Grand Ayatollah criticized by Religious Nationalists for not toeing the line

As discussed previously in this blog, religious nationalist states (and many other states) have three prominent groups in politics, the secularists, the religious nationalists and the deeply religious, who do not feel comfortable with how religious nationalists instrumentalize religion to achieve their political ends. While the focus is always on the tussle between the secularists (who are mostly not atheists or agnostics) and the religious nationalists, it is much more enlightening to probe the scrimmage between the religious nationalists and the deeply religious ones who do not agree with each other.

Marja' (Grand Ayatollah) Mousa Shubairi Zanjani is a 90-year-old marja-e-taqlid (meaning authority to be followed) or marja', the highest authority in Twelver Shiite religious tradition. This highest rank is the attained after decades of scholarship and only a few ayatollahs reach this rank. By the strict standards of the tradition, even Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei does not qualify to be one, although he is accepted by many as a marja'. Every Shia is bound to follow one of the living marja'.

The recent controversy, which pitted religious nationalists against a marja', started in early October 2018 when former president Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) and some other members of the reformist camp met Marja' Mousa Shubairi Zanjani. Khatami has been rejected by the official conservative circles since the end of his presidency but hardliners, close to Rahbar (Supreme Leader) Ali Khamenei, became especially angry after he supported Mir-Hossein Mousavi candidacy and mass protests after the controversial 2009 elections. He has since been banned from official media and is not allowed to leave the country.

Ayatollah Yazdi(L) and Marja' Zanjani (R)

Source: Radio Farda

The meeting drew a severe rebuke from a hardline conservative Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who is close to Khamenei. Khamenei has repeatedly appointed him as one of the members of the influential Guardian Council and also helped him get elected as the current Chairman of the Assembly of Experts. Previously, Khamenei appointed him the head of judiciary for 10 years (1989-99). Ayatollah Yazdi not only wrote a stinging letter to Marja' Zanjani but also released it to the public. He wrote:

Following the publication of pictures on social media of you alongside some problematic individuals who have no respect for the system of the Islamic Republic and the supreme leader, I hereby state that this issue has caused concern and upset among followers and in the seminaries...I would like to remind you that your status and respect are tied to your respect for the ruling Islamic system, the leadership and the status of marjas... and take steps to ensure such matters are not repeated again. 

This was unprecedented in many ways. Ayatollahs usually do not indulge in public spats and nobody criticizes marja's, especially not the lower-ranked ayatollahs. Marja' are the highest authority in the Shiite hierarchical system after are meant to be followed reverently and blindly, not questioned.

The response of Marja' Zanjani was befitting his office as Al-monitor explains:

Zanjani’s office released a statement saying that the senior cleric would not respond to the letter and would remain silent, but that his students and junior clerics who study under him would respond. The Qom Seminary, the largest and oldest Islamic seminary in Iran, issued a statement condemning the letter, saying, “Slandering a grand ayatollah for a personal action and determining [who he can meet with], with the excuse of defending the Islamic Republic and the supreme leader, will have no result but weakening the Islamic Republic and the seminary." The letter, which was signed by 84 clerics, stated ominously, “No government which insults its figures and threatens them is sustainable.”

This episode informs us about the working of religious nationalist states. Such states give great prominence to religion and its political leadership regularly reaffirms its loyalty to the religious leadership and doctrine but, in reality, their loyalty is instrumental and when there is a choice between religion and power, the power always triumphs.

Can a Zoroastrian be a representative of Muslims in Iran?

Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, has five separate reserved seats for religious minorities out of a total of 270 seats. Iranian Christians have three of these reserved seats, while Zoroastrians and Jews have one each.  Sunni Muslims are not considered a religious minority and they can run for all seats of the Majlis. Non-Muslims cannot run for the general seats in the Majlis as they do not believe in the ideology (Islam or Shiite Islam) of the Iranian state. High officials of the state have to be Muslim.

