Who are Wahhabis? What is Wahhabism? Is it different from Salafism?

Wahhabism is something controversial. Many of Wahhabis do not even like to be called Wahhabis as this term was initially used as an insult by the Wahhabi movement enemies. The following seminar video explains the different terms and the history of Wahhabism well in less than 40 minutes. 

The seminar was delivered by Dr. Cole Bunzel from Yale University at the Centre for Islamic and Middle East Studies (CIMS), Oslo University, Norway. The lecture was titled “Classical Wahhabism and Its Modern Revival” and was based on Dr. Cole's dissertation and forthcoming book. It took place at the University of Oslo on October 17, 2018

Here is an introduction about Cole from CIMS webpage:

Cole Bunzel is a postdoctoral research fellow in Islamic Law and Civilization at the Yale Law School, where his work focuses on the history of Wahhabism and the Jihadi Salafi movement in modern Islam. In 2017, he received the Porter Ogden Jacobus Fellowship, Princeton University’s top honor for graduate students. He is the editor of the blog Jihadica.

Cole talks about:

• What is Wahhabism?
• What are the two forms of Tawhid (monotheism) defined by ibn-Taymiyyah and how they were used to kill Muslims?
• What are the two types of Wahhabism?
• How Classical Wahhabism (from the 1740s to 1920s) is different from the Modern Wahhabism (after 1920s)?
• The three Saudi states (1740s-1818, 1823- 1891, 1902 - present)
• What was jihad in Classical Wahhabism? Hatred is not enough, show enmity, later violence
• How King Abdul Aziz tamed Wahhabis, reinterpreted doctrines of Al-Shiekh and entered into a settlement with Sunni Islam and the larger world?
• The revival of Classical Wahhabism under Al-Qaida and the Daesh (the ISIS)

Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh 

Source: Islamic Societies Review

The seminar video can be watched here

Wahhabism is often confused with Salafism as Wahhabis call themselves Salafis or Al-Muwahhidun (or monotheists). Following a commentary from S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore on the differences between Wahhabism and Salafism:

The terms Salafi and Wahhabi are often used interchangeably. Many confuse the two while others refer to them as one. What are the differences between the two? 

The study of modern Salafism will not be complete without looking into Wahhabism – a reference to the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and its relation to Salafism. In the current discourse on Islam, the term “Salafi” and “Wahhabi” are often used interchangeably. Many confuse the two while others refer to them as one.

Wahhabi is a label given to those who follow the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Wahhabis are always referred to as Salafis, and in fact they prefer to be called as such. As a rule, all Wahhabis are Salafis but not all Salafis are Wahhabis. The term Salafism did not become associated with the Wahhabi creed until the 1970s. It was in the early 20th century that the Wahhabis referred to themselves as Salafis. 

Who is a Salafi? 

The usage of the term Salafi today refers to those who embrace Salafism (Arabic: Salafiyyah). Salafiyyah is known to be the manhaj or way of the Salafis. The Salafis are Muslims who advocate literal and to some degree binary interpretation of Islamic teachings as enjoined by Prophet Muhammad and subsequently practised by the early pious predecessors known as the salaf al-salih. Following the salaf is the reason for their self-designation as Salafis. 

Linguistically, the term salafi is an ascription to the salaf. A Salafi is one who ascribes himself/herself to the way and teachings of the salaf. From the linguistic standpoint, if someone says, for example “ana Britani” (I am British), it means he comes from Britain or ascribing himself to Britain. 

The letter ‘i’ at the end of the word (e.g. Britani, Salafi) shows that the person saying the word is associating himself to the word. Hence, when a person says “I am a Salafi”, he is saying that he ascribes himself to the way/teachings of the salaf. 

Who is a Wahhabi? 

A Wahhabi is one who follows Wahhabism (Arabic: Wahhabiyyah) or the teachings of Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in Najd in 1703 in Uyainah, in present-day Saudi Arabia. He grew up in an atmosphere where there was widespread deterioration in the Muslim beliefs and practices. 

Many Muslims had fallen into acts considered shirk (associating Allah with others), and returned to the days of jahiliyyah (ignorance or pre-Islamic period). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to reform the Muslims under the banner of “true” Islam and get rid of these acts which he considered heretical. 

Wahhabis do not prefer the term Wahhabiyyah or being called as Wahhabis. They prefer to be called Al-Muwahhidun (the people of monotheism) or Salafiyyun (the Salafis) in reference to the pious predecessors (salaf al-salih). But over time Ibn Abd al-Wahhab followers prefer the more generic term salafiyyun which signifies adherence to the faith and practices of the Prophet and the first three generations of Muslims. 

Unlike “Salafi” which is both a label and self-designated term, the term “Wahhabi” is a label given to the followers of the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, from whose name the term “Wahhabi” originates. Wahhabism simply means the way of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab which also denotes his ideology. Hence, linguistically, a Wahhabi is one who subscribes to Wahhabism. 

The main reason why Wahhabis have rejected the term Wahhabism is because it provides the impression that the teachings propagated by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is a new doctrine or belief within the Islamic faith, whereas they believe that it is merely a reflection and an extension of the teachings of the Prophet, his companions and the salaf al-salih. 

Due to the importance of following the footsteps of the salaf, Wahhabism has always been a form of Salafism. It subscribes to the methodology of the salaf in theology and law. In fact, the teaching spreads in the modern Muslim world under the banner of Salafism instead of Wahhabism. As Khaled Abou El-Fadl, a professor of Islamic law from the US observes, “the attachment of Wahhabism to Salafism was indeed needed as Salafism was a much more ‘credible paradigm in Islam’; making it an ideal medium for Wahhabism”. 

Ideology of Salafism and Wahhabism 

The ideology of Salafism and Wahhabism is built upon a narrowly defined religious text. Methodologically, they are literalist and puritanical in their approaches to Islamic theology and law. 

In matters of jurisprudence, Salafis and Wahabbis subscribe to the Hanbali mazhab (school of thought) and law. However, many of them claim no specific affiliation to any particular mazhab. Instead, they claim to follow the stronger opinion among the Salaf based on the Quran and the Sunnah (the Prophet’s Traditions). 

But one who studies their views in jurisprudence will find their origins in the Hanbali school of fiqh. Even Ibn Taimiyah, a famous Islamic theologian in the medieval period and his student, Ibn Qayyim, the two scholars most referred to by the Salafis and Wahhabis, adopted the methodology of the Hanbali school. 

To maintain the purity of Islam, Salafis and Wahhabis attempt to combat what they view as deviant and heretical practices such as offering prayers at tombs, glorifying ‘holy places’ and ‘saints’. Such are classified as shirk, kufr (infidelity), riddah (apostasy), and bid’ah (innovation). They strongly reject any belief and practices that are not enjoined by the Quran and the Prophet. 

For example, Salafis and Wahhabis claim that Sufi practices such as tawassul (intercession between man and God) which had accrued over the centuries since the pristine period of Islam threatens tawhid (monotheism or the belief in the oneness of God). They believe that bid’ah resulted from the adoption of local cultures by Islamic missionaries in their attempts to attract new converts. However, this blend of Islam and customs helped significantly the conversion process to Islam by making it accessible to wider audiences. 

Ideologically, Salafism is wider than Wahhabism. Salafi thought has existed for hundreds of years and has spread throughout the Muslim world and beyond. Wahhabism only existed from the mid 18th century. While it is true that Wahhabism is Salafism, it is only one of Salafism’s many orientations. Salafi and Wahhabi are not two sides of the same coin. 

