No-Nos for a Caliphate

Christian Caryl has written an interesting article on Islamic state or more precisely on how to establish a successful caliphate (See 9 Things to Avoid When Creating Your Own Caliphate). In a letter to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the newly (self) proclaimed caliph of IS, Caryl lists the following nine no-nos.

1. You might want to think twice about wearing a Rolex
2. Don't ban music
3. Think twice about punishing girls for alleged immodesty
4. Don't vandalize ancient cultural relics
5. Try not to include too many foreigners in your army
6. Don't alienate local notables
7. Don't prohibit little pleasures
8. Don't spread disunity among Muslims
9. Don't declare yourself a caliph

Source: Was it a Rolex? Caliph’s watch sparks guesses

This list appears to be quite insightful, with all the nine measures linked to the mistakes made during recent attempts at establishing 'Islamic' states. Looking again, one can see that almost all of these no-nos can be subsumed under two broad themes.

• Respect local culture and traditions
• Do not be too strict with the people

These recommendations appear intuitive. Everybody knows that human beings have a powerful affinity with their culture and most of them find it difficult to live under strict rules. The very first Islamic state, established under Prophet Muhammad (PBH), also appears to be following these recommendations. Arab culture was largely adopted or accommodated in Islam. Moreover, the few things in which Islam went against Arab culture were very gradually introduced so that people do not feel burdened (e.g. prohibition of alcohol). Leniency, not strictness, was the hallmark of the first Islamic state.  

The question is then, why Muslim movements continue to go down the same destructive path of rigidity, sternness, and hostility toward local cultures?

The problem appears to be the way these states are created. These states are generally created by young zealots and fighters, not experienced thinkers, administrators, scholars etc. The later groups are largely absent not only in the most prominent leaders, but also in the second tier leadership as purity is appreciated and experience (with the previous regime) is considered a sign of hypocrisy and lack of true faith. In pre-modern history, zealots founded states could survive a bit longer because states had less control our people lives and people didn't demand much from their rulers. However, these primitive states also had to eventually accept the local culture and govern with compassion, if they had to survive long.

Not surprisingly, the zealous leadership of the recent 'Islamic' states, while comparatively good at conquering territory, find it hard to rule and govern. Killing, looting and destroying are the only skills they have and they continue using them, even when they are not required or disastrous. They long for certainties which are (perceived to be) available during wars but are difficult to keep adhering to when one is governing millions of people over large swaths of territory. Uncertainty is difficult to handle for these leaders and they might feel that God has left them. Iconoclasm is their way to show that they are still faithful to God and seek His support. Banning local traditions and small pleasures in another.    

But, are Caryl's warnings only applicable to successful caliphates or Islamic states? It is obvious no state can survive long, if it didn't pay close attention to these warnings. A very illuminating comparison can be made with the communist states of the twentieth century. While leaders that tried to strictly follow Marxist ideology couldn't survive long, leaders that blended Marxism with local culture survived and endured.

From a religious nationalism perspective, the lesson is that religion is important and people would do a lot to save their souls but local culture cannot be ignored.     

Official Ulema: Can they provide legitimacy?

Abdullah Saeed in his chapter titled 'The official ulema and religious legitimacy of the modern state' in Islam and Political Legitimacy (Edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed) argues that official ulema can provide little legitimacy to the modern state. 

Defining alim (plural ulema) as anyone formerly trained in Islamic religious disciplines, Saeed divides ulema into two categories based on their relationship with the state. The official ulema are economically dependent on state and are usually part of a bureaucratic structure. The unofficial ulema are largely independent of state and depend on income from sources other than state coffers.

Development of institution of ulema

Before delving into the issue of legitimacy of the modern state, Saeed has traced the history of ulema-state relationship in Muslim history. He argues that at the time Prophet Muhammad there was no real distinction between his political and religious authority but this should not mean, religious authority always dominated the political authority. The gradual application of different laws and specific timing of their promulgation clearly showed political and social considerations. After the death of Prophet, the Rashidun (rightly-guided) Caliphate ruled Muslims (632-661 AD). During this period, the unity of religious and political authority continued but due to the absence of revelation (and the direct divine attribution and sanction that comes with it), caliphs orders could be debated and challenged. However, there was still no particular clerical class.   

Umayyad dynasty (661-750 AD) established the first Muslim monarchy. As its rule was devoid of any Islamic sanction, its legitimacy was circumspect from the start. Religious and temporal affairs were now separate but there were still no ulema. According to Saeed, it was only in the early Abbasid period (750-1258) that a clear distinct class of ulema can be detected. The factors that led to this development were development of Islamic disciplines and need of specialists; Abbasid's use of notion of divine rule; ulema's legitimacy of political authority to avoid chaos/fitna; some attempts by caliphs to impose a particular theology using political power; need of legal framework for expanding empire and qadis; and caliph loss of political authority to sultans.

Ulema in modern period: role, status, and legitimacy
Saeed contends that in pre-modern period ulema enjoyed a privileged status:

As scholars, judges and muftis they developed law. As judges (qadis) they administered justice and as administrators of awkaf (endowments) they often had substantial economic independence. The ulema also controlled the training of students, basing this on a model in which religious disciplines were given priority. The influence of religion in all aspects of life in the society thus confirmed the social role of ulema.

But the modern period, with its trend toward secularization, transformed the state and ulema's position in society. First, colonial authorities and then modern nation-states took over most of the functions previously performed by the ulema. Some of the measures taken by the modern state that minimized the role of ulema were the marginalization of Islamic law; regulation of the training of ulema; bureaucratization of ulema; state control of mosques; establishment of a public education system and regulation of religious education in schools; and state management of the awkaf.

State legitimacy
Saeed argues that ulema have historically been used by the state to gain legitimacy. Often (official) ulema would issue a fatwa of heresy against political opponents of those in power so that these opponents could be imprisoned/killed. But the current attempts of modern state to gain legitimacy through official ulema have not resulted in much success due to the lack of piety/knowledge and economic dependence of ulema and sharp criticism they suffered from Islamists (prominent among them are Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, and Syed Qutb) who regarded them corrupt and lacking the knowledge of 'real' 'true' Islam. With their own legitimacy eroded, Saeed contends, it is a myth that they could provide legitimacy to the state.

Chairman, Council of Islamic Ideology (Pakistan) meeting with the President of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Turkey), 2012

Source: Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan visit to Turkey

Critical review
Saeed's arguments are focused and clearly lay down the reasons why official ulema cannot provide legitimacy to the modern state. However, two developments, hinted by Saeed but not fully explored, still point toward the substantial utility of the official ulema in increasing the legitimacy of a modern Muslim state. First, with the control of public education, the state with the help of official ulema can socialize the populace into its own version of Islam. This process takes time but it is possible. This happened, for example, in Turkey. Second, the state needs to defend its policies in an Islamic discourse and official ulema can provide that.  The alternative would be to defend state policies on the basis of some other ideology which is possible but has not been much successful in many Muslim states.

Another issue that needs to be discussed is how Muslims define legitimacy. Have the criteria changed over the last fourteen centuries or remained the same? Modern states, whether Muslim-majority or not, need to perform many new tasks to be considered legitimate. These tasks were previously not considered part of Islamic legitimacy of the state but now they are. Islamists have successfully increased the requirements of Islamic legitimacy of the state in line with the modern times and most Muslim states have failed to live up to this new modern-Islamic criteria. As modern Muslim states accept these criteria and then fail to keep up with it, official ulema have a very difficult task.