Ireland's waning religious nationalism

Nationalism and Christianity were very close and overlapping in 19th century Europe. Most of the European countries believed their nation had a special affinity with God. Since all of these countries were Christian-majority, so the God was Christian God (See Religious nationalism in 19th century Europe). While many European countries lost their enthusiasm for religious nationalism in the early 20th century, Ireland, primarily due to the long history of Catholic persecution by the Britishers, was brimming with Christian nationalism at that time (See Irish Nationalism, Easter Rising (1916) and Catholic Church). After independence, Ireland adopted a constitution that highlighted the role of the Catholic Church. For instance, the Preamble of the Constitution stated:

In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred,We, the people of Éire,

Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial,

Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful independence of our Nation, And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations, Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.

Furthermore, Article 44(1)2º stated, "The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens. (This clause was removed by the Fifth amendment as given below).

Source: Ireland: A Chronology of De-Christianization

In the wake of the Irish referendum on liberalizing abortion, Church Militant, a Catholic magazine published an article Ireland: A Chronology of De-Christianization to demonstrate the gradual delinking of the Catholic Chruch and the state in the Republic of Ireland. The chronology only mentions the defeats and ignores the victories of those who believed in religious nationalism such as the 1983 referendum related to abortion and the 1986 referendum on divorce. In 1983, 66.9% voted to approve a constitutional amendment recognising the right to life of the unborn child (In 2018, almost the same proportion (66.4%) voted to repeal this amendment). In 1986, 63.5% rejected a proposed constitutional amendment to remove the prohibition on divorce that was part of the original constitution enacted in 1937:

1972: Irish voters approve, by a referendum margin of 84 percent, a constitutional amendment repealing Article 44 of the Irish Constitution, which recognized "the Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of citizens."

1973: The Irish Supreme Court declares a right to marital privacy which includes contraceptive use, but declines to overturn laws prohibiting the sale of contraceptives.

1979: The Health (Family Planning) Act becomes law, allowing pharmacists to dispense contraceptives to those holding a prescription from a doctor.

1985: The Health (Family Planning) Amendment Act becomes law, allowing the over-the-counter sale of condoms and spermicides to anyone over the age of 18.

1987: Ireland's first openly homosexual public official, David Norris, is elected to the Senate. A pedophilia defender and anti-Catholic bigot, Norris would call Pope St. John Paul II an "instrument of evil" and Pope Benedict XVI "a Nazi." His 2011 presidential campaign would implode after it was revealed that he sought clemency for a convicted homosexual child rapist who had been his partner in sodomy.

1988: In Norris v. Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights rules that Irish law prohibiting sodomy violates Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

1989: The Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act becomes law, which outlaws so-called hate speech directed against so-called sexual orientation.

1990: Mary Robinson, a former senator who advocated for the legalization of contraception, divorce and homosexuality, is elected the seventh president of Ireland. Robinson was the nominee of the Labour Party, but was also endorsed by the Marxist-Leninist Workers Party.

1992:The Health (Family Planning) Amendment Act becomes law, allowing the unrestricted sale of contraceptives to anyone over the age of 17.

1992: In Attorney-General v. X, the Irish Supreme Court declares a right to abortion arising from a threat to the life of the mother, including suicidal ideation.

1992: Voters in Ireland reject, by a referendum margin of 65 percent, a proposed amendment to the Irish Constitution which would overturn the X ruling.

1992: The Thirteenth Amendment to the Irish Constitution is passed, by a referendum margin of 62 percent, establishing a "right to travel" outside the country for the purpose of procuring an abortion. Between 6,000 and 8,000 Irish women go to England each year to kill their unborn children.

1992: The Fourteenth Amendment to the Irish Constitution is passed, by a referendum margin of 59 percent, establishing a right to obtain information about abortion.

1993: The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act becomes law, decriminalizing sodomy in Ireland.

1995: The Fifteenth Amendment to the Irish Constitution repealed, by a referendum margin of 50.2 percent, the constitutional prohibition against divorce, and allowed the civil dissolution of marriage.

1998: The Employment Equality Act becomes law, prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon so-called sexual orientation.

2000: The Equal Status Act becomes law, prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations based upon so-called sexual orientation.