About the Authors
Mohamed Bin Ali is Assistant Professor and Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University Singapore. Both studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and are counsellors with the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG).

In 2016, Cole Bunzel has written about the contest between the third Wahhabi state (Saudi Arabia) and what he calls the fourth Wahhabi state (ISIS) for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Following are the conclusions. The whole paper can be read here.

The Islamic State, which draws on the teachings of the Wahhabi school of Islam, finds inspiration in the example of the first Saudi-Wahhabi state (1744–1818), which engaged in expansionary jihad and cultivated a sectarian animus toward the Shia.

The Islamic State has declared three so-called provinces in Saudi Arabia and carried out some fifteen attacks there since November 2014.

The Islamic State’s rise has reignited a debate in Saudi Arabia over the intolerant and aggressive nature of Wahhabism. Liberals have called for a revisionist movement, as they describe it, to expunge certain doctrines from Wahhabism.

In some ways the Islamic State’s claim to the Wahhabi heritage is not unfounded. The early Wahhabis advanced an exclusivist version of Sunni Islam that was universally seen as a heresy, founded a state that waged expansionary jihad against fellow Sunni Muslims, and killed Shia Muslims because they were seen as hopeless idolaters. The Islamic State has done the same on all three counts.

Other features of the Islamic State’s ideology—from the declaration of a caliphate to the use of extraordinary violence to the group’s apocalyptic fervor—do not find a mainstream Wahhabi precedent.

The Islamic State’s campaign in Saudi Arabia has slowed considerably since October 2015. Despite concerted propaganda efforts, the group appears to be making little headway against a state outfitted with one of the most advanced counterterrorism infrastructures in the world. But given the substantial Islamic State following in Saudi Arabia, more attacks, however occasional, can be expected.

Saudi Arabia is a long way from pursuing meaningful reforms of Wahhabi doctrine. Saudi liberals’ criticism of Wahhabism is tolerated as of early 2016 more than ever before, despite the kingdom’s religious scholars who would prefer the government silence them. But the new political leadership is busy consolidating power, while the religious leadership is defensive and mired in conspiracy theories.

Can Mohammad bin Salman win?

Yury Barmin, who is a Russian Middle East and North Africa expert, has highlighted the dangers of Prince Mohammad bin Salman's reforms as the prince is going against Saudi history, practice and nationalism of more than two hundred years:

"We are returning to what we were before - a country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions and to the world," MBS said to international investors in Riyadh in October 2017. 

Explaining his ambition to "return" Saudi Arabia to the path of moderate Islam, the crown prince told the Guardian that "what happened in the last 30 years is not Saudi Arabia." He explicitly blamed the kingdom's turn towards ultraconservatism on the Iranian revolution in 1979 and Tehran's attempts to spread the revolution across the Middle East. 

These comments are remarkable for two reasons: first, because they acknowledge that moderation is lacking in the interpretation of Islam that the Saudi state has followed; second, because they reflect the notion that the religious system currently in place hinders socioeconomic development and is not compatible with the demands of the young generation. 

Yet they are also somewhat misleading as they try to deflect responsibility for the situation inside Saudi Arabia to external factors, namely the 1979 Islamic Revolution. But was it really revolutionary Iran that pushed Saudi Arabia towards ultraconservatism?

Source: Can Mohammed bin Salman break the Saudi-Wahhabi pact?

Mr. Barmin rightly argues that it was the seizure of Grand Mosque (Holy Kaaba) by ultra-conservative Wahhabis in 1979, not the Iranian Revolution, that was the main reason for the return to the ultraconservatism of pre-Faisal era. However, even Kaaba's seizure was secondary to the orthodox, hide-bound dictates of Wahhabi nationalism on which Saudi Arabia was founded in the 18th century. 

Wahhabism, cited as the official Saudi religious doctrine for which the country's leadership has been so vehemently criticised and which MBS is looking to rebrand, is based on the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). 

Abd al-Wahhab was an Islamic scholar from the Nejd region of the Arabian Peninsula, an avid traveller and the author of The Book of Unity, which was rejected by most of his contemporaries in Mecca and Medina. Abd al-Wahhab preached returning to the Quran and the Hadith, rejected religious innovation (bidaa) and advocated eliminating practices (such as Sufi rites and veneration of saints) that are not grounded in the Quran. He even accused other Muslims of being infidels for following practices that were, in his opinion, un-Islamic and called for strict adherence to traditional Islamic law (sharia). 

There was nothing new in Abd al-Wahhab's teachings which were based on some old ideas and constituted a revival of the Hanbali doctrine in the most ultraconservative form. It was, however, his religious zeal that ultimately drove him close to the Saud family. 

Muhammad ibn Saud ruled over the area of al-Diriya, today on the outskirts of Riyadh, around the time when Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was unsuccessfully preaching in Mecca and elsewhere across the Middle East. In 1744, fleeing from Medina, Abd Al-Wahhab arrived in al-Diriya and sought protection from ibn Saud. The two formed an alliance dividing power and responsibilities: ibn Saud ruling over the military and political matters and Abd al-Wahab over the religious ones. Armed with religious legitimacy, ibn Saud expanded his rule beyond al-Diriya, establishing the first Saudi state. 

The death of Abd al-Wahhab did not impact the power-sharing arrangement that had been solidified during his lifetime. The descendants of Abd al-Wahhab (the Sheikh family) remained in charge of religious affairs under Saudi rule. To this day, they legitimise the political power of the House of Saud by approving succession and endorsing the king's decisions. In exchange, the Sheikh family enjoys a privileged position in the state structures and plays a key role in the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs.

Mr. Barmin contends that what Prince Mohammad bin Salman is doing is dangerous as it goes against what was normal for so long and he is making many enemies:

The Wahhab-Saud pact survived more than 250 years, guaranteeing religious legitimacy for Saudi power in the Arabian Peninsula. So has its time finally come? Has it run its course and is no longer needed by the House of Saud? 

In the past few years, the Saudi authorities have been gradually and cautiously limiting the extent of the Sheikh family's power. In August 2010, for example, the late King Abdullah issued a decree that only state-vetted scholars were allowed to issue fatwas.
Under King Salman, and his son - MBS, more drastic measures have been taken. In April 2016, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice was stripped of arresting powers which curbed its policing functions. In December 2016, the king appointed more moderate clerics to the Council of Senior Scholars, the highest religious body in the country. And in 2017, music concerts were allowed, mixed public events for both genders were held, and cinemas were scheduled to reopen after 35 years. 

However, the most monumental shifts are yet to take place in the Saudi power structure. The country's legal system operates within Islamic law, which is the ultimate source of legislation in Saudi Arabia. Strictly abiding by traditional interpretations of Islamic law is a crucial element of the worldview Abd al-Wahhab introduced. This is why, in simplified terms, breaking the Saudi-Wahhabi pact would mean breaking up with this traditional interpretation and potentially codifying law rather than relying on judges to interpret it. 

A more important question at this point is whether the country needs to part with its Wahhabi roots at all in order to implement reforms and open up to foreigners. The diminishing significance of religious authorities is a general trend across Gulf monarchies and it seems that Saudi Arabia is set to slowly embrace a similar model. 

The Saudi religious establishment has been publicly supportive of the crown prince's war on corruption and the weakening of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice even if they feel disadvantaged as a result of these developments. The centuries-old monolithic religious structure might turn out to be a paper tiger whose fate is in the hands of the monarch. 

