Who are Wahhabis? What is Wahhabism? Is it different from Salafism?

Wahhabism is something controversial. Many of Wahhabis do not even like to be called Wahhabis as this term was initially used as an insult by the Wahhabi movement enemies. The following seminar video explains the different terms and the history of Wahhabism well in less than 40 minutes. 

The seminar was delivered by Dr. Cole Bunzel from Yale University at the Centre for Islamic and Middle East Studies (CIMS), Oslo University, Norway. The lecture was titled “Classical Wahhabism and Its Modern Revival” and was based on Dr. Cole's dissertation and forthcoming book. It took place at the University of Oslo on October 17, 2018

Here is an introduction about Cole from CIMS webpage:

Cole Bunzel is a postdoctoral research fellow in Islamic Law and Civilization at the Yale Law School, where his work focuses on the history of Wahhabism and the Jihadi Salafi movement in modern Islam. In 2017, he received the Porter Ogden Jacobus Fellowship, Princeton University’s top honor for graduate students. He is the editor of the blog Jihadica.

Cole talks about:

• What is Wahhabism?
• What are the two forms of Tawhid (monotheism) defined by ibn-Taymiyyah and how they were used to kill Muslims?
• What are the two types of Wahhabism?
• How Classical Wahhabism (from the 1740s to 1920s) is different from the Modern Wahhabism (after 1920s)?
• The three Saudi states (1740s-1818, 1823- 1891, 1902 - present)
• What was jihad in Classical Wahhabism? Hatred is not enough, show enmity, later violence
• How King Abdul Aziz tamed Wahhabis, reinterpreted doctrines of Al-Shiekh and entered into a settlement with Sunni Islam and the larger world?
• The revival of Classical Wahhabism under Al-Qaida and the Daesh (the ISIS)

Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh 

Source: Islamic Societies Review

The seminar video can be watched here

Wahhabism is often confused with Salafism as Wahhabis call themselves Salafis or Al-Muwahhidun (or monotheists). Following a commentary from S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore on the differences between Wahhabism and Salafism:

The terms Salafi and Wahhabi are often used interchangeably. Many confuse the two while others refer to them as one. What are the differences between the two? 

The study of modern Salafism will not be complete without looking into Wahhabism – a reference to the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and its relation to Salafism. In the current discourse on Islam, the term “Salafi” and “Wahhabi” are often used interchangeably. Many confuse the two while others refer to them as one.

Wahhabi is a label given to those who follow the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Wahhabis are always referred to as Salafis, and in fact they prefer to be called as such. As a rule, all Wahhabis are Salafis but not all Salafis are Wahhabis. The term Salafism did not become associated with the Wahhabi creed until the 1970s. It was in the early 20th century that the Wahhabis referred to themselves as Salafis. 

Who is a Salafi? 

The usage of the term Salafi today refers to those who embrace Salafism (Arabic: Salafiyyah). Salafiyyah is known to be the manhaj or way of the Salafis. The Salafis are Muslims who advocate literal and to some degree binary interpretation of Islamic teachings as enjoined by Prophet Muhammad and subsequently practised by the early pious predecessors known as the salaf al-salih. Following the salaf is the reason for their self-designation as Salafis. 

Linguistically, the term salafi is an ascription to the salaf. A Salafi is one who ascribes himself/herself to the way and teachings of the salaf. From the linguistic standpoint, if someone says, for example “ana Britani” (I am British), it means he comes from Britain or ascribing himself to Britain. 

The letter ‘i’ at the end of the word (e.g. Britani, Salafi) shows that the person saying the word is associating himself to the word. Hence, when a person says “I am a Salafi”, he is saying that he ascribes himself to the way/teachings of the salaf. 

Who is a Wahhabi? 

A Wahhabi is one who follows Wahhabism (Arabic: Wahhabiyyah) or the teachings of Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in Najd in 1703 in Uyainah, in present-day Saudi Arabia. He grew up in an atmosphere where there was widespread deterioration in the Muslim beliefs and practices. 

Many Muslims had fallen into acts considered shirk (associating Allah with others), and returned to the days of jahiliyyah (ignorance or pre-Islamic period). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to reform the Muslims under the banner of “true” Islam and get rid of these acts which he considered heretical. 

Wahhabis do not prefer the term Wahhabiyyah or being called as Wahhabis. They prefer to be called Al-Muwahhidun (the people of monotheism) or Salafiyyun (the Salafis) in reference to the pious predecessors (salaf al-salih). But over time Ibn Abd al-Wahhab followers prefer the more generic term salafiyyun which signifies adherence to the faith and practices of the Prophet and the first three generations of Muslims. 

Unlike “Salafi” which is both a label and self-designated term, the term “Wahhabi” is a label given to the followers of the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, from whose name the term “Wahhabi” originates. Wahhabism simply means the way of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab which also denotes his ideology. Hence, linguistically, a Wahhabi is one who subscribes to Wahhabism. 

The main reason why Wahhabis have rejected the term Wahhabism is because it provides the impression that the teachings propagated by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is a new doctrine or belief within the Islamic faith, whereas they believe that it is merely a reflection and an extension of the teachings of the Prophet, his companions and the salaf al-salih. 

