Jewish Civilizationism in Israel

 My article "Jewish Civilizationism in Israel: A Unique Phenomenon" as published in Religions journal in February 2023.

Abstract:

Populism and civilizationism have transformed the politics of many countries. Many scholars consider them the biggest challenges to democracy since the rise of fascism and communism in the first half of the last century. The close affinity between populism, civilizationism, and rightwing politics has also been analyzed and recognized in many countries from Turkey to India to the US. However, there are three areas that distinguish the appearance of civilizationism in Israel. First, in contrast to many other countries, civilizationism in Israel is not a new phenomenon. It has been an essential part of Israeli nationalism or Zionism since the early 20th century. Second, unlike many countries, Jewish civilizationism in Israel is an article of faith for all major Israeli political parties. It is not a slogan raised only by the rightwing, conservative part of the political spectrum. Finally, one observes an affinity between civilizationism and populism. Civilizational rhetoric is the mainstay of populist leaders, such as Trump, Erdogan, etc. In Israel, populism and civilizationism have no special relationship as civilizationism is mainstream politics. All politicians, populists and non-populists, have to pay homage to Jewish civilizationism; otherwise, they will not succeed. This paper analyzes the Israeli founding fathers’ statements, the Declaration of Independence, Israeli state symbols, the revival of the Hebrew language, the Law of Return, the first debate in the Knesset, and the more recent Nation-State Law to demonstrate how Jewish civilizationism is old, mainstream, and not exclusively populist.

Article

Recent years have seen a rise in civilizational rhetoric in several democratic societies across different continents. In April 2022, Turkish President Erdogan inaugurated the Islamic Civilizations Museum in Istanbul to showcase the versatility and superiority of Islamic civilization (Daily Sabah 2022). In November 2022, Jordan Bardella won the presidential election of the rightwing National Rally party, replacing Marine Le Pen, promising to defend French civilization (Associated Press 2022). In December 2022, Modi said, “India was the most refined idea of human civilisation, the most natural voice of humanity” (The Statesman 2022). While the focus of nationalism is territorial, the civilizational rhetoric prioritizes defending or saving a civilization based on religion, not a state. The state is considered a single manifestation of civilization that spans many territories and millennia. Both rightwing and leftwing populist leaders have used this rhetoric to win voters and elections by denouncing liberalism and established mainstream parties. For instance, in Europe, numerous rightwing populist European parties and leaders have fought and won elections based on the argument that Christian civilization or Judeo-Christian civilization and traditions are under threat from Islam, Muslims, and other refugees that do not belong to the White Christian civilization (Yilmaz and Morieson 2021; Ozzano and Bolzonar 2020; Brubaker 2016; Kaya and Tecmen 2019; Marchetti et al. 2022).

Yilmaz and Morieson (2022) have identified civilizationism as another thick ideology that populism, a thin ideology, attaches to itself to give itself a solid defensible argument. They define civilizationism in the following way:

Civilizationism is an idea which posits that the world and its peoples can be divided into several ‘civilizations’, most of them defined by religion. Adhered to populism, civilizationism defines self and other not primarily in national terms, but civilizational terms...

This article focuses on Jewish civilizationism in the state of Israel. Three aspects distinguish Israel from most other countries where civilizational rhetoric and politics have been successful. First, in most of the other countries, such as in the United States, Turkey, India, and Poland, civilizationism, linked with religion, was until a few decades ago a fringe phenomenon (Saleem 2023). Scholars link it primarily to the 21st century. This might be the case for other countries but, as this chapter will show, Israeli civilizationism is mainstream and as old as the Israeli state, if not older. Israeli nationalism or Zionism is based on Jewish civilizationism. From the First Zionist Congress in 1897 to the Nation-State Law passed in 2018, Jewish civilizationism has monopolized Israeli nationalism and defeated attempts by many Israeli scholars and leaders to make Israel a state honoring the histories and lives of all its citizens equally.

Second, in numerous countries, civilizationism is closely associated with rightwing nationalism and populism. It is the rightwing parties and movements that have raised the flag of civilizationism, and they are its key torch bearers. Whether it is the Republican Party in the US, the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, or the Bharatiya Janata Party in India, the rightwing conservatives spread religio-civilizational rhetoric and are the most impressed by it. This is not the case in Israel. It was the socialist, broadly secular leftwingers that raised the flag of Jewish civilizationism and created the state of Israel. Even after the creation of Israel, the broadly leftwing parties ruled Israel for thirty years and kept Jewish civilizationism alive.

Finally, when one studies other country cases, one observes an affinity between civilizationism and populism. Civilizational rhetoric is primarily the mainstay of populist leaders. Civilizationism has played a key role in making such leaders win elections and dominate the political arena. Erdogan and Modi, two populist leaders, have used civilizationism to completely change the politics of their countries. Now, even the opposition parties in Turkey and India have to resort to civilizational rhetoric to prove their authenticity. Populist leaders instrumentalize religion and religious identity to create a sense of fear that the national culture and identity are civilizational, and that it is under attack by people from foreign civilizations living not only outside the state but also inside the state. In Israel, this exclusive affinity between populism and civilizationism breaks down. As Jewish civilizationism is not limited to the left wing or right wing, similarly, it is not limited to populist or mainstream politics. Jewish civilizationism is Israeli nationalism as propagated by the state, and rejecting it means rejecting the basis of the state. Therefore, no political party, populist or non-populist, can succeed in Israel without bowing to this altar.

The rest of the article can be read here.

Vaccine for Holocaust survivors living in other countries but not for Arab Israelis & Palestinians living under Israeli occupation?

Israel is planning to provide Coronavirus vaccine shots to Holocaust survivors living anywhere in the world. Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Omer Yankelevich on 12th January announced this new policy. Erin Ben-Moshe in her article Israel explores plan to provide free vaccines to Holocaust survivors worldwide reports Yankelevich's statement:

“During this global crisis, we have an opportunity to support Holocaust survivors whose resilience continues to guide and inspire humanity today,” said Yankelevich. “It is our collective obligation to safeguard this treasured yet vulnerable population in the spirit of mutual responsibility.”