Yet, MBS breaking up with the decades-long policy of cosying up to the religious elites in favour of modernisation, could provoke some to call it corruption and an embrace of Western influence again. It is also likely that the policies MBS is introducing would force a lot of dissenters among the clerics underground. Discontent could simmer for years before surfacing in some form or another. 

MBS's policies are catering to young Saudis, but they do not hold the key to power. It is the older generation that has lived through decades of conservative rule, the disenfranchised princes whose access to power has shrunk and the vast religious elites who are now in a position of vassals that legitimise the Saudi royal family.

Many of them feel marginalised which could drive them to extremes and bring about a repeat of 1979. (see Can Mohammed bin Salman break the Saudi-Wahhabi pact?)

Women can drive in Saudi Arabia but is it really a big change?

Saudi Arabia is not the place from where one can expect good news for women. It is the most restrictive country for women in the world. It's not for nothing that it has been called the most masculine state and anti-woman kingdom. Though many blame Islam for women plight in Saudi Arabia, there are around fifty other Muslim-majority countries in the world and none of these countries control and regulate women lives as much as the Saudi state.Those blaming Islam for the Saudi state's misogyny, however, have one powerful supporter inside the kingdom, the Saudi state, which justifies its invidious discrimination of women on the basis of Islam, Sharia and tradition.

So, knowing Saudi state's general puritanism and its stance on gender equality, it was a surprise to read a series of news that advance the empowerment of Saudi women. Following are the positive news received over the last two months:

• King Salman issued a historic decree removing the ban on issuance of driving licenses to women. Women will be able to drive by June 2018 (See King Salman’s decree allows women to drive in Saudi Arabia):
• Iman Bint Abdullah was appointed as Assistant Mayor of the Al-Khobar municipality, with special responsibility for information technology. She is the first Saudi woman to hold such a senior position (See First Saudi woman appointed as assistant mayor);
• Fatimah Baeshen was appointed as the first female spokesperson for the Saudi Embassy in Washington DC (See First spokeswoman appointed at Saudi embassy in Washington);
• As part of the independence day celebrations, Saudi women were allowed to enter the King Fahd International Stadium (Riyadh) for the first time to attend a pageant operetta. They were also allowed to attend a concert in Jeddah (See National celebrations open Saudi sports stadium to women for [the] first time);
• Saudi Ministry of Education issued a decree that will allow girls to participate in physical education classes for the first time. The government also agreed, again for the first time, to issue female gym licences. Female gyms previously operated as salons and faced threats of closure (See Saudi Arabia will finally allow girls to take PE — that's a big deal).

Besides openings for Saudi women, the Saudi government also proclaimed at least one future relaxation for foreign women. In August, it was announced that a new 50 island Red Sea luxury resort would be built and this resort would be “governed by laws on par with international standards.” The government did not explicitly say it but the meaning of "international standards" was mostly interpreted as freedom for women to wear whatever they like, including bikinis, at the resort (See Saudi Arabia to open luxury beach resort where women can wear bikinis).

So, why this change and why so fast? This was the kingdom which believed in evolution, not revolution. This was the kingdom where tradition and Wahhabi style Islam reigned supreme unfettered by modernity. Most analysts have pointed out that the force behind these changes is the new Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Since his father ascended to the throne in January 2015, he has gradually acquired more and more power. In the first cabinet of his father, Prince Mohammed was appointed Minister of Defense and he was also the head of the Royal Court. Also in January, he was named the chair of the newly established Council for Economic and Development Affairs. In April 2015, he was appointed Deputy Crown Prince and Second Deputy Prime Minister, just two heartbeats away from the throne. So after April 2015, he was controlling both economic and defence policies of the kingdom (For his pivotal role in the Yemen war see Saudi Arabian Nationalism, Religion and Yemen War, an earlier blog post).

A year later, "Mr. Everything," a name given to Prince Mohammed because of his all-pervasive influence (See Why Saudi's Mohammed bin Salman is 'Mr Everything'), presented Vision 2030, a roadmap for the Saudi economy and society for the next 15 years. In his final promotion, Prince Mohammed bin Salman was made Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister by his father in June 2017. 

There are several reasons why openings for the Saudi women are being linked to Prince Mohammed. First, he has said many times that he favors women joining the workforce. In 2016, when he was asked, "Do you think having a greater proportion of women in the workforce would be good for Saudi Arabia?" He replied, "No doubt. A large portion of my productive factors are unutilised. And I have population growth reaching very scary figures. Women’s work will help in both of these issues." Second, he is the main force behind the Vision 2030 which declares:

Saudi women are yet another great asset. With over 50 percent of our university graduates being female, we will continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of our society and economy.

Third, the timing of the reforms is too difficult to ignore. In late June, Prince Mohammed vanquishes his last major rival (cousin and former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Naif) and becomes Crown Prince and in the next two months, a series of reforms happen. Finally, because of his failure to deliver a victory in the Yemen War, he wants a big win to consolidate his power and these changes can give him that, if he can manage the conservative Wahhabi religious establishment. 

Source: Saudi Arabia to allow women to obtain driving licences

The question is whether these changes are going to be a game changer for Saudi women or not. The major change is, of course, permission to drive. Many analysts have pointed out that while important, this change still does not give freedom to drive to Saudi women. After June 2018, Saudi women will still need to have consent from their male guardians:

The key change is that there is no longer any legal prohibition for women to drive. And nor, according to the statements of the formerly reluctant clerics, is there a basis for a ban in sharia law, which governs most aspects of Saudi society. The onus of decisions about whether women can sit behind the wheel has been shifted from the state to families.

Under repressive guardianship laws, male relatives have veto over whether wives or daughters can leave the home unaccompanied. While a woman can be granted a licence and is allowed to drive, a male family member can still stop her from doing so. (See Saudi Arabia: Prince Mohammed plays his biggest card yet)

Madawi Al-Rashid, a Suadi Arabian scholar, has argued not much is going to change. According to her, it is a "public relations stunt" and women are still going to be oppressed in Saudi Arabia and the changes have been solely done to mollify Western critics and get their support:

The Saudi state is one of the most male-dominated in the world. Now it is compelled to look as if it is treating women better to win over critics in the west. As a result, it has embarked on a series of cosmetic reforms...History is littered with dictators who have promoted women, from Turkey’s Atatürk, the Iranian Shah, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Appearing to support women has won dictators applause, especially in the west, where women’s rights have become an axis against which to measure nations and evaluate regimes.

Today’s authoritarian regimes will win extra praise when they appear to be liberating Muslim women from the oppression of Islam. Saudi Arabia is no exception. Here, Muslim women are depicted either as survivors of their patriarchal religion or as heroes who are challenging such a dominant and primitive culture. Like their counterparts in Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan and elsewhere, Saudi women had been framed in this binary image. Dictators conveniently depict themselves as liberators of these downtrodden women while society is shown to be the oppressor. In particular, in recent times, Islam and sharia law are portrayed as the cause of women’s suffering.

