More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran

The tussle between the Islamic/Shiite identity and the Persian ethnolinguistic identity is continuing. Since the 19th century or even before, Iranians are debating which of their two identities is real and authentic and which one is affected and false or which one is dominant and which one is recessive. The Iranian state also sways, sometimes moving in one direction and then in the opposite direction. During the time of Pahlavi dynasty (1925-79), the Persian identity remained the ascendant and principal identity but since the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic identity became the paramount identity while Persian identity became recessive and invisible.

However, during the last decade, it appears the pendulum has changed direction again. The Persian identity is rising and there has been an attempt by the elite to appropriate it, without rejecting the Islamic identity. Former President Ahmadinejad was the first one from the top elite of the Islamic regime to also acknowledge/lay claim on the Persian identity (See blog post Afraid of Ahmadinejad). He loaned the famed Cyrus Cylinder from the British Museum in 2014 and exhibited it in Iran,  taking pride in ancient Persian history, while not discarding his Islamic identity (He claimed, without much evidence, that Cyrus was mentioned in the Holy Quran). Last year, there was more evidence that the people and political elite are embracing the Persian identity and do not consider it contradictory to their Islamic identity. In October 2016, thousands of Iranians visited Cyrus's tomb and President Rouhani joined the celebrations via Instagram, “Persepolis is one of the invaluable and unique remains of the ancient history of this land, which demonstrates the antiquity of the civilization, the ingenuity, the wisdom, and the management skills of the great people of Iran, as well as their monotheism.” (See blog post Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?). The last part of the message establishes a link between Cyrus and Islam (i.e. monotheism) and makes sure that Rouhani is not accused of rejecting Islam. This embracing of both identities is new for the elite but many Iranians have no problem doing it. As explained in a previous blog post, in the Iranian society, many groups embrace both religious and ethnolinguistic identities:

However, it would be a mistake to consider both groups as mutually exclusive and some scholars, even partisans, do not completely reject the arguments of their rivals. Except for the opinionated, the difference between the two groups is whether the emphasis is placed on religion or ethnolinguistic characteristics as the primary constituent to the Iranian identity.

For example, many Persian nationalists claim that Islam in its true form is only practiced (i.e. Shia/Twelver sect Islam) in Iran and Islam was saved from Arabs and others only by Iranians. So, they view Islam as part of Iranian identity but do not accept that Islam gave Iranians a new identity. Instead, they claim that it was Iranians, a group at a much higher level of civilization than Arabs, that saved Islam by adopting it, otherwise, Islam's achievements would have been few and it would have been far less successful. 

Similarly, Islamic nationalists accept that Iranian Islam (Twelver sect) is superior and give homage to ethnolinguistic identity perspective by arguing that Iranians have a special affinity with the true religion, Islam, as they are special, seekers of what is true and right. For them, the Aryan/Iranian/Shiite Islam was and is the real Islam while the Semitic/Arab/Sunni Islam is the adulterated false version, despite Prophet Muhammad being an Arab. (See blog post Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity)

Source: Shrine of Sahabi Salman Al Farsi (The Persian)

Amir Taheri's article informs us how efforts to bring Iran and Islam closer has led to the renovation of the tomb of Salman Farsi (Salman, the Persian), who was a Persian and one of the earliest non-Arab converts of Islam and a confidant of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). He also talks about the recent popularity of non-Islamic names in Iran:

The current new fascination that many in Iran feel for Salman is part of the movement for “Iranian Islam” which has been gaining ground in the past few years. Iranian history in the past 15 centuries has often see-sawed between religion and nationalism. The rise of one has often been accompanied with the decline of the other and vice versa.

“Partly because of dissatisfaction with the role of (Shi’ite) clerics in politics, Iran is experiencing a growing anti-religious trend,” says Mehrangiz Bayat, a Tehran researcher.
That analysis is backed by some prominent clerics. For example, Grand Ayatollah Shubeir Zanjani, one of the top clerics in Qom, warned last week that involvement in politics had contributed to the decline of the authority and popularity of the Shi’ite clergy in Iran.

Ultra-nationalists, including pan-Iranists who dream of reviving the Sassanid Empire in one form or another, have seized the popular disaffection with the ruling clergy as template for attacking Islam as “an alien Arab religion imposed on Aryan Iranians by the sword.” They ignore the fact that the mass of Iranians converted to Islam long after the 80-year-old Arab occupation of parts of Iran had ended. The concept of the “Iranian” or ”Aryan Islam” has been launched to counter the claim of “alien Islam”....

