Pakistani deep state again using Islamists?

Though religious nationalism was, for a large part, responsible for the creation of Pakistan, Pakistan has seen ebbs and flows of religious nationalism. For instance, Pakistani state tried to limit religious nationalism to symbolism in the early part of Pakistani history. The leadership, like in many other Muslim-majority countries, was generally secular and did not want religious law implemented in Pakistan. 

However, after the separation of East Pakistan, the state leadership decided to use Islam. The instrumentalization of Islam led to Islamization in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The main culprit in this area was General Zia who used Islamists to kill, maim and threaten the democrats. The militancy he introduced and the violence he allowed the Islamists to do, both inside and outside Pakistan, was unmatchable. He not only changed the society but also the military (he is the longest-serving chief of Pakistan Army, from 1976-88), making it more religious and adept at using Islamists for achieving their institutional objectives. 

One of Pakistan military's main institutional objectives is to control Pakistan's defense and foreign policies and intervene in any other area they like until Pakistani democrats are mature (notwithstanding its own efforts to not let the politicians attain maturity). Two other institutional objectives are keeping the Kashmir issue alive and working for a friendly government in Afghanistan. For all these objectives, Islamists come in handy. Because Islamists have difficulty collectively winning more than 10% of popular elections, they do not like democracy and are usually ready to destabilize democratically elected governments. Two examples of such destabilizations are in 1977 and 1996. Not surprisingly, they are also ready to support the military-led governments to implement their agenda as coming to power through the ballot box is a long shot dream. They supported both General Zia and General Musharraf martial laws and were rewarded with unprecedented power. Islamists also share Pakistani military's suspicions about India and think that "Hindu" India and "Muslim" Pakistan can never be friends. Both of them want India out of Kashmir. Therefore, Islamists are used by the Pakistani military to create problems for India in Indian-held Kashmir. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the interests of the Pakistani military and Islamists are aligned. The Pakistani military wants a friendly government, which accommodates Pashtuns. Islamists want the Taliban in power who are mostly Pashtuns. The Taliban are also against "Hindu" India, like the Pakistani military. 

Currently, Pakistan is going through another period of visible civil-military tensions. Both the civilian government and the military are looking for allies and support. When the military started its military operation, Zarb-e-Azb,  against militant Islamists in June 2014, there was a hope that the more than three decades old alliance between the military and the Islamists have finally been broken. This notion gained strength after the Army Public School massacre in which around 150 children died at the hand of Islamist militants in a military-managed school. However, currently, it appears that military has again decided to use Islamists to destabilize/defeat the civilian government. What has changed is that along with the old Islamists, the military is now working with some newly created or refurbished Islamist outfits. 

Milli Muslim League (MML) is the latest incarnation of the Jamat-ud-Dawa (JD) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). It is a new political party. Its creation was announced in August 2017. Ostensibly, the reason for the creation of this new party is to make Pakistan a real Islamic state. The MML president Saifullah Khalid said to the reporters on the MML launch, “We have decided to make a new political party, so that Pakistan is made a real Islamic and welfare state” (See JuD launches political party to contest upcoming polls).

The creation of the MML, however, also serves two objectives, both close to the heart of Pakistan's military. First, it promotes the legitimization of the JD and LeT as a legitimate political party and decreases pressure on Pakistan to ban all its activities. Second, it divides the vote bank of PML(N) which is the ruling party as well as leading center-right party in Pakistan and which is currently in a tussle with the military for civilian ascendency.

Poster of Milli Muslim League clearly showing the picture of Hafiz Saeed

Source: Ibcurdu.com

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan (TLP) is a sign of increasing Barelavi militancy. In Pakistan's history, Deobandis have long been linked with extremism and militancy but Barelvis, which also follow Imam Abu Hanifa and hence belong to the same Hanafi sect as Deobandi Muslims, were considered to be more mellow, syncretic, acquiescent and peaceful. Barelvis were thought to be folkish, believers in local spirits and saints and less interested in power as compared to Deobandis, who were considered dogmatic, believers in high religion and interested in implementing Sharia. This is, of course, a general description and at the individual level, there were always militant Barelvis as well as amenable Deobandis in Pakistan.

Barelvi militancy showed its strength in the anti-Ahmadi movement in the 1950s and then again reared its head in the mid-1970s when anti-Ahmadi movement 2.0 was in full swing. However, with the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslim, the militancy again decreased. The third resurgence of Brelavi militancy was mostly concentrated in and around Karachi in the 1990s. The organization leading it was Sunni Tehrik or Sunni Tehreek. The ST, which was recently renamed the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek, was formed in 1990 to prevent the mosques and madrasas of the Barelvi school of thought in Karachi from being “captured” by Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups.

Analysts believe Barelvi groups; especially the ST, have started politically exploiting the issue of blasphemy and the execution of Qadri has provided them with an opportunity to show their strength to counter the growing influence of Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups in the country. The ST's slogan was ‘Tauheen rasalat ki ek saza, sar tan se juda."(See Ditching the tag of mysticism, Barelvi militancy rears head in form of Sunni Tehreek).

The TLP is a new Islamist political party but is very similar to the ST. It has made its name for inciting violence and promoting militancy. The TLP claims on its website that it will work to make Pakistan an Islamic state through gradual and legal struggle:

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan also known as TLP is an Islamist political party. Its objective is to make Pakistan an Islamic state, governed by Shariat e Mohammadi, through a gradual legal, and political process. (See TLP website)

But its actions and statements belie such claims. The TLP was formed in 2015 in Karachi but gained support in 2016 after the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri, who had killed Punjab province's governor in 2011. Since then, it has been involved in protests, rallies and sit-ins, the most famous of which was in front of parliament (Who is leading this sit-in?)  in March 2016. Another of their rallies, in January 2017, disrupted traffic in Lahore.

