Iranian identity and nationalism: Shahnameh's Jamsheed or Biblical Cyrus

Professor Ali Ansari gave a very enlightening talk on Iranian identity at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver. He is a professor at St. Andrews and has written extensively on Iran, Iranian identity, Iranian nationalism, and Iran-US relations. He has written seven books on Iran: 

• Iran: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2014),
• The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
• Crisis of Authority: Iran's 2009 Presidential Election, (Chatham House, 2010), 
• Iran Under Ahmadinejad (Routledge, 2008), 
• Iran, Islam & Democracy - The Politics of Managing Change ( RIIA, London, 2000), 
• The History of Modern Iran Since 1921: the Pahlavis & After (Longman, Pearson Education, London, 2003), and 
• Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust, (C Hurst and co, 2006).

Professor Ansari starts his talk by criticizing the ahistorical approach of studying Iranian history through the lens of the 1979 Revolution. He laments that scholars start from the 1979 Revolution and then look back for reasons why it happened as if it was the most important event in modern Iranian history. He contends that it is actually the 1906 Constitutional Revolution that is the most significant event and if one wants to understand Iran, one has to prioritize the 1906 Revolution. 

Professor Ansari explains that his talk is not about the politics of nationalism but about the ideas and myths that formed the basis or have fashioned Iranian identity and nationalism. He argues that it is the national mythology that defines nations, informs people who they are. 

In his talk, Professor Ansari dismisses the usual five periods division of modern Iranian history that he has also used in some of his works: the Constitutional Revolution, Reza Shah and modernization, Second World War and Mussaddeq, Second autocracy under Muhammad Reza Shah, and the post-Islamic Revolution period. He divides modern Iranian history into three periods on the basis of ideas prevalent about Iranian identity:

1. The age of enlightenment (1890-1963?)
2. The age of extremes (1963-1989): the unhappy consciousness?
3. The age of contestation (1989-present)

The age of enlightenment was the key period, according to Professor Ansari. During this formative age, ideas about nation and nationalism were absorbed from the West and then applied to Iran. Surprisingly, the level of engagement between the two sides was pretty sophisticated and a small but influential group of Iranians was debating ideas and was not ready to accept everything Western. The key problem faced by these Iranians was how to disseminate the ideas of civic nationalism to the wider public. They understood that for a nation, both history and myth are necessary. The myth they choose was Ferdowsi's Shahnameh (The Book of Kings). 

Professor Ansari does not explain Shahnameh as most of the people interested in Iran already know what it is but many readers here may be ignorant of its importance, so here is a short introduction. Shahnameh is a long epic Persian poem, consisting of some 50,000 couplets (two-line verses). It was written by Ferdowsi at the turn of the first millennium (977-1010 CE). It is the national epic of Greater Iran. The British Library website has the following Ferdowsi quote and a very, very short synopsis of the epic (more details about Shahnameh on the website can be read here):

"The houses that are the dwelling of today will sink beneath shower and sunshine to decay but storm and rain shall never mar the palace that I have built with my poetry." Ferdowsi.

The Shahnameh, literally meaning 'Book of Kings,' is structured according to the mythical and historical reign of 50 Persian Kings. The epic can be roughly divided into three parts: the first part tells of the mythical creation of Persia and its earliest mythical past; the second part tells of the legendary Kings and the heroes Rostam and Sohrab; the third part blends historical fact with legend, telling of the semi-mythical adventures of actual historical Kings.

Shahnameh was chosen because it was known to the Iranians. For centuries, millions of Iranians had listened to the epic and debated about the qualities of Jamsheed, Rostam, and Sohrab even when there was no historical evidence of their existence.  Even the British recognized the importance of Shahnameh and were using it to seek ordinary Iranians support for allies cause in WWII. In the propaganda pamphlet (published in 1942) below, Kaveh (the mythical blacksmith in Shahnameh who led the popular uprising against the cruel foreign ruler, Zahak) leads, while Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin follow him and Hitler (shown as Zahak) is bound on a horseback.

Source: Alamy.com

It's better to listen to Professor Ansari's lecture for understanding his argument, however, following is a summary of the rest of the talk. 

