Military and Populism: A Global Tour with a Special Emphasis on the Case of Pakistan

 Pakistan army chief General Qamar Bajwa and Prime Minister Imran Khan in Miranshah

Source: Khyber TV

Abstract

Although populism has become a focus of research in the last decade, there hasn’t been much academic work on how militaries around the world have reacted/acted to the rise of populist leaders. There is some timeworn research on the relationship of militaries in Latin America with various left-wing populist governments and leaders from the 1930s to 1970s. Given that populism was largely understood in the context of left-wing politics, with the rise of right-wing populism, the literature on the military and populism needs to be advanced by studying the relationship between right-wing populism and the military. This article aims to address this gap by looking at the right-wing populism case study of Pakistan, where the military has actively participated in the rise of a religious populist leader. To situate the case study within the larger literature of the military and populism, the dynamics and history of military associations with populism and populist leaders are revisited in the article’s first part.

The article can be read at European Center for Populism Studies

Role of non-religious parties in Islamization of Pakistan

Nadeem Farooq Piracha (NFP) has written a very detailed and excellent article on non-religious parties' role in Islamization of the government (Role of non-religious parties in fanning religious extremism). He calls it "fanning religious extremism" but the examples he gave and the speeches he cited cannot all be termed as religious extremism. NFP starts with the 1953 Ahmadi riots in Punjab that were covertly supported or encouraged by the then Chief Minister Mumtaz Daultana, who was not religious but wanted to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Others have argued that this instrumentalization of Islam for political ends in Pakistan much earlier than 1953. Some scholars point towards the passage of Objectives Resolution in March 1949 as the first instance of using Islam for political ends by non-religious parties and non-practicing leaders. Most Indian scholars, of course, term the whole independence movement of Pakistan as an example of using Islam to fan division, hatred, and communalism, all for mundane political objectives. 

The "selling of religion for political ends," as Pakistan's first President Iskander Mirza termed it while abrogating Pakistan's first (1956) constitution, continues unabated from 1953 onwards. General Ayub's tenure (1958-69) is considered by many as the apex of Islamic modernism. The article also hints at agreeing with this idea especially before 1965. However, digging a little deep, one can see that Ayub was not really against using Islam for his own political ends. Islamic modernism was employed by Ayub Khan to promote the development agenda of his regime. The fact that he included, not one (as in the 1956 Constitution) but two constitutional bodies to research on Islamic history, law, philosophy, etc., and to advise the government in the 1962 Constitution (articles 199 to 207) bespeaks of his willingness to instrumentalize Islam. We can agree that Ayub was not fanning extremism but he was also instrumentalizing Islam. Bengalis would also point out to his using of Islam to denigrate them and to deny them their political, democratic, and civil rights in Pakistan. Ayub infamously wrote in his book, Friends, Not Masters, "In addition, they [East Pakistanis] have been and still are under Hindu cultural and linguistic influence." Inferior Muslims (Bengalis) were, of course, not allowed to rule superior Muslims (West Pakistanis), even if the inferior ones are in majority. 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's story of caving in to religious parties or his unfortunate attempt to steal their thunder is often told as a modern-day replication of a Greek tragedy. Bhutto is proclaimed as a non-religious hero, who started with a secular vision, but was eventually defeated by the nefarious Islamist forces. The reality is, as always, more complex. Bhutto did pay homage to religious sentiment from the start, much before he came to power. The slogan of "Islamic socialism" was used by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Bhutto himself during the 1970 election campaign. Furthermore, as NFP informs in his article, Bhutto was forced to adopt religious clauses in the new 1973 Constitution and later other Islamization measures, including declaring Ahmadis non-Muslim, not only by the religious parties but also by non-religious parties which allied with religious parties in order to dent Bhutto's popularity and defeat him.

Source: Role of non-religious parties in fanning religious extremism

The 1990s saw Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League led the charge towards Islamization. Islam was used to browbeat and defeat PPP. Not surprisingly, the name of the opposition alliance, cobbled together by the military and led by Sharif, was Islami Jamhori Ittihad (Islamic Democratic Alliance). Benazir was portrayed as Western and not truly Muslim. She was linked with India and Israel.

