Can a Zoroastrian be a representative of Muslims in Iran?

Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, has five separate reserved seats for religious minorities out of a total of 270 seats. Iranian Christians have three of these reserved seats, while Zoroastrians and Jews have one each.  Sunni Muslims are not considered a religious minority and they can run for all seats of the Majlis. Non-Muslims cannot run for the general seats in the Majlis as they do not believe in the ideology (Islam or Shiite Islam) of the Iranian state. High officials of the state have to be Muslim.

Source: Radio Farda

However, non-Muslims have participated in elections at the local level and been elected to the general seats (i.e. seats not reserved for minorities). One such election is now causing controversy in Iran as the conservative judiciary and moderate politicians fight to prevail. An excerpt from an article on the controversy is given below:

The election of Sepanta Niknam, a Zoroastrian, as a city council member in the central Iranian town of Yazd has become the topic of hot debate on the country’s political stage. While the Guardian Council says religious minorities cannot be representatives of Muslim-majority constituencies, the administration of President Hassan Rouhani and the parliament think otherwise.

It should be noted that Niknam has already served one full term as city councilor in Yazd from 2013-2017. However, following his re-election in the May 19 municipal polls, a defeated conservative candidate filed a complaint on the grounds of Niknam's religion, arguing that it was against Iran's constitution for a member of a religious minority to make decisions on behalf of the whole population of a Muslim-majority city. The complaint prompted the Court of Administrative Justice to issue an order suspending Niknam’s membership to the city council, basing its decision on an earlier letter by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the ultra-conservative head of the Guardian Council, which is the clerical body that vets candidates for elections.

So where did the story begin? On April 15, about one month before Iran’s local and presidential elections, Jannati issued a directive demanding that non-Muslims be disqualified from running in the then-upcoming city and village council elections in localities where most of the population are Muslims. His order was met with different reactions from Iran’s political groups, with many voicing opposition to such a measure.
However, since city council elections — contrary to presidential and parliamentary polls — are not supervised by the Guardian Council and a parliamentary delegation oversees the vetting of the candidates for these elections, Jannati’s directive was never implemented. Thus, many religious minorities participated in the May 19 municipal vote and won, including Niknam.

A few months later, on Oct. 9, Yazd City Council Chairman Gholamali Sefid said he had been ordered by the governor of Yazd to suspend Niknam’s membership to the city council in accordance with a ruling by the Court of Administrative Justice. However, Sefid announced his refusal to implement the order two days later, on Oct. 11, and insisted that he would resign from his post if the suspension was not revoked.
Reformists strongly criticized the Guardian Council decision, calling it illegal. Many political figures asked that parliament step in and revoke Jannati’s order. Even parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani, himself a Principlist, opposed the decision.

In a meeting with Yazd city councilors on Oct. 18, Larijani said, “I said from the start that we do not approve of this method. In my talks with Ayatollah [Ahmad] Jannati, the honorable secretary of the Guardian Council, I emphasized that local councils should be handled according to the law. … The Court of Administrative Justice getting involved in the matter has not been a timely move either, and I mentioned this point to the judiciary as well.” Larijani added, “If this matter is not resolved, we have no choice other than to refer it to the Expediency Council for a final resolution.”

Also on Oct. 18, Guardian Council spokesman Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaei said that Jannati’s ruling was unchangeable and its implementation mandatory: “Anytime one of the Guardian Council jurists sees a measure that is against Islamic law [Sharia], he can step in and say so. Those who object to this have no knowledge of the laws and want to look at the issue from an expediency perspective.”

This was not the end of the story. On Oct. 24, hard-line cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, Iran’s former judiciary chief (1989-99) and a current member of the Guardian Council, announced that “the jurists in the [Guardian] Council have unanimously voted for the suspension of Sepanta Niknam, the Zoroastrian member of the Yazd City Council. This is a decision that is lawful, in accordance with Islamic laws, definite and nonretractable. No one can revoke this law.” He then warned that any attempts to overturn this ruling would be “a fight against the principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which the establishment surely would not tolerate.”

According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, followers of Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism are each allowed to have a representative in parliament. But what does the Iranian Constitution say about city councils? Based on Article 91 of the constitution, the Guardian Council is responsible for examining the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) with Islam. However, Article 94 of the constitution sets a time frame for how long the Guardian Council has the liberty to comment on a piece of legislation. Based on this article, “All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be sent to the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council must review it within a maximum of 10 days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility with the criteria of Islam and the constitution. If it finds the legislation incompatible, it will return it to the assembly for review. Otherwise, the legislation will be deemed enforceable.” This is while city council elections were held on May 19, 2017, with results being announced a few days after.

With rising controversy, the Rouhani administration was soon pulled into the issue as well. On Oct. 25, Shahindokht Molaverdi, the president’s special aide on citizens’ rights, said, “There is no legal prohibition against Sepanta Niknam’s membership of the Yazd City Council — neither from a citizen’s rights point of view nor in regard to any other law.”

Rest of the article can be read here. 

Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity

In religious nationalist states, the basis of national identity is usually contested. As religious nationalism is a dominant theme, a large number of groups claim a specific religion or sect as the basis of national identity. However, this view is always contested by others who claim the ethnic, linguistic or simply territorial basis of national identity.

The debate about Iranian identity has always featured two broad groups: the Persian nationalists and the Islamic nationalists. The Persian nationalists claim that Iranian identity has an ethnolinguistic basis. Iranians were Iranians long before Islam came to Iran. In contrast, the Islamic nationalists contend that Islam has become the primary constituent of Iranian identity since Iran was conquered by Arabs in the 7th century. 