During the second period, according to Professor Ansari, the focus shifts from Shahnameh to Biblical Cyrus. The change is the result of the affinity that Mohammad Reza Shah felt for Cyrus, the Great. He perhaps thought Cyrus, the Great more useful for his own projection as an enlightened, liberal monarch who would emancipate his people and others from darkness, cruelty, and subjugation. The change also prioritizes 'real' history over myth. During the third period, Cyrus was initially rejected and Shahnameh was again promoted by the state as the basis of Iranian identity but more recently, Cyrus has also seen a revival. Can we see a synthesis in the near future?

To understand the tussle between religious and ethnolinguistic nationalism in Iran, here are some previous blog posts on Iranian nationalism: Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity, Shiite and Persian Nationalism are both myths, Afraid of Ahmadinejad,  Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?, and More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran.

Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?

The tussle between the Islamic/Shiite identity and the Persian ethnolinguistic identity has been a constant theme in the modern Iranian politics (See blog post Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity). Sometimes, one type of identity becomes so powerful that it seems that the other type has been completely evanesced. However, soon the apparently evanesced identity reappears and dominates the political scene, making the once primary identity vanish. For instance, the Persian identity remained dominant during the reigns of Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah and the Islamic identity was on the fringe and mostly invisible but, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Islamic identity became the paramount identity and Persian identity was nowhere to be seen.

During the last decade, it appears the Persian identity is gradually rising again. Former President Ahmadinejad was the first one from the top elite of the Islamic regime to acknowledge/lay claim on the Persian identity (See blog post Afraid of Ahmadinejad). For the first time after the Revolution, Ahmadinejad loaned the famed Cyrus Cylinder from the British Museum and exhibited it in Iran. His advisor Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei even linked Cyrus with the prophets of Islam, drawing severe censure from the conservative circles.

Recently, there is more evidence of the growing influence of the Persian identity in Iran. During recent years, more and more Iranians are visiting the Tomb of Cyrus in Pasargadae on October 29, the internationally designated day of Cyrus the Great. In October 2016, there was an unprecedented traffic jam near Pasargadae as thousands of Iranians tried to reach the tomb and President Rouhani also joined the celebrations via Instagram:

The number of people who showed up at Pasargadae was surprising. The event fell on a Friday, which is a weekend in Iran, and reportedly saw a traffic jam in a 30- to 40-kilometer (19- to 25-mile) radius on the roads leading to the tomb. Those who had witnessed similar get-togethers say they had never seen such a large gathering. The locals, including those dwelling in the nearby Pasargadae village, were also quite amazed by the sheer number of visitors. Reports say people started gathering in the area, especially around the Tomb of Cyrus, from as early as the evening before and that there was heavy traffic on roads to the site. As such, the main entrance to Pasargadae was closed the night before, with no more cars allowed to enter. On Oct. 28, social media users shared widely circulated videos and pictures of the gathering of Cyrus devotees, showing some of them shouting slogans praising the Achaemenid king.

President Hassan Rouhani even published a picture of himself next to the nearby Achaemenid capital of Persepolis on his Instagram page, with the caption: “Persepolis is one of the invaluable and unique remains of the ancient history of this land, which demonstrates the antiquity of the civilization, the ingenuity, the wisdom, and the management skills of the great people of Iran, as well as their monotheism.” (See ‘Cyrus the Great’ enters Iranian politics)

Source: The rise of nationalist fervour in Iran

Not surprisingly, this gathering was criticized by the conservatives. Ayatollah Hossein Nouri-Hamedani, one of the most senior clerics, said on October 30th: 

"People rose and brought about the revolution and allowed the emergence of a true Islamic system. The shah used to say, ‘O Cyrus, sleep in peace as we are awake.’ Now, a group of people have gathered around the Tomb of Cyrus and they are circumambulating it and have taken their handkerchiefs out and cry [as they do for Shiite Imam Hussein]. In the time of Imam [Ruhollah] Khomeini, too, a group of people started commemorating Cyrus. The imam [Khomeini] said that these people have gathered and are crying because we have brought Islam to this country.” He added, “These are the same [people]; they are counter-revolutionaries. I am amazed that these people get together around the Tomb of Cyrus, shouting the same slogans for him that we shout in support of the supreme leader, and yet we are sitting here, alive and well, and just watching this...Who in power has been so negligent to allow these people to gather? We are in a revolutionary and Islamic country, and this revolution is the continuation of the actions of the prophet and the imams, and their point was to create a perfect populace."(See ‘Cyrus the Great’ enters Iranian politics)