2003: The European Convention on Human Rights Act becomes law, by which Ireland accepts the radically anti-Christian legal code of the European Union.

2007: In Foy v. Ireland, the Irish High Court rules that Irish law contravenes Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights by refusing to recognize as a woman a man who underwent so-called sex re-assignment surgery.

2010: The Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act becomes law, without a recorded roll call, establishing civil unions for same-sex couples.

2011: The Republic of Ireland closes its Embassy to the Holy See. Diplomatic relations with the Vatican are maintained through the Irish Embassy to the Italian Republic and the Apostolic Nunciature in Ireland.

2011: The first openly homosexual TD's (members of parliament) — Jerry Buttimer, John Lyons and Dominic Hannigan — are elected to the Dail.

2013: The Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act becomes law, legalizing abortion in cases of suicidal ideation by the mother.

2015: The Children and Family Relationships Act becomes law, allowing homosexual partners to adopt children.

2015: The Thirty-Fourth Amendment to the Irish Constitution is passed, by a referendum margin of 62 percentage, allowing two persons to contract marriage "without distinction as to their sex."

2015: The first openly homosexual cabinet minister, Leo Varadkar, the son of an Indian immigrant, becomes Minister of Health.

2015: The Gender Recognition Act becomes law, allowing individuals to define their own gender.

2015: The Employment Equality Amendment Act becomes law, which extends anti-discrimination law pertaining to homosexuals and the so-called transgendered to Catholic schools and hospitals, and other religious institutions.

2016: American-born Katherine A. Zappone becomes Ireland's first openly lesbian cabinet minister, when she is appointed Minister for Children and Youth. Zappone is civilly "married" to Ann Gilligan, a former Catholic nun with whom she became romantically involved while both were studying at Jesuit administered Boston College.

2017: Leo Varadkar becomes Ireland's first homosexual prime minister.

2017: The United Nations recommends that Irish schools introduce compulsory sex education, which should include "comprehensive sex education for adolescent girls and boys covering responsible sexual behaviors and focused on preventing early pregnancies, and ensure that it is scientifically objective and its delivery by schools is closely monitored and evaluated."

2018: Dail Eireann passes, in its second reading, the Provision of Objective Sex Education Bill, which, if enacted, would force Catholic schools to indoctrinate Catholic children with propaganda affirming abortion, contraception, gender dysphoria and sodomy.

2018: The Irish Department of Education orders Catholic schools to change religion classes from an opt-out to an opt-in requirement.

2018: The Irish government proposes an amendment to the Status Act, which would forbid Catholic schools from giving enrollment preference to Catholic students. 

2018: The Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution, which guaranteed the right to life of unborn children, is repealed in a national referendum by a margin of 66.4 percent.

There are still some remnants of religious nationalism, such as the Preamble and Article 6 (1):

All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, under God, from the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, according to the requirements of the common good.

Article 44(1):

The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour religion.

Finally, the oaths of the President, Council of State, and judges etc. start with the words, "In the presence of Almighty God, ..."

Religious nationalism in 19th century Europe

Hugh McLeod in his article, "Christianity and nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe" (International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, Vol. 15, No.1, 2015) discusses the 19th century European nationalisms, the relationship between Christianity and nationalisms and religious support for the First World War in all the European countries.

McLeod argues that nationalism was one of the most influential ideologies in 19th century Europe, along with socialism, liberalism and conservatism. Nationalism was sometimes allied with liberalism and at other times with conservatism. Socialists were also not devoid of nationalist sentiments. 

Mcleod distinguishes between three types of nationalisms in nineteenth-century Europe:

Nationalism 'from below': The nationalism of the subject peoples, living within the great European Empires, that asserted their right to more autonomy or independence

Unification nationalisms: The nationalism of the people, who belonged to the same culture but were divided into numerous small states, that sought to form a unified nation-state for these 

Nationalism ‘from above’: The nationalism propagated by the governments through the education

system, etc. in their own countries so that their people are ready to defend or attack and do not fall prey to nationalism 'from below.'

