The nexus of religious populism and digital authoritarianism in Pakistan

The nexus of religious populism and digital authoritarianism in Pakistan

Source: https://www.citizenlab.co/

Abstract

Pakistan’s democracy has a turbulent political history. In the seven decades since its creation, the country has faced four military-led dictatorships and another two decades under indirect military rule. Given this political trend, authoritarianism is not a novel phenomenon in the country. Digital authoritarianism, however, is a relatively new domain of oppression. This paper looks at how a political party in power and the “establishment” (military elite and its civilian collaborators) have been increasingly controlling digital mediums as well as weaponizing cyberspace. This dual control and usage allow for growing digital authoritarianism.

Using the case study of Islamist civilizational populist Imran Khan’s government (2018-2022) and its collaboration with the military establishment in enforcing digital authoritarianism, this article provides a four levels of assessment of internet governance in Pakistan: 1. whole network level, 2. sub-network level, 3. proxy level, and 4. user level. In addition, the role of Khan’s political party’s Islamist civilizational populist outlook in contributing to authoritarianism is also discussed. A lot of censorship happens around the ideas of protecting Islam and Pakistan’s Muslim identity. Thus, Pakistan’s digital space is oppressive where ideas of religion, ontological insecurity, and nationalism are weaponized to legitimize the state’s growing authoritarianism.  

Read the article at the European Center for Populism Studies

Military and Populism: A Global Tour with a Special Emphasis on the Case of Pakistan

 Pakistan army chief General Qamar Bajwa and Prime Minister Imran Khan in Miranshah

Source: Khyber TV

Abstract

Although populism has become a focus of research in the last decade, there hasn’t been much academic work on how militaries around the world have reacted/acted to the rise of populist leaders. There is some timeworn research on the relationship of militaries in Latin America with various left-wing populist governments and leaders from the 1930s to 1970s. Given that populism was largely understood in the context of left-wing politics, with the rise of right-wing populism, the literature on the military and populism needs to be advanced by studying the relationship between right-wing populism and the military. This article aims to address this gap by looking at the right-wing populism case study of Pakistan, where the military has actively participated in the rise of a religious populist leader. To situate the case study within the larger literature of the military and populism, the dynamics and history of military associations with populism and populist leaders are revisited in the article’s first part.

The article can be read at European Center for Populism Studies

As Imran Khan fails, he turns to religious nationalism to save him

Imran Khan came to power as a populist right-wing politician. His key support came from the powerful Pakistani military, which arranged favorable judicial verdicts against ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and other leaders of (Sharif's party) Pakistan Muslim League (N), a sycophantic media, a hostile atmosphere for PMLN second-tier leadership forcing them to change loyalties, and rigging on the election day.

The military also helped discredit the religious credentials of the right-of-center PMLN leadership by painting them as pro-Ahmadi or pro-Qadiani. A new extremist organization, the Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), was supported by the military to arrange protests all over the country and to force the country to come to a standstill. The military refused to come to the aid of the civilian government which it was constitutionally bound to. Furthermore, once Sharif's government bowed before the extremists, an army general was photographed paying money to the TLP protesters publicly. 

All this was, however, before the 2018 elections. As time passed by and the economy and governance deteriorated sharply, the confidence of even Imran Khan's supporters in his competence went downhill. Blaming the opposition and using the COVID-19 pandemic to hide misgovernance worked for a period but when corruption and mismanagement soared and the military also reduced its support, instrumentalizing Islam was the only possible way to retain popularity.

During the last three years, Imran Khan has reversed the trend of decreasing religious nationalism in Pakistan that was almost two decades old. As explained in my book, State, Nationalism, and Islamization, religious nationalism increased during the 30- year period from the early1970s to the late 1990s. With the start of the new century, there was a change, and the Pakistani state reduced (not end) its support for religious nationalism and extremism. 