“Now is the time for all of us, Jewish institutions and leaders from across the world, to come together in this operation,” she said. “Together, we can ensure that Holocaust survivors are efficiently vaccinated, wherever they live.”

However, Ben-Moshe also informs that there are no definite plans yet on how to manage vaccination of around 130,000 Holocaust survivors outside Israel (around 200,000 are Israelis):

As of now, there is no definite plan to finance and manage the vaccination project, including the involvement of Jewish philanthropic networks. Solutions for other expected hurdles, such as obtaining permits from foreign governments and the purchase of vaccines by the ministry, are also being examined. The statement also notes that vaccines for this initiative will be acquired separately and in addition to Israel’s current supply.

Nathan Jeffay in his The Times of Israel article, Israeli group sparks debate with plans to vaccinate world’s Holocaust survivors, has collated other questions raised about this scheme. The first objection is from the agency that is supposed to distribute the vaccine:

Shalom Corps was set up a few months ago by Israel’s Diaspora Affairs Ministry and the Jewish Agency. While Diaspora Affairs Minister Omer Yankelevich has waxed lyrical about the plan, the Jewish Agency only learned about it through the media, and has not echoed her enthusiasm.

“It’s quite an undertaking,” a Jewish Agency spokeswoman told The Times of Israel on Wednesday. “We weren’t aware of it and haven’t had a chance to properly look into whether it’s feasible.”

Haaretz cited an anonymous source familiar with the Jewish Agency’s reaction saying that officials in the organization were “shocked” and “outraged” when they saw a story on the idea, which they called “abhorrent.”

 

... the source who spoke to Haaretz regarding discussions in the Jewish Agency said it would be “unfeasible, illegal, immoral, diplomatically disastrous and an absolute impossibility” to interfere with the way individual countries distribute vaccines by creating special provision for Jewish Holocaust survivors.

Strict regulations, which vary from country to country, govern medical procedures, and while experts say some do permit private vaccination for select individuals, the plan could run into legal issues in other jurisdictions.

While Israel is planning to vaccinate Holocaust survivors that are citizens of other countries and most of them are most likely vaccinated by their governments in the next few months (most of the Holocaust survivors live in the rich Western countries, which have advanced health systems and already secured large amounts of vaccine doses, and are prioritizing vaccination of their older population, which also includes Holocaust survivors), it has shown far less concern about Palestinians under its occupation or even its own Arab Israeli population:

In the midst of the fanfare surrounding Israel’s vaccine campaign, Palestinian activists and rights groups have criticized Israel for not offering the vaccine to the millions of Palestinians living under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. 

Under Article 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is required as an occupier to “ensure the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics” — in this case, the COVID-19 vaccine. 

Israel has deflected such criticisms, saying the obligation to vaccinate Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza lies in the hands of the Palestinian Authority (PA). 

Meanwhile, Israeli leaders insist that they are vaccinating all Israeli citizens, regardless of race or ethnicity, equally and fairly — including the state’s 2 million Palestinian citizens. 

But that just might not be true, human rights advocates have pointed out. 

While Palestinians citizens of Israel qualify, just as Jewish Israelis do, to receive the vaccine and would not be turned back at a clinic simply because they are Palestinian, rights groups are claiming that there are other sinister mechanisms of discrimination at work when it comes to Israel and its distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. 

Adalah — The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel has slammed Israel’s emergency medical service for failing to provide vital COVID-19 information, including facts relating to the vaccine, available in Arabic. 

The website of Magen David Adom (MDA), the emergency service responsible for informing the Israeli citizenry on everything from COVID-19 guidelines and updates, how and where to get tested, and vital information regarding the vaccine, currently only provides information and updates in Hebrew and English.

This, Adalah says, is unacceptable, and marginalizes millions of Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up 20% of the population and primarily speak Arabic. 

“In Israel, Magen David Adom is basically the equivalent of the Red Cross,” Adalah attorney Sawsan Zaher told Mondoweiss. “All of the essential information that they provide is not available at all in Arabic.”

Zaher told Mondoweiss that she believes, as someone who has been documenting and fighting against discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel for years, the failure to provide vital information regarding COVID-19 and the vaccine in Arabic is “not a coincidence.”

“There is a policy of systematic racial discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel,” Zaher said, and the failure of official bodies like MDA to cater to all citizens is just one small example of that policy. 

Zaher pointed to Israel’s 2018 Nation State Law, which among other provisions declared that only Jews have the right to self-determination, as a template for discrimination against Palestinians “on all levels.”

“Having the Jewish Nation State Basic Law… which stated that Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people, excluded the Palestinian citizenry from the preamble and the definition of who the citizens are,” Zaher said.

“This exclusion is providing constitutional legitimacy to discrimination of Palestinians on all levels,” she said, including, for example, “not providing a very important website in Arabic which is vital.

“Unfortunately this [discrimination] is seen not only on high level policies, but basic policies and decisions like providing information in Arabic or making sure all campaigns on COVID-19 awareness are provided equally in Palestinians and Arab towns,” Zaher said. 

The implications of not having accurate COVID-19 information in Arabic are potentially devastating and far-reaching for Palestinian communities in Israel, where reports have indicated widespread misinformation regarding the virus and the vaccine. 

With no official Arabic-language platforms to educate people on the vaccine and combat existing misinformation, advocates fear that it could lead to significant cases of Palestinians in Israel refusing to get vaccinated, therefore putting the community at greater risk. 

The implications of such discriminatory practices when it comes to the coronavirus, Zaher says, are “a matter of life and death.” (Israel says vaccine equally available to all citizens. But is that really the case?)

March 2021 Israeli elections and "fifty shades of right"

Israel is going to have its fourth national Knesset elections in two years in March 2021. Whether this election will result in a stable government is anybody's guess. However, one thing is certain, rightwing will dominate the Knesset and the new government, irrespective of how long they last. This will be a case of "fifty shades of right." This means that any meaningful solution to the Israel-Palestine issue is unlikely, to say the least.