After this statement, the local officials sprung into action and some organizers of the gathering were arrested. However,  Rohollah Faghihi (See What Iranian clerics really think of Cyrus the Great) argues that it would be wrong to think that conservatives are united in disowning Cyrus. Many Iranian clerics consider Cyrus, the Great, Dhul Qarnayn, an ancient king praised in Quran:

In verses 83 and 98 of the chapter Kahf, the Quran narrates a story revolving around an individual named Dhul-Qarnayn, who is praised as a believer and ruler: “Indeed, we established him upon the earth, and we gave him to everything a way.” Allameh Muhammad Hossein Tabatabai, one of the most prominent thinkers of philosophy and contemporary Shiite Islam, cautiously identifies Cyrus as Dhul-Qarnayn in his 20-volume work of Quranic exigesis, the "Tafsir al-Mizan." Other scholars engaged in Quranic exigesis, such as Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi — one of the most senior clerics in Qom — have also described Cyrus as Dhul-Qarnayn.

Faghihi also quotes an anonymous Shiite scholar:

In an interview with Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, a Shiite scholar and cleric who has been teaching at the Qom seminary for the past two decades said, “Islam doesn’t seek to take away national pride from people. What is currently happening is a political issue.” He added, “The seminary and religion do not dismiss Cyrus and the ancient history of Iran at all. Some who are expressing their opposition to Cyrus aren’t speaking on behalf of the whole seminary. I should say that even those who have voiced their opposition regarding this issue do not hold an opinion against Cyrus. For instance, Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani criticized the tears the crowd there [in Pasargadae on Oct. 28] shed, not Cyrus himself.”

Are things going to change soon? Is there a coming together of the two Iranian identities? Not likely. Clerics consider nationalism as unislamic, Western import and the advocates of Persian ethnolinguistic identity consider clerics and their rule un-Iranian:

Like many other pious Muslims, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, viewed the concept of nationalism as un-Islamic. He thought nationalism was in opposition to the concept of ummah (Muslim worldwide community), which fundamentally rejects borders that divide Muslim societies. He asserted that “nationalism is designed by the plotters to create discord among the Muslims and it is being propagated by the agents of imperialism.”

Ayatollah Khomeini further remarked that “the plan of the great powers and their affiliates in the Muslim countries is to separate and divide the various strata of Muslims, whom God, the Blessed and Exalted, has declared brothers. … Those who, in the name of nationalism, factionalism, etc., create schism and disunity among Muslims are armies of Satan, opponents of the Holy Quran, and helping agents of the superpowers.”

Additionally, the conservatives view nationalism – essentially a secular movement that advocates separation of state and religion – as a serious threat to the foundation of the state’s ideology, which is based on the guardianship of the Islamic jurists. During the 28 October gathering, one of the slogans chanted was “freedom of thought cannot take place with beards,” a reference to the figures in power. (See The rise of nationalist fervour in Iran)

Religious Nationalism Course

I taught a course on  'Religious nationalism' at George Mason University, managed by Encore Learning. Here are the slides of the lectures.

Religious Nationalism: Introduction

Pakistan: Religious (Muslim) Nationalism

Iran: Religious (Muslim/Shia) Nationalism

Israel: Religious (Jewish) Nationalism

Saudi Arabia: Religious (Muslim/Wahhabi) Nationalism

Multivocality of Islam and Iranian population policies

Recent news reports point toward a major change in Iran’s population policy in near future. Worried about the falling birth rate and its consequences for country’s future, Iranian policy planners are reversing the population policy once again and hoping that the population will listen to them as it did twice before in the 1980s and 1990s.

Source: Tactics and Strategy at the Strait of Hormuz

While many Muslim ulema (traditionally trained scholars) would claim family planning is not allowed, Quran and Sunnah, the two main sources of Islamic law, are ambiguous on this issue. Family planning has been approved, partially approved and rejected using the same two sources. This multi-vocality of Islam has given the Muslim-majority states more leeway in designing population policies than the Catholic-majority states, though most of the Muslim-majority states have not used this leeway to the fullest extent. Iran is an exception in this regard. Though not giving full reproductive rights, Iran has managed to first convince its population to increase the birth rate and then decrease it to close to replacement levels, all in three decades. Let’s look at Iran’s population policies in a little more detail.