Source: Radio Farda

However, non-Muslims have participated in elections at the local level and been elected to the general seats (i.e. seats not reserved for minorities). One such election is now causing controversy in Iran as the conservative judiciary and moderate politicians fight to prevail. An excerpt from an article on the controversy is given below:

The election of Sepanta Niknam, a Zoroastrian, as a city council member in the central Iranian town of Yazd has become the topic of hot debate on the country’s political stage. While the Guardian Council says religious minorities cannot be representatives of Muslim-majority constituencies, the administration of President Hassan Rouhani and the parliament think otherwise.

It should be noted that Niknam has already served one full term as city councilor in Yazd from 2013-2017. However, following his re-election in the May 19 municipal polls, a defeated conservative candidate filed a complaint on the grounds of Niknam's religion, arguing that it was against Iran's constitution for a member of a religious minority to make decisions on behalf of the whole population of a Muslim-majority city. The complaint prompted the Court of Administrative Justice to issue an order suspending Niknam’s membership to the city council, basing its decision on an earlier letter by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the ultra-conservative head of the Guardian Council, which is the clerical body that vets candidates for elections.

So where did the story begin? On April 15, about one month before Iran’s local and presidential elections, Jannati issued a directive demanding that non-Muslims be disqualified from running in the then-upcoming city and village council elections in localities where most of the population are Muslims. His order was met with different reactions from Iran’s political groups, with many voicing opposition to such a measure.
However, since city council elections — contrary to presidential and parliamentary polls — are not supervised by the Guardian Council and a parliamentary delegation oversees the vetting of the candidates for these elections, Jannati’s directive was never implemented. Thus, many religious minorities participated in the May 19 municipal vote and won, including Niknam.

A few months later, on Oct. 9, Yazd City Council Chairman Gholamali Sefid said he had been ordered by the governor of Yazd to suspend Niknam’s membership to the city council in accordance with a ruling by the Court of Administrative Justice. However, Sefid announced his refusal to implement the order two days later, on Oct. 11, and insisted that he would resign from his post if the suspension was not revoked.
Reformists strongly criticized the Guardian Council decision, calling it illegal. Many political figures asked that parliament step in and revoke Jannati’s order. Even parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani, himself a Principlist, opposed the decision.

In a meeting with Yazd city councilors on Oct. 18, Larijani said, “I said from the start that we do not approve of this method. In my talks with Ayatollah [Ahmad] Jannati, the honorable secretary of the Guardian Council, I emphasized that local councils should be handled according to the law. … The Court of Administrative Justice getting involved in the matter has not been a timely move either, and I mentioned this point to the judiciary as well.” Larijani added, “If this matter is not resolved, we have no choice other than to refer it to the Expediency Council for a final resolution.”

Also on Oct. 18, Guardian Council spokesman Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaei said that Jannati’s ruling was unchangeable and its implementation mandatory: “Anytime one of the Guardian Council jurists sees a measure that is against Islamic law [Sharia], he can step in and say so. Those who object to this have no knowledge of the laws and want to look at the issue from an expediency perspective.”

This was not the end of the story. On Oct. 24, hard-line cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, Iran’s former judiciary chief (1989-99) and a current member of the Guardian Council, announced that “the jurists in the [Guardian] Council have unanimously voted for the suspension of Sepanta Niknam, the Zoroastrian member of the Yazd City Council. This is a decision that is lawful, in accordance with Islamic laws, definite and nonretractable. No one can revoke this law.” He then warned that any attempts to overturn this ruling would be “a fight against the principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which the establishment surely would not tolerate.”

According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, followers of Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism are each allowed to have a representative in parliament. But what does the Iranian Constitution say about city councils? Based on Article 91 of the constitution, the Guardian Council is responsible for examining the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) with Islam. However, Article 94 of the constitution sets a time frame for how long the Guardian Council has the liberty to comment on a piece of legislation. Based on this article, “All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be sent to the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council must review it within a maximum of 10 days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility with the criteria of Islam and the constitution. If it finds the legislation incompatible, it will return it to the assembly for review. Otherwise, the legislation will be deemed enforceable.” This is while city council elections were held on May 19, 2017, with results being announced a few days after.

