Elective Affinity between Religious Nationalism and Right Wing Populism

Professor Philip Gorski of Yale University gives an excellent account of the elective affinity between religious nationalism and right-wing populism that we see in many countries today (See Religious Nationalism and Right-Wing Populism: Trumpism and Beyond). I have copy-pasted the whole article. Enjoy.

One of the great puzzles of the 2016 elections in the United States was the extraordinary support that Donald Trump received from white evangelicals. Nearly 80% ultimately voted for Trump. It is important to note that most non-white evangelicals did not vote for Trump, and that most white evangelicals voted for other candidates during the Republican primaries. And yet, Trump was still the first choice of a plurality of white evangelicals. 

One of the great puzzles of the first 18 months of the Trump administration is the steady increase in Trump’s approval ratings amongst white evangelicals. Over 80% now approve of Trump. During the presidential elections, many white evangelical leaders were prepared to publicly excuse Trump’s patently un-Christian personal behavior—including his ill-concealed racism and misogyny—and many white evangelical voters were evidently willing to overlook them as well. Now, they appear ready to overlook his ongoing assault on American democracy, too—including the rule of law, the freedom of the press. 

This is not a uniquely American puzzle. The affinity between religious conservativism and right-wing populism is a phenomenon that antedates Trump and extends beyond America. That affinity is perhaps less obvious and less important in Western Europe, where the ranks of Christian conservatives have been in rapid decline for some time now. But even there, neo-populists often position themselves as defenders of “Christian civilization.” Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen did not borrow this move from Trump’s playbook. On the contrary, the opposite is more likely the case. 

Elsewhere in the world, the connection between religious conservativism and right-wing populism is both striking and significant. In Hungary, for instance, Viktor Orban has promised to replace “liberal democracy” with “Christian democracy,” by which he evidently means an ethno-nationalist form of one-party-rule and plebiscitary democracy. Moving eastwards, to the inner boundary of Eurasia, we arrive in Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey, where the “secular democracy” of the Kemalist regime has been supplanted by an Islamic version of the Orban model. 

Source: Meetup 

Any suspicion that Western analysts might harbor concerning the European origins of this phenomenon are however promptly shattered when we arrive on the Indian sub-continent. There, civilizationist discourse is nearly a century old. The Hindu nationalist movement has long had both religious and secular followers, and Hindu nationalist discourse has long claimed that Hinduism is a way of life or a form of civilization to which non-Hindu Indians can and indeed must belong. 

While the origins of left-wing populism are usually traced to the American populist movement of the late 19th century, the genealogy of right-wing populism begins further South, in Latin America. There, too, authoritarian populist leaders found substantial support amongst Catholic conservatives. 

Of course, not all religious conservatives feel attracted to the populist message. In the US, for instance, the ranks of the #neverTrumpers include a good number of conservative Christian intellectuals, Protestants as well as Catholics. The question, then, is which religious conservatives and why? The tentative answer that I’d like to advance here is: “religious nationalists.” 

Until recently, of course, most scholars of nationalism would have dismissed the very concept as an oxymoron. Nationalism was assumed to be a wholly “modern” phenomenon, a kind of ersatz religion for secular modernity. Today, many scholars understand religious nationalism as a distinctive variant of modern nationalism, one that makes religious identity the litmus test of national belonging. 

While religious nationalism may well be a modern phenomenon, the connection between religion and nationalism long antedates modernity. Indeed, one could argue—and many including myself have argued—that Western nationalism has religious origins. For the definitional triptych of “people, land, and state” is already sketched out in the Hebrew Scriptures, which speak of a chosen people, a holy land, and a Jewish state. 

Academic analysts have often remarked on the quasi-religious character of modern nationalism. Some have explained this in functional terms. In this account, nationalism fills the “God-shaped hole” left by secularity. Others have explained it in instrumental terms. From this perspective, nationalist politicians invoke religious language to galvanize their followers. The genealogical account suggests a different explanation: modern nationalism has a religious “unconscious” that can always be summoned back to the surface again. 

In “Western” versions of religious nationalism—by which I mean versions that are historically rooted in the Jewish and Christian scriptures—this religious unconscious has at least four key elements: 

Blood tropes. Talk of blood is a red thread that runs through both the Jewish and Christian scriptures. There is talk of blood sacrifice, blood conquest, blood purity, and blood atonement, amongst other things.

Apocalyptic narratives. The histories of Judaism and Christianity are both replete with apocalyptic discourse. For most of these histories, literalist interpretations of the apocalyptic texts (viz., Daniel, Revelation) were confined to fringe movements. Today, they are a core element of evangelical Christianity.

Persecution/victimization narratives. The “pariah” status of the ancient Jews and Roman persecution of the Jesus movement left a deep imprint in the collective memories of both traditions. It is especially deep amongst present-day evangelicals, who expect to be persecuted for their faith.

Messianic expectations. Full-blown messianic movements have probably been somewhat more common in modern Judaism, but modern Christianity has certainly had its share (e.g., Mormonism) and the history of modern evangelicalism is of course rife with charismatic preachers who claim quasi-messianic powers. 

These four elements are not “key” in the sense of being “unique” characteristics of Judaism and/or Christianity that distinguish them from other religious traditions. On the contrary, they are commonly found in “non-Western” versions of religious nationalism as well (e.g., Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamist). They are key, then, not in the sense of grounding a typological distinction between religious traditions, but rather in the sense that they underlie the elective affinity between religious nationalism and right-wing populism. 