Rest of the blog post can be read at Calgary Centre of Global Community who invited me to write on their blog here.

Sending people to heaven by force or a whip

A recent controversy in Iran brought into focus the use of the state to enforce religion, a tactic used by states based on religious nationalism.

According to Al-monitor, six young men and women Iranians were arrested after they posted a video of them dancing to Pharrell Williams’ hit song, Happy (See Rouhani, critics debate 'path to heaven' ). President Rouhani, who doesn't control justice department, was not amused and remarked, 

Do not interfere so much in people’s lives, even out of compassion. … Let people choose their own path to heaven. We cannot send people to heaven by force or a whip. 

Source: Rouhani encourages political freedom in Iran

Conservative clergy establishment that controls justice department and is wary of Rouhani's overtures to the West, blasted him for these remarks and not only questioned his excellent clerical credentials but also accused of moving away from Imam Khomeini's path ( See Rouhani accused of trying to separate religion, administration). Hard-line cleric Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a member of the Assembly of Experts and director of the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute in Qom said, 

That some say the administration does not have a responsibility for the people’s religion, but that the administration’s only responsibility was to remove the sanctions — and not through resistance but through diplomacy — is against Imam [Khomeini]’s path. Did Imam start an uprising because of sanctions and the economy? Did this many martyrs sacrifice their lives for their stomachs and sanctions?

Saudi Arabian and Pakistani states have also tried to send people to heaven using a whip. Under They have tried to legislate and enforce good behavior. Good behavior or good religious behavior, however, can only come from people's own free will. Enforcement usually leads to false piety and hypocrisy. 

In Pakistan, during the last two decades, there has been a manifold increase in people travelling to Saudi Arabia for visits to the holy sites. In a poor country in need of foreign exchange, millions of dollars are spent each year on these travels. Similarly, millions more are spent to arrange festivals relating to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)'s birthday. Although I do not have statistics, generally it is agreed that more people are praying in mosques than before. But has Pakistanis also witnessed a corresponding increase in piety or spirituality or humility or a decrease in fraud or corruption in the last two decades? Very few Pakistanis can answer this question in affirmative. So, Islamization has only lead to superficial and overt religiosity. As Rouhani said, 'whip' has not moved them any closer to God or heaven.      

Pakistani Rulers and Council of Islamic Ideology

In states based on religious nationalism, guiding religious discourse and decisions is extremely important for the state. As national identity is based on religion, religious decisions have widespread implications, affecting the economy, social relations and political set-up.

Looking at Iran and Saudi Arabia, we see a religious establishment closely aligned with the state, safeguarding its interests. In Iran, religious establishment controls the state so state interests are well-protected. Since the Revolution, Iranian religious establishment has changed its religious preferences many times keeping in view state needs. Religious establishment has even rejected marjas and Imam Khomeini's own family to protect what it perceives as interests of the state (See Khamenei vs. Khomeini).

Family planning is just one example of prioritization of state needs over religious rules. After Revolution, Imam Khomeini called for more children so that there is a bigger Islamic nation. However, by the end of the 1980s, the state had realized that it cannot cope with the population explosion resulting from this policy. So, the religious establishment changed its stance and started propagating family planning and this resulted in the most successful family planning project in human history.

The election of current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was another example of how loyalty to the state was preferred over religious credentials. Ali Khamenei was not a Marja or Grand Ayatullah at the time of his election as Supreme Leader and Iranian constitution required the Supreme Leader to be one. The religious establishment had the option of electing a Marja or Grand Ayatollah but it elected Khamenei and went for the more problematic course of amending the constitution to make Khamenei's lesser religious credentials acceptable/legal. 

In Saudi Arabian religious establishment has been so close to the monarchical state that members of the establishment have been called bureaucrats. In the 1990s, when there were protest and misgiving in Saudi Arabia about the presence of the US forces, religious establishment supported the state wholeheartedly. This was the main reason why the state was able to defeat the opposition to its rule and policies. Previously, religious establishment supported state against puritanical Ikhwans in the 1920s despite Ikhwans being very religious. Again, in the 1960s, it supported state when television was first introduced in the kingdom, despite its own misgivings and protests in the kingdom, in which even a prince (nephew of the king) was killed. 