With rising controversy, the Rouhani administration was soon pulled into the issue as well. On Oct. 25, Shahindokht Molaverdi, the president’s special aide on citizens’ rights, said, “There is no legal prohibition against Sepanta Niknam’s membership of the Yazd City Council — neither from a citizen’s rights point of view nor in regard to any other law.”

Rest of the article can be read here. 

Guardian Council, 12 Holy Men

The Council of Guardians or Guardian Council of the Constitution (Shoraye Negahban-e Qanun-e Assassi) is the most powerful constitutional body in the current Iranian political system, much more important than the Iranian elected legislature (Majlis: Islamic Consultative Assembly). Guardian Council has been called Iran’s most powerful body (that controls Iranian democratic framework), most influential body, one of the most significant institutions under by the Supreme Leader, and de-facto Upper house of the Iranian legislature (p-41). Why the Guardian Council is so powerful when there are a host of other constitutional bodies, such as Majlis, Expediency Council, Assembly of Experts, etc?

Let's first see how the Guardian Council is constituted.

According to the Iranian Constitution of 1979, the Council has 12 members. Six of these members are Islamic jurists and are selected/nominated by the Supreme Leader. The other six civil jurists are specialists of other branches of law and are elected by the Majlis from among the list of Muslim jurists provided by the Head of Judiciary (Article 91). The term of the Guardian Council is six years (Article 92).

It appears that at least six members of the Guardian Council are (indirectly) elected and, therefore, they would be more concerned about the popular opinion. However, this is a facade as the six "elected" members are also from the list provided by the Head of the Judiciary, who is in turn selected by the Supreme Leader (Article 157). The Majlis cannot independently elect even one member of the Council. Hence, one can safely say that the Supreme Leader has almost complete control on who serves on the Council.

Source: Iran's Guardian Council

Why Guardian Council is considered so powerful?

First, the Iranian Constitution gives the Guardian Council many powers. Some of its most important powers are the following:

• Vetting all the candidates for the President, Majlis and the Assembly of Experts before the elections: This means that one cannot become a member of the Majlis or the Assembly of Experts or become President without the approval of the Guadian Council. Even if all the Iranian voters want to elect a particular person as President, they cannot do it unless the Guardian Council approves. The Guardian Council can and has not allowed many popular candidates to run in the elections. Furthermore, the Guardian Council also supervises any referenda or any other direct recourse to the public opinion  (Article 99);
• Approving every piece of legislation passed by the Majlis: All legislation passed by the elected Majlis needs the approval of the Guardian Council to become law. The Council judges all legislation on basis of its conformity with the official religion (Islam- Twelver Shia sect) and the Constitution. If Council does not approve, a draft law, even if it is passed by all members of the Majlis, will remain a draft law. There is no provision to bypass the Guardian Council. Majlis itself cannot overrule Council's rejection by a two-thirds or three-fourths supermajority. In fact, according to the constitution, the Majlis does not hold any legal status if there is no Guardian Council in existence. If there is disagreement between the Council and the Majlis, the case goes to the Expediency Council, which like the Guardian Council is a body nominated by the Supreme Leader and usually has all the members of the Guardian Council as its members (Article 4, 72, 91, 93 and 96);
• Sole interpreter of the Constitution: Like the Supreme Court in many countries, the Guardian Council has the power to interpret the constitution and its judgment is final (three-fourths majority required). The Council is also part of the constitution-amending process (Article 98 and 177).

Source: Deep-Seated Entanglements, RAND

Second, the Guardian Council consists of only twelve members. Comparing it with the membership of Majlis (290 members), Expediency Council (usually 30+ members) or Assembly of Experts (usually 80+ members), one can fathom how much more power an individual member of the Guardian Council would have, even if powers of all these constitutional bodies were equal. The fact is that the Guardian Council has greater powers than all these bodies and it is smaller then all of them, making it extremely powerful.