TLP poster/banner

Source: Tehreek Labbaik Official (facebook page)

The nexus of military intelligence agencies and the TLP or Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasoolullah appears to have formed or strengthened after the disappearance of five bloggers in January 2017. These bloggers were liberal men who were critical of religious extremism and military's involvement in the political affairs of Pakistan. They were not involved in any kind of blasphemous activities. However, when they were picked up by the security/intelligence agencies, they were decried on the social media as anti-Islam bloggers who also wrote or promoted blasphemous ideas/writings. The abductors find it convenient to link the bloggers with blasphemy as in Pakistan, more than sixty people, who were accused of blasphemy, have been killed by vigilantes. Once one is accused of blasphemy in Pakistan, one is a sitting duck. As expected, the TLP immediately came out in support of jailing or killing bloggers. The chastened bloggers were released after a few weeks but the secret alliance of military with TLP appears to become closer. In recent elections, there were reports that TLP candidates were supported by the intelligence agencies. At present, in November 2017, the TLP has again resorted to "dharna politics" and have cut-off one part of Islamabad from the other for the last ten days.

Bangladesh's secular nationalism asserts itself

From 1947 to 1971, Pakistan had two wings, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, separated by Indian peninsula. While West Pakistan (the present Pakistan) was multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic, East Pakistan was ethnically and linguistically homogeneous. Almost all of the people living in East Pakistan were ethnically Bengalis, speaking Bengali language. East Pakistan separated from West Pakistan in 1971 and became Bangladesh after a bloody civil war and an Indian invasion. This separation was based on a rejection of Pakistani religious nationalism and adoption of an ethnolinguistic nationalism, based on the love of Bengali language and Bengali ethnicity. Most Bengalis of the erstwhile East Pakistan felt that Pakistani religious nationalism was a hoax that claimed West Pakistanis and East Pakistanis were not only equal but Muslim brothers/sisters but refused to give Bengalis equal status and their due share in power. Religious parties' near unanimous opposition to Bangladesh's independence movement and the support they provided to Pakistan army during the civil war increased Bangladeshi misgivings to religion's role in politics. Hence, Bangladesh, unlike (pre-1971 or post-1971) Pakistan, chose to be a secular republic. 

The first constitution of Bangladesh proclaimed secularism as one of the four basic principles of the new republic (other three being Bangladeshi nationalism, socialism, and democracy). The new republic also avoided putting a crescent and a star on its flag, revealing the minor role Islam played in Bengali nationalism. Even the green color on the flag is not linked to Islam (as it is in many Muslim-majority nations' flags, like Pakistani, Moroccan, Saudi Arabian flags etc.). Green color symbolizes the lush green land of Bangladesh. Furthermore, Bangladesh's national anthem,  Amar Sonar Bangla (My Golden Bengal). is also a tribute to Bengal and has anti-religion connotations. It was written by Rabindranath Tagore in 1905 against Partition of Bengal on religious lines in 1905. Add to it many speeches/statements of Bangladesh's founder Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and it is beyond doubt that Bangladesh's nationalism was ethnolinguistic and secular.

Despite all the above-mentioned evidence of secular nationalism, Bangladesh quickly reversed its course and dropped secularism. In 1977, fifth constitutional amendment introduced by military ruler Zia-ur-Rehman removed secularism as one of the basic principles and replaced it with the following words "Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all actions". In 1988, another military ruler Hussain Muhammad Ershad made Islam the state religion of Bangladesh. For the next fifteen year, religious parties role and overall religious discourse increased and it appeared Bangladesh is still part of Pakistan, with military and religious parties controlling politics and manipulating religious discourse. Awami League, the founding party of Bangladesh, despite its strong attachment to the principle of secularism, also had to accept the reality of the situation as any support for secularism was portrayed as pro-Indian and anti-Islam by its rival, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).  

While secularism seemed defeated and religious nationalism on the rise, there was one problem; religious nationalism had difficulty legitimizing Bangladesh's separation from Pakistan. It was only on the basis of ethnolinguistic nationalism that a separate country Bangladesh can be explained to the new generation. New generations were thus socialized in a much different environment (more secular) than those ruling elite that grew up in Pakistan.   

Things began to change with the arrival of the twenty-first century. It appears a new generation socialized in the secular nationalism of Bangladesh came of age and started occupying positions of power. Their sentiments were cashed by Awami League, the party of the Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, now led by his daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wajid. Courts, media, and intellectuals also helped and promoted the secularism/restoration of 1972 constitution movement. In 2005, the high court declared fifth constitutional amendment illegal and secularism was reintroduced as one of the basic principles of the republic. Sheikh Hasina then decided to take on religious parties. She established tribunals to punish those who were involved in crimes against Bangladeshis during the war of liberation. It was a politically astute move as it not only mobilized her own voters and many others but also damaged Jamaat-e-Islami (a religious party whose leadership supported Pakistan Army in 1971 and now usually supported her rival BNP). Although, there was an outcry against the partiality of these tribunals, a large majority of Bangladeshis supported these trials and punishments awarded by these tribunals. The trails revived the dubious role played by many religious leaders, implicating political Islam and increasing the support for secularism.

Although, Islam is still the state religion (so 1972 constitution is not fully restored), secularism is definitely on the march and religious nationalism in retreat. A recent evidence of this came when pro-religion rightist BNP also came out against the political role of religion. Tarique Rehman, the current senior vice chairman and the future leader of BNP, said (See Tarique against Religion-based Politics):

We’ve learned from experience that politics of that kind doesn’t work, it didn’t during Pakistan era... There are many among us who have tried to create political essence and outline based on religion. But invariably they have failed.