Following are excerpts from my article Upcoming Israeli elections and its impact on Palestinians published in Naya Daur: 

National elections will be held in Israel in March 2021 and these elections will again be dominated by the rightwing, making a solution of the Palestinian issue unlikely or impossible. This article unpacks why Israel is having the fourth national election in two years. Later, it analyzes the politics of various rightwing leaders and parties regarding the Palestinian issue to see whether this election can lead to a solution to the Israel-Palestine conundrum...

Today, Israel’s political space is dominated by rightwing parties, which Eran Globus’s an Israeli analyst termed, “fifty shades of right.”  The major rightwing party is the Likud party. It has been in government since 2009, with Netanyahu as PM. This party is expected to win the most seats (28 or 29) in the coming elections. Most of the rightwing parties, except religious parties, have come out of Likud as their leaders have been part of Likud and served in Netanyahu administrations. The most recent and the most important breakaway party is called “New Hope” and is led by Gideon Sa’ar, who until last month was a Likud member for 17 years and was Netanyahu’s Minister of Education (2009- 13) and Minister of Interior (2013-14). New Hope is expected to win the second largest number of seats (17 or 18) in the Knesset.

 Source: hk3.news

 

Yamina, the party/coalition that is expected to win the third largest number of seats (between 12 and 14) is again led by someone who was tutored by Netanyahu for a number of years. Nafteli Bennet entered politics in 2006 as Chief of Staff to the then Leader of Opposition Netanyahu and served him until 2008. He then served as leader of an Israeli settler organization before forming his own political party and remained minister with different portfolios in Netanyahu-led governments.

 

Two key religious parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, expected to win seven or eight seats each, are also loyal allies of Netanyahu and are likely to support him in forming the next coalition government. Shas represents the Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewish people (from Middle Eastern and North African countries) while the United Torah Judaism represents Ashkenazi Jewish people (from European countries). While most of the supporters of these parties are Ultra-orthodox religious Jewish, some modern orthodox and secular Jewish people also support them.

 

Next, we have Yisrael Beytenu, a party led by Avigdor Lieberman, another Netanyahu protégé.  From 1993 to 1996, when Netanyahu was the party leader, Lieberman served as Director-General of the Likud. After the Likud party won the election and Netanyahu was the Prime Minister, Lieberman became the Director-General of the PM's Office for a year (1996-97). In 1999, he formed his own party, Yisrael Beytenu, and has been part of numerous rightwing governments under Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Netanyahu. Yisrael Beytenu is expected to win five or six seats in March. As the table below shows, the rightwing is going to dominate the March 2021 elections winning between 76 and 82 of the total 120 Knesset seats.

 

 

Public Opinion Polls for March 2021 elections: Expected number of seats

Party	Minimum	Maximum
Likud	28	29
New Hope	17	18
Yamina	12	14
Shas	7	8
United Torah Judaism	7	7
Yisrael Beytenu	5	6
Total Rightwing seats	76	82

 

 

Many people think that Netanyahu is the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East. It might be true in the past but now there are numerous obstacles to peace. The leadership of all the parties discussed above has at various times opposed giving any concessions to the Palestinians. Lieberman resigned numerous times whenever even a small concession was given to the Palestinians. He was dismissed by PM Sharon for his harsh opposition to Gaza disengagement in 2004 and resigned in 2008 for resuming peace talks with Palestinians and again in 2018 for ending the brutal Gaza War. He has also given many statements against Palestinians and Israeli Arabs which were considered racist by many analysts. Bennet, the leader of the Yamina party, as mentioned above, served as leader of an Israeli settler organization and has been opposed to a Palestinian state and to the freezing or uprooting of illegal Jewish settlements. Similarly, Gideon Sa’ar of the New Hope party has always been to the right of Netanyahu. He has been a recalcitrant opponent of the two-state solution (calling it once a two-state illusion) and has shown an inability to show genuine concern for Palestinian rights. Religious parties, Shas and United Judaism, do not have a clear policy on the two-state solution but are against the division of Jerusalem and the freezing of Israeli settlements, making them unlikely partners in a peace deal.

 

The discussion above clearly shows that the new Israeli government will not be supportive of the two-state solution, so the ordeal of the Palestinians is, unfortunately, going to continue. The election campaign will force these parties to move more to the right to outflank each other, resulting in extreme and intransigent positions regarding a Palestinian state. 

Israel: An Ethnocracy or Democracy? Can a Zionist state be a democratic state?

Judaism is a religion, Zionism is a political ideology. As anti-Zionism is increasingly being equated with anti-Semitism, there is a need to analyze these terms in the historical context and how they are being used today. The implications of how these terms are defined are not only limited to Israelis, Palestinians, or people in the Middle East but also to Jewish people living all over the world and their relationship with the majorities in the countries they live in. Richard Silverstein, in his famous blog, Tikun Olam, discusses in detail Zionism, Isreali democracy, BDS, fascism, Holocaust, white supremism links with Judeo-supremism, BLM-Jewish relations, etc. Some excerpts of blog are reproduced below (Entire blog can be accessed Conflating Judaism and Zoinism: Bad New for Jews):

Often arguments over political or religious terms used in everyday discourse are dry or the province purely of zealots.  But these terms can develop a power all their own. Religious or political azealots take them to heart and make life and death decisions based on their interpretation. This is the case regarding  Judaism and Zionism.

Israel’s founding document and sacred text of Zionism, the Declaration of Independence, defined the state as “Jewish” and inextricably tied to the Diaspora, which was anticipated to ensure its future by furnishing much of its immigrant population. Later in 1985, Israel’s Basic Law added the term “democratic,” thus yoking the two words inextricably.

After 1977, and the ascendancy of the far-right Likud and other ultra-nationalist parties, the unresolvable tension between “Jewish” and “democratic” become clear.  They paid lip-service to Israel’s democracy and embraced the supremacy of Israeli Jews.  Passage in 2018 of the nation-state law as a Basic Law enshrined the notion of Judeo-supremacy. It also defined with solemn permanence the subjugation of Palestinian citizens of Israel.But the seeds of Israeli racism were there from the state’s  inception. It was not democratic because it did not offer non-Jewish citizens equal rights.  In fact, Palestinians lived under martial law from 1948-1966.