Such a narrative is appealing to both Arab dictators and certain constituencies in the west. But allowing women to obtain a driving licence is little more than a public relations stunt designed to cement this notion of the Saudi regime as the liberator of women. (See Women are still not in the driving seat in Saudi Arabia)

Al-Rashid is correct in her assessment that Saudi women lives will not transform because of these few changes. However, she also argues that Saudi Royals are following Ataturk, Muhammad Reza Shah and Bourguiba and like them trying to please the West. If she is correct, this is a big change. It may not be a big change for the Saudi women but it is a metamorphosis for the Royals. Saudi Arabia is based on religious nationalism and Ataturk, Muhammad Reza Shah and Bourguiba were enemies of religious nationalism in their countries. These leaders derived their power by standing against the religious conservatives and Shariah while Saudi Royals justify their rule on the basis of Shariah. So, I would argue that the hold of religious nationalism on Saudi Arabia has loosened a bit because of these changes. If Prince Mohammad keeps on (slowly) moving away from religious nationalism, Saudi Arabia will feel the changes in other areas too. One should be thankful for the small mercies.

Saudi Arabian Nationalism, MBS, Salafism, and Yemen War

A mix of dynastic and Salafist nationalism is on the rise in Saudi Arabia. Intervention in the Yemeni Civil War (named the 'Decisive Storm') has the intended rally around the flag effect. Simeon Kerr wrote about it in the Financial Times in May 2015:

Lines of green Saudi flags hang proudly along Riyadh’s wide highways while screens around the capital broadcast footage on a loop of warplanes flying into combat and massive explosions.Local companies have taken out giant billboards pledging allegiance to the “decisive and determined” King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, while ordinary Saudis have taken to social media to show their support for the new king and the county’s military campaign in Yemen.An unprecedented jingoism — hidden for decades — has swept through Saudi Arabia since King Salman ascended to the throne in January and the launch in March of the aerial campaign against Shia Houthi rebels.Although the air strikes have raised international concern and heightened tensions with Iran, its rival for regional dominance, they have been cheered in Saudi by an increasingly nationalist and sectarian sentiment.

Saudi cartoon showing Iranian cleric being hit by a missile on which Decisive Storm (عاصفة الحزم) is visible.

Source: Al-Watan, Saudi Arabia, March 27, 2015

The royalists, nationalists, and the servile media also have a young, tall, dark and handsome prince to gush about. In one year, Deputy Crown Prince and Second Deputy Prime Minister Prince Mohammad bin Salman has risen from being one of the dozens of grandsons of King Abdul Aziz al-Saud (the founder of Saudi Arabia) to arguably the most powerful man in the kingdom. Prince Mohammad is currently holding three posts:

• He is the head of the Royal Court, meaning he is not only King Salman's son but also his closest advisor; 
• He is the Defense Minister and as Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir is not a royal, Prince Mohammad is more powerful of the two men leading Saudi foreign engagements;
• He is the key economic decision-maker in Saudi Arabia. He chairs the Council of Economic Affairs and Development, the main decision-making body on economic and financial issues in Saudi Arabia. In his capacity as the lead economic player, Prince Mohammad announced his plans for Saudi economy and for the Aramco (the national energy company that drives the Saudi economy) in January 2016. In March 2016, he announced the Saudi Arabia’s Vision for 2030. 

For a country that has been ruled by septuagenarians and octogenarians for decades, it's unprecedented for a thirty-years old to hold such power. His youth and action-oriented leadership have made him popular but many are wary of such concentration of power.

Source: The National Interest

Is Saudi nationalism moving away from Salafism or is Salafism becoming more entrenched in the Saudi nationalism under King Salman?

There is evidence to support both sides of the argument. Since the late 1990s, Saudi Arabia has promoted a more dynastic and ecumenical religious nationalism and has tried to move away from Salafi nationalism. Official media and educational and cultural institutions have focused more on the exceptionalism of Saudi land and royal family than on the exceptionalism of Salafism. Some of the measures taken are given below:

• A cult of King Abdul Aziz has been cultivated;
• King Abdullah curtailed the power of Salafi clerics and religious police; 
• National Museum was founded in Riyadh;
• A new subject 'national education' was introduced in the schools (Saudi Arabia in Transition 2015, page 4-5);
• The first co-educational university in Saudi Arabia was established in 2009 by King Abdullah. He gave it his own name (King Abdullah University of Science and Technology) and quashed criticism of Salafi critics;
• In the early 2000s, Saudi Royals for the first time made some non-Salafi Sunnis and Shias (and women) included in the Shura Council, the highest advisory body. King Abdullah also started a dialogue with the Shiites, who are ten percent of Saudi population and more crucially are a majority in the oil-rich Eastern province;
• Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 announced recently called for 'a tolerant country with Islam as its constitution and moderation as its method.' It declared that the 'values of moderation, tolerance, excellence, discipline, equity, and transparency will be the bedrock of our success.' Emphasis on toleration and moderation show a change of focus and decrease in the power of Salafi religious establishment;
• Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 also had good news for women. It asserted that 'Saudi women are yet another great asset. With over 50 percent of our university graduates being female, we will continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of our society and economy.' This was another defeat of Salafi clerics who want women to stay at home;
• The Saudi Arabian leadership has repeatedly said that Yemeni intervention was not  Salafi/Sunni fight with Shi'ism. They have clarified that it was a fight against Iran, which was trying to control the Middle East and carving a new Persian Empire. They have also condemned the sectarian rhetoric of the Daesh (Islamic State), which is mainly Salafi, and called for unity of all Muslims.

Abdullah Hamidaddin, a scholar, has also argued in Al-Arabia that the power of (Salafi) clerics is on the wane in Saudi Arabia:

In recent weeks, the Saudi government has been sending a clear message to its people and the world that economic development and religious extremism cannot coexist. This message is in line with the launch of Saudi Vision 2030, which depends on a social vibrancy that is antithetical to extreme religious values. Of course, people have the right to be religious, but religious institutions - formal and informal - shouldn't be allowed to be above the law to forcefully impose or propagate their views. 

Many analysts consider the recent government announcement to limit the ability of the “Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice" which is known in many foreign media outlets as "religious police,” to arrest and interrogate a significant move. But a much more important decision was the appointment during last week’s cabinet reshuffle of Sulaiman Aba al-Khayl as president of the University of Imam Mohammad bin Saud. I personally believe this cements the government’s focus to work closely with the religious institution for the greater good. His appointment came as a pleasant surprise to moderates and reformers. The university had been considered by some that it promotes nationally and internationally hardline views.

However, there is also evidence of the rise in Salafi nationalism after the ascendance of King Salman and Yemeni intervention. While Saudi government has tried to avoid stroking anti-Shia hatred, many official clerics and others people linked with the government have publicly portrayed Yemen and Syrian civil wars as a conflict between real Islam (Salafism/Sunnism) and false Islam (Shiism) and resorted to scaremongering after the start of Saudi campaign against Yemeni Houthis. Angus Mcdowall of Reuters gave examples of such instances:

"If they (Shi'ites) manage to win and control the state, they ravage Sunnis: clerics, women, children, the rulers and the ruled. They attack just like the lion attacks his prey," said Farid al-Ghamdi, a cleric at Mecca's Umm al-Qura seminary in a sermon visible on YouTube...."Decisive Storm came to sever any ambition of the Safavids to besiege Muslims in their own homes," wrote cleric Saad al-Breik to his 1.15 million Twitter followers after the air strikes began last month. 

That kind of scare-mongering has been evident in the Saudi press as well. A report in the daily al-Medina newspaper last week cited "military experts" as saying the Houthis wanted to turn Yemen's capital Sanaa into "an entirely Shi'ite city by 2017" and that the air strikes would thwart "this Iranian plan"....