Mcleod explains, with examples, why nationalism and Christianity were so close and overlapping in 19th century Europe or, in other words, why religious nationalism was so popular at that time:

Many of the classic histories of nationalism see it as an essentially secular ideology – even as a ‘political religion’, substituting for a declining Christianity. The French Revolution does indeed demonstrate this possibility. But more often nationalists made free use of Christian symbols and concepts, and churches willingly embraced nationalist ideologies. 

Benedict Anderson famously defined the nation as an ‘Imagined Community’, whereby people felt an affinity with millions of others, whom they had never met and with whom they might have little in common, because they belonged to the same ‘nation’. But this ‘Imagined Community’ could not be created out of nothing. Its basic building blocks were shared language and/or shared historical memories. Even the language sometimes had a significant religious dimension, as is shown by the importance of translations of the Bible in the history of many languages. The historical memories nearly always had a significant religious dimension. The alliance between religion and nationalism was two-edged in its implications both for nationalism and for Christianity – as I shall argue. But it was uniquely potent as a means of inspiring both devotion to the nation and loyalty to the church. As regards the latter, it is well known that, in an era of increasing secularisation in many parts of Europe, loyalty to the church reached its highest levels in countries such as Ireland, where the links between religious and national identities were closest. Conversely, secularisation progressed much more rapidly where nationalism had a predominantly anti-church or anti-religious character....  

When nationalists pointed to shared experiences of oppression or of unity against external foes, these experiences were more often than not associated with religion. For example, in the eyes of Irish nationalists, the clearest example of British oppression was offered by the anti-Catholic Penal Laws ..... For English nationalists, on the other hand, the proudest moment in their national history was the defeat in 1588 of the Spanish Armada.... 

The national heroes whom they revered more often than not had an evident religious significance. The greatest figures in Spanish history were Ferdinand and Isabella, ‘The Catholic Monarchs’, who had not only united the nation, but had forced Muslims and Jews either to convert or to leave....  

Nationalists liked to celebrate distinctive national values and virtues, and very often these were seen as having religious roots. Thus nineteenth-century Britons frequently claimed that their political power, their economic success and their free institutions were all rooted in Protestantism. In a typical sermon of 1898, Dr Welldon, headmaster of Harrow School and later Bishop of Calcutta, claimed that ‘wherever there was a nation that was stationary and retrogressive it was Catholic, wherever there was a people that was progressive and Imperial it was Protestant’.... 

Nationalists celebrated the art, architecture, literature, music and folklore of their people, and very often these were shaped by specific religious traditions. A classic case is the French Catholic revival of the years around 1900, which was strongly coloured by nationalism.... An important part of this rediscovery was the realisation that French history and culture were so deeply imbued with Catholicism, that to be truly French it was necessary also to be Catholic. 

Nationalists also drew on ideas of national mission or chosenness. Many nineteenth century Britons believed that the British Empire had been providentially ordained to facilitate the spread of the pure Protestant gospel. Sometimes, as in France there were two rival versions of this national mission: one pointing to France’s historical identity as ‘The Eldest Daughter of the Church’, while the other focused on ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’.... 

More commonly, as in Britain, explicitly religious and more secular understandings of national mission, rather than being in opposition to one another were mutually reinforcing, offering a repertoire of justifications for national pride and national power which could be drawn upon separately or in combination as the situation demanded. The historian of missions, Andrew Walls, highlights the immense popularity of the poetry of Rudyard Kipling, whose justification for British (and American) imperialism as ‘The White Man’s Burden’, though not explicitly Christian, drew on biblical language and examples in a way that both Christian and agnostic readers found inspiring.

Meanwhile priests and pastors were often strongly influenced by nationalist ideas and gave them influential support through sermons, through ‘national’ hymns, through the teaching in church schools, through Christian youth organisations. 

Anniversaries of notable battles, as well as royal birthdays and jubilees provided occasions for special services with patriotic sermons and sometimes the composition of new hymns with patriotic themes. For example Queen Victoria’s jubilees in 1887 and 1897 were marked by numerous special services at which imperial themes played a big role. The year 1913 saw the anniversary of the Prussian uprising against Napoleon and special services were held in many German churches.... Walls notes a new category of ‘national hymns’ entering British hymn-books in the 1880s, and observes that it was then that hymn-books began to include the national anthem. The Swedish historian Alf Tergel refers to the popularity in the early years of the twentieth century of hymns by J.A. Eklund, bishop of Karlstad. In ‘Our Fathers’ Church’ he recalled Sweden’s decisive role in the Thirty Years’ War, and then went on to appeal to ‘Christian youth’ to ‘battle for God’s glory in the North’..... 