Due to the importance of following the footsteps of the salaf, Wahhabism has always been a form of Salafism. It subscribes to the methodology of the salaf in theology and law. In fact, the teaching spreads in the modern Muslim world under the banner of Salafism instead of Wahhabism. As Khaled Abou El-Fadl, a professor of Islamic law from the US observes, “the attachment of Wahhabism to Salafism was indeed needed as Salafism was a much more ‘credible paradigm in Islam’; making it an ideal medium for Wahhabism”. 

Ideology of Salafism and Wahhabism 

The ideology of Salafism and Wahhabism is built upon a narrowly defined religious text. Methodologically, they are literalist and puritanical in their approaches to Islamic theology and law. 

In matters of jurisprudence, Salafis and Wahabbis subscribe to the Hanbali mazhab (school of thought) and law. However, many of them claim no specific affiliation to any particular mazhab. Instead, they claim to follow the stronger opinion among the Salaf based on the Quran and the Sunnah (the Prophet’s Traditions). 

But one who studies their views in jurisprudence will find their origins in the Hanbali school of fiqh. Even Ibn Taimiyah, a famous Islamic theologian in the medieval period and his student, Ibn Qayyim, the two scholars most referred to by the Salafis and Wahhabis, adopted the methodology of the Hanbali school. 

To maintain the purity of Islam, Salafis and Wahhabis attempt to combat what they view as deviant and heretical practices such as offering prayers at tombs, glorifying ‘holy places’ and ‘saints’. Such are classified as shirk, kufr (infidelity), riddah (apostasy), and bid’ah (innovation). They strongly reject any belief and practices that are not enjoined by the Quran and the Prophet. 

For example, Salafis and Wahhabis claim that Sufi practices such as tawassul (intercession between man and God) which had accrued over the centuries since the pristine period of Islam threatens tawhid (monotheism or the belief in the oneness of God). They believe that bid’ah resulted from the adoption of local cultures by Islamic missionaries in their attempts to attract new converts. However, this blend of Islam and customs helped significantly the conversion process to Islam by making it accessible to wider audiences. 

Ideologically, Salafism is wider than Wahhabism. Salafi thought has existed for hundreds of years and has spread throughout the Muslim world and beyond. Wahhabism only existed from the mid 18th century. While it is true that Wahhabism is Salafism, it is only one of Salafism’s many orientations. Salafi and Wahhabi are not two sides of the same coin. 

About the Authors
Mohamed Bin Ali is Assistant Professor and Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University Singapore. Both studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and are counsellors with the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG).

In 2016, Cole Bunzel has written about the contest between the third Wahhabi state (Saudi Arabia) and what he calls the fourth Wahhabi state (ISIS) for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Following are the conclusions. The whole paper can be read here.

The Islamic State, which draws on the teachings of the Wahhabi school of Islam, finds inspiration in the example of the first Saudi-Wahhabi state (1744–1818), which engaged in expansionary jihad and cultivated a sectarian animus toward the Shia.

The Islamic State has declared three so-called provinces in Saudi Arabia and carried out some fifteen attacks there since November 2014.

The Islamic State’s rise has reignited a debate in Saudi Arabia over the intolerant and aggressive nature of Wahhabism. Liberals have called for a revisionist movement, as they describe it, to expunge certain doctrines from Wahhabism.

In some ways the Islamic State’s claim to the Wahhabi heritage is not unfounded. The early Wahhabis advanced an exclusivist version of Sunni Islam that was universally seen as a heresy, founded a state that waged expansionary jihad against fellow Sunni Muslims, and killed Shia Muslims because they were seen as hopeless idolaters. The Islamic State has done the same on all three counts.

Other features of the Islamic State’s ideology—from the declaration of a caliphate to the use of extraordinary violence to the group’s apocalyptic fervor—do not find a mainstream Wahhabi precedent.

The Islamic State’s campaign in Saudi Arabia has slowed considerably since October 2015. Despite concerted propaganda efforts, the group appears to be making little headway against a state outfitted with one of the most advanced counterterrorism infrastructures in the world. But given the substantial Islamic State following in Saudi Arabia, more attacks, however occasional, can be expected.

Saudi Arabia is a long way from pursuing meaningful reforms of Wahhabi doctrine. Saudi liberals’ criticism of Wahhabism is tolerated as of early 2016 more than ever before, despite the kingdom’s religious scholars who would prefer the government silence them. But the new political leadership is busy consolidating power, while the religious leadership is defensive and mired in conspiracy theories.

Too liberal an outlook is resulting in a backlash because people want culturally rootedness, identity and traditions

Professor David Gushee argues that a liberal outlook that does not give importance to people's attachment to their country and/or  religion is perhaps resulting in a backlash. The signs of this backlash are Trump, Brexit and various type of religious fundamentalisms. 

One of the most important developments in global politics and religion is the triumph of “thick” over “thin.” By that I mean the triumph of politicians and religious leaders who offer strong rather than weak national identity platforms, passionate rather than becalmed articulations of loyalty, particularist rather than universalist policy visions.

