rule that they would prefer women limiting their study to basic Quran and Sunnah lessons. Similarly, while the Quran clearly speaks against the killing of innocents, the Taliban have shown their willingness to kill innocents, if they do not adhere to their (Taliban's) strict interpretations. After the US invasion, they have also engaged in kidnappings for ransom and drug trade, despite earlier acknowledging that these actions were forbidden in Islam. Drug trade was banned when the Taliban were ruling Afghanistan but now the Taliban not only allow it but profit from it. Clearly, the Taliban are not fully adhering to Islamic injunctions and using it to achieve their cultural, ethnic, group or personal objectives. 

However, the Taliban have always proclaimed themselves as soldiers of Islam and are very strict in observing Islamic ibadah and rituals. Using their pan-Islamic message, they have been successful in decreasing the strength of tribal loyalties that are very important for Pukhtun culture. This success, albeit, has remained confined to Pukhtuns and non-Pukhtun Muslims have rejected the Taliban's pan-Islamism. In fact, ethnic and sectarian divisions and boundaries in Afghanistan, 99% Muslim, have deepened after the Taliban emergence. In Afghanistan, the Taliban represent not Muslim nationalism but Sunni nationalism or even more restricted Salafi (Wahhabi) or Deobandi nationalism. They have failed to present themselves as an Islamic force to other ethnic and sectarian groups in Afghanistan and commentators are talking of two Afghanistans, one for Pukhtuns and other for non-Pukhtuns.

So, if the Taliban are not true Islamic warriors, are they true adherents of Pashtunwali, ancient code of Pukhtun nationalism? Not really. When the Taliban rose, they first rejected the tribal elders and jirga (an assembly of elders to settle disputes), both essential tenets of the Pashtunwali.  According to the code, badal or revenge was limited to the perpetrator, his family or his tribe. Under the Taliban, badal of a Taliban was extended to any anti-Taliban, a gross misinterpretation. Massacres of innocents and abduction of women of rivals are again not part of Pashtunwali but were part of the Taliban tactics.

Pukhtun Jirga (assembly of elders)

Source: Foreign Policy

So, are the Taliban religious nationalists or Pukhtun nationalists? They are both, meaning they are neither true religious/Muslim nationalists nor true Pukhtun nationalists. Like most groups, their history, ethnicity, religion, society, and culture has influenced them. The Taliban cannot eliminate any of these influences even if they want to. They are a farrago of Pakhtunwali, Deobandi school, and Salafism (Wahhabism) so they do not entirely and precisely follow the predominant practices of Pakhtunwali, Deobandi school, and Salafism.

The Taliban were students of madressahs of Deobandi sect of Islam, but quite different than the Deobandism practiced in other parts of South Asia. What Taliban practiced was a hotchpotch of Pashtunwali-Deobandism[12] with Saudi-inspred practices. The Saudi influence came up with the Saudi money in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.[13] They attempted to create more or less a state modeled on the principles of Saudi Arabia.[14] The Taliban ideology could be understood from their imposition of ‘Sharia’ based laws and banning of certain practices which they deemed against Islamic traditions. The Taliban ideology could be clearly examined by analyzing their acts and implementation of tribal-based practices. 

This elusive mix resulted in the edifice which Taliban tried to erect and which shocked the world. The Taliban clerics defined their state as true manifestation of an ideal Islamic one. In that sense they tried to implement a tribal customs-mixed Islam on Afghan populace that the world had never seen before. The Taliban’s Saudi influences were harsher than that of Saudis as they lacked oil wealth to appease the masses and Afghan society though tribal but not homogeneous Taliban went further in following the Saudi model and considered all of their practices as ‘true’ interpretations of Quran. As Deobandism is more of an urban phenomenon in India and Pakistan[15] the Deobandism of Taliban was much different and their practices were more inspired of Saudi system and the laws.[16] Despite of the world’s abhorrence of their imposed laws the Taliban laws were considerably well received in Pashtun dominated areas as most of these edicts were already part of Pashtun culture. (See Understanding Taliban through the prism of Pashtunwali code)

Okay, but can we ascertain which is the major influence on the Taliban, Islam or Pashtunwali? It is difficult as the Taliban are a collection of groups fighting under the overall command of the Taliban leader Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada. Most of these groups are close-knitted men, sometimes from one tribe, fighting under the command of one tribal leader in a particular area. Based on the preference of leader or tribe, either of the three influences (Pashtunwali, Deobandi or Salafism) can be dominant.