After the restoration of democracy in 2008, using Islam for political purposes by the non-religious parties declined a bit. However, this changed when the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, and many other parties decided to support religious parties protest against an amendment in the Finality of Prophethood declaration by the electoral candidates. The PTI continued to smear Sharif, even after the amendment was taken back and the law minister resigned, of not really believing in the finality of prophethood. In addition to the help of the military, this usage of Islam to defame its opponent was crucial in its win in Punjab.

Hence, NFP is right. Non-religious parties have been using Islam to get a political or electoral advantage. The million-dollar question is why they are doing it? And why they have succeeded at least in some cases? Is it because of Pakistan's religious nationalism?

Pakistani deep state again using Islamists?

Though religious nationalism was, for a large part, responsible for the creation of Pakistan, Pakistan has seen ebbs and flows of religious nationalism. For instance, Pakistani state tried to limit religious nationalism to symbolism in the early part of Pakistani history. The leadership, like in many other Muslim-majority countries, was generally secular and did not want religious law implemented in Pakistan. 

However, after the separation of East Pakistan, the state leadership decided to use Islam. The instrumentalization of Islam led to Islamization in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The main culprit in this area was General Zia who used Islamists to kill, maim and threaten the democrats. The militancy he introduced and the violence he allowed the Islamists to do, both inside and outside Pakistan, was unmatchable. He not only changed the society but also the military (he is the longest-serving chief of Pakistan Army, from 1976-88), making it more religious and adept at using Islamists for achieving their institutional objectives. 

One of Pakistan military's main institutional objectives is to control Pakistan's defense and foreign policies and intervene in any other area they like until Pakistani democrats are mature (notwithstanding its own efforts to not let the politicians attain maturity). Two other institutional objectives are keeping the Kashmir issue alive and working for a friendly government in Afghanistan. For all these objectives, Islamists come in handy. Because Islamists have difficulty collectively winning more than 10% of popular elections, they do not like democracy and are usually ready to destabilize democratically elected governments. Two examples of such destabilizations are in 1977 and 1996. Not surprisingly, they are also ready to support the military-led governments to implement their agenda as coming to power through the ballot box is a long shot dream. They supported both General Zia and General Musharraf martial laws and were rewarded with unprecedented power. Islamists also share Pakistani military's suspicions about India and think that "Hindu" India and "Muslim" Pakistan can never be friends. Both of them want India out of Kashmir. Therefore, Islamists are used by the Pakistani military to create problems for India in Indian-held Kashmir. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the interests of the Pakistani military and Islamists are aligned. The Pakistani military wants a friendly government, which accommodates Pashtuns. Islamists want the Taliban in power who are mostly Pashtuns. The Taliban are also against "Hindu" India, like the Pakistani military. 

Currently, Pakistan is going through another period of visible civil-military tensions. Both the civilian government and the military are looking for allies and support. When the military started its military operation, Zarb-e-Azb,  against militant Islamists in June 2014, there was a hope that the more than three decades old alliance between the military and the Islamists have finally been broken. This notion gained strength after the Army Public School massacre in which around 150 children died at the hand of Islamist militants in a military-managed school. However, currently, it appears that military has again decided to use Islamists to destabilize/defeat the civilian government. What has changed is that along with the old Islamists, the military is now working with some newly created or refurbished Islamist outfits. 

Milli Muslim League (MML) is the latest incarnation of the Jamat-ud-Dawa (JD) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). It is a new political party. Its creation was announced in August 2017. Ostensibly, the reason for the creation of this new party is to make Pakistan a real Islamic state. The MML president Saifullah Khalid said to the reporters on the MML launch, “We have decided to make a new political party, so that Pakistan is made a real Islamic and welfare state” (See JuD launches political party to contest upcoming polls).