He contends that it is difficult for universalism and liberalism (thin) to inspire people as much as nationalism and religion (thick) and this has been deomntrated by the events happening around the world. President Putin, President Erdogan and now President-elect are the proofs:

One of the most striking things Donald Trump regularly said during the election campaign was that without border enforcement, “you don’t have a country.” 

Perhaps what he meant to apply to one policy issue has broader application, wider resonance. People want to “have a country” that still means something, so they choose country over Europe, country over global trade deals, country over international norms, country over inclusivity ethics. It’s a thick, local, particularist identity and loyalty. 

And in religion, “you don’t have a religion” without doctrinal borders, without behavioral expectations, without clear identity demarcations over against those of other religions and no religion.

Professor Gushee's recipe for avoiding future Trumps and religious fundamentalisms is coming up with a different type of religion and nationalism, not liberalism. He is following his own advice:

These days as I prepare to preach weekly sermons in a post-Southern Baptist church outside Atlanta, I am trying to offer a non-fundamentalist but still thick account of Christian theology and practice. Here, I am seeking to say, we teach a religion with substance, a religion worth devoting your life to, a religion with biblical rooting, doctrinal solidity, and ethical-communal expectations. So far, so good.

The same thing will need to happen at the national political level. If we don’t like Donald Trump’s version of thick American nationalism and national loyalty, we must offer an equally thick but more compelling alternative. We must articulate and demonstrate why our understanding of what it means to be American, of the core values of American democracy, and of best public policies, are superior to the alternative on display — within the terms of a thick American identity and loyalty.
Because thick beats thin every time.

Is Professor Gushee's argument valid? Maybe religion and nationalism are so potent (thick) because we socialise and indoctrinate every child with religion and nationalism. If we teach liberalism and universalism from age four, then maybe liberalism also becomes thick?

Saudi Arabian Nationalism, MBS, Salafism, and Yemen War

A mix of dynastic and Salafist nationalism is on the rise in Saudi Arabia. Intervention in the Yemeni Civil War (named the 'Decisive Storm') has the intended rally around the flag effect. Simeon Kerr wrote about it in the Financial Times in May 2015:

Lines of green Saudi flags hang proudly along Riyadh’s wide highways while screens around the capital broadcast footage on a loop of warplanes flying into combat and massive explosions.Local companies have taken out giant billboards pledging allegiance to the “decisive and determined” King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, while ordinary Saudis have taken to social media to show their support for the new king and the county’s military campaign in Yemen.An unprecedented jingoism — hidden for decades — has swept through Saudi Arabia since King Salman ascended to the throne in January and the launch in March of the aerial campaign against Shia Houthi rebels.Although the air strikes have raised international concern and heightened tensions with Iran, its rival for regional dominance, they have been cheered in Saudi by an increasingly nationalist and sectarian sentiment.

Saudi cartoon showing Iranian cleric being hit by a missile on which Decisive Storm (عاصفة الحزم) is visible.

Source: Al-Watan, Saudi Arabia, March 27, 2015

The royalists, nationalists, and the servile media also have a young, tall, dark and handsome prince to gush about. In one year, Deputy Crown Prince and Second Deputy Prime Minister Prince Mohammad bin Salman has risen from being one of the dozens of grandsons of King Abdul Aziz al-Saud (the founder of Saudi Arabia) to arguably the most powerful man in the kingdom. Prince Mohammad is currently holding three posts:

• He is the head of the Royal Court, meaning he is not only King Salman's son but also his closest advisor; 
• He is the Defense Minister and as Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir is not a royal, Prince Mohammad is more powerful of the two men leading Saudi foreign engagements;
• He is the key economic decision-maker in Saudi Arabia. He chairs the Council of Economic Affairs and Development, the main decision-making body on economic and financial issues in Saudi Arabia. In his capacity as the lead economic player, Prince Mohammad announced his plans for Saudi economy and for the Aramco (the national energy company that drives the Saudi economy) in January 2016. In March 2016, he announced the Saudi Arabia’s Vision for 2030. 

For a country that has been ruled by septuagenarians and octogenarians for decades, it's unprecedented for a thirty-years old to hold such power. His youth and action-oriented leadership have made him popular but many are wary of such concentration of power.

Source: The National Interest

Is Saudi nationalism moving away from Salafism or is Salafism becoming more entrenched in the Saudi nationalism under King Salman?