What do I mean by “right-wing populism”? There is widespread scholarly agreement that populism is not an “ideology,” at least not in the sense that, say, liberalism or communism are ideologies. Populism does not have a Mill or a Marx, a treatise or a manifesto, nor a program of reform or revolution (e.g., the expansion of individual rights or the abolition of private property). And yet, while it may lack the intellectual systematicity of these 19th century ideologies, it is not without a certain coherence. Some analysts have proposed that it is best understood as a political discourse centered around the notion of the “sovereign people” and related notions such as “popular will” and “popular unity.” This is why populist rhetoric often has a democratic ring. However, as proponents of this interpretation are quick to point out, right-wing populists also reject core elements of liberal democracy, such as the rule of law, the rights of the minority, and the internal pluralism of all peoples. 

Building on Arlie Hochschild’s work, some scholars, including myself, have argued that populism is not just a discourse but a narrative. In her widely-read ethnography, Strangers in Their Own Land, Hochschild argued that her subjects interpreted the world through the frame of a “deep story,” a narrative that they were not always able to articulate themselves, but which they immediately recognized and affirmed as “theirs” as soon she articulated it for them. The central event in the populist story is “line-cutting.” Hochschild’s subjects imagine themselves to be waiting patiently in a long line that leads to the “American dream” of material prosperity. But the line is standing still. In fact, it hasn’t moved in years, decades even. Why? Up ahead, her subjects notice, other people are cutting in line, immigrants and minorities who just recently arrived. Not only that, the Federal Government is guiding them to the front of the line. This, they feel, is deeply unjust. 

In my view, Hochschild’s deep story is just one variant of a more generic narrative that underlies right-wing populism. It features four actors: a pure people, a corrupt elite, an undeserving other, and a messianic leader. The people have been betrayed by the elite which is allied with the other, and the leader promises to restore the people to its birthright. There is also a left-wing version of this story. It features three actors: an oppressed people, a corrupt elite, and a social movement. In this account, the people are being exploited by the elite and have joined together in a movement of liberation. 

Right-wing populist movements have at least two other common, if not universal features. The first—and the most important for our purposes—is a charismatic leader. Because the populist goal of popular unity can never really be achieved it is often performed. In left-wing populist movements, unity is usually embodied in “the movement.” In right-wing populist movements, by contrast, it is more often incorporated in a leader. The second common feature of right-wing populist movements (sometimes found in the left-wing variant, too) is the performance of “bad manners,” above all by the leader, but also by his (or, occasionally, her) followers. By “bad manners,” I understand ongoing violations of social norms of polite speech and sometimes also of dress and grooming. The speech of populist leaders is often impolite and profane. And their personal appearance is often unconventional. Bad manners serves two purposes: it distances the leader from the elite and signals his or her closeness to the people. But it also distances the leader from “ordinary” people and suggests extraordinary talents or superhuman powers. 

Having enumerated some important characteristics of both religious nationalism and right-wing populism, it is now possible to identify some of the elective affinities between them. They run in both directions. Religious nationalists are attracted to right-wing populist movements and parties if and insofar as they: 

Invoke notions of blood sacrifice, blood conquest, blood purity and, more generally, attribute mystical powers to human blood.

Paint the contemporary situation in Manichean and apocalyptic terms, as a cosmic struggle between good and evil, that is hurtling towards its final denouement.

Portray the dominant ethno-cultural majority as a persecuted, religious minority; in particular, a minority persecuted on account of its faith.

Are headed by a charismatic leader who makes messianic promises and claims messianic powers. 

Conversely, right-wing populists are attracted to religious nationalism if and insofar as it: 

Emphasizes the moral purity of the common people.

Blames national decline on cultural elites, and especially on secular intellectuals.

Clearly identifies moral and/or religious others who can never become full members of the people.

Sanctifies the charismatic leader, despite or even because of his or her bad manners. 

Against this backdrop, the ongoing love affair between Donald Trump and white evangelicals becomes a good deal less perplexing. Trump has a peculiar (and possibly psychotic) obsession with human blood, particularly but not exclusively, women’s blood. He espouses a dark, “us vs. them” view of the world, always on the brink of disaster. He espies conspiratorial plots and nefarious enemies most everywhere he looks. And he imagines that he can easily fix difficult problems with simple solutions that have somehow eluded his predecessors. Conversely, Trump-supporting evangelical leaders such as Jerry Falwell, Jr., and Franklin Graham envision the United States as a Christian nation that has been corrupted by secular elites, often on behalf of underserving others (typically racial, religious or sexual minorities), and they have not only given Trump a series of “mulligans” for his personal morality, they often seem to revel in his bad manners, particularly when they are aimed at those they dislike. 

The goal of this memo has been to sketch out the cultural logic that underlies the elective affinity between religious nationalism and right-wing populism and, more broadly, to dispel the view, quite widespread among Western intellectuals, that the alliance between religious nationalists and neo-populists is purely instrumental or patently hypocritical. While I am confident that this framework can “travel”—i.e., that it gives us some theoretical purchase over other cases of neo-populism, Western and non-Western alike—I do not imagine that it would survive such a journey unscathed. Further comparative work is of course necessary, particularly comparisons that go beyond Europe and the Americas to include various regions of Asia and Africa. Nor do I wish to suggest that this cultural analysis constitutes an adequate explanation much less an exhaustive account for the rise of neo-populist movements or their relative success or failure. That would require a fuller analysis, not only of national-level factors (e.g., party systems, immigration patterns, religious demography etc.) but also of global and geopolitical changes as well.