Third, the Guardian Council is powerful because its decisions, in most cases, are final. Its decisions regarding interpretation of the constitution cannot be contested. Similarly, its decisions regarding the vetting of candidates or election results are legally conclusive.

Finally, Council is powerful because constitution does not bar re-appointment of its members. Therefore, Guardian Council members can stay on for decades, if they retain the confidence of the Supreme Leader. The current Chairman of the Guardian Council, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, has been a member of the Council since its first establishment in 1980 (37 years) and has been its chairman since 1992 (25 years). Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, another member, has been part of the Council since 1988 (29 years). Ayatullah Sayed Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, another member, was earlier also part of the Council from 1992 to 1999. Then, he was appointed as the Head of Judiciary (1999-2009) and in that capacity was nominating Guardian Council candidates to the Majlis and then he again became a member of the Council in 2009. 

90 years old Ayatollah Jannati, head of the Guardian Council, with the Supreme Leader

Source: ‘Election Violations’ Used Against Rouhani

From the above analysis, it is clear that the Guardian Council plays a crucial role in the continuous clerical control of the Iranian political system. If Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) protects it militarily, the Guardian Council protects it constitutionally and legally.

Related blog post: Is Iran's Supreme Leader subject to oversight? Constitutionally yes, but...

Is Iran's Supreme Leader subject to oversight? Constitutionally yes, but...

Iran's constitution gives wide powers to the Supreme Leader. The preamble of the constitution states that in the physical absence of Hidden Imam, the nation would be guided by a person, recognized by the people as leader 'under all conditions, so that there shall be security against deviation by various organizations'.

Article 57 states, 'The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute vilayat al-'amr and the leadership of the Ummah, in accordance with the forthcoming articles of this Constitution. 

Article 110 enumerates the vast powers of the Supreme Leader:

Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership:

• Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Nation's Exigency Council.
• Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system.
• Issuing decrees for national referenda.
• Assuming supreme command of the armed forces.
• Declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces.
• Appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of the resignation of:

a. The fuqaha' on the Guardian Council.
b. The supreme judicial authority of the country.
c. The head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
d. The chief of the joint staff.
e. The chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.
f. The supreme commanders of the armed forces.

• Resolving differences between the three wings of the armed forces and regulation of their relations.
• Resolving the problems, which cannot be solved by conventional methods, through the Nation's Exigency Council.
• Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by the people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections take place by the Guardian Council; and, in the case of the first term [of the Presidency], by the Leadership.
• Dismissal of the' President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89 of the Constitution.
• Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria, on a recommendation [to that effect] from the Head of judicial power.

The Leader may delegate part of his duties and powers to another person. 

So with such imperial powers, is supreme leader subject to insight? 

The constitution says yes and gives this power to the Assembly of Experts (Article 111). The current supreme leader also agrees but argues that oversight should be broad and if the supreme leader fulfills that basic conditions of leadership, all of his actions and that of his subordinates should be beyond criticism. Now, what are these broad conditions? According to the constitution (Article 109), there are three conditions:

1. Scholarship, as required for performing the functions of mufti in different fields of fiqh.
2. Justice and piety, as required for the leadership of the Islamic Ummah. 
3. Right political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative facilities and adequate capability for leadership.

Others have argued that because he is the guardian/Supreme Leader of all, nobody has the capacity/ability to judge/oversight him.

Shahir explains the dynamics of this important issue in his article in Al-Monitor (See http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/iran-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-supreme-leader-oversight.html) 

Afraid of Ahmadinejad?

On June 4, Al-Monitor correspondent in Tehran reported about a possible return of former Iranian President Ahmadinejad (See Is Ahmadinejad plotting a comeback?).