There is evidence to support both sides of the argument. Since the late 1990s, Saudi Arabia has promoted a more dynastic and ecumenical religious nationalism and has tried to move away from Salafi nationalism. Official media and educational and cultural institutions have focused more on the exceptionalism of Saudi land and royal family than on the exceptionalism of Salafism. Some of the measures taken are given below:

• A cult of King Abdul Aziz has been cultivated;
• King Abdullah curtailed the power of Salafi clerics and religious police; 
• National Museum was founded in Riyadh;
• A new subject 'national education' was introduced in the schools (Saudi Arabia in Transition 2015, page 4-5);
• The first co-educational university in Saudi Arabia was established in 2009 by King Abdullah. He gave it his own name (King Abdullah University of Science and Technology) and quashed criticism of Salafi critics;
• In the early 2000s, Saudi Royals for the first time made some non-Salafi Sunnis and Shias (and women) included in the Shura Council, the highest advisory body. King Abdullah also started a dialogue with the Shiites, who are ten percent of Saudi population and more crucially are a majority in the oil-rich Eastern province;
• Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 announced recently called for 'a tolerant country with Islam as its constitution and moderation as its method.' It declared that the 'values of moderation, tolerance, excellence, discipline, equity, and transparency will be the bedrock of our success.' Emphasis on toleration and moderation show a change of focus and decrease in the power of Salafi religious establishment;
• Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 also had good news for women. It asserted that 'Saudi women are yet another great asset. With over 50 percent of our university graduates being female, we will continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of our society and economy.' This was another defeat of Salafi clerics who want women to stay at home;
• The Saudi Arabian leadership has repeatedly said that Yemeni intervention was not  Salafi/Sunni fight with Shi'ism. They have clarified that it was a fight against Iran, which was trying to control the Middle East and carving a new Persian Empire. They have also condemned the sectarian rhetoric of the Daesh (Islamic State), which is mainly Salafi, and called for unity of all Muslims.

Abdullah Hamidaddin, a scholar, has also argued in Al-Arabia that the power of (Salafi) clerics is on the wane in Saudi Arabia:

In recent weeks, the Saudi government has been sending a clear message to its people and the world that economic development and religious extremism cannot coexist. This message is in line with the launch of Saudi Vision 2030, which depends on a social vibrancy that is antithetical to extreme religious values. Of course, people have the right to be religious, but religious institutions - formal and informal - shouldn't be allowed to be above the law to forcefully impose or propagate their views. 

Many analysts consider the recent government announcement to limit the ability of the “Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice" which is known in many foreign media outlets as "religious police,” to arrest and interrogate a significant move. But a much more important decision was the appointment during last week’s cabinet reshuffle of Sulaiman Aba al-Khayl as president of the University of Imam Mohammad bin Saud. I personally believe this cements the government’s focus to work closely with the religious institution for the greater good. His appointment came as a pleasant surprise to moderates and reformers. The university had been considered by some that it promotes nationally and internationally hardline views.

However, there is also evidence of the rise in Salafi nationalism after the ascendance of King Salman and Yemeni intervention. While Saudi government has tried to avoid stroking anti-Shia hatred, many official clerics and others people linked with the government have publicly portrayed Yemen and Syrian civil wars as a conflict between real Islam (Salafism/Sunnism) and false Islam (Shiism) and resorted to scaremongering after the start of Saudi campaign against Yemeni Houthis. Angus Mcdowall of Reuters gave examples of such instances:

"If they (Shi'ites) manage to win and control the state, they ravage Sunnis: clerics, women, children, the rulers and the ruled. They attack just like the lion attacks his prey," said Farid al-Ghamdi, a cleric at Mecca's Umm al-Qura seminary in a sermon visible on YouTube...."Decisive Storm came to sever any ambition of the Safavids to besiege Muslims in their own homes," wrote cleric Saad al-Breik to his 1.15 million Twitter followers after the air strikes began last month. 

That kind of scare-mongering has been evident in the Saudi press as well. A report in the daily al-Medina newspaper last week cited "military experts" as saying the Houthis wanted to turn Yemen's capital Sanaa into "an entirely Shi'ite city by 2017" and that the air strikes would thwart "this Iranian plan"....

An analysis of over seven million Arabic tweets from February to August 2015 done by Alexandra Siegel, a PhD student at the New York University showed that while both sides are using social media for hate speech, such tweets from Saudi Arabia are much more common (although it might be said that this conclusion would have something to do with only looking at Arabic tweets).

In the years following the escalation of the Syrian civil war, six main derogatory terms have been frequently used to disparage Shia Muslims online: rafidha (rejectionist), Hizb al-Shaytan (party of the devil), Hizb al-Lat (party of Lat), Majus (Magianism or Zoroastrianism), Nusayri (followers of Nusayr), and Safawi (Safavid). Rafidha refers to Twelver Shias, the largest of the Shia sects, and implies that they have rejected “true” Islam as they allegedly do not recognize Abu Bakr, the first caliph, and his successors as having been legitimate rulers after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. For example, Salafi cleric Abdulaziz al-Tarifi tweeted to his approximately 800,000 followers in February, “Jews and Christians did not used to collude with the rafidhaas they do today in this country and every country.”

The killing of Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr was considered as another sign of anti-Shiite bias although the Saudi government pointed out that dozens of Sunni terrorists were also executed on the same day as Sheikh Nimr and claimed that executions were against terrorism, not against Shia or Shiaism. Furthermore, the coalition of Muslim countries that was announced in December 2015 to fight terrorism does not have one Shia-ruled Muslim country as its members. Bahrain is the only Shia-majority country that is a member of the coalition but it is ruled by a Sunni monarchy. So, it appears that not only Iran but all Shia-ruled countries (Iraq and Lebanon) were excluded from this alliance.