The creation of the MML, however, also serves two objectives, both close to the heart of Pakistan's military. First, it promotes the legitimization of the JD and LeT as a legitimate political party and decreases pressure on Pakistan to ban all its activities. Second, it divides the vote bank of PML(N) which is the ruling party as well as leading center-right party in Pakistan and which is currently in a tussle with the military for civilian ascendency.

Poster of Milli Muslim League clearly showing the picture of Hafiz Saeed

Source: Ibcurdu.com

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan (TLP) is a sign of increasing Barelavi militancy. In Pakistan's history, Deobandis have long been linked with extremism and militancy but Barelvis, which also follow Imam Abu Hanifa and hence belong to the same Hanafi sect as Deobandi Muslims, were considered to be more mellow, syncretic, acquiescent and peaceful. Barelvis were thought to be folkish, believers in local spirits and saints and less interested in power as compared to Deobandis, who were considered dogmatic, believers in high religion and interested in implementing Sharia. This is, of course, a general description and at the individual level, there were always militant Barelvis as well as amenable Deobandis in Pakistan.

Barelvi militancy showed its strength in the anti-Ahmadi movement in the 1950s and then again reared its head in the mid-1970s when anti-Ahmadi movement 2.0 was in full swing. However, with the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslim, the militancy again decreased. The third resurgence of Brelavi militancy was mostly concentrated in and around Karachi in the 1990s. The organization leading it was Sunni Tehrik or Sunni Tehreek. The ST, which was recently renamed the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek, was formed in 1990 to prevent the mosques and madrasas of the Barelvi school of thought in Karachi from being “captured” by Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups.

Analysts believe Barelvi groups; especially the ST, have started politically exploiting the issue of blasphemy and the execution of Qadri has provided them with an opportunity to show their strength to counter the growing influence of Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups in the country. The ST's slogan was ‘Tauheen rasalat ki ek saza, sar tan se juda."(See Ditching the tag of mysticism, Barelvi militancy rears head in form of Sunni Tehreek).

The TLP is a new Islamist political party but is very similar to the ST. It has made its name for inciting violence and promoting militancy. The TLP claims on its website that it will work to make Pakistan an Islamic state through gradual and legal struggle:

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan also known as TLP is an Islamist political party. Its objective is to make Pakistan an Islamic state, governed by Shariat e Mohammadi, through a gradual legal, and political process. (See TLP website)

But its actions and statements belie such claims. The TLP was formed in 2015 in Karachi but gained support in 2016 after the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri, who had killed Punjab province's governor in 2011. Since then, it has been involved in protests, rallies and sit-ins, the most famous of which was in front of parliament (Who is leading this sit-in?)  in March 2016. Another of their rallies, in January 2017, disrupted traffic in Lahore.

TLP poster/banner

Source: Tehreek Labbaik Official (facebook page)

The nexus of military intelligence agencies and the TLP or Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasoolullah appears to have formed or strengthened after the disappearance of five bloggers in January 2017. These bloggers were liberal men who were critical of religious extremism and military's involvement in the political affairs of Pakistan. They were not involved in any kind of blasphemous activities. However, when they were picked up by the security/intelligence agencies, they were decried on the social media as anti-Islam bloggers who also wrote or promoted blasphemous ideas/writings. The abductors find it convenient to link the bloggers with blasphemy as in Pakistan, more than sixty people, who were accused of blasphemy, have been killed by vigilantes. Once one is accused of blasphemy in Pakistan, one is a sitting duck. As expected, the TLP immediately came out in support of jailing or killing bloggers. The chastened bloggers were released after a few weeks but the secret alliance of military with TLP appears to become closer. In recent elections, there were reports that TLP candidates were supported by the intelligence agencies. At present, in November 2017, the TLP has again resorted to "dharna politics" and have cut-off one part of Islamabad from the other for the last ten days.

Why street protests work in Pakistan?

Daniel Markey recently wrote an article on the success of street protests in Pakistan?' (See Why street protests work in Pakistan?). His main arguments is that democratically elected leaders in Pakistan face such protests not only because they face very difficult challenges and weak political institutionalization but also because of their own tendencies to centralize power.