In Britain Christian youth organisations with military trappings proliferated in the years 1880–1914. The prototype was the Boys’ Brigade (BB), founded by a Glasgow Presbyterian in 1883, and also popular in the English and Welsh Free Churches. This aimed to attract members through the wearing of uniforms and military ranks, and marches through the street banging drums and blowing bugles, and carrying dummy rifles....

Again in France there were rival Catholic and Republican youth organisations in these years, but both were imbued with the nationalist spirit.... For Catholics and republicans alike, politics and religion were closely bound together and could not be clearly separated, and neither could be separated from devotion to an idealised Catholic or Republican France.

There were many reasons for the strongly nationalist colouring of much European Christianity in the nineteenth century, but among these reasons we should remember that priests and pastors could not be entirely detached from their social environment. It would indeed be crudely reductionist to suppose that clergymen thought and behaved exactly like other members of their social class, but it would be equally unrealistic to suppose that they lived entirely within a clerical sub-culture. Protestant clergy, in particular, who had been educated at university with future doctors and lawyers, and who also married and had children, were especially likely to be influenced by their family and by those of their parishioners with whom they mixed socially. Furthermore, both Protestant and Catholic clergy were highly politicised in this period, and were influenced not only by their families but by the political circles in which they moved...

German Empire Standard (1871-1918) with motto, Gott mit uns (God with us)

Source: Wiki Commons

Of course, religion and nationalism did not always agree and there were tensions as Mcleod explains:

In spite of many affinities, the relationship was two-edged. Religious sentiments and symbols could nearly always be drawn upon by nationalist orators and organisers – but churches were institutions with their own doctrines and interests which could contradict the nationalist agenda. 

A striking example was the conflict between Italian nationalism and the papacy. Enthusiasts for Italian unification initially hoped that the pope might give his blessing to their cause. But it soon became clear that Pius IX was completely opposed.... In response to papal obstruction, a nationalist movement that had initially been strongly influenced by Catholicism took on a strongly anti-clerical dimension.  

The church might also be strongly committed to nationalist objectives, while condemning the methods that some nationalists used. Here the classic example would be the persistent tensions between the Irish Catholic Church and the revolutionary wing of Irish nationalism, from the Fenians in the 1860s to the Provisional IRA in our own times. 

Moreover the alliance between religion and nationalism, while extremely effective in countries that were more or less religiously homogeneous, could raise problems within religiously divided nations, where appeals to the religion of the majority risked alienating minorities. Indeed there is a fundamental tension between a religion such as Christianity, which claims to have a message for all of humankind and in which ‘there is neither Jew nor Greek’, and the claims by nationalists that everyone’s first loyalty should be to his or her own people. 

So in the later nineteenth century many nationalists were seeking new bases for national identity which were religiously neutral and which circumvented confessional differences.... Sometimes this meant a focus on language, or even on sport.... But most often the search for alternative bases for national identity meant recourse to the newly fashionable racial ideas, which gained intellectual authority from trends in anthropology and in Social Darwinism.... In Great Britain the dominant imperialism of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was legitimated by belief in a national mission to bring civilisation and good government to less favoured regions of the world. This was often linked to Protestant Christianity and its plethora of overseas missions. But increasingly this religiously based concept of national mission was supplemented by, or even replaced by, claims for the racial superiority of the ‘Anglo-Saxon peoples’.... 

National churches were not surprisingly those readiest to identify with ‘the nation’. These national churches included most obviously the ‘people’s churches’ (Volkskirchen) of Germany and Scandinavia, the Churches of England and Scotland, the Greek Orthodox or Russian Orthodox Churches – but also the Catholic Churches of France and Spain which saw themselves as churches of the nation, or those of Ireland and Poland which claimed to speak for a nation as yet denied nationhood. Overt opposition to the nationalist agenda was most likely to come from minority churches, whether because of uncertainty as to how far they were really part of the national project – or whether the experience of being in a minority (and often of discrimination arising from this) tended to make such churches readier to question mainstream values and conventional wisdom. Thus in Germany the Catholic Church was more cautious than the Protestants in its support for militarism and imperialism....