Frederic Wehrey is not very hopeful of future and considers that Salafism has increased its role in Saudi nationalism under King Salman  (Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy, p-111-12)

At its core, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remains an authoritarian state with a ruling family wedded to monarchical privilege and backed by a deeply anti-liberal and sectarian religious establishment. If anything, it appears to be becoming more so under King Salman. In contrast to King Abdullah, Salman has been wooing the Kingdom’s religiously conservative base of power to shore up public support for his domestic policies and to demonize Iran in the region. The result has been a rollback of Abdullah’s limited reforms and a new, more virulent Sunni-based nationalism. 

Professor Madawi al-Rasheed, one of the most eminent scholars of Saudi politics, claims that the Yemen war is the latest incarnation of militarized Wahhabi nationalism. Writing in Politico, in a column titled "Wahhabi religious nationalism turns ugly," she traces the history of Wahhabi nationalism:

In the Arab world, religious nationalism was invented early in the 20th century in Saudi Arabia, a kingdom whose goal was to unite dispersed people and purify their religious beliefs and practices under the leadership of the Al-Saud. This unification took place as a result of a fringe Islamic revivalist tradition, commonly known as Wahhabiyya, which morphed into a military religious nationalist movement. With time, the project went beyond simple piety: Sharia law and conformity to Islamic teachings were rigorously applied. Under state patronage, this Wahhabiyya was turned into a quasi-nationalist project. Its ideology has proliferated and now inspires Muslims across the globe, fueled by petrodollars and globalization.

Early in the 20th century, an all-encompassing Wahhabi religious nationalism inflamed the imagination of a substantial section of the population of Arabia. It provided the ideological tool to band together to achieve independence from an ailing Ottoman empire that had little control over this peripheral region of its Empire. With a political leadership eager to expand throughout Arabia and to assert its control over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, Al-Saud militarized the fragmented tribal population, united them under an Islamic flag and mobilized them to wage war against all those who refused their homogenizing theology and radical Wahhabi message.

From the heart of Arabia they spread across the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. They created a state that has remained hostage to the Wahhabi agenda, bigoted interpretations of religious texts, and violent strategies whose aim is to control the behavior of Muslims and non-Muslims in its jurisdictions.

Yemen war, according to Professor al-Rasheed, is linked with the Wahhabi nationalism's quest to obliterate its rivals, who are all heretics and idolators, and bring the people back to its "pure" version of Islam and she argues there is only one way to end the terrorism and recurrent sectarian wars:

The zeal of religious nationalism turns ugly when it moves from the mosque to the military. And even uglier when it becomes the religion of the state. Whether in Saudi Arabia or in the nascent so-called Islamic State, where religious nationalism holds people together by the power of the sword, it is difficult to imagine an alternative way of being Muslim.

In Saudi Arabia, the airstrikes on Yemen launched in March proved a shrewd move for the government: They sparked the imagination of many Saudis who saw them through the prism of their old Wahhabi tradition as countering the hegemony of a rival Shiite power, namely Iran and its alleged Zaydi Houthi clients. The Saudi leadership could not simply watch a rival power such as the Islamic State take all the credit for eradicating heretics. Both Saudi Arabia and the Islamic State came into being as a result of the same type of ideology. Their interests may clash but they share a common goal.

Unless religious nationalism is replaced by new identities about being citizens in a bounded nation in which people enjoy equality and rights, we will continue to see a repeat of the terrorist atrocities committed in the name of Islam.

No-Nos for a Caliphate

Christian Caryl has written an interesting article on Islamic state or more precisely on how to establish a successful caliphate (See 9 Things to Avoid When Creating Your Own Caliphate). In a letter to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the newly (self) proclaimed caliph of IS, Caryl lists the following nine no-nos.

1. You might want to think twice about wearing a Rolex
2. Don't ban music
3. Think twice about punishing girls for alleged immodesty
4. Don't vandalize ancient cultural relics
5. Try not to include too many foreigners in your army
6. Don't alienate local notables
7. Don't prohibit little pleasures
8. Don't spread disunity among Muslims
9. Don't declare yourself a caliph

Source: Was it a Rolex? Caliph’s watch sparks guesses

This list appears to be quite insightful, with all the nine measures linked to the mistakes made during recent attempts at establishing 'Islamic' states. Looking again, one can see that almost all of these no-nos can be subsumed under two broad themes.

• Respect local culture and traditions
• Do not be too strict with the people

These recommendations appear intuitive. Everybody knows that human beings have a powerful affinity with their culture and most of them find it difficult to live under strict rules. The very first Islamic state, established under Prophet Muhammad (PBH), also appears to be following these recommendations. Arab culture was largely adopted or accommodated in Islam. Moreover, the few things in which Islam went against Arab culture were very gradually introduced so that people do not feel burdened (e.g. prohibition of alcohol). Leniency, not strictness, was the hallmark of the first Islamic state.  

The question is then, why Muslim movements continue to go down the same destructive path of rigidity, sternness, and hostility toward local cultures?