Israel offered Jewish citizens superior rights, the definition of an ethnocracy.  That is, a nation in which the majority ethnic or religious group enjoys a set of rights which the minority is denied.  This phenomenon was strengthened after 1967, when the settler movement became a de facto form of Judeo-supremacy. Its original focus was on “settling” Jews outside the Green Line in what it called the Greater Land of Israel (i.e. Palestine). But its political ambitions gradually became much more expansive till today, when it maintains a firm grip on virtually all the levers of state power.

Many Diaspora and Israeli Jews shared a liberal Zionist dream of a Jewish democratic state. But we have come to understand that democracy and “Jewishness,” in terms of the Israeli state, cannot be reconciled. They simply cannot coexist.The same is true of Judaism and Zionism. Israel, in the beginning, was a secular state in which the ruling parties endorsed socialism and offered a version of the welfare state. But when Benjamin Netanyahu became finance minister in 2003, he dismantled it with a series of harsh Thatcherite polices. They in turn rendered socialism obsolete.  Even more recently Israel has dropped secularism as well.  A plurality of Jews continue to be secular, but overwhelming political power and social control rests on a system of Judeo-supremacism...

For this reason, it’s critical to distinguish between Judaism as a religion and Zionism as a political ideology.  Israel is a nation, not a religion.  Zionism is a political movement, not a theology. Judaism as a religion is a spiritual expression which eschews, at least in the Diaspora, political power.  Remember Zechariah’s famous dictum: “Not by might, now by power, but by My Spirit says the Lord of Hosts.”

 

Mixing politics and religion poses tremendous danger.  When a conflict lies in the realm of politics it is often possible to arrive at compromise.  It might not be easy, and it may take years.  But political differences can be negotiated and resolved.  Politics are not always rational, but at their best they are.  Conflicting political views can be resolved through rational discussion and analysis.

But once a conflict takes on a religious dimension, compromise becomes almost impossible.  You have moved from the material world to the divine.  A nation which believes that God has sanctified it has assumed a mantle of omnipotence and infallibility.  With God on your side, you are invincible.  Such beliefs have been the cause of immense human suffering over the ages.

Israel’s prevailing religious ultra-nationalism has succeeded in wielding religion as a powerful tool in a political conflict. Just as von Clausewitz said that war was “politics by other means,” so Israel’s political-religious extremists offer warrior Judaism as politics by other means. This is the malady afflicting Israel today. 

 

What is Post Zionism?

Before we define post-Zionism, let's talk a little bit about Zionism. Zionism is Israel’s national ideology. Zionists believe that Jews have a special relationship with Zion, a synonym of Jerusalem in the Bible. Zionists define Zion broadly as the area of the (Mandate) Palestine. They claim that Judaism is not only a religion but also a nationality, so Jews deserve their own state and because of their special two millennia-old connection, Zion should be that state. Zionists discount and disregard the presence and majority of Palestinians in erstwhile Palestine before the creation of Israel. The slogan, "A land without a people for a people without a land" explains the Zionist idea.

If Zionism is about particular -- a particular land for a particular people at a particular time -- post- Zionism concerns universal -- humans coming together after acknowledging their differences and idiosyncrasies. If Zionism is based on denying Palestinians existence, suffering, and exclusion, post- Zionism is known for acknowledging Palestinians' trauma and called for their inclusion. If Zionism is about hegemony, post-Zionism cherishes harmony. If Zionism gave birth to Israel, post-Zionism was, many intellectuals thought, to give it maturity. If Zionism prefers the tribe, post-Zionism promotes trade-offs. If Zionism is about Jews who can fight for their own rights, post-Zionism prioritizes Jews that can fight not only for themselves but also for others. 

Zionism rose to prominence is the 1890s; post-Zionism became a thing, hundred years later, in the 1990s. There is no agreed definition of post-Zionism. Most of its detractors and some of its proponents claim that it is not much different from more than a century old anti-Zionism. However, while anti-Zionists are by-definition against Zionism, many of the post-Zionists are not. A large number of post-Zionists appreciate the necessity of Zionism for bringing Jews together and for creating the state of Israel. What unites most post-Zionists is the belief that Zionism has well past its expiry date. 

While the heydays of the post-Zionist movement were the 1990s and 2000s, its origin can be traced to the late 1960s. For instance, publicist Uri Avnery published a book in 1968 titled Israel without Zionists. Others have associated post-Zionism with the 1940s and 1950s cultural movement of the Mandate Palestine Jews who dreamed of a "Hebrew" nation, a nation that would be composed of Middle Eastern people (both Arabs and Jews), who have rejected their religious (Islamic and Judaic) pasts. Post-Zionism started as an academic movement. Its first proponents were Israeli academics who are usually referred to as “New Historians.” These historians, in the 1980s, used Israeli government declassified documents, interviews, and objective rigorous research to unpack and highlight the massacre and dislocation of the Palestinians before but primarily after the 1948 War. Tom Segev, Ilan Pappé, Benny Morris, and Avi Shlaim were prominent New Historians. Gradually, in the 1990s, these revisionist historians became the pioneers of a much larger movement. However, this movement never became popular. Ordinary Israelis continued to believe in the official nationalist ideology of Zionism.

Source: Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (2006)

Journalist Neri Livneh, who was part of the movement, defined post-Zionism in her Haaretz's article Post-Zionism Only Rings Once (September 20, 2001):

In the wider sense, if the term post-Zionism is meant to describe every attempt to examine the injustices perpetrated by Zionism and to reassess Israel's history from a standpoint that is different from the standard version, all those who are identified in this article as "post-Zionists" will undoubtedly agree to be included in the list. 

But in the narrower, and more precise, sense, post-Zionism is a political attitude that recognizes the legitimacy of Zionism as a national movement of Jews, but specifies a certain date, a kind of watershed, from which point on Zionism concluded its historical role or lost its legitimacy because of injustices it did to others (not only to Arabs but also, for example to Holocaust survivors from Europe, Yiddish speakers, Jews from Arab and Islamic countries, ultra-Orthodox Jews and women). 

