The nexus of religious populism and digital authoritarianism in Pakistan

The nexus of religious populism and digital authoritarianism in Pakistan

Source: https://www.citizenlab.co/

Abstract

Pakistan’s democracy has a turbulent political history. In the seven decades since its creation, the country has faced four military-led dictatorships and another two decades under indirect military rule. Given this political trend, authoritarianism is not a novel phenomenon in the country. Digital authoritarianism, however, is a relatively new domain of oppression. This paper looks at how a political party in power and the “establishment” (military elite and its civilian collaborators) have been increasingly controlling digital mediums as well as weaponizing cyberspace. This dual control and usage allow for growing digital authoritarianism.

Using the case study of Islamist civilizational populist Imran Khan’s government (2018-2022) and its collaboration with the military establishment in enforcing digital authoritarianism, this article provides a four levels of assessment of internet governance in Pakistan: 1. whole network level, 2. sub-network level, 3. proxy level, and 4. user level. In addition, the role of Khan’s political party’s Islamist civilizational populist outlook in contributing to authoritarianism is also discussed. A lot of censorship happens around the ideas of protecting Islam and Pakistan’s Muslim identity. Thus, Pakistan’s digital space is oppressive where ideas of religion, ontological insecurity, and nationalism are weaponized to legitimize the state’s growing authoritarianism.  

Read the article at the European Center for Populism Studies

A Quest for Identity: The Case of Religious Populism in Pakistan

Pakistani Identity

 Source: BBC

Abstract:

Since its founding, both civil and military Pakistani governments have used religious populism to consolidate support and legitimize their actions. This has paved the way for religious populism to become a part of the nation’s cultural imagination and identity. During the country’s “infant” or “fragile” democratic phase, religious populism was repeatedly used to consolidate support. Religious parties and groups hold great political sway in the county. Through the use of religious populism, these factions have been allowed to nurture their own “people” who are partisan towards “others.” The weak level of governance, political turmoil, and distrust in institutional capabilities has pushed the public into the arms of religious populists. 

The article can be read at European Center for Populism Studies

Military and Populism: A Global Tour with a Special Emphasis on the Case of Pakistan

 Pakistan army chief General Qamar Bajwa and Prime Minister Imran Khan in Miranshah

Source: Khyber TV

Abstract

Although populism has become a focus of research in the last decade, there hasn’t been much academic work on how militaries around the world have reacted/acted to the rise of populist leaders. There is some timeworn research on the relationship of militaries in Latin America with various left-wing populist governments and leaders from the 1930s to 1970s. Given that populism was largely understood in the context of left-wing politics, with the rise of right-wing populism, the literature on the military and populism needs to be advanced by studying the relationship between right-wing populism and the military. This article aims to address this gap by looking at the right-wing populism case study of Pakistan, where the military has actively participated in the rise of a religious populist leader. To situate the case study within the larger literature of the military and populism, the dynamics and history of military associations with populism and populist leaders are revisited in the article’s first part.

The article can be read at European Center for Populism Studies

As Imran Khan fails, he turns to religious nationalism to save him

Imran Khan came to power as a populist right-wing politician. His key support came from the powerful Pakistani military, which arranged favorable judicial verdicts against ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and other leaders of (Sharif's party) Pakistan Muslim League (N), a sycophantic media, a hostile atmosphere for PMLN second-tier leadership forcing them to change loyalties, and rigging on the election day.

The military also helped discredit the religious credentials of the right-of-center PMLN leadership by painting them as pro-Ahmadi or pro-Qadiani. A new extremist organization, the Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), was supported by the military to arrange protests all over the country and to force the country to come to a standstill. The military refused to come to the aid of the civilian government which it was constitutionally bound to. Furthermore, once Sharif's government bowed before the extremists, an army general was photographed paying money to the TLP protesters publicly. 