McLeod's article demonstrates that religious nationalism was almost as popular in the 19th century Europe as it is now in Asia and North Africa.

Irish Nationalism, Easter Rising (1916) and Catholic Church

Easter Rising is a seminal event in the Irish history. Following a brief summary of the uprising against British during the First World War from history.com:

On Easter Monday, April 24, 1916, a group of Irish nationalists proclaimed the establishment of the Irish Republic and, along with some 1,600 followers, staged a rebellion against the British government in Ireland. The rebels seized prominent buildings in Dublin and clashed with British troops. Within a week, the insurrection had been suppressed and more than 2,000 people were dead or injured. The leaders of the rebellion soon were executed. Initially, there was little support from the Irish people for the Easter Rising; however, public opinion later shifted and the executed leaders were hailed as martyrs. In 1921, a treaty was signed that in 1922 established the Irish Free State, which eventually became the modern-day Republic of Ireland.

On the eve of the hundredth anniversary of Easter Rising, a prominent Irish theologian, intellectual, and academician argued that religion/Catholicism was used by the leaders of the uprising against British colonial rule. Father Seamus Murphy, who is the associate professor of philosophy at Loyola University Chicago, accused the leaders of the rising, including Patrick Pearse, of instrumentally using Catholicism, its symbols and its teachings:

Pearse, familiar with but not overpious about, his Catholicism, uses the Old Testament and scapegoat themes, but NOT with Christian meaning...However, since all this superficially resembles some Catholic mass themes, he is able to channel the Catholic energy that is out there among ordinary Irish Catholics in the direction of a violent bloody undemocratic and intolerant nationalism. It’s very clever.

Catholic leaders at the time of the uprising in 1916 were also not supportive of this uprising because of its recklessness, futility, violence, and being carried by members of a secret society, Irish Republican Brotherhood. Though sympathetic to the sentiments of the men and women that took part in the uprising, the Catholic hierarchy, including the Pope, repudiated the act and helped the British re-establish law and order. However, later on, Catholic hierarchy softened its stance towards the rebels as they were afraid of losing the confidence of laity.

Source: http://riveredge.bccls.org/children.shtml

Well, this should not surprise anybody who has an understanding of religious nationalism, which always uses religion as a tool for nationalism. Very few religious nationalist leaders are religiously observant. The established church always have a complicated relationship with religious-nationalist leadership as they are not pious and are usually ready to bend religious edicts/principles, if it helps their cause. However, it is important to remember that church leadership is itself not immune from using religion to preserve or enhance its power.

Eamonn McCann, writing in The Irish Times, presents the view that the Catholic religious leadership was also trying to increase their power and used the Irish nationalist sentiment to their advantage in early 20th century. McCann, who is a political activist, atheist and socialist, has written extensively on religion in Ireland, including Dear God The price of religion in Ireland. He contests the view that Catholic hierarchy condemned the uprising:

It is said that “the bishops condemned the Rising”. This is at best an exaggeration, repeated today in efforts to project the Rising as a secular event. In fact, there were 31 Catholic bishops in Ireland in 1916, of whom only seven explicitly condemned the rebels. Most of the rest kept cannily quiet, before placing themselves soon at the head of the national movement which was to arise from the Dublin rubble.

He argues that the Catholic hierarchy soon owned the Easter Rising as well as the broader nationalist movement and managed to defeat the radical/Marxist/secular element in the nationalist movement that has led the uprising in 1916. Not surprisingly, Ireland emerged as a 'ultra-conservative confessional State' six years later:

The enthusiastic support of the (Catholic) hierarchy was vital for the success of the crucial 1918 anti-conscription campaign. “The Irish people have a right to resist [conscription] by every means consonant with the law of God” declared the bishops in a “manifesto” read at all Masses. This can be seen as the definitive moment when the endorsement of the church passed from the Home Rule Party to Sinn Féin. The bishops were nothing if not adept in detecting what way the wind was blowing...The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 partitioning the island handed the bishops a State in which their ideological mastery was already established. Hence some of the horrors inflicted on the most vulnerable of the population in the half century which followed. There were no protest marches against church rule. They wouldn’t have been allowed.