This viewpoint also gives rise to a political conclusion, according to which Israel must disengage itself from its Zionist elements, which are the foundation of its Jewish character, because they are preventing it from being a democratic state. In the eyes of its opponents, this conclusion by the post-Zionists places them in a saliently anti-Zionist camp.

Livneh explicates that many scholars, who are identified as post-Zionists rubbish the label. Professors Raz-Karkutzkin and Shenhav do not want to be called post-Zionists, although they were called post-Zionists. Poet, novelist, and essayist Yitzhak Laor self-identified as an anti-Zionist also did not like the term:

"Post-Zionism," says Dr. Amnon Raz-Karkutzkin, from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Be'er Sheva, "is actually a kind of general term that was invented in order to stuff into one basket and denounce everyone who does not identify completely with the establishment, or who has anything critical to say about the way history is taught in Israel, or who see the huge damage that Zionism has done to the Palestinians or the Mizrahim" - referring to Jews whose origins lie in Middle Eastern countries. 

"Post-Zionism is an empty label," asserts Prof. Yehouda Shenhav from Tel Aviv University. "I think we have to stop using the category of `post-Zionism,' because people invoke it confusingly. Not everyone who calls for an end to the occupation is necessarily a post-Zionist. People who want to return to the 1967 lines can be Zionists through and through, because they are convinced that nationhood cannot exist without borders. On the other hand, you could say that the settlers are post-Zionists, because their very existence is harmful to nationhood within clear boundaries." 

"Post-Zionism is a term I abhor," Raz-Karkutzkin states. "I am absolutely not a post-Zionist..." 

"Post-Zionism is a kind of convenient bag into which all kinds of people can be stuffed," he[Laor] says. "On the one hand, it allows anti-Zionists to come out of the closet without calling themselves anti-Zionists, and on the other hand, it allows all the ideological establishment Zionists to throw them all into that bag so they can kick it around."

Professor Uri Ram, in his book Israeli Nationalism: Social conflicts and the politics of knowledge (2011, 118), contends that post-Zionism has a great impact on Israeli academia, art, and culture:

In fact, the post-Zionist critique on what may be called “nationalist epistemology” (or nationalist point of view) is felt today in all disciplines of knowledge and creative arts in Israel (even if not always explicitly under the post-Zionist heading). This is the situation in the field of history, where the “new historians” or “revisionist historians” had a lasting impact on history writing and on historical memory...The presence of post-Zionism in Israeli culture in general and of post-Zionist studies of Israeli society in particular is pervasive and unequivocal.

Ram also identifies many branches of post-Zionism. Feminist post-Zionists, for instance, argue that post-Zionism is about rejecting the nationalistic, militaristic, and masculine traits of Zionism which reinforce each other. Diasporic post-Zionism is more concerned about the effects Zionism on non-Israeli Jews and aims to "de-Israelize" the Jewish diaspora.

For Zionists, there is not much difference between anti-Zionists and post-Zionists. Scholars, such as Shlomo Avineri and Meyrav Wurmser, who ascribe to the official Zionist paradigm, unpack the negative and disastrous agenda of the post-Zionists in the following section:

Avineri notes that post-Zionists contend that Zionism is a colonial phenomenon rather than a national movement in conflict with another national movement over their claim to the same territory. “At the same time,” he says, “those who are careful not to accept the Zionist narrative sometimes accept the Palestinian narrative without question. To them it is clear that there is a Palestinian people, that what happened in 1948 is exactly what the Arabs say happened, and that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there is, on the one hand, a Zionist ‘narrative,’ and on the other, ‘facts’ that are precisely identical to the Palestinian narrative.” Avineri calls this “absolute folly...” 

[Wurmser argues] At its essence, post-Zionism holds that the State of Israel is an immoral phenomenon because it was established on the basis of the destruction of another people—the Palestinians. It presents the problem as transcending the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967; hence, its solution does not lie in a simple Israeli withdrawal from those territories. To the contrary, post-Zionists now tend to disparage left-wing Zionist groups for what they refer to as the “Peace Now Syndrome,” a cherishing of the period before 1967 as flawless while attributing all of Israel's wrongdoing to the 1967 occupation. Post-Zionists are much more radical: from their perspective, the problem has to do with the very existence of Israel. They deem Zionism a colonialist, racist, and evil phenomenon that stole another people’s land by force and continues to oppress them... 

Avineri says that “post-Zionists are simply anti-Zionists” who believe “that there is no Jewish people, that Zionism is an ally of imperialism and that the Palestinian Arabs are victims of Zionist aggression….They do not see Zionism and the State of Israel as a reality that has come to pass, but rather as something that is not legitimate from the outset and that must be eliminated down to its very foundations.” 

Wurmser observes that the intention of post-Zionists “is wholly negative; not to improve Zionism but to destroy it. Post-Zionist writers openly aspire not to create a new Israeli historiography free of all ideological biases, but rather seek to inject an anti-Israel bias into them.” (Zionism: “New Historians” and Post-Zionists)

These views are, of course, rejected by the post-Zionists. They claim to love their country and assert that they are trying to save their country from an impending disaster.  

Who is who and who is in bed with whom in Israeli elections in September

Israel had Knesset elections in April but no party could form a government when Yisrael Beiteinu's leader Avigdor Lieberman, who was once a close lieutenant of Netanyahu, insisted that more ultra-Orthodox men have to do the compulsory military service. It meant either Yisrael Beiteinu or the two ultra-Orthodox parties (Shas and United Torah Judaism) could be part of the ruling coalition and this made it impossible for Bibi to form a government. This also meant the plan of Bibi to legislate immunity for himself from corruption charges would have to be deferred. If Bibi is the King of Israel, Lieberman has become the kingmaker (See  How Israel’s ‘kingmaker’ could be the man to end Bibi’s reign). Bibi has done Lieberman but Yisrael Beiteinu's seats are expected to double from April in the coming September elections (from five to ten), making him even more important.