All this was, however, before the 2018 elections. As time passed by and the economy and governance deteriorated sharply, the confidence of even Imran Khan's supporters in his competence went downhill. Blaming the opposition and using the COVID-19 pandemic to hide misgovernance worked for a period but when corruption and mismanagement soared and the military also reduced its support, instrumentalizing Islam was the only possible way to retain popularity.

During the last three years, Imran Khan has reversed the trend of decreasing religious nationalism in Pakistan that was almost two decades old. As explained in my book, State, Nationalism, and Islamization, religious nationalism increased during the 30- year period from the early1970s to the late 1990s. With the start of the new century, there was a change, and the Pakistani state reduced (not end) its support for religious nationalism and extremism. 

Following are some of the key actions taken by the Imran Khan government/party to instrumentalize Islam after he came to power in 2018:

1. Riyasat-e-Madina rhetoric: From his maiden speech after becoming the Prime Minister, Imran has vowed to make Pakistan a newer version of the Madina state. In his maiden speech, he said that his 22-year struggle was aimed at turning Pakistan into a state like the Madina state, led by Hazrat Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him). He said that the West has adopted riyasat-e-Madina's principles of the welfare state, accountability, simplicity, justice, spending on education, etc., while Pakistan had not. Importantly, during the last three years, he has not worked consistently on any of the above objectives. Pakistan is more corrupt today than it was in 2018 while the accountability regime and courts have only targeted his political opposition.

2. Even during the height of COVID 19 pandemic, Imran Khan was not ready to anger religious extremists and temporarily stop congregation prayers. He risked outbreak of virus and deaths of hundreds of thousands Pakistanis just to appease extremists. Most religious conservatives were ready for the temporary end of congregation prayers as almost all of 50 Muslim-majority countries had done so but Imran was not reasdy to anger extremists who were a minority.

Source: Republicworld.com

3. Imran's government intends to implement the Single National Curriculum which increases the amount of religious content in the primary and secondary school curriculum, including making Arabic mandatory. This will also pave way for the hiring of thousands of madrassa-educated men by the government, influencing not only the teaching of Islamiat and Arabic but also of other subjects and the overall milieu.

4. Imran Khan has twice bowed before the TLP extremists and accepted their demands even when the military was supporting him. He accepted such ridiculous demands as declaring the French ambassador persona non grata. The most recent agreement between the TLP and the government has been kept in secret which shows that it also has some ridiculous and illegal demands. He has also said that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which has been implicated in the murder of thousands of innocent Pakistanis, would be pardoned.

5. Imran Khan has repeatedly blamed women clothes for increase in crimes agianst women and then repeatedly claimed that he didn't mean what he said or people didn't understand what he was saying. These statements curry favor with the conservatives who also argue that crimes agianst women are largly due to women's independence, clothes, and activities outside their homes.

5. Rehmatul Lil Alameen Scholarship Program: Prime Minister Imran Khan also launched the Rehmatul Lil Alameen Scholarship Program 2021 which would help finance undergraduate education of underprivileged and deserving students across the country.

6. National Rahmatul-Lil-Alameen Authority was launched by the PM in 2021. This authority aims to promote research on Seeratun Nabi (Peace Be Upon Him) and guide youth on multiple aspects of the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) life. According to PM Khan, it will monitor media for any blasphemous content and school curriculum for promoting the true image of Islam.

7. The Punjab Government, also led by the PTI, decided in 2021 to make Naazrah Quran education compulsory for classes 1-5 for schools across the province,  This was in addition to the Compulsory Teaching of the Holy Quran Act, 2018.

8. The PTI Punjab Chief Minister Usman Buzdar has also ordered that the recitation of Darood-e-Ibrahimi (verses in praise for Holy Prophet (PBUH)) before the national anthem and after the recitation of the Holy Quran must be ensured at the public school assemblies. 

9. Imran Khan has raised issue of Islamophobia at various fora, including the UN General Assembly. He has also written letters to major social media companies as well as leaders of 50 Muslim majority states to highlight the issue and to call for its end. However, crucially, he has been very silent about what is happening to Uighar Muslims in China or Sri Lankan Muslims, showing his hypocrisy and duplicity.