Growing Jewish Nationalism in Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the pushback

Scholars have been warning about the rising influence of the religious nationalists in the IDF. Not only the number of religious nationalists (or national-religious or religious Zionists as they are called in Israel) is rising in the IDF but they are also serving in more combat roles and rising in ranks. Conversely, the secular Israelis that had been the backbone of the IDF since the 1940s have been reluctant to serve after their mandatory military service in the IDF. Yagil Levy, in his 2014 article in Armed Forces and Society Journal, wrote about the theocratization of the IDF. He gives four reasons why there has been a significant increase in religious influence in the Israeli military:

At the center of this process stands the national-religious sector, which has significantly upgraded its presence in the ranks since the late 1970s. It is argued that four integrated and cumulative processes gradually generated this shift toward the theocratization of the Israeli military: (1) the crafting of institutional arrangements that enable the service of religious soldiers, thereby (2) creating a critical mass of religious soldiers in many combat units, consequently (3) restricting the military command’s Intra-organizational autonomy visa`- vis the religious sector, and paving the road to (4) restricting the Israel Defense Forces autonomy in deploying forces in politically disputable missions.

A Christian Science Monitor report by Christa Bryant in 2015 highlighted the same issue. 

In the early 1990s,...Orthodox men accounted for 2.5 percent of graduates of infantry officer training courses; since then, it’s grown to more than 25 percent, according to a 2013 book. In some combat units, they make up as much as 50 percent of new officers – roughly quadruple their share of Israel’s population. The upward trend, coupled with a parallel decline in the number of combat soldiers and officers coming from secular families, is dramatically changing the face of the IDF. Many Israelis respect religious Zionists like Fund – Orthodox Jews who see the state as playing a part in the prophesied redemption of Israel ­– for their willingness to defend the nation.

But some worry that their worldview could change the character not only of the army – traditionally a secular “people’s army,” where youngsters of all stripes forged lasting bonds during their mandatory two- to three-year service – but the state of Israel itself. One of the most cited concerns is that if Israel agreed to a peace deal with Palestinians, the outsized influence of religious soldiers could complicate the IDF’s evacuation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

An investigative report by Reuters in April 2016 also points towards the same phenomenon and argues that religious nationalists have now reached the highest echelons of Israel's powerful security sector:

The community, sometimes referred to as the ‘national religious’, has increased its presence in both government and the civil service. This year, for the first time ever, the heads of the national police, the Mossad spy agency and the Shin Bet domestic security service are all Religious-Zionists.

Nowhere, though, has the shift been more pronounced than in the military. Most soldiers in the Israeli army are secular or observant Jews, though Druze and Bedouin Arab citizens serve as well. But over the past two decades, academic studies show, the number of Religious-Zionist officers in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has seen a huge increase. The military has also felt the growing influence of rabbis who have introduced matters of faith and politics to the battlefield.

Source: Reuter's Report

The author of the Reuter's report, Maayan Lubell, however, argues that there are signs of pushback from the secular decision-makers that are still a majority in both civilian and security sectors of Israel. Their criticisms are mainly focused on the power of the Military Rabbinate and it's Jewish Awareness Branch that have tried relentlessly, according to many secular Jews, to promote a right-wing, ideological, and religious agenda and to make the IDF an army with a religious mission, instead of a national mission. In 2012, the State Comptroller of Israel criticized the pamphlets circulated among soldiers by the Rabbinate during the 2008-09 Gaza war in which it was written that 'not one millimeter' of land should be ceded to the Palestinians and cruelty to the Palestinians was sometimes necessary. In January 2016, the IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot announced he would remove the Jewish Awareness Branch from the Military Rabbinate. In his letter to the IDF officers, he argued that a military divided over religion and politics could hardly fulfill its mission:

The IDF is the people’s army and includes a wide spectrum of Israeli society...A change is needed with the aim of keeping the IDF a stately army in a democratic country, nurturing that which unites its soldiers.

His decision was severely criticized by the religious nationalists, who are a majority in the current ruling coalition, and they planned to reverse it. More recently, Israel's deputy military chief Major-General Yair Golan’s Holocaust memorial speech touched a nerve when compared behavior of some of the Israelis to the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s:

If there’s something that frightens me about Holocaust remembrance it’s the recognition of the revolting processes that occurred in Europe in general, and particularly in Germany, back then - 70, 80 and 90 years ago - and finding signs of them here among us today in 2016.

This was in reference to the killing of an incapacitated Palestinian by an Israeli soldier in cold blood in Hebron in March 2016. However, General Yair was castigated for making this comparison and in the end, because of the political power of the religious nationalists, the IDF had to issue a clarification.

Can the secular Israelis stop the growing Judaization/theocratization of the IDF? The jury is still out but this will surely be the last stand of the secular Israelis.