So, Murphy is right to be indignant of what Pearce did, the usage of to use Catholic themes for his mundane nationalist objectives. However, as McCann explains, Pearce and other nationalists could not have used Catholic themes, if the Catholic Church hierarchy was not supporting them. 

Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism

When a state argues to be based on religious nationalism, religion becomes important in defining who are full citizens of that state. It is a case similar to countries based on ethnic nationalism. Japanese, Turkish, Korean or German nationalisms are based on specific ethnicities and those ethnicities are sometimes consciously and blatantly and sometimes unconsciously prioritized. Not long ago, a Russian, having German ancestry, who could not speak German and had never lived in Germany had a stronger claim to German citizenship than a Turk, who had not only been born in Germany but had lived in Germany all his life.

In such 'ethnic' nations, it becomes very important to clearly define who has the 'correct' ancestry and who has not. It becomes important for the state to know, for example, whether both your parents of a citizen were born in the country or not, even if both of them are also citizens. These defining markers are controlled by the state as means of informing the masses who they are and what should be important to them and punishing those who ignore these markers. Recently, the highest court of Dominican Republic court stripped thousands of people of citizenship because their parents had entered the country illegally decades ago (see Haitian-descended residents of Dominican Republic stripped of citizenship by high court). 

In case of religious nationalism, the focus is on religion or sect so defining who is a Muslim, Jew or Catholic becomes important. An Irish joke makes this point clear. In Northern Ireland, a car is stopped at a checkpoint and policeman asks the driver, 'Are you a Catholic or a Protestant?' The driver answers, 'I am an atheist.' The policeman thinks for a few seconds and then asks, 'A Catholic-atheist or a Protestant-atheist?'

The first nationality marker is of course whether one is a member of the national church. This marker discriminates against those who are not members but states with religious nationalism usually ignore this criticism as many states based on ethnic nationalism also do when they discriminate against those not belonging to prioritized/majority ethnic group.

However, as citizenship comes with significant social, cultural and economic benefits, markers of nationalism (ethnic or religious) are contested. Minorities try to dilute these markers to be part of the mainstream while diverse social groups within the titular group try to narrow them to get a larger share of benefits. As a result, in case of ethnic nationalism, the titular group experiences more ethnic fragmentation and infighting. And in states with religious nationalism, sectarianism rages unless state decisively intervenes. Readers of this blog will remember that Malaysian lawmakers from ruling party UMNO recently suggested that Islam should be limited to Sunni sect. A much horrible aspect of sectarianism is visible in Pakistan where there are attacks on religious places and leaders of rival sects (Sectarian killings soar in Pakistan, raising fears of regional spillover).

Source: The Various Strands of Shiite-Sunni Discord

Can religious nationalists stop sectarianism? I personally think the answer is no.

What is Religious Nationalism?

This blog will focus on religious nationalism and its effects on the politics of diverse countries. I will mostly write about countries where religious nationalism is strong, such as Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, etc. However, other countries where religious nationalism is increasing (e.g. Turkey, Poland and the US) or decreasing (e. g. Nepal and Ireland) will also be discussed.

But before discussing the effects of religious nationalism, let's first define it.


Scholars have difficulty agreeing on how to define nationalism and religion so, unsurprisingly, efforts to come up with a universal definition of religious nationalism have been unsuccessful. Atalia Omer and Jason Springs (2013) in their book Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook argue that religious nationalism is the situation when ‘political and religious objectives are conflated and interwoven’. Later, they coin the term ethnoreligious nationalism which not only adds another complex concept, ethnicity, to the mix but also excludes states, such as Pakistan, where ethnicity works against religious nationalism, from the ambit of the definition.