An analysis of over seven million Arabic tweets from February to August 2015 done by Alexandra Siegel, a PhD student at the New York University showed that while both sides are using social media for hate speech, such tweets from Saudi Arabia are much more common (although it might be said that this conclusion would have something to do with only looking at Arabic tweets).

In the years following the escalation of the Syrian civil war, six main derogatory terms have been frequently used to disparage Shia Muslims online: rafidha (rejectionist), Hizb al-Shaytan (party of the devil), Hizb al-Lat (party of Lat), Majus (Magianism or Zoroastrianism), Nusayri (followers of Nusayr), and Safawi (Safavid). Rafidha refers to Twelver Shias, the largest of the Shia sects, and implies that they have rejected “true” Islam as they allegedly do not recognize Abu Bakr, the first caliph, and his successors as having been legitimate rulers after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. For example, Salafi cleric Abdulaziz al-Tarifi tweeted to his approximately 800,000 followers in February, “Jews and Christians did not used to collude with the rafidhaas they do today in this country and every country.”

The killing of Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr was considered as another sign of anti-Shiite bias although the Saudi government pointed out that dozens of Sunni terrorists were also executed on the same day as Sheikh Nimr and claimed that executions were against terrorism, not against Shia or Shiaism. Furthermore, the coalition of Muslim countries that was announced in December 2015 to fight terrorism does not have one Shia-ruled Muslim country as its members. Bahrain is the only Shia-majority country that is a member of the coalition but it is ruled by a Sunni monarchy. So, it appears that not only Iran but all Shia-ruled countries (Iraq and Lebanon) were excluded from this alliance.

Frederic Wehrey is not very hopeful of future and considers that Salafism has increased its role in Saudi nationalism under King Salman  (Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy, p-111-12)

At its core, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remains an authoritarian state with a ruling family wedded to monarchical privilege and backed by a deeply anti-liberal and sectarian religious establishment. If anything, it appears to be becoming more so under King Salman. In contrast to King Abdullah, Salman has been wooing the Kingdom’s religiously conservative base of power to shore up public support for his domestic policies and to demonize Iran in the region. The result has been a rollback of Abdullah’s limited reforms and a new, more virulent Sunni-based nationalism. 

Professor Madawi al-Rasheed, one of the most eminent scholars of Saudi politics, claims that the Yemen war is the latest incarnation of militarized Wahhabi nationalism. Writing in Politico, in a column titled "Wahhabi religious nationalism turns ugly," she traces the history of Wahhabi nationalism:

In the Arab world, religious nationalism was invented early in the 20th century in Saudi Arabia, a kingdom whose goal was to unite dispersed people and purify their religious beliefs and practices under the leadership of the Al-Saud. This unification took place as a result of a fringe Islamic revivalist tradition, commonly known as Wahhabiyya, which morphed into a military religious nationalist movement. With time, the project went beyond simple piety: Sharia law and conformity to Islamic teachings were rigorously applied. Under state patronage, this Wahhabiyya was turned into a quasi-nationalist project. Its ideology has proliferated and now inspires Muslims across the globe, fueled by petrodollars and globalization.

Early in the 20th century, an all-encompassing Wahhabi religious nationalism inflamed the imagination of a substantial section of the population of Arabia. It provided the ideological tool to band together to achieve independence from an ailing Ottoman empire that had little control over this peripheral region of its Empire. With a political leadership eager to expand throughout Arabia and to assert its control over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, Al-Saud militarized the fragmented tribal population, united them under an Islamic flag and mobilized them to wage war against all those who refused their homogenizing theology and radical Wahhabi message.

From the heart of Arabia they spread across the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. They created a state that has remained hostage to the Wahhabi agenda, bigoted interpretations of religious texts, and violent strategies whose aim is to control the behavior of Muslims and non-Muslims in its jurisdictions.

Yemen war, according to Professor al-Rasheed, is linked with the Wahhabi nationalism's quest to obliterate its rivals, who are all heretics and idolators, and bring the people back to its "pure" version of Islam and she argues there is only one way to end the terrorism and recurrent sectarian wars:

The zeal of religious nationalism turns ugly when it moves from the mosque to the military. And even uglier when it becomes the religion of the state. Whether in Saudi Arabia or in the nascent so-called Islamic State, where religious nationalism holds people together by the power of the sword, it is difficult to imagine an alternative way of being Muslim.

In Saudi Arabia, the airstrikes on Yemen launched in March proved a shrewd move for the government: They sparked the imagination of many Saudis who saw them through the prism of their old Wahhabi tradition as countering the hegemony of a rival Shiite power, namely Iran and its alleged Zaydi Houthi clients. The Saudi leadership could not simply watch a rival power such as the Islamic State take all the credit for eradicating heretics. Both Saudi Arabia and the Islamic State came into being as a result of the same type of ideology. Their interests may clash but they share a common goal.

Unless religious nationalism is replaced by new identities about being citizens in a bounded nation in which people enjoy equality and rights, we will continue to see a repeat of the terrorist atrocities committed in the name of Islam.

Rise of Sectarianism and Pakistani Religious Nationalism

Religious nationalism often leads to sectarianism. As explained in a previous blogpost (See Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism), when religious affiliation  defines citizen from a non-citizen, sectarian issues attain a political, economic and social significance. Far from being the concern of few theologians and zealots, they became the concern of everyone. For example, if religious law is not the law of the state and there is no chance it ever becoming state law or source of state law, few care how the rival sect differs in interpreting a certain Biblical or Quranic verse or hadith. However, once religious law is considered to be the source of state law, then everybody is concerned as there is a chance that one's religious beliefs maybe declared illegal or these beliefs maybe legal but would not entitle one full citizenship rights. 

An example would clarify. In 1978, General Zia introduced zakat (annual alms tax) system in Pakistan and ordered compulsory deduction of 2.5% from bank accounts that have amounts above a certain minimum level. Beliefs of Shia and Sunni sects about who can collect zakat differ. Sunnis believe state can collect zakat, Shias do not. Not many people, Shias or Sunnis, thought this difference was important before 1978. However, when Zia introduced the new system, Shias immediately protested and when Zia ignored them, they took control of some of the important government buildings in Islamabad and vowed to fight. In the end, Zia gave in and Shias were exempted from compulsory deduction of zakat by state.

So, a sectarian or confessional bias is inherent in a religious nationalist state. If state adopts religious laws, it has to choose between different interpretations. For example, in Saudi Arabia, state has adopted a particular religious interpretation about how women should appear in public. This particular interpretation has been rejected by most Muslims but Saudi state has enforced it. In Israel, marriage registration is controlled by the Orthodox Chief Rabbinate. If rules set by the Orthodox rabbinate are not followed, state would not register a marriage. Even a marriage under Reform or Conservative Judaism (rules), two other major streams in modern Judaism, is not kosher for the state. 

In Pakistan, sectarianism became an issue after General Zia started Islamizing the government. Before General Zia, there were sects and differences and sometimes violence would happen but such instances were few and far between. The knowledge of sectarian differences and the animosity that one saw in the 1980s and later was not present before. Rise of sectarianism was primarily because of General Zia's Islamization program but not all reasons of this rise were internal. Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which made Saudi Arabia a very important player in Pakistan's religious landscape, also helped the rise of sectarianism.

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal as given at Who is killing Pakistan's Shias and why?