Western Wall Prayer Controversy in Israel

Whenever states have tried to implement religious laws/rules in modern times, they have faced challenges. Two of these challenges are particularly intractable. First, while translating a religious regulation into law, the state has to prioritize one interpretation over others, which increases sectarianism. Second, as most of the dominant religious interpretations are patriarchal, the state has to either go against these interpretations or trample over women rights. Israel is facing both these complications while trying to administer the praying at the Western Wall of Temple Mount in Jerusalem. 

The Western Wall is the last remnant of the retaining wall of the Second Jewish Holy Temple on Temple Mount that was destroyed by the Romans in 70 C.E. The Second Holy Temple existed between 530 BCE and 70 CE. This six centuries period is called the Second Temple Period. The First Holy Temple was built by King/Prophet Solomon (reign 970-931 BCE) and was destroyed by the Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar in 587 BCE, standing for more than four centuries. According to the Jewish religious tradition, the Third Holy Temple will be built soon at the same place (Temple Mount) where the first two temples existed and the construction is linked to the End of Times/Messianic age. 

Due to Western Wall's connection with the Second Holy Temple, it is considered the holiest spots where Jews can pray. It has been the most revered Jewish pilgrimage place for centuries. According to the Israeli government, more than 10 million people visit the Western Wall (called Kotel) annually. Since coming under Israel’s control after 1967 War, the Temple Mount Area has been carefully managed so as to lessen contact between Jews and Muslims, who also consider Temple Mount a sacred spot. The Kotel area/prayer arrangements are administered by an authority, which is under the control of ultra-Orthodox Jewry, as Israeli state does not recognize other Jewish traditions. So, while Jews from other traditions (Conservative, Reform, etc.) can pray at the Wall, they have to follow the rules based on ultra-Orthodox tradition. Some of the particularly controversial provisions of this tradition are the refusal to allow a mixed-gender space, women praying as a group, women wearing a prayer shawl (tallit) or women reading from a Torah scroll at the Kotel. Currently, these actions may lead to physical and verbal abuse by the ultra-Orthodox as well as arrest, fine or jail sentence by the state. Women groups and Jews from other traditions have been protesting against the ultra-Orthodox monopoly on Kotel for decades. 

Women of the Wall (WOW), formed in 1998, is an organization working to increase women rights of prayer at the Kotel. It has been appealing to state and courts to end discrimination at the Kotel. It filed its first case in Supreme Court of Israel in 1991. After several delays, wins and losses, the issue is still not settled. The WOW continued to pray together and aloud while ultra-Orthodox continued to harass and abuse them. However, WOW were not reading directly from the Torah. In 2104, WOW smuggled a tiny Torah and read from it. In April 2015, one of the men handed them one of the 300 full-sized Torahs, which are only available to men, and women started reading from it. Violence broke out as ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) men entered the women section and tried to physically take Torah away.  Police stopped them but in May locked the gates to prevent women from having Torahs again (See Women of the Wall). To resolve the deteriorating situation Israeli government formed an advisory team. On the recommendations of this team, in January 2016, the Israeli government created a permanent and separate area - an egalitarian prayer space - where ultra-Orthodox rules would not be applicable.

The approved area will be a 900-square-meter section that will be built to replace the temporary platform that was set up in the Southern area of the Western Wall next to Robinson’s Arch some two years ago. The permanent structure will be much larger and will be built with a multi level structure.  In addition, the entrance to the new area will be accessed by a common entrance that will include entrance to the traditional gender-segregated prayer areas already existing.  The new prayer section will also enjoy equal visibility. The "upper plaza" situated outside the official prayer areas will no longer be under the same control as the Western Wall as a result of this new agreement and, as a result, official national ceremonies will take place in which  men and women will now be able to sit together and women can sing. (See Prayer arrangements at the Western Wall (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

The WOW, international Jewry, Reform and Conservative movements were happy with this compromise but ultra-Orthodox public and political parties were not. They are accusing WOW of being more interested in political posturing and deliberate provocation than in religion (See Western Wall rabbi: Women desecrating site by bringing in Torah and The Western Wall Is No Place for Political Posturing). Meir Porush, a member of the ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism party said that the Women of the Wall to be “sent to the dogs.” He was reprimanded by the Knesset Ethics Committee for his statement (See Knesset Ethics Committee reprimands Haredi MK for the biblical insult to Women of the Wall). 

Source: The Times of Israel (AFP/GALI TIBBON)

The Israeli Chief Rabbinate Council, which is also controlled by the ultra-Orthodox, also leapt into the fray and has forbidden the government from implementing the compromise recommendations:

The council demands that the government of Israel suspend the decision until such a time that it fulfills the obligation to hold a consultation with the Chief Rabbinate, in accordance with the law. It grants a foothold in the holy place to a group that has for years uprooted Zion and Jerusalem from their prayer book, and which publicly declares that they do not view the Torah of Israel as unique and do not believe in the fundamentals of the Jewish faith, one of whose foundations is ‘This is the Torah, it will not be replaced.’ This is a serious matter. The Land of Israel is outraged by the introduction of alien things into the holy place. (See Chief Rabbinate: Israel Must Suspend New Western Wall Prayer Arrangements) 

As ultra-Orthodox parties are part of the current ruling coalition, they enjoy enormous power. They were not happy with the compromise and eventually forced Prime Minister Netanyahu to rethink. In March 2016, he announced that bureau chief to revisit the compromise deal given his ultra-Orthodox partners’ objections. This change of stance, of course, did not go well with the WOW and Reform and Conservative Jews and they have decided to file an appeal in the Supreme Court (See Pluralist groups warn government over foot-dragging on Western Wall deal. So stay tuned for more controversy. 