The problem appears to be the way these states are created. These states are generally created by young zealots and fighters, not experienced thinkers, administrators, scholars etc. The later groups are largely absent not only in the most prominent leaders, but also in the second tier leadership as purity is appreciated and experience (with the previous regime) is considered a sign of hypocrisy and lack of true faith. In pre-modern history, zealots founded states could survive a bit longer because states had less control our people lives and people didn't demand much from their rulers. However, these primitive states also had to eventually accept the local culture and govern with compassion, if they had to survive long.

Not surprisingly, the zealous leadership of the recent 'Islamic' states, while comparatively good at conquering territory, find it hard to rule and govern. Killing, looting and destroying are the only skills they have and they continue using them, even when they are not required or disastrous. They long for certainties which are (perceived to be) available during wars but are difficult to keep adhering to when one is governing millions of people over large swaths of territory. Uncertainty is difficult to handle for these leaders and they might feel that God has left them. Iconoclasm is their way to show that they are still faithful to God and seek His support. Banning local traditions and small pleasures in another.    

But, are Caryl's warnings only applicable to successful caliphates or Islamic states? It is obvious no state can survive long, if it didn't pay close attention to these warnings. A very illuminating comparison can be made with the communist states of the twentieth century. While leaders that tried to strictly follow Marxist ideology couldn't survive long, leaders that blended Marxism with local culture survived and endured.

From a religious nationalism perspective, the lesson is that religion is important and people would do a lot to save their souls but local culture cannot be ignored.     

Hamas and Islamic State

Ali Mamouri has written an article on why there is no love lost between Hamas and the so-called Islamic State (of Iraq and al-Sham) (see Why Islamic State has no sympathy for Hamas?). Ali argues that there are some doctrinal reasons why the IS does not support Hamas:

Salafists believe that jihad must be performed under legitimate leadership. This argument is advanced through the “banner and commander” concept, which holds that whoever undertakes jihad must follow a commander who fulfills the criteria of religious and political leadership and has raised the banner of jihad. Given that there is neither a legitimate leader nor a Salafist-approved declaration of jihad in Palestine, fighting there is forbidden.

In addition, for Salafists, if non-Muslims control Islamic countries and apostates exist in the Islamic world, the Islamic world must be cleansed of them before all else. In short, the purification of Islamic society takes priority over combat against non-Islamic societies. On this basis, Salafists see conflict with an allegedly illegitimate Hamas government as a first step toward confrontation with Israel. Should the opportunity for military action present itself in the Palestinian territories, Salafists would fight Hamas and other factions deemed in need of “cleansing” from the land and engage Israel afterward.

This approach has its roots in Islamic history, which Salafists believe confirms the validity of their position. Relevant points of historical reference include the first caliphate of Abu Bakr, which gave priority to fighting apostates over expanding Islamic conquests, which occurred later, during the second caliphate, under Umar bin al-Khattab. Likewise, Saladin fought the Shiites and suppressed them before he engaged the crusaders in the Holy Land.

Salafists today see that their priority as fighting Shiites, “munafiqin” (dissemblers, or false Muslims) and apostates, whom they call the “close enemy.” During the current war in Gaza, a number of IS fighters have burned the Palestinian flag because they consider it a symbol of the decline of the Islamic world, which succumbed to national divisions through the creation of independent political states. In Salafist doctrine, the entire Islamic world must be united under a single state, an Islamic caliphate, which IS declared in late June.

So, there are two reasons:

• According to Islamic doctrine, jihad is only allowed under a legitimate leadership and Hamas is not the legitimate leadership because it fights for democracy and a Palestinian state (while IS fights for God and for an Islamic state)
• The IS has to fight the apostate Muslims first, before fighting the non-Muslims. Purification comes before the conquest. So, fighting Shias in Iraq and Syria comes before fighting Israel.

In a recent statement, the IS tried to deflect the criticism that it is not helping Palestinians in Gaza by reiterating its commitment to liberating Palestine and destroying Israel. It asked Gazans to be patient as the IS is working and is not interested in issuing empty statements like many Arab governments (See Gaza crisis: ISIS vows to help Palestinians fight barbaric Jews).

Source: Hamas Website

The IS spokesman, Nuseiri, also argued that it is following a systematic approach and has a plan (See ISIS Spokesman Explains Why 'Islamic State' Not Supporting Hamas) 

However, he pointed out that ISIS has been taking a systematic approach in its campaign, and outlined six specific stages it said needed to be fulfilled before taking on Israel.
Some of those "stages" - building a firm base for an Islamic state in Iraq, and using it as a springboard to wage war in Syria and Lebanon - have already been achieved. But he said a number of other criteria still needed to be fulfilled before challenging Israel directly.
Among them, Nuseiri said that the US - seen as Israel's greatest ally - needed to be weakened politically and economically via attacks on the American mainland, as well as US interests in Muslim countries. Additionally, the existing "Islamic State" needed to expand its borders to cover all of "Greater Syria" (which would include Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and possibly Gaza); such a state, he said, would then be in a position for a direct confrontation with Israel.