However, it would be a mistake to consider both groups as mutually exclusive and some scholars, even partisans, do not completely reject the arguments of their rivals. Except for the opinionated, the difference between the two groups is whether the emphasis is placed on religion or ethnolinguistic characteristics as the primary constituent to the Iranian identity.

For example, many Persian nationalists claim that Islam in its true form is only practiced (i.e. Shia/Twelver sect Islam) in Iran and Islam was saved from Arabs and others only by Iranians. So, they view Islam as part of Iranian identity but do not accept that Islam gave Iranians a new identity. Instead, they claim that it was Iranians, a group at a much higher level of civilization than Arabs, that saved Islam by adopting it, otherwise, Islam's achievements would have been few and it would have been far less successful. 

Similarly, Islamic nationalists accept that Iranian Islam (Twelver sect) is superior and give homage to ethnolinguistic identity perspective by arguing that Iranians have a special affinity with the true religion, Islam, as they are special, seekers of what is true and right. For them, the Aryan/Iranian/Shiite Islam was and is the real Islam while the Semitic/Arab/Sunni Islam is the adulterated false version, despite Prophet Muhammad being an Arab.

Source: Wikimedia Commons 

Afshin Matin-Asgari gives a detailed account of the debate within the Persian nationalist camp in her chapter, 'The Academic Debate on Iranian Identity: Nation and Empire entangled' in Iran Facing Others, edited by Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani (2012). 

Matin-Asgari's chapter gives a comprehensive overview of the different authors and their positions on Persian nationalism, I will try to give a summary here. Matin-Asgari contends that from the late 19th to late 20th century, Persian nationalists -_ the ethnolinguistic camp__ was the dominant thesis in Iranian identity debate. This camp was influenced by Orientalists (such as German Ernst Herzfeld and British Edward Granville Browne) who linked Iranians with Aryans and old Persian empires with the modern state of Iran and claimed a continuity over centuries/millennia. Archaeological discoveries in the 19th century also helped in the strengthening of this thesis. Called the 'Aryan Neo-Achaemenid nationalism', its proponents believed:

1. Iranian identity is ancient, with an archaic core existent for thousands of years. 
2. The Persian language is at the center of Iranian identity. Persian language has been dominant in Iranian territory for centuries and has a major contribution in making non-Iranian inhabitants, immigrants, and conquerors, Iranians. 
3. Since at least Achaemenid times (6th century-4th century BC), Iranian and Persian identities are synonymous. The Persian language has preserved Iranian identity and/or 'the spiritual unity of Iranian history'. 
4. Iranian identity has a racial component based on (Aryan) racial affiliation. 
5. The 'national religion' of Iran was Zoroastrian and Islam is an imposition but Iranian have changed Islam to make it fit their 'Persian Psyche'.

Iranian Flag with Ahura Mazda(God of Zoroastrianism)

Source: Wikimedia Commons

Based on the ethnolinguistic superiority of Iranians and taking pride in ancient 'Persian' empires, this paradigm __ not surprisingly __ takes a dim view of Arabs. Arabs are considered inferior and uncivilized. For example, Abbas Ashtiyani, a 20th century nationalist wrote:

The Iranians spent a hundred years of severe humiliation under the yoke of Arab domination...Yet he did not give up on acquiring knowledge, something that Arab then lacked..

This Persian nationalist thesis, an orthodoxy in the field of Iranian Studies according to Matin-Asgari, has been challenged lately.

1. Mostafa Vaziri rejected the notion of ancient Iranian identity and claimed that pre-modern usage of term 'Iran' referred to a geographic entity only.
2. Austrian scholar Bert Fragner argued that the Persian language is central to Iranian consciousness but Persian was initially a language of the elite and a small portion of people living in today's Iran. It was more a ' Persian linguistic hegemony as crafted and sustained via dominant elite cultures, and not as a "national" heritage shared by a homogeneous Iranian people'. 
3. Italian scholar Gherardo Gnoli argued that 'Iran' as a political concept was an imperial project started by Sassanids( 3rd century -- 7th century).
4. Tavakoli-Targhi contended that Iran was re-imagined in the 19th century in line with the rising consciousness. Various terms like millet, siyaset, and Iran were 're-articulated'. The 'Iranzamin' of ancient texts has quite different boundaries from modern Iran. He also challenged Persian language link with today's Iran.

These challenges forced the at least some of the Persian nationalists to moderate their thesis and they accepted that many dynasties ruling Iran, including the Greeks and Parthians, were not Iranian so there is no seamless continuity from ancient to modern. There is also some acceptance of the argument that 'Iran' in pre-modern times was an imperial, not a national, conception and Persian might not be the language of most people living in Iran in the past. However, most Persian nationalists have not been able to accept the new research and so their thesis continues to suffer from contradictions.

Matin-Asgari suggests the issues in Persian nationalist thesis can be resolved by abandoning the essentialist 'continuity' aspect and accepting that

1. Pre-modern Iran was an imperial concept and imperial Iran was multi-lingual and multi-ethnic, with a shifting heartland.
2. Persian linguistic hegemony did not create ethnic and national homogeneity across history.

An interesting article. Author's position on Iranian nationalism is close to Smith's argument about nationalisms in general i.e. nationalism is neither strictly primordial nor wholly imagined. It appears both Persian nationalist and religious nationalist Iranians are moderating their positions and accepting that the other side is not completely off base. Moderation of Persian nationalist thesis has been discussed above and religious nationalists moderation could be seen in Ahmadinejad's politics in his second term, discussed in this blog on 8th February, 2014.