Meanwhile, Israel is steadily moving rightward, more nationalistic and more religious as compared to 2015 Knesset elections (See  Israel's Political Map Has Shifted Rightward – and That’s Bad News for Netanyahu) 

Source: Israel's Political Map Has Shifted Rightward – and That’s Bad News for Netanyahu)

Allison Kaplan Sommer in Haaretz explains the major parties/coalitions that are fighting the September elections (See Israel’s Do-over Election: A Guide to All the Parties and Who Holds the Keys to the Next Government)

Following are almost all the parties, as described by Allison, that are fighting in this election (original article can read here):

Yamina
The newly formed Yamina (formerly United Right) slate is essentially a restoration of the alliance Ayelet Shaked helped dismantle, with disastrous results, after she and Naftali Bennett broke away to form Hayamin Hehadash last December. (Their new party failed to cross the electoral threshold). After a weak showing in the election, the religious parties they left behind — Habayit Hayehudi and Bezalel Smotrich's National Union, realized that the whole of the “right of Netanyahu” camp is greater than the sum of its parts, and have fallen in line behind Shaked — to the astonishment of men who did not believe male Orthodox political leaders could ever bow to the leadership of a secular woman. 

But political survival is a powerful motivator. After polls made it clear that the personal popularity of Shaked would garner them extra seats in the Knesset, they agreed that she should top the ticket.

Source: Israel’s Do-over Election: A Guide to All the Parties and Who Holds the Keys to the Next Government

Joint List

They’re back! After a powerful debut showing in the 2015 election, in which it won an impressive 13 seats, the alliance of four predominantly Arab parties broke into two separate slates for the April race — and the results were bad. 

Disheartened and unhappy with the Joint List’s ugly breakup earlier this year, voter turnout in the Arab community dropped dramatically — from 63 percent down to just 50 percent. The two slates (Hadash-Ta’al and United Arab List-Balad) only picked up 10 seats between them, a major drop in representation. Having learned the error of their ways, the four ideologically disparate parties have decided to unite once more to reenergize their community. The slate’s leader, Ayman Odeh, has expressed hope that the move will help “overthrow the right-wing government,” as well as “preventing racism, annexation and the destruction of democracy.”

Yisrael Beiteinu
Avigdor Lieberman played his political cards cleverly when he refused to join Netanyahu’s coalition after April’s election, thus triggering the September ballot. His bold move, grandstanding against the ultra-Orthodox parties and forcing a new election, has not hurt his electoral chances by turning off right-wing voters. On the contrary: Polls indicate he could nearly double the number of seats he won in April (five) by turning himself into a gladiator for secular Israelis standing up against the ultra-Orthodox parties, and his declaration that he will force Likud into forming a national unity government. If Netanyahu refuses, he says, he will shift his support to Gantz. 

This has led Netanyahu to charge that his rival is betraying the right and that “a vote for Lieberman is a vote for a left-wing government.” Netanyahu and Likud have been working — thus far in vain — to convince Russian-speaking voters that he, not Lieberman, is their true champion.

United Torah Judaism
Not much has changed for the Ashkenazi, ultra-Orthodox alliance comprised of Agudat Yisrael and Degel Hatorah, which hopes to recreate its strong showing in the April election. There is a possibility UTJ could even make gains, bolstering voter turnout by using Lieberman’s threat to work for a coalition without them. Such a government, their leaders will warn communities, will try to draft their children. Lieberman has said he is determined to forge ahead with government plans to cut the number of full-time yeshiva students granted exemptions from army service. It was UTJ’s refusal to yield to Lieberman on this point that ultimately triggered the new election. 

Despite the fact UTJ forced Netanyahu into this situation, it remains loyal to the prime minister. Its leader, Yaakov Litzman, said recently that the party wouldn’t consider supporting any other candidate, saying, “We will go with Bibi alone.”

Shas
Like its Ashkenazi counterpart, the Mizrahi ultra-Orthodox party is confident that things can only improve in the do-over election — though some polls suggest otherwise. Shas leader Arye Dery aspires to winning 10 seats in September, but recent polls indicate a more modest showing with only seven seats — one fewer than the eight it won in April.
Shas, like UTJ, will run hard against Lieberman’s threat to push it out of the coalition by forming a unity government that would include its other political nemesis — Kahol Lavan’s Yair Lapid. And, as it did in April, Shas will stand firm on refusing to join a coalition that is not led by Likud and Netanyahu.

Labor-Gesher
In the first Israeli election of 2019, Labor was hobbled by the leadership of problematic outsider Avi Gabbay. Now, though, he has been replaced by former party head Amir Peretz, but there’s a new problem: Peretz’s decision to attempt to appeal to the center-right by teaming up with Orli Levi-Abekasis’ Gesher party, which failed to enter the Knesset in April, This has sown discontent in Labor ranks, as has his refusal to forge an alliance with Meretz or Ehud Barak’s new party, Democratic Israel. 

The darkening mood in the party was further fueled after one of its young stars, Stav Shaffir, jumped ship, joining Meretz and Barak in the new Democratic Union, and former party leader and Peretz ally Shelly Yacimovich — one of its most influential lawmakers — announced she was taking a break from political life. 

It hasn’t helped morale that new polls show the party performing even more poorly than it did in April, where it garnered only six seats — a humiliating position for the party of Israel’s founding fathers to find itself in.

Democratic Union
Among the wave of alliances in Israeli politics, this new electoral pact is perhaps the oddest. It was born after former Prime Minister Ehud Barak thundered back onto the political scene in May, burning with desire to unite the nation’s center-left and leftist parties into one. And although he didn’t declare as much, he implied that he’d like to see himself leading the charge. 

There had been talk of a Labor-Meretz merger, but the Barak factor disrupted the dynamic. In the end, Barak has joined with Meretz (a left-wing/Zionist party) in a marriage aimed at keeping both parties above the electoral threshold — with the added bonus of renegade Labor lawmaker Shaffir. She expressed hope that more Labor members would follow her lead, but has largely been disappointed. 

Also disappointed: Barak himself, who has been forced to forfeit his leadership role within the new party in order to assuage misgivings about his connections to convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein — a scandal that threatened to end his political comeback before it even began. 

The hegemony of Israel's political right in Knesset elections

In How Israel’s religious right is now in the driving seat, Jonathan Cook argues that right dominates Israel's politics and is going to win most seats in the coming Knesset elections. The key fight is between the camps that fuse ultra-nationalism and religion, with the secular right trying to find a place for itself. The center-left, including the once-powerful Labor Party that dominated Israeli politics for decades, is going to remain marginal and insignificant. 