Atif Main, Imran Khan and Pakistan

The newly minted government in Pakistan removed Professor Atif Mian, an eminent economist belonging to the Ahmadi minority, from its Economic Advisory Council (EAC) on September 7th. This news was heard by many with profound disbelief. Pakistan is facing a balance of payment crisis and Princeton Professor Atif Mian, who was included in the list of the top 25 young economists in the world by the IMF, could have helped plan a fast recovery. But it was not to be. Religious nationalism and the fear of the other prevented not only Professor Atif Mian but also Harvard Professor Asim Khwaja and University College London Professor Imran Rasul, both of whom resigned from the EAC in protest over the removal of Professor Atif Mian. 

Pakistan became an independent state in 1947 but after more than seventy years and one bloody and traumatic separation (when East Pakistan became Bangladesh), the debate over whether Pakistan was created for Muslims to live their lives freely without persecution or for implementing Islamic Shariah goes on. However, almost everyone agrees that Islam’s contribution to Pakistani nationalism is significant and instrumental. Muslims, living in different parts of British India, did not have much else in common except the fear of Hindu persecution after independence. The marker of difference was Islam even if the desire for implementation of Islamic Shariah was not universal.

Professor Atif Mian

Source: Princeton University

Pakistan is not known for ensuring equal rights for its religious minorities. In fact, it is known to be one of the countries where religious minorities regularly face official and social discrimination. So, Pakistanis and others should not have been surprised by Professor Atif Mian’s expulsion but it was a shock for a number of reasons. First, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, which won the 25th July elections, claimed to be the harbinger of a more inclusive Pakistan. Its election slogan was Do Nahi Aik Pakistan (translation: Not two, but one Pakistan). Second, Prime Minister Imran Khan, the charismatic cricketer-turned politician that led Pakistan the PTI to victory, does not subscribe to conservative religious views, though he has not refrained from using Islam to gain an edge over his political rivals.  Imran Khan lived in the United Kingdom for almost twenty years and his children are British citizens, living, with his former wife, Jemima Goldsmith, a rich journalist and heiress of Jewish descent, near London.,

Finally, the PTI government knew that Professor Atif Mian was an Ahmadi and not only still appointed him to the EAC but also forcefully defended his appointment when the backlash started. Fawad Chaudhry, the Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting, called those protesting against the appointment extremists and said that the government would not bow to the extremists. He also announced ‘Protecting minorities is our responsibility. It is the religious duty of each Muslim, not just the government, to protect minorities and respect those that they live with.’ However, two days after this statement, the PTI government capitulated and removed Professor Atif Main from the EAC. 

What contributed to this capitulation? Many analysts would blame religious nationalism but that is not the whole truth. Besides religious nationalism, weak political institutions and the lack of a democratic culture also contributes to surrender before the religious hardliners. Prime Minister Imran Khan is socially a liberal but joined an onslaught of religious groups last year to weaken the previous government. The issue was again related to Ahmadis. The Ahmadis or Ahmadiyyah consider themselves Muslim but do not consider Prophet Muhammad as the last and final prophet. They were initially considered a Muslim sect but gradually many Muslim-majority countries and societies have come to regard them as heretic and non-Muslim. They are persecuted not only in Pakistan but also in Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Gulf sheikhdoms, Iran, Indonesia and Malaysia. Pakistan declared Ahmadis non-Muslim is 1974 and then placed additional restrictions on their freedom of religion in the 1980s. The last government, while working on electoral reforms, proposed an inconsequential change in the oath of major office holders that contained an assertion that there was no prophet after Prophet Muhammad. This proposal was approved by the opposition parties, including the PTI, after lengthy deliberations. However, when some religious groups started protesting against the change and claimed that the government had made the change on the demand of the Ahmadis, all the opposition parties joined them. The Pakistan military, which because of four successful coups has ruled Pakistan for more than thirty years and is the strongest political player, also not so clandestinely supported the religious groups to weaken the civilian government. The media, under pressure of the military, also bolstered the opposition and in the end, the change was dropped and the law minister had to resign. The issue did not end even after that and the PTI and other opposition parties portrayed the previous government as a supporter of Ahmadis and this contributed to the loss of its support – and defeat –  in the July national elections.