Pakistan is perhaps the only state based on religious nationalism that does not have a religious establishment. There is only one body, Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), of less than twenty members that can be termed as state's representative on matters pertaining to religion. As in the case of the countries discussed above, the purpose of this small religious establishment/CII  is to advise the government on religious injunctions and to vet laws passed by the Parliament. However, as is clear from above, one of the unwritten purposes of the religious establishments is to defend the state policies from an attack from the right. Like in other states based on religious nationalism, CII has largely supported state's decisions, However, more recently, CII  has been ambiguous in supporting state policies. In the last one year, it has given three decisions that are completely at odds with the vision of the state. Following are the decisions in brief:

1. In September, CII decided the DNA cannot be the primary evidence in rape cases (See CII rules out DNA as primary evidence in rape cases). This was completely out of tune with international practice and with the trend of increased protection of women. 
2. In March, CII decided that first wife's permission is not necessary for second marriage. This was a major concession won by Pakistani women back in the 1960s (See First wife's nod for 2nd marriage un-Islamic: Council of Islamic Ideology). No major political party supports this decision. In fact, this issue was not even on the radar of religious parties.
3. Again in March, CII decided that there is no minimum age for marriage. Children can be married at any age. The only issue is the consummation of marriage and that should be delayed until puberty of both parties (See Laws prohibiting underage marriage not Islamic: Council of Islamic Ideology ). This is again a major step backwards. According to CII decision, children can be married in their cribs and marriage can be consummated in early teens. 

Why this is so? And what is the solution?

The recent decisions of the CII can be seen in terms of short-term politics. The CII is currently chaired by Maulana Sherani, who is also the provincial head of Jamiat Ulema Islam-Fazal-ur-Rehman Group (JUI-F) (See CII Chairman Profile). Since the May 2013 elections, JUI-F pressure was rejected by the Federal Government headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in at least three areas. First, JUI-F wanted Nawaz Sharif to form a coalition government with them in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Nawaz Sharif rejected their overtures and allowed the majority party, Tehreek-e-Insaf, to form a government in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Second, JUI-F wanted to join both the central/federal and Balochistan government. While Nawaz Sharif invited them to join federal government, he accepted the request of Baloch nationalists (heading the coalition government in Balochistan) not to be forced to accept JUI-F as a coalition partner. Finally, Nawaz Sharif didn't give importance to JUI-F chief Fazal-ur-Rehman in his negotiations with Taliban. All these factors might have forced JUI-F to make life difficult for Nawaz Sharif by coming up with such decisions. However, this theory flounders when we take into consideration the fact that three JUI-F members joined the federal cabinet just a month ago (See JUI-F Represented: Three new ministers take oath).

Source: Slice of cake: JUI-F demands share in Balochistan cabinet

A more plausible explanation of what is happening is the change in the chairman's education. Maulana Sherani is only the second person appointed as chairman CII, who does not have a Western styWestern-style Earlier Maulana Kasur Niazi remained chairman CII for only four months in the mid-1990s. However, Maulana Niazi had a much more pluralist outlook and criticized conservative ulema all his life and was in turn criticized by them. So, from 1962 to 2010, when Maulana Sherani became chairman CII was headed by men who were not only scholars of Islam but also had  knowledge of the modern world and requirements of the state. Maulana Sherani was first one to break this trend. 

The next logical question is how Maulana was able to break the trend. The answer lies in the ineptness of the last government. while chairmanship of CII had been used as political largesse to be distributed to supporters before, it was never given before to traditional ulema. This was the first time a traditional alim was made chairman CII and the state and the people of Pakistan will suffer the consequences. 

It's time Pakistani rulers realize that chairman CII is not like the chairman of a steel mill or president of a university. It is a much more important position. Without a religious establishment, this is the only institution that protects the state from any attack from the right or the left. When national identity of  a state is based on religion, it's better for that state and its rulers to give importance to religious institutions. 

Even before these decisions, there were calls to abolish the CII (See DNA Controversy: Abolition of Council of Islamic Ideology demanded). However, as discussed above, state needs CII. A far more easier step and the right step is to appoint such members and chairmen who have a more anti-traditional and pluralist outlook. More women members will definitely decrease the bias and misogyny that one can see in the latest decisions of CII. It is worthwhile to mention that the constitution stipulates that there should be at least one woman member of CII and the only member of present CII died in August last year. So, these decisions are illegal as CII is incomplete according to the Constitution of Pakistan.