The IS statement can be taken as few practical considerations (which every successful movement has to take into account) in the expansion of the IS Caliphate and this is how the IS wants others to see it. However, these doctrinal and practical considerations can also be understood as a camouflage for nationalistic concerns. 

Doctrinally, the claim of legitimacy of IS is weaker than that of Hamas. Neither the IS leadership is more pious, nor it has support/baya of most of the pious Muslim leadership. Moreover, jihad needs legitimate leadership when Muslims are attacking. When Muslim lands, homes, and persons are attacked (as in Gaza), all Muslims are allowed/required to defend themselves, with or without legitimate leadership.

Source: Islamic State Threatens to Topple Hamas in Gaza

The argument about 'purifying' and killing apostate Muslims first and non-Muslims later is also weak. When Muslim women and children are being killed in hundreds, it is preposterous (and doctrinally indefensible) to not stop this massacre and focus on killing apostates. The fact of the matter is that IS's main enemies are Shias in both Syria and Iraq so it might also be a way to legitimize its own actions. Moreover, as Salafist groups are challenging Hamas in Gaza, the IS might want Israel to destroy Hamas so that more radical and doctrinally closer Gazan Salafists may take over.

Update: By mid-2015, the divisions between the IS and Hamas were public and the IS issued a threat to Hamas in a video statement as reported by YNet News:

The video statement, issued from an Islamic State stronghold in Syria, was a rare public challenge to Hamas, which has been cracking down on jihadis in Gaza who oppose its truces with Israel and reconciliation with the US-backed rival Palestinian faction Fatah.

"Eight years they control the territory, and have yet to enforce one Islamic teaching," the ISIS speaker said in the video.

"We will uproot the state of the Jews (Israel) and you and Fatah, and all of the secularists are nothing and you will be over-run by our creeping multitudes," said a masked Islamic State member in the message addressed to the "tyrants of Hamas".

"The rule of sharia (Islamic law) will be implemented in Gaza, in spite of you. We swear that what is happening in the Levant today, and in particular the Yarmouk camp, will happen in Gaza," he said, referring to Islamic State advances in Syria, including in a Damascus district founded by Palestinian refugees. (See Islamic State Threatens to Topple Hamas in Gaza)

Muslim yearning for caliphate and ISIS caliphate

ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) or ISIL (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) has declared itself a Caliphate and named its leader as Caliph of all Muslims. The group spokesman said:

He is the imam and khalifah (Caliph) for the Muslims everywhere.......Accordingly, the "Iraq and Sham" (Levant) in the name of the Islamic State is henceforth removed from all official deliberations and communications, and the official name is the Islamic State from the date of this declaration.......It is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to (him) and support him...The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khalifah's authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.( See ISIS Declares Islamic 'Caliphate' And Calls On Groups To Pledge Allegiance)

Powerful words indeed. While president of Indonesia or Prime Minister of Pakistan, democratically elected leaders of around 200 million Muslims, would find it difficult to call themselves caliph of around 1.5 billion Muslims, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, commander of fewer than fifteen thousand fighters, has claimed the coveted title. As Al-Qaida's rejection of ISIS shows, al-Baghdadi is not even an accepted leader of militant,trans-national, anti-West extremist Muslims in Iraq or Syria.  

Huff post quotes John Esposito, one of the most eminent scholars of Islam in the West, defining Caliphate in the following way (See What Is A Caliphate? ISIS Declaration Raises Questions) :

Historically, the caliph was the successor to the prophet, the political leader of the community, and therefore the head of the early transnational Islamic empire. That's important -- the idea of it being a transnational empire, that reflected the ummah, and transcended national boundaries.

Does it matter that al-Baghdadi has declared himself caliph? Some have argued that now more Muslim militants would be attracted to him. Fair point. But others have argued that this might be a disastrous outreach (See Jihadis in Iraq and Syria declare a caliphate? Why that's good).

Yesterday's declaration of a caliphate by the leading jihadi army in Iraq and Syria – and its demand that Muslims swear oaths of fealty to its leader – could prove the most disastrous piece of jihadi overreach since Al Qaeda in Iraq's routine use of torture and beheadings spurred a Sunni Arab backlash in 2006. 

The formerly Al Qaeda-linked jihadis are generally reported as going from strength to strength in Iraq, taking and holding cities like Mosul and Tikrit from the central government. But the success of the uprising in Iraq in the past month has rested heavily on the backs of Sunni Arab tribes and former Baathists with formal military training. And the grandiose announcement – a telegraphed intent to impose a harsh and regressive vision of Islam on as much territory as possible – is unlikely to make them happy.

I personally think this announcement does not matter much. Does al-Baghdadi become more legitimate or get more recruits? Some recruits but not much else. ISIS is a like a fringe of a fringe. Al-Baghdadi is a brutal callous killer and it is difficult to find many Muslims, except for the militants, giving his message any serious thought. As an NPR reporter described, even in his own country Iraq, he is considered a nut job. Most of the Muslim probably do not know who he is and those, who have heard of him, would most likely try to keep as much distance from him as possible. In conclusion, ISIS caliphate has not changed much on the ground or elsewhere. As Juan Cole explains in his brief history of Caliphate, hundreds of fringe groups have been claiming caliphate for probably more than a thousand years (See The Debacle of the Caliphates: Why al-Baghdadi’s Grandiosity doesn’t Matter).