The succumbing to the religious groups by the current PTI government is thus linked to religious nationalism and a political landscape where democratic governments cannot assert themselves because the religious groups and the military constantly harass them. Sometimes, media groups, opposition parties and the judiciary also join them in keeping civilian democratic governments weak and ineffective. Three different political parties have ruled Pakistan since 2008. Each one of them has faced opposition from the same quarters and each one of them has yielded to pressure from the religious right because the religious right is not alone. 

Pakistani deep state again using Islamists?

Though religious nationalism was, for a large part, responsible for the creation of Pakistan, Pakistan has seen ebbs and flows of religious nationalism. For instance, Pakistani state tried to limit religious nationalism to symbolism in the early part of Pakistani history. The leadership, like in many other Muslim-majority countries, was generally secular and did not want religious law implemented in Pakistan. 

However, after the separation of East Pakistan, the state leadership decided to use Islam. The instrumentalization of Islam led to Islamization in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The main culprit in this area was General Zia who used Islamists to kill, maim and threaten the democrats. The militancy he introduced and the violence he allowed the Islamists to do, both inside and outside Pakistan, was unmatchable. He not only changed the society but also the military (he is the longest-serving chief of Pakistan Army, from 1976-88), making it more religious and adept at using Islamists for achieving their institutional objectives. 

One of Pakistan military's main institutional objectives is to control Pakistan's defense and foreign policies and intervene in any other area they like until Pakistani democrats are mature (notwithstanding its own efforts to not let the politicians attain maturity). Two other institutional objectives are keeping the Kashmir issue alive and working for a friendly government in Afghanistan. For all these objectives, Islamists come in handy. Because Islamists have difficulty collectively winning more than 10% of popular elections, they do not like democracy and are usually ready to destabilize democratically elected governments. Two examples of such destabilizations are in 1977 and 1996. Not surprisingly, they are also ready to support the military-led governments to implement their agenda as coming to power through the ballot box is a long shot dream. They supported both General Zia and General Musharraf martial laws and were rewarded with unprecedented power. Islamists also share Pakistani military's suspicions about India and think that "Hindu" India and "Muslim" Pakistan can never be friends. Both of them want India out of Kashmir. Therefore, Islamists are used by the Pakistani military to create problems for India in Indian-held Kashmir. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the interests of the Pakistani military and Islamists are aligned. The Pakistani military wants a friendly government, which accommodates Pashtuns. Islamists want the Taliban in power who are mostly Pashtuns. The Taliban are also against "Hindu" India, like the Pakistani military. 

Currently, Pakistan is going through another period of visible civil-military tensions. Both the civilian government and the military are looking for allies and support. When the military started its military operation, Zarb-e-Azb,  against militant Islamists in June 2014, there was a hope that the more than three decades old alliance between the military and the Islamists have finally been broken. This notion gained strength after the Army Public School massacre in which around 150 children died at the hand of Islamist militants in a military-managed school. However, currently, it appears that military has again decided to use Islamists to destabilize/defeat the civilian government. What has changed is that along with the old Islamists, the military is now working with some newly created or refurbished Islamist outfits. 

Milli Muslim League (MML) is the latest incarnation of the Jamat-ud-Dawa (JD) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). It is a new political party. Its creation was announced in August 2017. Ostensibly, the reason for the creation of this new party is to make Pakistan a real Islamic state. The MML president Saifullah Khalid said to the reporters on the MML launch, “We have decided to make a new political party, so that Pakistan is made a real Islamic and welfare state” (See JuD launches political party to contest upcoming polls).