Source: University of Manitoba

Before the 1970s, academic literature primarily portrayed nationalism as a new religion replacing the old religion so religious nationalism was an oxymoron. Nationalism developed in the 17^th and 18^th centuries in Europe and was predominantly based on ethnic and/or linguistic affinity. It was argued that as nationalism slowly gained strength, the power of religion waned and the nation became the primary or core identity of the people. Nationalism, like the old religion, had myths, symbols and heroes and expected similar undivided loyalty. Naturally, this led to a tussle between religion and nationalism and, in many states, nationalism and religion became competitors. Religious leaders criticized nationalism as a liberal or Western imposition that was intolerant of religion and promoted differences within the religious flock. Many modernist scholars agreed with these religious leaders that nationalism is linked with modernity and is detrimental to religion. Peter van der Veer in his seminal book, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India, rejects this dichotomy between nationalism and religion:

The claim that something like religious nationalism exists will be rejected by many students of nationalism for the simple reason that both nationalism and its theory depend on a Western discourse of modernity. This discourse constitutes the traditional as its antithesis and interprets difference as backwardness. A crucial element of the discourse of modernity is the opposition of the religious to the secular. One point I want to make in this book is that leading theories of nationalism tend to ignore the importance of colonialism and orientalism in the spread of nationalism. To understand religious nationalism in India we need both an analysis of tradition that is not prejudiced by the discourse of modernity and a theory of the impact of colonialism and Orientalism that does not deny agency to colonial subjects. (van der Veer 1994, x)

van der Veer argues that nationalism is not always the result of the demise of tradition/religion. Sometimes, it may be the result of the diffusion of tradition/religion and modernity as was the case in India:

Nationalism is generally assumed to belong squarely on the modern side of the great divide. It is the result of the demise of traditional society and is therefore a sign of modernity. But there is a tension between this view and the observation that, in many societies, nationalism is the product of diffusion. In the latter case, the modern is not the result of a historical transition; rather, the modern invades the traditional. According to Dumont, this leads to a period of uneasy combinations, as exemplified by Indian communalism, which combines religion and nationalism. (van der Veer 1994, 17)

Both Steve Bruce, in his book Politics and Religion (2003), and Roger Brubaker, in his article Religion and nationalism: four approaches (2012), have tried to explain different relationships between religion and nationalism or nationalists. Bruce has identified four types of relationships between religion and nationalists. 

1. Nationalists mobilize strong religious identities: In these countries, nationalism and religion are deeply enmeshed. It is difficult to separate the two. National identity is based on religious identity and, usually, the major rival country of these countries has a different sect or religion, which helps strengthen the relationship between religion/sect and the nation. Pakistan, Israel and Iran are examples of such countries. 
2. Nationalists mobilize and re-ignite weak religious identities: In countries exhibiting this relationship, changing boundaries and religious diversity has hindered in forging a strong religious identity with the nation. Bruce gives the example of Russia and Ukraine where nationalists are now trying to revive and possibly unite these weak identities. 
3. Nationalists reject strong religious identities: Usually, this rejection is due to national elite’s repudiation of any role of religion in public affairs after a period of tussle with the religious establishment. France, Mexico, etc. are examples of such a relationship. 
4. Nationalists again reject religious identities but the reasons are different: Bruce identifies most sub-Saharan African countries as examples of this type of relationship. The reason why African elite reject religious identities as the basis of nationalism is not only religious diversity in their countries but also the inability of the Christianity, the majority religion in most African countries, to provide the myths necessary for forging a strong nationalism. Christianity is further impaired by its complicity in the horrors of slavery and colonialism.

Roger Brubaker, in his article referred above, presents four ways to analyze religion and nationalism connection but these may also be considered to be four types of relationships between religion and nationalism. In the first case, religion and nationalism contest each other. Each tries to become the primary identity of a group of people, to the exclusion of the other. Nationalism is considered a modern religion that is trying to replace the old one. 

Second, religion explains some aspects of nationalism. Usually, these aspects are the origin and early development. Religion is an implicit part of the nationalist ideology of a large number of countries. Third, religion contributes to nationalism and is a visible part of the national identity. Some national myths and symbols maybe religion-based. 

Finally, Brubaker defines a much stronger relationship between religion and nationalism. In this case, it is difficult to separate the two. This relationship can be identified as religious nationalism but Brubaker is reluctant to call this type as nationalism as according to him nationalism is related to a polity existing within other polities and this type of religious nationalism downplays polities and nations. In this relationship, the majority religion and nationalism are so intertwined that the nation supposedly owes its existence to the religion. Nationalisms of Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia can be presented as examples of such nationalism. 