On June 3, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made his first major speech since leaving office last year. He praised Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who died 25 years ago on June 4, and said that Iran’s enemies have not yet realized that Iranians would defend the Iranian revolution “until the last breath.” Ahmadinejad, however, did not speak about the one thing that has been a source of speculation: his political return.On May 31, his brother Davoud Ahmadinejad said that the chances of the former president running for the presidency again were “very high.”while Davoud’s comments did not receive the usual Ahmadinejad-type attention, it seems that other forces in Iran are taking his return to politics seriously, and are intent on preventing it.The arrest of two political figures with close ties to Ahmadinejad, as well as the constant criticism directed at the former president by some of his own former ministers, indicates that the possibility of Ahmadinejad returning to the political arena is being taken seriously by the country's right-wing political elite.

Source: Is Ahmadinejad Coming Back In From The Cold?

However, correspondent also reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to give importance to Ahmadinejad.

Although Ahmadinejad's faction was eliminated from politics following the presidential elections, Khamenei appointed Ahmadinejad as a member in the Expediency Discernment Council. Also, last fall, during the mourning ceremony of Ashoura, he was sitting next to the supreme leader. Two months ago, other images were published showing Ahmadinejad and Khamenei next to each other during the second night of the mourning ceremony of "Fatimiyah."

What these images might mean is that, in spite of his disagreements with Ahmadinejad, Khamenei still views him as an influential political figure or that at least Ahmadinejad is not yet completely removed from the list of people close to Khamenei.

Given this tacit support by Khamenei, neither Ahmadinejad nor his supporters seem deterred. Davari said in April, “I assure you that currently we do not have an organized plan for the next elections. However, this might change in the future.” He continued, "If these anti-people policies of the current administration continue, then I think Ahmadinejad will restart his political activities to defend the people's rights."

That right-wing clerics, ministers and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e-Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami) are against former president's return is understandable. Though a loyal protege of the Supreme Leader during his first term, Ahmadinejad became increasingly independent in his second term and tried to chart a more nationalistic and less religious course (See Missing Mahmoud?). He even tried to defy the Supreme Leader and contested his authority. The final act of Ahmadinejad's betrayal was trying to get his chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, elected as President in 2013 presidential elections. Mashaei was intensely disliked by the right wing because of his promotion of Iranian territorial nationalism, among other things (Mashaei was eventually disqualified by the right wing Guardian Council that vets all presidential candidates) (See Who's Afraid of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?).

The question is why the Supreme Leader is giving importance to Ahmadinejad thereby giving confidence to his supporters and fueling rumors while also ordering (or at least consenting to) the arrest of Ahmadinejad's supporters. Judiciary and police are in control of the Supreme Leader so the arrests could not have happened without his knowledge. Some analysts argue that the Supreme Leader is supporting Ahmadinejad to keep the pressure on the new Rouhani government:

As BBC Persian analyst Hossein Bastani noted, it's highly unlikely that former President Mohammad Khatami would be allowed to sit near the supreme leader in public. Khatami, a reformist, was never considered to be close to Khamenei, who publicly expressed support for Ahmadinejad's anti-Western stances. 

Bastani believes that Khamenei could use Ahmadinejad to put pressure on Iran's new government team, which has been accused by hard-liners of giving in to the West and the United States.(See Is Ahmadinejad Coming Back In From The Cold?)

However, there are many other ways to keep the Rouhani government on the "straight path." The reason Khamenei is courting Ahmadinejad perhaps lies in what Ahmadinejad represents. He has impressive nationalist credentials and is also religiously devout. The question is why Iranians need the rule of the clergy (velayat-e-faqih doctrine) when they can elect people like Ahmadinejad? The whole argument that only clergy can save Iran and Islam from external threats becomes doubtful. Ahmadinejad has not helped his case by claiming to be in communication with the Hidden Imam (thus debunking clergy legitimacy because they claim to rule in the name of the Hidden Imam) and also promoting pre-Islamic Iran (thus trying to harness the votes of those who believe in territorial/Persian nationalism). 

So, the Supreme Leader is perhaps trying to impress on the former president that he can enjoy a leisurely secure retirement during which he would be feted at the state functions and given due respect (even perhaps consulted) or he can think of running again and make his and his friend's lives difficult. The choice is yours. Ahmadinejad!