Rise of Sectarianism and Pakistani Religious Nationalism

Religious nationalism often leads to sectarianism. As explained in a previous blogpost (See Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism), when religious affiliation  defines citizen from a non-citizen, sectarian issues attain a political, economic and social significance. Far from being the concern of few theologians and zealots, they became the concern of everyone. For example, if religious law is not the law of the state and there is no chance it ever becoming state law or source of state law, few care how the rival sect differs in interpreting a certain Biblical or Quranic verse or hadith. However, once religious law is considered to be the source of state law, then everybody is concerned as there is a chance that one's religious beliefs maybe declared illegal or these beliefs maybe legal but would not entitle one full citizenship rights. 

An example would clarify. In 1978, General Zia introduced zakat (annual alms tax) system in Pakistan and ordered compulsory deduction of 2.5% from bank accounts that have amounts above a certain minimum level. Beliefs of Shia and Sunni sects about who can collect zakat differ. Sunnis believe state can collect zakat, Shias do not. Not many people, Shias or Sunnis, thought this difference was important before 1978. However, when Zia introduced the new system, Shias immediately protested and when Zia ignored them, they took control of some of the important government buildings in Islamabad and vowed to fight. In the end, Zia gave in and Shias were exempted from compulsory deduction of zakat by state.

So, a sectarian or confessional bias is inherent in a religious nationalist state. If state adopts religious laws, it has to choose between different interpretations. For example, in Saudi Arabia, state has adopted a particular religious interpretation about how women should appear in public. This particular interpretation has been rejected by most Muslims but Saudi state has enforced it. In Israel, marriage registration is controlled by the Orthodox Chief Rabbinate. If rules set by the Orthodox rabbinate are not followed, state would not register a marriage. Even a marriage under Reform or Conservative Judaism (rules), two other major streams in modern Judaism, is not kosher for the state. 

In Pakistan, sectarianism became an issue after General Zia started Islamizing the government. Before General Zia, there were sects and differences and sometimes violence would happen but such instances were few and far between. The knowledge of sectarian differences and the animosity that one saw in the 1980s and later was not present before. Rise of sectarianism was primarily because of General Zia's Islamization program but not all reasons of this rise were internal. Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which made Saudi Arabia a very important player in Pakistan's religious landscape, also helped the rise of sectarianism.

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal as given at Who is killing Pakistan's Shias and why?

Sectarianism continue to increase and become more violent after Zia due to the following reasons:

• Madrassas and religious nationalism: Mushrooming of madrassas, which promote religious nationalism and train students along sectarian lines, under Zia started to have its effect on Pakistan in the 1990s. Madrassas provided recruits to religious parties and sectarian militias but were also proponents of Pakistani religious nationalism that Pakistani state was also promoting so taking action against them was difficult. Moreover, religious parties, which had overlapping membership with sectarian militias and leadership of both were trained in the same madrassas, made any strict action against sectarian militias difficult as it was termed as an action against Islam and against Pakistan;
• Political instability in the 1990s: The nineties decade was highly unstable, with average tenure of Prime Minister being a year (nine Prime Ministers from 1990 to 1999). It not only undermined democratic development but also affected economic growth and law and order. A long term coordinated action against sectarian militias was not taken. Military sometimes used religious parties, which were supported by sectarian militias, to counter politicians' attempt to stabilize their rule and reduce military's power;
• Sectarian militias as tools to promote religious nationalism abroad: Sectarian militias were used by military (particularly ISI) as tools for promoting religious nationalism in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Any attempt to take strict action against sectarian militias by the civilian governments was undermined by this link;
• Rise of Taliban: Taliban and Pakistani Sunni sectarian militias had close links as Taliban also believed in same violent sectarian ideology and many members of Pakistani militias and Taliban had studied at the same Pakistani madrassas and fought alongside each other in Afghanistan. Therefore, Taliban rise and success in Afghanistan not only increased the confidence of Pakistani sectarian outfits but also provided them a sanctuary. 

After 9/11, sectarian outfits were banned and there were some attempts to limit them but these attempts were halfhearted at best. Internationally, General Musharraf was fighting against Muslim extremism but in Pakistan, Musharraf was in alliance with religious parties (Muthidda Majlis-e-Amal) that had a soft corner for the sectarian militias and publically supported Taliban's struggle in Afghanistan. Later, rise of Pakistani Taliban provided Sunni militias confidence, support and sanctuary inside Pakistan.

Benazir Shah writing in Foreign Policy in August 2014 (See The Trouble Convicting LeJ's Malik Ishaq) writes about these links between Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, one of the most notorious sectarian militias: 

In Pakistan’s toxic mix of terrorist organizations, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi maintains ideological and operational links with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda. When need be, its foot soldiers have not hesitated to take their mission of sectarian strife across the border. In 2011, an offshoot of the radical group claimed responsibility for killing 55 Shiites in Kabul, possibly in cahoots with al Qaeda. Other jihadist groups, including Jaish-e-Muhammad, espouse its mission of establishing a Sunni state. More than 600 Shiites were killed in Pakistan in 2013, and over 1,000 were injured in a troubling uptick in sectarian attacks.