Will the secular right emerge with enough political weight to act as a power-broker in the post-election negotiations, or can the religious right form a government without any support from the secular parties? That is what the election will determine. 

An earlier election in April, which failed to produce a decisive result between these two camps, nonetheless confirmed the right’s absolute dominance. The Zionist centre-left parties, including the founding Labor party, were routed, securing between them just 10 seats in the 120-member parliament.

Source: How Israel’s religious right is now in the driving seat

Cook argues that Israel's is getting more religious and, therefore, the political center is continuously moving towards right. 

The secular right is going to vote for two parties, the new Blue and White party and Yisrael Beiteinu party, led by Avigdor Lieberman:

Much of the rest of the secular right has deserted Netanyahu’s Likud party. At the last election, they mostly found a political home in the new Blue and White party, led by a former military chief of staff, Benny Gantz. 

Polls suggest Lieberman may also attract a larger share of these voters after his recent stand-off with Netanyahu. He has demanded an exclusively secular right-wing government, comprising Likud, Blue and White, and his own Yisrael Beiteinu party. Blue and White has presented itself chiefly as a vehicle for protest against Netanyahu...

Blue and White has been misleadingly labelled as centrist by some observers. But it tied with Netanyahu’s Likud, at 35 seats each, in April by appealing to a largely secular strain of right-wing nationalism that three decades ago was the domain of the Likud party.

The religious right camp can be divided into three blocs as described by Cook below:

The religious right itself is characterised by three main blocs. All believe that the occupied territories belong exclusively to the Jewish people, and are united in their unabashed support for the settlements and the entrenchment of the occupation. Political differences relate chiefly to matters of how quickly and brazenly the occupied territories should be annexed and how the Palestinian population there should be dealt with. 

More significant than ideological differences, however, are the varied religious constituencies that each bloc represents. Netanyahu’s Likud party is the largest, and draws primarily on the support of religious traditionalists – Israeli Jews who are generally observant and socially conservative. Likud, Gurvitz noted, has moved more firmly into the religious camp since 2005... 

The second bloc comprises two ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, which look to their respective chief rabbis for political direction. Between them they won 16 seats in April. 

The main difference between the two relates to ethnicity. United Torah Judaism represents the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox community, whose recent ancestry is traced to Europe. Shas, meanwhile, represents the Mizrahim, Jews whose families hailed mostly from the Arab world. The third bloc comprises various small far-right parties representing what are known in Israel as the national-religious camp – those who subscribe to the ideology of the settler community... 

Gurvitz [a researcher] estimates the camp numbers close to one million – or about one in seven of Israel’s Jewish population. About half live in the settlements of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The majority are religious, but not all of them. The camp has proved fractious, but its three main parties established an electoral coalition last week called United Right, which polls currently suggest may win up to 14 seats... 

The three parties have minor differences over their approaches to annexation of the West Bank, likely the biggest issue facing the next parliament. Shaked’s New Right and Peretz’s Jewish Home demand formal annexation of most of the West Bank, denying Palestinians there equal rights and imposing apartheid-style rule over them. 

Since Donald Trump became US President, Likud has moved closer to openly adopting this as its policy. Smotrich [of Tkuma], meanwhile, would prefer to annex the entire West Bank and has been more explicit in suggesting it would be necessary to ethnic cleanse Palestinians as part of that annexation process... 

The fact that Likud and the United Right compete for largely the same pool of voters had fuelled even more extremist positions on the right, he [Gurvitz] added. “The national-religious parties need to offer more extreme policies to distinguish themselves from Likud, otherwise they will lose votes to Netanyahu,” he said. “But that then encourages Netanyahu to take more extreme positions to ensure he doesn’t look less nationalist than his rivals. It ends up creating a spiral of extremism.”

Israel: More messianic and more religious

Akiva Eldar, the veteran Israeli journalist and best-selling author, has written an article for Al-Monitor, "Israel at 71, more religious, messianic and extreme." On Israeli Independence Day, May 8-9, Mr. Eldar reminds Israelis and others of the Declaration of Independence. He compares the language in the declaration with that in the newest Basic Law, the Nationality Law or the Nation-state Law, passed last year. The language in the declaration is liberal, inclusive and democratic, with only a hint of Jewish ascendency in the new state. This is a world apart from the language in the 2018 basic law, which is exclusive, supremacist and illiberal. It shamelessly informs the world and the Israeli non-Jewish citizens that only Jewish Israeli are the true citizens, rest of the Israelis should not expect equality. Mr. Eldar writes:

What will a civics teacher answer a student who asks how the values of justice promised in the Declaration of Independence to all citizens — irrespective of religion, race and sex — square with a law stipulating “the right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people”? What will the teacher tell a student who asks how the promise of equality and the call to Israel’s Arabs to fulfill their role in state-building based on full and equal citizenship go hand-in-hand with a law stipulating “the State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value and will act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation”? 

These questions relate, of course, to the Nationality Law, anchoring the Jewish nature of the State of Israel, adopted in 2018 by the previous Knesset and received by the incoming Knesset as a fait accompli. The alienation of Israel’s 21% Arab minority that is inherent in the legislation gives off a stench of nationalism, if not outright racism, and contradicts the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. The clause on self-determination, while hurtful to the feelings of Israel’s non-Jewish citizens and undermining their affinity for the state, does not have practical meaning. On the other hand, the clause stipulating that the state will only develop Jewish settlement constitutes a direct blow to the property rights of millions of Palestinians and undermines their affinity for the land of their forefathers. The previous Knesset translated this clause into action when it legislated the so-called Regularization Law, which retroactively legalized all buildings erected in West Bank settlements in contravention of the law.