Sectarianism continue to increase and become more violent after Zia due to the following reasons:

• Madrassas and religious nationalism: Mushrooming of madrassas, which promote religious nationalism and train students along sectarian lines, under Zia started to have its effect on Pakistan in the 1990s. Madrassas provided recruits to religious parties and sectarian militias but were also proponents of Pakistani religious nationalism that Pakistani state was also promoting so taking action against them was difficult. Moreover, religious parties, which had overlapping membership with sectarian militias and leadership of both were trained in the same madrassas, made any strict action against sectarian militias difficult as it was termed as an action against Islam and against Pakistan;
• Political instability in the 1990s: The nineties decade was highly unstable, with average tenure of Prime Minister being a year (nine Prime Ministers from 1990 to 1999). It not only undermined democratic development but also affected economic growth and law and order. A long term coordinated action against sectarian militias was not taken. Military sometimes used religious parties, which were supported by sectarian militias, to counter politicians' attempt to stabilize their rule and reduce military's power;
• Sectarian militias as tools to promote religious nationalism abroad: Sectarian militias were used by military (particularly ISI) as tools for promoting religious nationalism in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Any attempt to take strict action against sectarian militias by the civilian governments was undermined by this link;
• Rise of Taliban: Taliban and Pakistani Sunni sectarian militias had close links as Taliban also believed in same violent sectarian ideology and many members of Pakistani militias and Taliban had studied at the same Pakistani madrassas and fought alongside each other in Afghanistan. Therefore, Taliban rise and success in Afghanistan not only increased the confidence of Pakistani sectarian outfits but also provided them a sanctuary. 

After 9/11, sectarian outfits were banned and there were some attempts to limit them but these attempts were halfhearted at best. Internationally, General Musharraf was fighting against Muslim extremism but in Pakistan, Musharraf was in alliance with religious parties (Muthidda Majlis-e-Amal) that had a soft corner for the sectarian militias and publically supported Taliban's struggle in Afghanistan. Later, rise of Pakistani Taliban provided Sunni militias confidence, support and sanctuary inside Pakistan.

Benazir Shah writing in Foreign Policy in August 2014 (See The Trouble Convicting LeJ's Malik Ishaq) writes about these links between Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, one of the most notorious sectarian militias: 

In Pakistan’s toxic mix of terrorist organizations, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi maintains ideological and operational links with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda. When need be, its foot soldiers have not hesitated to take their mission of sectarian strife across the border. In 2011, an offshoot of the radical group claimed responsibility for killing 55 Shiites in Kabul, possibly in cahoots with al Qaeda. Other jihadist groups, including Jaish-e-Muhammad, espouse its mission of establishing a Sunni state. More than 600 Shiites were killed in Pakistan in 2013, and over 1,000 were injured in a troubling uptick in sectarian attacks.

Shah also asked the question, will the state act against sectarian militias as it had started acting against Taliban?

For now the state is engaged. On June 15, it launched a comprehensive military operation in North Waziristan, long considered a deadly crucible of local and foreign terrorists. But there is a sectarian face-off brewing in the Punjab heartland, where Jhangvi is firmly rooted. But when the state’s gaze will turn to that fight remains to be seen.

All this history brings us to the recent killing of Malik Ishaq, his sons and other leaders of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. This will be discussed in the next blogpost.

Religious Nationalism Course

I taught a course on  'Religious nationalism' at George Mason University, managed by Encore Learning. Here are the slides of the lectures.

Religious Nationalism: Introduction

Pakistan: Religious (Muslim) Nationalism

Iran: Religious (Muslim/Shia) Nationalism

Israel: Religious (Jewish) Nationalism

Saudi Arabia: Religious (Muslim/Wahhabi) Nationalism

Bhutan: A religious nationalist state??

Bhutan is a small kingdom in Himalayas, between India and China. Not many people know it exist and for a long time, Bhutanese elite were happy for being hidden/separate from the world. Darius Lee discusses Bhutan's constitution and calls it a constitutional theocracy (See Here There be Dragons! Buddhist Constitutionalism in the Hidden Land of Bhutan). For us, it is interesting because it is another example of how national identity and religious identity gets mixed up, giving rise to religious nationalism.

Lee argues that written constitutions are meant to stop power concentration but some countries, which he calls constitutional theocracies, have mixed religion and constitutionalism and damaged the very purpose of constitutions.

The goal of constitutionalism is limited government, which is opposed to any form of absolutism, whether religious, cultural or secular. In an age of human rights, untrammeled government power is circumscribed through constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights, including religious freedom. 

But constitutional theocracies turn it upside down, Lee argues, and use constitutions to legalize curtailment of religious and other freedoms. These constitutional theocracies are different from common theocracies.

Unlike a ‘pure’ theocracy, power in a constitutional theocracy is not drawn directly from divine text or a governing priesthood but lies in political figures operating within the bounds of a written constitution. Constitutional theocracies adhere to the core elements of modern constitutionalism, such as constitutional supremacy but enshrine religion as a source of public law.

The key differences between a secular state and a constitutional theocracy in terms of state structure, as identified by Lee, are given below:

          Secular state                                Constitutional theocracy

    Separation of religion and state                                                State recognition of a particular religion as privileged

Benevolent neutrality; accommodates religion                                 Not neutral, favors one religion over others

   Religion is not a source of public law                                                      Religion is a source of public law

In terms of religious freedom, the key differences are as follows:

           Secular state                                  Constitutional theocracy    
State holds no monopoly over religious belief                                                 Religion is tied with national identity

    Does nothing to control religious doctrine                                     Legal sanction for propagation of unorthodox beliefs

Accommodates practices of religious minorities                                          Limited protection for religious minorities

Lee declares that Bhutan is a constitutional theocracy, like Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, although its 2008 constitution commits to separation of religion and politics and does not declare Buddhism as state religion. In comparison with other Buddhist-majority states, Bhutan falls between Cambodia and Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar and Laos.  

Although article 3(3) of Bhutan constitution prima facie supports separation of religion and politic, its justification shows that this separation is rooted in Buddhism. Article 3(3) reads:

It shall be the responsibility of religious institutions and personalities to promote the spiritual heritage of the country while also ensuring that religion remains separate from politics in Bhutan. Religious institutions and personalities shall remain above politics.

The two reasons given for its inclusion are not related to human rights or freedoms but to Buddhism. This article was included in the constitution first, because Lord Buddha separated religion and politics and secondly, because under the first king of Bhutan, religious and political affairs were separate. 

Other reasons for declaring Bhutan a constitutional theocracy are given below:

1. Preamble of constitution pays homage to the three gems of Buddhism. 
2. King must be Buddhist, although he is declared protector of all religions (Article 3(2)). 
3. Article 3(6) establishes the Dratshang Lhentshog (Commission for the Monastic Affairs) and Buddhist religious bodies are funded by the state. 
4. Some part of the ecclesiastical structure of the Dratshang Lhentshog and the qualifications for religious office are given in the Bhutan Constitution, reflecting the privileged position of Buddhism.
5. In Bhutan, Buddhism is considered a major part of Bhutanese culture and the state considers it its responsibility to defend it. For example, article 4(1) asks the state to ‘preserve, protect and promote the cultural heritage of the country, including… religion’.
6. Article 9(20) of the Constitution asks the state to ‘create conditions that will enable the true and sustainable development of a good and compassionate society rooted in Buddhist ethos and universal human values.’ 

Using examples from penal code and other laws, Lee further demonstrates the close link between state and majority religion, negating the notion that Bhutanese state is neutral in matters of religion or that religious minorities are not discriminated.  