According to reports, which cannot be independently verified, the “brain” behind the idea of an “Aryan Islam” is an obscure cleric named Hassan Yaaqubi who, although he has never been seen or heard in public, is supposed to have authored more than 40 books.
Other clerics have tried to promote the idea of an “Aryan Islam” by claiming that Hussein Ibn Ali, son of Ali Ibn Abitaleb and Fatimah, married Bibi Shahrbanu a daughter of the last Sassanian King Yazdegerd, initiating a fusion of Islam and Iran. “All descendants of Hussein have Iranian blood in their veins,” says Ayatollah Sobhani. “This means an unbreakable human bond exists between Islam and Iran.”

Iranian nationalists, however, reject that idea and claim that Bibi Shahrbanu, whose shrine near Tehran attracts millions of pilgrims every year had been taken a captive and never converted to Islam.

Another cleric, Ayatollah Husseini Qazwini, claims that Iran’s Islam bond was strengthened by the Twelfth Imam, known as the Hidden Mahdi al-Montazar, emerged from his Long Absence in secret and married a girl from Tehran, ensuring the continuation of the “sacred line of Ali” with generation after generation of people with “Iranian blood in their veins.”

However, the traditional Iranian conflict between nationalism and religion seems set to intensify. According to government sources, more and more Iranians now use non-Islamic names for their new-born children. That has led to a decision by the Central Registration Office at the Ministry of Interior last Thursday to toughen rules for using “non-Islamic” names.

Spokesman for the registration office Seyf-Allah Abutorabi told a press conference that the ministry would also help those who wish to replace their non-Islamic names to do so with a minimum of bureaucratic hassle. (See Iranians Debate the Reality of ‘Aryan Islam’)

Sending people to heaven by force or a whip

A recent controversy in Iran brought into focus the use of the state to enforce religion, a tactic used by states based on religious nationalism.

According to Al-monitor, six young men and women Iranians were arrested after they posted a video of them dancing to Pharrell Williams’ hit song, Happy (See Rouhani, critics debate 'path to heaven' ). President Rouhani, who doesn't control justice department, was not amused and remarked, 

Do not interfere so much in people’s lives, even out of compassion. … Let people choose their own path to heaven. We cannot send people to heaven by force or a whip. 

Source: Rouhani encourages political freedom in Iran

Conservative clergy establishment that controls justice department and is wary of Rouhani's overtures to the West, blasted him for these remarks and not only questioned his excellent clerical credentials but also accused of moving away from Imam Khomeini's path ( See Rouhani accused of trying to separate religion, administration). Hard-line cleric Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a member of the Assembly of Experts and director of the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute in Qom said, 

That some say the administration does not have a responsibility for the people’s religion, but that the administration’s only responsibility was to remove the sanctions — and not through resistance but through diplomacy — is against Imam [Khomeini]’s path. Did Imam start an uprising because of sanctions and the economy? Did this many martyrs sacrifice their lives for their stomachs and sanctions?

Saudi Arabian and Pakistani states have also tried to send people to heaven using a whip. Under They have tried to legislate and enforce good behavior. Good behavior or good religious behavior, however, can only come from people's own free will. Enforcement usually leads to false piety and hypocrisy. 

In Pakistan, during the last two decades, there has been a manifold increase in people travelling to Saudi Arabia for visits to the holy sites. In a poor country in need of foreign exchange, millions of dollars are spent each year on these travels. Similarly, millions more are spent to arrange festivals relating to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)'s birthday. Although I do not have statistics, generally it is agreed that more people are praying in mosques than before. But has Pakistanis also witnessed a corresponding increase in piety or spirituality or humility or a decrease in fraud or corruption in the last two decades? Very few Pakistanis can answer this question in affirmative. So, Islamization has only lead to superficial and overt religiosity. As Rouhani said, 'whip' has not moved them any closer to God or heaven.      

Afraid of Ahmadinejad?

On June 4, Al-Monitor correspondent in Tehran reported about a possible return of former Iranian President Ahmadinejad (See Is Ahmadinejad plotting a comeback?).