By rights, however, Sharif (and Zardari before him) should not face such a high deficit of popular legitimacy as the one that loomed over Musharraf's tenure. Whatever the flaws of national elections in 2008 and 2013, they were better than what came before, or at least no worse. It is hard to accept that the motivating energy behind the latest round of protests is truly a consequence of voting irregularities. No, today's opposition leaders Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri are opportunistically latching on to whatever charges can be leveled against Prime Minister Sharif and company. Vote rigging, like corruption, is a perennially effective club to wield against most Pakistani politicians and their parties. 

Part of Sharif's present vulnerability to popular protests can be explained by his own policy missteps that have dissipated enthusiasm for his rule. His dealings with the army, for instance, have been rife with tensions over the Musharraf case and the timing of negotiations and military operations against the TTP. In addition, although Pakistan's economy is no worse off than it was before Sharif assumed office (and by many measures, it is probably stronger), the common Pakistani has seen little material benefit. To be fair, even the best schemes for new power plants and Chinese-financed infrastructure cannot be realized overnight, but decades of unfulfilled promises by Pakistani politicians have jaded the public. The summertime heat and persistent power outages undercut Sharif's appeal as a can-do businessman, his calling card in the last election. 

 Yet lots of democracies face setbacks; the anti-incumbent theme of "throwing the bums out" is a universal rallying cry. In countries where democratic institutions are firmly entrenched, however, opposition parties work through parliamentary and electoral systems to accomplish those ends. It is primarily in democratic systems where institutions are weak and ineffective that unconventional forms of political participation, like street protests, are the norm. At least, this is the principal finding of an insightful political analysis comparing democratic states across Latin America by the Inter-American Development Bank in 2009.

By this logic, Nawaz Sharif's main failing -- the one that makes him most vulnerable to street protest today -- is his lack of investment in the institutionalization of democratic politics. That deficit is indeed glaring. Sharif's critics are right to chastise his do-nothing parliament and hyper-centralization of political authority in the hands of a tiny group of cronies.

I argued in my comments that what Markey is saying is right but the role of Pakistan's military cannot be ignored. It is one of the main reasons why such protests (with proportionally very small number of people) succeed:

A more pertinent question is why such SMALL street protests work in Pakistan. The current protest marchers in Islamabad  are around fifty thousand. Pakistan's population is more than 180 million. So, the question is why 0.003% of population can topple a government. Governing through parliament is important and there is no doubt that Nawaz Sharif' has centralized power but many other world leaders have a similarly centralized power and faced big protests and still continue to rule. Two prominent examples are Erdogan and Putin. Both these leaders have a centralized style of governance and faced proportionally bigger protests but still continue to rule. 

It is true that in countries where democratic institutionalization is weak, unconventional forms of political participation (e.g.  street protests) are the norm but do they topple governments? A pertinent example in that of Mexico where in 2006, there were large protests against vote rigging, similar to what is happening in Pakistan now. What was the end result? The Mexican government patiently waited and eventually protests ended.
There is also no need to resort to ruthless force as the Mexican example shows. Protesters in Mexico city camped for months. Pakistani government has to just wait and there is every reason to believe that Imran Khan supporters (who have a more valid case for protest) would fizzle out.
So, why Pakistani government is worried? The answer is history of military involvement in politics and the perception in Pakistan that military is not happy with Nawaz Sharif. This perception of military's displeasure emboldens Sharif's opponents and makes many others to hedge their bets or go against Sharif to protect their interests. For example, most of the news channels in Pakistan report news with a clear bias against Sharif government. They hardly question the legitimacy of having 0.003% of people demanding dissolution of national assembly, using undemocratic means.
Perhaps looking at Turkey in 1997 and in 2013 will clarify my contention. In 1997, a democratically elected government was toppled one year after being elected only by a memorandum by the Turkish military. In 2013, a democratically elected but much more centralized (and maybe more corrupt too) are not toppled. The main difference in 1997 and 2103 was the absence of military's political power in 2013.