While Lee's arguments about Bhutan not being a secular state are strong, his definition of constitutional theocracies needs more elaboration because if we define constitutional theocracies only on the basis of how much privilege the constitutional clauses grant to majority religion in these countries then many other (quite liberal and secular) countries have to be called constitutional theocracies which they are not. For example, as Lee acknowledges, many West European democracies have established churches. Their constitutions privilege majority religion. Can we call them constitutional theocracies, like Iran? I think Lee would not agree.

On the other hand, if we  give importance to not only constitutions but all the other factors (like Lee does in case of Bhutan) in defining constitutional theocracies then is it right to call them constitutional theocracies? 

Arab Nationalism: The end?

Adeed Dawisha's article remember's Arab nationalism (See Requiem for Arab Nationalism), once a powerful force, aiming to revive the glory of Arab nation.

He talks about Nasser, the undisputed leader of Arab nationalism, and the effect of 1967 defeat.

It took some time for the light to go out on Arab nationalism, but its power generator went down in June 1967. After the Six-Day War, the slide of Arab nationalism toward political marginality became irreversible. And what finished it was the fact that Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser, lost the war. Egypt's devastating defeat was Arab nationalism's mortal loss, for the fate of Arab nationalism during the struggles, triumphs, and reversals of the 1950s and 1960s was inexorably linked to Egypt and its charismatic president.

Had Syria or Jordan, or even both, lost the war, it would not have been the unmitigated disaster for Arab nationalism that it proved to be. But Arab nationalism could not survive the abject humiliation inflicted on its acknowledged prophet, who, through his shrill and overzealous propaganda machine, had promised a fabled triumph in al-Ma'raka al-Masiriya, the battle of destiny.

Arab countries and their flags 

Source: Islam and Arab Nationalism الإسلام و العربية الجنسية in the 21st century

The main competitor of Arab nationalism was, of course, individual country/territorial nationalisms. Arab nationalism was all about unity and indivisibility of the proud Arab nation but gradually borders between Arabs became important. 

Part of the reason for this "sanctification" of borders was that Arab political and economic elites developed a vested interest in the survival of each particular state. Not surprisingly, these elites were loath to put themselves at risk for the sake of Arab unity.So they argued that Arab nationalism was really just a license for some elites to browbeat others. The advocates of territorial nationalism also relied on geo-political and cultural arguments in making their case. They insisted that Arab nationalists had failed to understand that while various Arab states might accept an overarching Arab identity, geographic and even cultural differences were real enough to preclude an organic unity. And they were right: the decline of Arab nationalism from 1961 validated their argument.

But territorial nationalisms were not the only enemy. Many sub-state and supra-state identities also damaged the Arab nationalist's cause. Tribal loyalties, argues Adeed, were powerful in many Arab countries and didn't disappear as Arab nationalism and territorial nationalisms fought for the primary loyalty of the Arabs.

In some states, tribal affiliations formed the backbone of popular support that shielded local leaderships from the advancing tide of revolutionary Arab nationalism. Such was the case in Saudi Arabia, where the tribal-based demographic structure contributed to the stability of the political order.Successive Saudi monarchs, in the process of shifting the loyalty of the Bedouin from tribe to state, made sure to act and be perceived as tribal overlords.

Bedouin military personnel were also responsible for the survival of Jordan's young King Hussein, in the face of seemingly impossible odds. Jordan's "Arab Legion" was initially formed to combat Bedouin anarchy in the new country. In a stroke of genius, the Arab Legion's founder, the British officer John Bagot Glubb, decided to harness the warlike qualities of the Bedouins by recruiting them into the army. Very quickly, the Arab Legion became the Arab world's most disciplined fighting force. But one thing that Glubb did not change was tribal solidarity, which he nurtured every step of the way to make the Arab Legion "the Bedouin prop of the Hashemite polity.

Source: Arab League, Wikipedia

Coming to the focus of this blog, religious identities also didn't allow Arab nationalism to take hold. Sectarian loyalties divided Arabs and in many countries, especially when they were politicized as in Iraq. These loyalties were weakened and laid dormant during the heyday of Arab nationalism and Nasser but they were back with a vengeance in the 1970s.

Iraq's sectarian divisions formed another hurdle in the Arab nationalist march. The country's Shi'ite majority never overcame its suspicion of Arab nationalism as a Sunni project. Shi'ite grievances against the Sunnis were primarily political, pertaining to Sunni dominance over Iraq's political order. The Shi'ites would point to the paucity of their numbers among the decision-making elite and in the ranks of the administrative and military institutions.

It is not that the Shi'ites did not believe in Arab nationalism, or that they did not consider themselves to be Arabs. Shi'ite men of letters penned some of the marvels of Arabic literature. Iraqis of all religions and denominations flocked to the Arab nationalist cause under Abdel Nasser's leadership in the 1950s and 1960s. But that did not mean that tribalism and sectarianism were erased. They were too deeply ingrained to disappear; they simply retreated into the recesses of people's consciousness. Once Arab nationalism began to suffer reverses and setbacks, and Abdel Nasser's ability to work his magic came into question, all the particularistic, anti-national tendencies reemerged and even surged to the forefront.

Although Adeed talks about 'radical Islam', as the last competitor of Arab nationalism, how he explains it, this 'radical' Islam is closer to what others have called political Islam or religious nationalism ('Radical' Islam is usually used to describe militant Islam). Political Islam and Arab nationalism share many myths. The glory and grandeur of Arab nation happened after Arabs accepted Islam and Islam is empty without Arab contribution.

In one sense, this competition is surprising. The vast majority of Arabs are Muslims, and the most glorious periods of Arab history occurred during the dazzling medieval Islamic empires. Similarly, all Muslims, moderates or radicals, could not but admit the central role of the Arabs in their religion. After all, Islam was born in the Arabian Peninsula, the Prophet Muhammad was Arab, and God's message was revealed in Arabic. One would think that the two social movements would share a cooperative relationship.

Instead, it was downright hostile. Arab nationalists, from Husri to Abdel Nasser and Michel Aflaq, founder and philosopher of the Baath Party, accepted the special place that Islam occupied within the Arab nationalist movement. But they stressed only those aspects of Islam that were moral and spiritual in nature. They resolutely rejected Islam's political and constitutional implications and insisted on its complete subordination to Arab nationalism. The nationalists vehemently argued that it was not religious but linguistic and historical ties that would knit the Arab nation into a cohesive whole.

Religious nationalists, of course, could not accept religious loyalty being relegated by ethnolinguistic loyalty. They denounced Arab nationalists and claimed Arab nationalism means denying the primacy of Islam/God/Prophet. Adeed, in the following section, only talks about militants but there were many more Arab Muslims who silently disliked Arab nationalism than those who attacked it militarily.

This was sheer blasphemy to the radical Muslim groups, and nationalists became the target of these groups' jihad. The concept of jihad, holy struggle, was central to the lexicon of Islamic militancy. Jihad was to be waged against the perceived enemies of Islam—i.e., all those who would try to infuse Muslim society with alien and blasphemous ideas, imported primarily from the West. To the Muslim radicals, perhaps the greatest offenders were the secular nationalists, who propagated ethnicity at the expense of religion and advocated the separation of Islam from politics.

Adeed then talks about causes of Arab nationalism failure. But let's leave it for some other time. 

Sending people to heaven by force or a whip

A recent controversy in Iran brought into focus the use of the state to enforce religion, a tactic used by states based on religious nationalism.