Phillips Barker in his book Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God be for Us (2009) argues that there are two aspects of religious nationalism, although the first is much more important than the second. Religion’s role in national identity defines religious nationalism. According to Barker, ‘Religion must be central to national identity and to conceptions of what it means to belong to a given nation. If religion is not the central feature of the national identity, it is at least one of the several features. In addition, these other features will nearly always be coterminous with religious identity. In other words, a religious nationalism may focus equally on religion and language, but the individuals engulfed by the religious and linguistic markers are one and the same.’ The second aspect of religious nationalism is political religion i.e. religious influence on state laws, policies etc. Barker explains it as ‘the extent to which identification translates into action.’

Roger Friedland in his article Money, Sex, and God: The Erotic Logic of Religious Nationalism (2002) argues that religious nationalism has to be understood on the basis of institutional logic, structure and metaphors and not in terms of (Marxist) class conflict or quest for power by clerics:

Religious nationalism cannot be explained and hence interpreted in terms of class-specific material or status injury~Simpson 1983:201–02!. Neither can it be understood as a project of religious inclusion, of group representation. Nor is it merely a clerical power-play. Religious nationalist movements are often led by the laity, not the clerics...

Religious nationalism seeks to extend the institutional logic of religion into the domain of the democratic nation-state, deriving authority from an absolute divine writ, rather than a subjective aggregation of the demos. The nation’s history is seen as a cosmic drama that pushes toward redemption, not progress. Agency is located in a disciplined self bound by faith in God, not a sacralized, self-interested monad. Society is constituted not by abstract, disembodied individuals in markets but through the gendered flesh of the family bound together by faith.

Friedland defines religious nationalism in terms of four constitutive elements:

A specific chain of four elements can be found in the symbolic order of all contemporary religious nationalisms. First, religious nationalism configures the territorial collectivity asa sacred space and a divinely invested subject. Religious nationalisms all focus on the penetration and permeability of the boundaries of that territorial space, whether by foreign investment, civil or foreign war, immigration, or a global commodified culture. The defense of the integrity of the territorial space, as in all nationalist projects, is the medium through which the coherence, identity, and power of the collective subject is known and narrated. In every case of religious nationalism, there is an acute sense that that boundedness is at risk. Second, religious nationalists direct the bulk of their attention to the bodies of women—covering, separating, and regulating their erotic flesh. Third, religious nationalists accord considerable symbolic importance to money, to foreign money, to money out of control. And fourth, religious nationalists submit lovingly to God. 

Barbara-Ann Reiffer in her article Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship (2003) argues that the relationship between religion and nationalism has not received due importance. In the writings of scholars of nationalism, religion is ignored completely or receives a cursory mention. Citing the writings of Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawm, she argues that although religion contributed significantly to the Western European nationalisms, only economic factors are highlighted or religion’s contribution is diluted by presenting it as part of the culture. She attributes this trend to the propensity in the scholars studying nationalism to present nationalism as a modern movement/concept. Reiffer contends that religious nationalism often results in religion’s precepts ‘institutionalized in laws and procedures governing the nation.’

Reiffer also offers a categorization of the different types of interaction between religion and nationalism. The first category, religious nationalism, refers to the situation where religion and nationalism are inseparable. According to Reiffer, ‘it is a community of religious people or the political movement of a group of people heavily influenced by religious beliefs who aspire to be politically self-determining.’ The second category is ‘instrumental pious nationalism’ where religion is part of nationalism but it is not nationalism's most cardinal aspect. Mostly, such nationalism is used by the political elite to provide an additional layer of national cohesion on the core based on other characteristics such as ethnicity, language etc. The third category is ‘secular/anti-religion nationalism’ where religion does not form any part of nationalism or nationalism is defined on the basis of the fight against the dominant religion. 

So, what is religious nationalism? As the above discussion shows, it is difficult to come up with a definition that encompasses all aspect of this complex phenomenon. I find Barker's definition better than others:

Religion must be central to national identity and to conceptions of what it means to belong to a given nation. If religion is not the central feature of the national identity, it is at least one of the several features. In addition, these other features will nearly always be coterminous with religious identity. In other words, a religious nationalism may focus equally on religion and language, but the individuals engulfed by the religious and linguistic markers are one and the same.