Shah also asked the question, will the state act against sectarian militias as it had started acting against Taliban?

For now the state is engaged. On June 15, it launched a comprehensive military operation in North Waziristan, long considered a deadly crucible of local and foreign terrorists. But there is a sectarian face-off brewing in the Punjab heartland, where Jhangvi is firmly rooted. But when the state’s gaze will turn to that fight remains to be seen.

All this history brings us to the recent killing of Malik Ishaq, his sons and other leaders of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. This will be discussed in the next blogpost.

Religious nationalism: A new development in the Middle East

Nationalism is a concept linked with modernity and so are its numerous variants, including religious nationalism. Although Islam has been the dominant religion in the Middle East for the last 1500 years, religious nationalism is a recent phenomenon. Like European feudal states and empires, Muslim feudal states and empires of the pre-modern era did not propagate or even espouse religious nationalism.

Brian A. Catlos, the religious studies professor at the University of Colorado at Boulder, has written an excellent column in the Washington Post on religious nationalism in the Middle East. Following are some excerpts, but do read the Religious Nationalism finds a footing in the Middle East

With many reports of this violence come adjectives such as “barbarous” and “medieval,” along with the intimation that this sort of intolerance is particularly characteristic of Islam and antithetical to the enlightened and rational secularism of the West.

But brutal as this sectarian violence may be, the fact that there are so many religious minorities in the Middle East stands testament to the reality that, despite long-standing antagonisms, myriad ethnic groups and religious denominations have not only survived but even thrived in this region through some 1,500 years of Islamic domination. The richness of the culture, where many of the ancient sects and arcane languages — often surviving only in small, highly localized communities — predate Christianity, Islam and even modern Judaism, has no parallel in Europe. The Yazidi religion, for example, goes back to Mesopotamia; Aramaic, the language of Jesus, continues to be spoken in a clutch of villages near Damascus...

This reflects an entirely different model of political compromise than that which has developed in the West, and it may seem regressive to us. But it is an arrangement that developed organically and has functioned for about 14 centuries.

The breakdown of religious tolerance and plurality in today’s Middle East is not, then, a manifestation of some particularly Islamic barbarism or evidence of a return to the Middle Ages. Nor is it religious in motivation, although it may be in expression. It is a symptom of what we call modernization, and its political framework: nationalism...

Who counts as a Jew?

On February 20th, Pew's report 'A Portrait of Jewish Americans' was discussed. Here (Who Counts as a Jew?) Rachel Gross discusses how Pew researcher dealt with the tricky question, who counts as a Jew. As Rachel argues there is a long history of cultural Jews. So the study not only counted 'Jews by religion' but also 'Jews of no religion', the former being 78% of the total Jews. 

Gross supports Pew's definition and argues,

'The concept of religion is a modern Protestant creation, and modern Judaism has never fit comfortably into the category, despite the best efforts of Jewish thinkers and communal leaders. In the United States, Jews have embraced American conceptions of religion as an individual matter of belief and choice rather than one mandated by ethnicity and community, giving rise to dynamic, changing community structures and rituals.'

'But beyond the door of the synagogue or Jewish communal center, American Jews’ spiritual lives are rich, complex, and hard to pin down. Divisions between Judaism (the religion) and Jewishness (the culture) are no longer useful, if they ever were. Simplistic “religious” and “secular” Jews no longer accurately describe the diversity of American Jewish practice, if they ever did. As the Pew researchers highlight at the beginning of their report, “Jews by religion” and “Jews of no religion” are both overwhelmingly proud to be Jewish and have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people.'

This reminds me of reading about Hinduism and the difficulty in answering the question, who counts as a Hindu.  Hinduism, according to many scholars, was more a culture than religion until atleast the eighteenth century. It was the British colonial administration that first united all Hindus (on paper and under law) as believers in a distinct religion when it decided to make Hinduism the residual religion of all Indians. Hindu nationalists have now the unenviable task of not rejecting any major groups from the definition of Hindu but also drawing more clear boundaries so that who is a Hindu is more distinguishable. 

Going to Jail for studying Torah

As discussed in this blog on 11th February 2014 (See 'Is studying religion a service to the state?'), partial exemption of ultra-Orthodox/ Haredi students from military draft has become a major issue in Israel. In national elections last year, parties supporting ending or at least reducing this exemption for Haredi made big gains and the ruling coalition was formed only when PM Netanyahu agreed to change the law. But afraid of the religious community, Bibi was not ready to do much until his hand was forced by a Supreme Court ruling that made the compromise Tal law unconstitutional. 

In March 2014, a new law was proposed by the Israeli government. It was a compromise:

The new legislation sets annual quotas for drafting yeshiva students for military or national service, and mandates criminal penalties against draft evaders. However, the law doesn’t entail complete Haredi conscription, instead calling for a gradual annual increase in the number of ultra-Orthodox 18-year-olds drafted, and still allowing for small numbers of exemptions until 2017. (See Israel passes ultra-Orthodox draft law)

The ultra-Orthodox Jews were not happy. They thought that the law was discriminatory as it targeted only them and not other groups who were also exempted from military service (such as Arab-Israelis who were not required to serve). But mainly they were angry that in a Jewish state, Torah study was not being due importance and they would be sent to jail for studying Torah. They even threatened to quit Israel and emigrate to the US etc. to save their religion.