According to Al-monitor, six young men and women Iranians were arrested after they posted a video of them dancing to Pharrell Williams’ hit song, Happy (See Rouhani, critics debate 'path to heaven' ). President Rouhani, who doesn't control justice department, was not amused and remarked, 

Do not interfere so much in people’s lives, even out of compassion. … Let people choose their own path to heaven. We cannot send people to heaven by force or a whip. 

Source: Rouhani encourages political freedom in Iran

Conservative clergy establishment that controls justice department and is wary of Rouhani's overtures to the West, blasted him for these remarks and not only questioned his excellent clerical credentials but also accused of moving away from Imam Khomeini's path ( See Rouhani accused of trying to separate religion, administration). Hard-line cleric Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a member of the Assembly of Experts and director of the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute in Qom said, 

That some say the administration does not have a responsibility for the people’s religion, but that the administration’s only responsibility was to remove the sanctions — and not through resistance but through diplomacy — is against Imam [Khomeini]’s path. Did Imam start an uprising because of sanctions and the economy? Did this many martyrs sacrifice their lives for their stomachs and sanctions?

Saudi Arabian and Pakistani states have also tried to send people to heaven using a whip. Under They have tried to legislate and enforce good behavior. Good behavior or good religious behavior, however, can only come from people's own free will. Enforcement usually leads to false piety and hypocrisy. 

In Pakistan, during the last two decades, there has been a manifold increase in people travelling to Saudi Arabia for visits to the holy sites. In a poor country in need of foreign exchange, millions of dollars are spent each year on these travels. Similarly, millions more are spent to arrange festivals relating to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)'s birthday. Although I do not have statistics, generally it is agreed that more people are praying in mosques than before. But has Pakistanis also witnessed a corresponding increase in piety or spirituality or humility or a decrease in fraud or corruption in the last two decades? Very few Pakistanis can answer this question in affirmative. So, Islamization has only lead to superficial and overt religiosity. As Rouhani said, 'whip' has not moved them any closer to God or heaven.      

Barrington's Five Variants of post- independence nationalism

Lowell Barrington in his book After Independence: Making and Protecting in Post-colonial and Post-communist States (2006)  differentiates between pre-independence and post-independence nationalism and identifies five possible variants of post-independence nationalism. He argues that all nations have to decide about their territorial (which areas are part of the nation?) and membership (which groups are part of the nation?) boundaries. The five variants show different nationalisms emphasize different boundaries and their relationship with the state. The first two variants focused on territorial boundaries or national 'homeland' while the other three focus on national identity or membership boundaries. 

1. External Territory Claiming Nationalism: Under this variant, nationalism defines nation as existing outside the boundaries of the state. There is a strong belief that an emotionally important part of the homeland remains outside the borders. 
2. Sovereignty Protecting Nationalism: Nationalism here is under threat from minorities as nation is considered smaller than the territory it is holding. Thus, it is the opposite of the first variant.
3. Civic Nation Building nationalism: If ‘who is the nation’ answered in a such a way that all group inside the new state are included -- a relatively civic way -- an overarching national identity is developed. Nationalism becomes a nation-building project.
4. Ethnic Nation Protecting Nationalism: Majority ethnic group (sometimes dominant minority groups) may still feel under threat after independence. Independence is nor perceived to have brought cultural security and so nationalists may reject civic nation-building and continue struggle as ethnic group. In such a state, minorities are discriminated.
5. Co-National Protecting Nationalism: Ethnic nationalism, while discriminating at home, may extend itself to protecting co-ethnics or co-nationals in other states. Nationalists may mobilize people by claiming that co-nationals are being physical threatened or being economically, socially or politically discriminated and so need their help. 

Where does religious nationalism fit in these variants?

Religious nationalism does not fit in any of these variants. However, it is very close to the last type. It discriminates at home against religious minorities while calling for protection of coreligionists in other countries. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Israel are example of this co-national protecting nationalism. Barrington argues that these types are not mutually exclusive and can be combined. So, we can argue that religious nationalism of Pakistan and Israel are examples of combination of first and last type as both lay claims on external territory. The religious nationalism of Iran and Saudi Arabia, however, could be considered examples of sovereignty protecting nationalism and nation protecting nationalism before their interventions in Syria. In short, religious nationalism can fit in all of the types except civic nation building nationalism.  

Religious Conversion Laws and Religious Nationalism

Religious conversion laws are generally anti-religious conversion as they try to make the process of religious conversions difficult. These laws can be an indicator of growing religious nationalism. Religious nationalist countries usually have these laws as conversion from majority religion is considered tantamount to disloyalty to the state. As religion is conflated with the state, a change in religion (usually from state-preferred religion to another religion) is considered not only a rejection of previous religion but also a rejection of the state. 

Today, religious conversion was in the news because Myanmar/ Burmese authorities published the draft of a bill that would make it difficult to convert from one religion to another. The draft was published to get the opinion of the public. The proposed law is the result of efforts by Buddhist groups to stop/slow/restrict religious conversion. Although the draft law does not mention any specific religion, it is clear the effort is to stop conversion from the majority religion (Buddhism), rather than to it. News report gives the following details ( See  Myanmar Publishes Draft of Religious Conversion Bill):

Myanmar’s government on Tuesday published a draft bill on religious conversion, calling for public opinion on rules proposed by nationalist Buddhist monks which would require those who want to change faiths to first obtain permission from local authorities. Under the proposed law, anyone who wants to change their faith is required to apply to local registration teams—consisting of religious affairs, immigration, women’s affairs, education, and administration officials—for permission.

If passed, those found to be guilty of violating a list of prohibitions—which includes obstructing someone from converting—would be subject to a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment and a fine of 200,000 kyats (U.S. $200). Anyone found guilty of proselytizing could face up to a year in prison, though there is no mention of whether any action would be taken against someone who did not obtain permission to convert.

Organization of Protection of Race, Religion and Belief, a Buddhist group, pressurized the government to propose these laws after a public campaign that collected 1.3 million signatures last year. Myanmar is drifting toward religious nationalism as discussed in this blog before (See Buddhist Fundamentalism: Is it possible?).

Many Muslim religious nationalist states have religious conversion laws or restrict conversion from Islam through courts. In Saudi Arabia, for example,  religious conversion from Islam is termed as apostasy, a crime that carries the death sentence. Similarly, Iran criminalizes apostasy. In Pakistan, apostasy is not a crime despite religious parties efforts but apostates can be charged under the blasphemy law that carries the death penalty. 

Many countries that are drifting toward religious nationalism, like Myanmar, have been consistently pressurized by their majority religious groups to pass religious conversion laws. In some federations, like Malaysia and India, although there are no specific national laws on religious conversion, there are laws at the state/provincial level that restrict religious conversion.

The recent landslide victory of BJP, a Hindu nationalist party, have revived aspirations or fears of a national (anti) religious conversion law. BJP has supported religious conversion laws at the state level (See Narendra Modi (BJP) election win good for Indian economy, but scary for Christian minority) and BJP leaders have vowed to bring such law, if they win elections in 2014 (See ‘BJP will bring law against religious conversions if voted to power’).


Anti-conversion laws in Indian states

Source: Conversion of religion: India (legal aspects) 

Religious conversions are bound to increase as people have more opportunities to know about other religions so pressure from majority religious groups in states based on religious nationalism would also increase to restrict/ban religious conversions (from the majority religion, not to the majority religion). 

    

 Update: Myanmar Parliament passed the anti-conversion law in August 2015.