On June 3, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made his first major speech since leaving office last year. He praised Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who died 25 years ago on June 4, and said that Iran’s enemies have not yet realized that Iranians would defend the Iranian revolution “until the last breath.” Ahmadinejad, however, did not speak about the one thing that has been a source of speculation: his political return.On May 31, his brother Davoud Ahmadinejad said that the chances of the former president running for the presidency again were “very high.”while Davoud’s comments did not receive the usual Ahmadinejad-type attention, it seems that other forces in Iran are taking his return to politics seriously, and are intent on preventing it.The arrest of two political figures with close ties to Ahmadinejad, as well as the constant criticism directed at the former president by some of his own former ministers, indicates that the possibility of Ahmadinejad returning to the political arena is being taken seriously by the country's right-wing political elite.

Source: Is Ahmadinejad Coming Back In From The Cold?

However, correspondent also reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to give importance to Ahmadinejad.

Although Ahmadinejad's faction was eliminated from politics following the presidential elections, Khamenei appointed Ahmadinejad as a member in the Expediency Discernment Council. Also, last fall, during the mourning ceremony of Ashoura, he was sitting next to the supreme leader. Two months ago, other images were published showing Ahmadinejad and Khamenei next to each other during the second night of the mourning ceremony of "Fatimiyah."

What these images might mean is that, in spite of his disagreements with Ahmadinejad, Khamenei still views him as an influential political figure or that at least Ahmadinejad is not yet completely removed from the list of people close to Khamenei.

Given this tacit support by Khamenei, neither Ahmadinejad nor his supporters seem deterred. Davari said in April, “I assure you that currently we do not have an organized plan for the next elections. However, this might change in the future.” He continued, "If these anti-people policies of the current administration continue, then I think Ahmadinejad will restart his political activities to defend the people's rights."

That right-wing clerics, ministers and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e-Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami) are against former president's return is understandable. Though a loyal protege of the Supreme Leader during his first term, Ahmadinejad became increasingly independent in his second term and tried to chart a more nationalistic and less religious course (See Missing Mahmoud?). He even tried to defy the Supreme Leader and contested his authority. The final act of Ahmadinejad's betrayal was trying to get his chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, elected as President in 2013 presidential elections. Mashaei was intensely disliked by the right wing because of his promotion of Iranian territorial nationalism, among other things (Mashaei was eventually disqualified by the right wing Guardian Council that vets all presidential candidates) (See Who's Afraid of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?).

The question is why the Supreme Leader is giving importance to Ahmadinejad thereby giving confidence to his supporters and fueling rumors while also ordering (or at least consenting to) the arrest of Ahmadinejad's supporters. Judiciary and police are in control of the Supreme Leader so the arrests could not have happened without his knowledge. Some analysts argue that the Supreme Leader is supporting Ahmadinejad to keep the pressure on the new Rouhani government:

As BBC Persian analyst Hossein Bastani noted, it's highly unlikely that former President Mohammad Khatami would be allowed to sit near the supreme leader in public. Khatami, a reformist, was never considered to be close to Khamenei, who publicly expressed support for Ahmadinejad's anti-Western stances. 

Bastani believes that Khamenei could use Ahmadinejad to put pressure on Iran's new government team, which has been accused by hard-liners of giving in to the West and the United States.(See Is Ahmadinejad Coming Back In From The Cold?)

However, there are many other ways to keep the Rouhani government on the "straight path." The reason Khamenei is courting Ahmadinejad perhaps lies in what Ahmadinejad represents. He has impressive nationalist credentials and is also religiously devout. The question is why Iranians need the rule of the clergy (velayat-e-faqih doctrine) when they can elect people like Ahmadinejad? The whole argument that only clergy can save Iran and Islam from external threats becomes doubtful. Ahmadinejad has not helped his case by claiming to be in communication with the Hidden Imam (thus debunking clergy legitimacy because they claim to rule in the name of the Hidden Imam) and also promoting pre-Islamic Iran (thus trying to harness the votes of those who believe in territorial/Persian nationalism). 

So, the Supreme Leader is perhaps trying to impress on the former president that he can enjoy a leisurely secure retirement during which he would be feted at the state functions and given due respect (even perhaps consulted) or he can think of running again and make his and his friend's lives difficult. The choice is yours. Ahmadinejad!