“If this is the Jewish state, it is one that must have Torah at the center,” said Rabbi Mordechai Bloy, an educator of Haredi youth in Bnei Brak, a mostly Orthodox town near Tel Aviv, as he made his way to Jerusalem. “A Torah scholar must not be treated like a drug dealer.”Protesters’ posters carried slogans like “We will all go to jail” and biblical verses like “Save me, I pray, from the hand of my brother,” a plea made by Jacob, who feared that his brother, Esau, might kill him.

The ultra-Orthodox Jews were on the streets to protest the draft law. Around 300,000 of them protested in Jerusalem.

Defenders of the draft law argued that ultra-Orthodox Jews constitute 10% of the Israeli population and their share is increasing as they favor large families, so continued exemption will lead to a total collapse of the military draft system. Even some right wing parties were supporting the bill. Naftali Bennet of Jewish Home party contended that with 30% first grader coming from Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) homes, Israel could not survive unless ultra-Orthodox share the burden (see Ultra-Orthodox Jews Clog Jerusalem Streets to Protest a Draft Bill). 

Source: Israel passes ultra-Orthodox draft law

The issue as one newspaper pointed out is Israel's religious nationalism.

'In a nutshell, the equal burden law represents the deep schism that divides those who see Israel as the national secular Jewish state and those who see Israel as a place where Jews must live, first and foremost, in obedience to God and His Torah. The first are hinging the wellbeing of Israel on democracy and a strong army. The later hinges it on faith in God.' See Orthodox Jews Threaten to Quit Israel Over IDF Draft

The issue is whether Israel was made for Jews or for Judaism?

In the end, the draft law was passed with 67 voting in favor and only one voting against it in the Knesset. The opposition boycotted the vote.

Zionism, Judaism and Nationalism

Two very interesting articles that discuss the intersection of three philosophies. The New York Times article by Mark Oppenheimer (A Conflict of Faith: Devoted to Jewish Observance but at Odds With Israel) explains why six very learned and observant Jews oppose Israel's policies/Zionism.

Professor Manekin (Philosophy professor at the University of Maryland), Professor Stefan Krieger(Law professor at Hofstra University), Rabbi Alissa Wise (Works for Jewish Voice of Peace), Daniel Boyarin (Professor of Talmudic Culture at University of California-Berkeley), Noam Pianko (Associate Professor of Jewish History at University of Washington) and Corey Robin (Professor of Political Science at Brooklyn College) are all observant Jews. Talmudic precepts are important to them and they are well-versed in Jewish history and culture. These qualities makes them a minority in the American Jewry but they are also part of an exceeding rare group of religiously-observant Jews not supporting Israel.

These six scholars give a number of reasons for not supporting Israel, including Israeli unjust policies toward Palestinians, Zionism’s incompatibility with Jewish beliefs and moral issues with the idea of worshiping a heavily militarized state and with the belief of one land/state for one specific people.   

Few quotes:

"I think nationalism and religion together are toxic," said Stefan Krieger

"The very concept of a state defined as being for one people was deeply problematic and inevitably going to lead to moral and political disaster. Which I think it has", said Professor Boyarin.

"People look at 'non-statist Zionism' as the type that lost. But I found a lot of what they were saying resonated today, and a lot of their predictions about endless war had come to pass, " said Professor Manekin. 

 "There are lots of ways to be Jewish," Professor Robin said, "but worshiping a heavily militarized state seems like a bit of a comedown from our past."

Liel Leibovitz puts forward the counter argument in his article Why Religious Judaism is tied to Nationalism: What subjects of a recent New York Times column get fundamentally wrong   

"The answer is a core tenet of Judaism, namely the realization that earthly power is indispensable. As Michael Walzer elegantly noted in his (book) Exodus and Revolution, nothing inherent sets Canaan apart from Egypt and its houses of bondage; the Promised Land’s promise lies not in some external bit of magic but in the ability of the Jews to apply their sovereignty and turn their nation state into a concrete example of a just and merciful kingdom. In other words, Judaism suggests that if you’re going to live up to your calling and set a moral example, you do it not by shuffling off this mortal coil and declaring yourself too pure for the imperfect and compromise-ridden business of government, but by jumping right in and serving as an example of how a real nation addresses real problems right here in the real world."

These two articles bring into focus the main issues of religious nationalism. Does religion need state power to show its relevance? Does religion want to establish a just and merciful society or a just and merciful kingdom or one is a mean to reach the other? A just and merciful kingdom governed by divine laws should attract more adherents but religious states have usually resulted in persecution of religious minorities, so potential adherents have been lost forever than gained. How do we reconcile it with the idea of religious state being a 'moral example'? 

US Jews less committed to Israel because of their religiosity or because of Israel's politics

Recently, Pew released report of the American Jewry A Portrait of Jewish Americans. The following infographic details some of the important stats in the report.

This report also surveyed Jewish Americans' support for Israel

Benjamin Barer (Jewish Intermarriage and Israel) discusses one claim made by eminent Jewish sociologist Steven Cohen on the basis of above stats showing support of Israel in various groups of Jewish Americans. Cohen claimed that if more Jewish children are raised in homes with two Jewish parents than the support of Israel would be more widespread.