The creation of the MML, however, also serves two objectives, both close to the heart of Pakistan's military. First, it promotes the legitimization of the JD and LeT as a legitimate political party and decreases pressure on Pakistan to ban all its activities. Second, it divides the vote bank of PML(N) which is the ruling party as well as leading center-right party in Pakistan and which is currently in a tussle with the military for civilian ascendency.

Poster of Milli Muslim League clearly showing the picture of Hafiz Saeed

Source: Ibcurdu.com

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan (TLP) is a sign of increasing Barelavi militancy. In Pakistan's history, Deobandis have long been linked with extremism and militancy but Barelvis, which also follow Imam Abu Hanifa and hence belong to the same Hanafi sect as Deobandi Muslims, were considered to be more mellow, syncretic, acquiescent and peaceful. Barelvis were thought to be folkish, believers in local spirits and saints and less interested in power as compared to Deobandis, who were considered dogmatic, believers in high religion and interested in implementing Sharia. This is, of course, a general description and at the individual level, there were always militant Barelvis as well as amenable Deobandis in Pakistan.

Barelvi militancy showed its strength in the anti-Ahmadi movement in the 1950s and then again reared its head in the mid-1970s when anti-Ahmadi movement 2.0 was in full swing. However, with the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslim, the militancy again decreased. The third resurgence of Brelavi militancy was mostly concentrated in and around Karachi in the 1990s. The organization leading it was Sunni Tehrik or Sunni Tehreek. The ST, which was recently renamed the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek, was formed in 1990 to prevent the mosques and madrasas of the Barelvi school of thought in Karachi from being “captured” by Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups.

Analysts believe Barelvi groups; especially the ST, have started politically exploiting the issue of blasphemy and the execution of Qadri has provided them with an opportunity to show their strength to counter the growing influence of Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups in the country. The ST's slogan was ‘Tauheen rasalat ki ek saza, sar tan se juda."(See Ditching the tag of mysticism, Barelvi militancy rears head in form of Sunni Tehreek).

The TLP is a new Islamist political party but is very similar to the ST. It has made its name for inciting violence and promoting militancy. The TLP claims on its website that it will work to make Pakistan an Islamic state through gradual and legal struggle:

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan also known as TLP is an Islamist political party. Its objective is to make Pakistan an Islamic state, governed by Shariat e Mohammadi, through a gradual legal, and political process. (See TLP website)

But its actions and statements belie such claims. The TLP was formed in 2015 in Karachi but gained support in 2016 after the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri, who had killed Punjab province's governor in 2011. Since then, it has been involved in protests, rallies and sit-ins, the most famous of which was in front of parliament (Who is leading this sit-in?)  in March 2016. Another of their rallies, in January 2017, disrupted traffic in Lahore.

TLP poster/banner

Source: Tehreek Labbaik Official (facebook page)

The nexus of military intelligence agencies and the TLP or Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasoolullah appears to have formed or strengthened after the disappearance of five bloggers in January 2017. These bloggers were liberal men who were critical of religious extremism and military's involvement in the political affairs of Pakistan. They were not involved in any kind of blasphemous activities. However, when they were picked up by the security/intelligence agencies, they were decried on the social media as anti-Islam bloggers who also wrote or promoted blasphemous ideas/writings. The abductors find it convenient to link the bloggers with blasphemy as in Pakistan, more than sixty people, who were accused of blasphemy, have been killed by vigilantes. Once one is accused of blasphemy in Pakistan, one is a sitting duck. As expected, the TLP immediately came out in support of jailing or killing bloggers. The chastened bloggers were released after a few weeks but the secret alliance of military with TLP appears to become closer. In recent elections, there were reports that TLP candidates were supported by the intelligence agencies. At present, in November 2017, the TLP has again resorted to "dharna politics" and have cut-off one part of Islamabad from the other for the last ten days.