What is a more interesting question is why Caliphate still mesmerizes many Muslims today. Why pine for a medieval government/empire? 

Nowadays, the Caliphate has captured the imagination of many Muslims worldwide mainly because they are concerned about the abject condition of the Muslim Ummah today. Despite a plethora of resources and around fifty independent Muslim-majority states in the world, Muslims are followers/lackeys, not leaders. Decisions about Muslims and Muslim-majority states are made by others in Washington, Moscow or Beijing and Muslim leaders (with a few exceptions) kowtow to these capitals, instead of charting their own independent course for the benefit of their own people.

Many Muslim relate these circumstances to the lack of unity among Muslims and hark back to the times when Muslims were successful and leading the world. It is commonly believed that under the erstwhile caliphate, Muslims were united as one nation, within one political state and that was why they were so successful. There is also the notion that caliphate is blessed by Allah. Many Muslims, therefore, desire a new caliphate so that there would be an Islamic renaissance and Islamic civilization would reach another apogee by the blessings of Allah. The message of Hizb-ul-Tahrir, one of the most prominent organizations trying to establish caliphate (Khilafah) today, shows the allied themes of current humiliation; success in the past; and renaissance under a new caliphate (See Hizb-e-Tahrir: About us)

Hizb ut-Tahrir is determined to work within the Ummah in order to implement Islam and achieve its objective by endeavouring to gain the leadership of the Islamic Ummah so that she could accept it as her leader, to implement Islam upon her and proceed with it in her struggle against the Kuffar and in the work towards the return of the Islamic State as it was before, the leading superpower in the world.....

The rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir was in response to Allah (swt)’s saying: T.M.Q. “And let there arise from amongst you a band that calls to the good and commands what is right and forbids what is evil and those are the ones who will attain felicity.” in order to revive the Islamic Ummah after the severe decline to which she has sunk, to liberate her from the thoughts, systems and rules of Kufr, its systems and from the hegemony and influence of the Kufr states,  and  in order to work towards establishing the Islamic Khilafah State so that the rules by what Allah (swt) has revealed returns to the realm of life.

While not denying that erstwhile caliphate was a big Muslim state and a big Muslim state now would probably be more powerful than numerous small Muslim states, the notion that all Muslims were united under caliphate is historically not true. Muslims were only under one caliphate for a quarter of a century during the time of first three Rasidun Caliphs and then again for some decades under Umayyads. The whole period of one united caliphate is less than one century compared to more than thirteen centuries of many Muslim states/caliphates constituting the Muslim ummah. So thinking that just because there is a caliphate, Muslims are united under it, is false.   

Ottoman Sultan and Caliph Suleiman, the magnificent (1494 - 1566)

Source: Poetic Voices of the Muslim World

Linking the glory of Islam/Muslims with caliphate is also problematic. It can be true, partially true or false depending on how glory is defined. Is it the military success or the social development or the cultural refinement or the control over maximum territory? In terms of military successes, united caliphate of the seventh century is unparalleled in Muslim history. However, the height of (comparative) social development and cultural refinement was achieved by the Muslims in the times of early Abbasids when the caliph ruled majority of Muslims but not all Muslims. There were many independent Muslim emirs/king/rulers, alongside Abbasid caliphate. Comparing Muslim history on the basis of territory under control, probably 16th and 17th centuries can be considered the height of Islamic grandeur, a time of more than dozen Muslim states/empires (not one united caliphate). 

As Dr Muhammad Iqbal (poet par excellence,  Muslim philosopher and one of the founding fathers of Pakistan) wrote supporting the decision of Ataturk to abolish caliphate, for most of its history caliphate has worked more as an empire than as an Islamic state. Therefore, its religious sanction is doubtful, to say the least:  

In its essence Islam is not Imperialism. In the abolition of the Caliphate which since the days of Omayyads had practically become a kind of Empire it is only the spirit of Islam that has worked out through the Ataturk. In order to understand the Turkish Ijtihad in the matter of the Caliphate we cannot but seek the guidance of Ibn-i-Khaldun—the great philosophical historian of Islam, and the father of modern history. I can do no better than quote here a passage from my Reconstruction:

Ibn-i-Khaldun, in his famous Prolegomena, mentions three distinct views of the idea of Universal Caliphate in Islam: (1) That Universal Imamate is a Divine institution and is consequently indispensable. (2) That it is merely a matter of expediency. (3) That there is no need of such an institution. The last view was taken by the Khawarij, the early republicans of Islam. It seems that modern Turkey has shifted from the first to the second view, i.e., to the view of the Muttazilla who regarded Universal Imamate as a matter of expediency only. The Turks argue that in our political thinking we must be guided by our past political experience which points unmistakably to the fact that the idea of Universal Imamate has failed in practice. It was a workable idea when the Empire of Islam was intact. Since the break-up of this Empire independent political units have arisen. The idea has ceased to be operative and cannot work as a living factor in the organization of modern Islam.