Barer argues that the support of Israel may not be based on religiosity (i.e. more religious Jews are more supportive of Israel), linking it with homes with two Jewish parents. It may be linked to Israeli politics or how the Israeli state acts. As a committed Jew, planing to become s rabbi, he contends

In this case, we (younger, committed Jews) need to get the message across that there are other reasons why we -- not only 'cultural Jews' or 'Jews of no religion' -- are seen to have lessened (or abandoned) our attachment to Israel. Prime among them is that we do not define engagement with Israel purely as support for Israel. We know that critiquing Israel is a necessary, if sometimes difficult, part of forming and maintaining a robust relationship with a country that speaks in our name. Thus, when we see Israel acting -- politically and religiously -- in ways that we do not believe serve Israel's or Judaism's best interests, we feel inclined to speak out. Simply decreasing the rate of intermarriage among the next generation of Jews will not fix this problem. Talking about Israel, and the ideals that we hope it to embody, might.

Barer argument is valid but Cohen is also correct. Jewish Americans are less now less ready to support Israel no matter what it does, even when it ignores Jewish values. However, unconditional support is still more prevalent and likely to be more prevalent in religious Jews because probably they are more aware of Jewish history and feel more strongly about Israel's claim on the land. And so they are ready to ignore Israel's injustices in view of the centuries of injustice Jews have faced and do not think Palestinians have much right over the West Bank and Gaza.

Hence, there will be more people like Barer in future but they will still be a minority in the religious Jews group.

Is studying religion a service to the state? Will the 'praying division' of the Israeli military disband?

Studying religion may be accorded as much importance as military service in states based on religious nationalism. At the time of Israel's formation, to unify all groups behind the national cause, the secular political leadership made a deal with the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish (Haredi) leadership under which Haredi religious students, studying Torah, would be temporarily exempted from the compulsory military service. The special arrangement came to be known as Torato Omanuto arrangement. 

This arrangement was not an issue when the number of yeshiva (religious school) students asking for exemption using this arrangement was small. However, when the number grew almost exponentially (from less than a thousand in 1968 to more than forty thousand in 2005), secular and other Jewish religious groups started complaining. A case was filed against the exemption in the 1990s. The court decided that the arrangement was illegal as it had only been based on the orders of a defense minister. A law had to be passed to continue Torato Omanuto arrangement.

Students at Jerusalem’s Mir Yeshiva, the largest Jewish seminary in Israel

Source: Jerusalem - Israel Finance Ministry Cuts Yeshiva Funds After Court Ruling, Angers Ultra-Orthodox Jews

Israeli government formed a committee in 1999 under former Supreme Court Justice Tzvi Tal to come up with an agreed version of a bill that would be passed by the Knesset. Report of Tal committee resulted in Tal law (Deferral of Military Service for Yeshiva Students Law) which had to be renewed after every five years. Under this law, getting exemption became a bit more difficult and Israeli military (IDF) was asked to increase the number of Orthodox units (units where certain military rules are relaxed to ease the sensibilities of religious Jews) to make it easier for yeshiva students to serve. However, it did not result in much change and yeshiva students continued to avoid enlistment in large numbers as before. Although government admitted to the Supreme Court that there was a very small increase in enlistments by yeshiva students, it extended the law in 2007. The situation did not improve even after efforts by government and in 2012 the court declared Tal law unconstitutional. Prime Minister Netanyahu tried halfheartedly to come up with a compromise and a new law but talks failed and Knesset was dissolved. 

After the elections, Netanyahu formed a new government in March 2013 without ultra-religious parties and promised equal burden-sharing arrangement but due to the pressure of right wing parties from outside and conservative members of his own party, there was no progress on the issue. It was in these circumstances that court issued an interim injunction in February 2014 to compel the government to act by freezing part of the funding to yeshiva students and questioning the authority of the defense minister to keep issuing exemptions (Funding cuts for Haredi draft-dodgers finally puts an end to Knesset foot-dragging).

This issue brings into focus the Jewish character of Israeli nationalism. Yeshiva students claim to be doing at least as important national service (keeping Jewish tradition alive and praying for the Israeli people) as military personnel and they have been called 'praying division' of the Israeli military. Obviously, yeshiva students and their supporters believe in Jewish nationalism and are enraged at the attempts of other Israelis to belittle Torah study. Other Israelis, however, find it difficult to understand why yeshiva students would not bear an equal burden in the defense of a state in which they (yeshiva students) have such a privileged position.

It is important to note, however, that despite the reluctance of ultra-orthodox Jews to join the Israeli military, the Israeli military is gradually becoming more religious as there are many types of religious Jews in Israel. Most of the new recruits come from the settlements and are very religious. The Israeli governments and military have given various concessions to the religious sections of the society (such as some segregation of sexes in the military, separate units etc) and later have enlisted in large numbers. This development has implications for future peace with Palestinians as many 'settler-soldiers' join the military not to defend national boundaries of Israel but the biblical boundaries of Israel and Biblical Israel included the West Bank, Gaza, and other areas. The refusal of many Israeli soldiers to uproot settlers from Gaza in 2005 is an indicator of what problems Israel can face, if Israel makes a peace deal with the Palestinians and agrees to withdraw from these areas.