President  Rivlin, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Supreme Court president Esther Hayut on Israel’s 71st Independence Day, on May 9, 2019

Source: The Times of Israel

Mr. Eldar then compares the views of Mr. Herzl, the father of modern Zionism, with present-day Israel. While Mr. Herzl was against any role of rabbis in the state affairs, the current government depends on clerics for its existence (as almost all Israeli governments of the past decade) and, therefore, no important policy question can be decided without their approval:

The Declaration of Independence extols the visionary of the modern-day Jewish state, Theodor Herzl, who declared the right of the Jewish people to national revival in their land. Herzl also envisioned that clerics would seek to control institutions of the Jewish state. In his road map “The Jewish State,” Herzl wrote, “We shall therefore prevent any theocratic tendencies from coming to the fore on the part of our priesthood. We shall keep our priests within the confines of their temples in the same way as we shall keep our professional army within the confines of their barracks. Army and priesthood shall receive honors as high as their valuable functions deserve. But they must not interfere in the administration of the state which confers distinction on them, else they will conjure up difficulties without and within.” 

Israel’s next government will depend more than ever on ultra-Orthodox clerics, among them eight members of Yahadut HaTorah and eight of the Shas Party, as well as an identical number of national religious lawmakers who will all serve in the newly sworn-in 21st Knesset. As Shuki Friedman, director of the Center for Religion, Nation and State at the Israel Democracy Institute notes, religion dictates all facets of life in Israel of 2019. It controls how we shall be schooled and how we will marry; whether we will have public transportation on the Sabbath (usually not) and how we will spend our day of rest; what level of Kosher certification we consume; and will we be stuck in endless traffic because road and rail works cannot be carried out on the Sabbath, only during the work week. For the ultra-Orthodox parties, Jewish law is above state law. They are against the drafting of young ultra-Orthodox to the army, they discriminate against women and they incite against the progressive Judaism stream. All that, in complete contrast to the commitment made by the founders of Israel (in the Declaration of Independence) on equal rights to all citizens; religion, race or gender making no difference.

The article brilliantly details the differences between the 1948 and 2019 Israel but most of these differences existed only on paper. The declaration neither stopped the Nabka from happening, nor it could save the Israeli Arabs from the 70-year discrimination and the Palestinians from occupation. Since its independence in 1948, the Israeli state has never treated Israeli Arabs or Palestinians fairly, irrespective of what was written in the Declaration of Independence. The only difference between the 1948 Israel and 2019 Israel is that the mask is now off.

Israel is not a country of all its citizens

Religious nationalism in Israel or Zionism achieved a new high on March 10, 2019. A sitting Prime Minister, who many expect to be sworn in again after the Knesset elections and become the longest-serving Israeli Prime Minister in history, publicly declared, " Israel is not a country of all its citizens." He was denying equal citizenship or full citizenship of Arab Israelis who make almost one-fifth of the Israeli population. Many would argue that most countries in the world do prioritize one religious, ethnic, or linguistic community over other communities so the statement was not something rare or surprising. Others would argue that Israel has never given equal rights to its Arab citizens in its 71-year history so the only people baffled by Benjamin Netanyahu's statement were the ignorant morons. Bibi's critics would point to his statement on the previous election day in March 2015 when he appealed to the rightwing voter by demonizing Arabs. He said that “the rule of the right is in danger” because "Arab voters were coming out in droves to the polls," bused by the left-wing NGOs. This appeal was decisive in winning him the last Knesset elections.

Source: Jerusalem Post

But the statement was stupefying because we live in a world where microaggressions are frowned upon and Israel claims to be a democracy. In fact, it prides itself as the only democracy in the Middle East. A former Prime Minister and Chief of Staff Ehud Barak said Israel was "a villa in the jungle," i.e. an outpost of civilization amidst the barbarism of the Middle East. Do other democratic leaders use Netanyahu's kind of rhetoric to win elections? No. Even dictators would not use this rhetoric today. So, it was astonishing for Netanyahu to write it and then he doubled down it and defended his statement before a cabinet meeting. 

Here is what prompted Netanyahu to proudly declare that Israeli Arabs are second-class citizens. Rotem Sela, a popular Israeli model and TV host, watching Miri Regev, the Israeli Culture Minister being interviewed by Rina Matsliah. Rotem became upset by Miri's racist attitude and wrote on her Instagram: “Miri Regev is sitting and explaining to Rina Matsliah that the public needs to beware, because if Benny Gantz is elected he will have to create a government with the Arabs. Rina Matsliah is silent. And I ask myself: why doesn’t Rina ask her in shock: ‘And what’s the problem with the Arabs???’ Dear God, there are also Arab citizens in this country. When will anyone in this government tell the public that this is a country of all its citizens, and all people are born equal.” The actress said that “the Arabs are also human beings. And also the Druze, and the gays, and the lesbians and... gasp... leftists.” 

Netanyahu responded on Facebook, "Dear Rotem, an important correction: Israel is not a state of all its citizens. According to the Nation-State Law that we passed, Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people – and its alone. As you wrote, there is no problem with the Arab Israeli citizens – they have equal rights like everybody and the Likud government has invested in the Arab sector more than any other government."

Israeli President Rivlin criticized Netanyahu's “entirely unacceptable remarks about the Arab citizens of Israel” without naming him and added, "“There are no first-class citizens, and there are no second-class voters. We are all equal in the voting booth. We are all represented at the Knesset.” 

But Bibi was unapologetic and reaffirmed his anti-Arab stance before Sunday's Cabinet's meeting as Guardian reported:

As the comments caused waves in Israel, Netanyahu again spoke of the issue at the start of a cabinet meeting. He called Israel a “Jewish, democratic state” with equal rights, but “the nation state not of all its citizens but only of the Jewish people”.

Netanyahu has been accused of demonising Israeli Arabs, who make up about 17% of the population, in an attempt to boost rightwing turnout in elections due on 9 April. He has continually warned that his opponents will receive the support of Arab parties and that they will make significant concessions to the Palestinians.

Wonder woman star, Gal Gadot, supported her friend Rotem Sela:

“Love thy neighbor as thyself,” Gadot wrote in Hebrew on her own Instagram account in response. “It is not a matter of right or left, Jewish or Arab, religious or secular. It’s a matter of dialogue for peace, equality and tolerance for one another. It is our responsibility to plant hope and light for a better future for our children. Rotem, you are an inspiration for us all.” (See ynet news)