Following are some of the key actions taken by the Imran Khan government/party to instrumentalize Islam after he came to power in 2018:

1. Riyasat-e-Madina rhetoric: From his maiden speech after becoming the Prime Minister, Imran has vowed to make Pakistan a newer version of the Madina state. In his maiden speech, he said that his 22-year struggle was aimed at turning Pakistan into a state like the Madina state, led by Hazrat Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him). He said that the West has adopted riyasat-e-Madina's principles of the welfare state, accountability, simplicity, justice, spending on education, etc., while Pakistan had not. Importantly, during the last three years, he has not worked consistently on any of the above objectives. Pakistan is more corrupt today than it was in 2018 while the accountability regime and courts have only targeted his political opposition.

2. Even during the height of COVID 19 pandemic, Imran Khan was not ready to anger religious extremists and temporarily stop congregation prayers. He risked outbreak of virus and deaths of hundreds of thousands Pakistanis just to appease extremists. Most religious conservatives were ready for the temporary end of congregation prayers as almost all of 50 Muslim-majority countries had done so but Imran was not reasdy to anger extremists who were a minority.

Source: Republicworld.com

3. Imran's government intends to implement the Single National Curriculum which increases the amount of religious content in the primary and secondary school curriculum, including making Arabic mandatory. This will also pave way for the hiring of thousands of madrassa-educated men by the government, influencing not only the teaching of Islamiat and Arabic but also of other subjects and the overall milieu.

4. Imran Khan has twice bowed before the TLP extremists and accepted their demands even when the military was supporting him. He accepted such ridiculous demands as declaring the French ambassador persona non grata. The most recent agreement between the TLP and the government has been kept in secret which shows that it also has some ridiculous and illegal demands. He has also said that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which has been implicated in the murder of thousands of innocent Pakistanis, would be pardoned.

5. Imran Khan has repeatedly blamed women clothes for increase in crimes agianst women and then repeatedly claimed that he didn't mean what he said or people didn't understand what he was saying. These statements curry favor with the conservatives who also argue that crimes agianst women are largly due to women's independence, clothes, and activities outside their homes.

5. Rehmatul Lil Alameen Scholarship Program: Prime Minister Imran Khan also launched the Rehmatul Lil Alameen Scholarship Program 2021 which would help finance undergraduate education of underprivileged and deserving students across the country.

6. National Rahmatul-Lil-Alameen Authority was launched by the PM in 2021. This authority aims to promote research on Seeratun Nabi (Peace Be Upon Him) and guide youth on multiple aspects of the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) life. According to PM Khan, it will monitor media for any blasphemous content and school curriculum for promoting the true image of Islam.

7. The Punjab Government, also led by the PTI, decided in 2021 to make Naazrah Quran education compulsory for classes 1-5 for schools across the province,  This was in addition to the Compulsory Teaching of the Holy Quran Act, 2018.

8. The PTI Punjab Chief Minister Usman Buzdar has also ordered that the recitation of Darood-e-Ibrahimi (verses in praise for Holy Prophet (PBUH)) before the national anthem and after the recitation of the Holy Quran must be ensured at the public school assemblies. 

9. Imran Khan has raised issue of Islamophobia at various fora, including the UN General Assembly. He has also written letters to major social media companies as well as leaders of 50 Muslim majority states to highlight the issue and to call for its end. However, crucially, he has been very silent about what is happening to Uighar Muslims in China or Sri Lankan Muslims, showing his hypocrisy and duplicity.

Pakistan, Internet Freedoms and Digital Blasphemy

Pakistani Constitution guarantees freedom of religion (Article 20), freedom of speech (Article 19), freedom of assembly (Article 16), freedom of movement (Article 15), and the right of free trial (Article 10A) but throughout most of its history, these freedoms and rights have been unavailable to most of its citizens. No one expects much under a martial law government or when a general is "legally-elected" president. However, when there is a democratic government, like today, when the military is not formally controlling the government, one expects the constitution would be given importance. Unfortunately, this is not true. Minorities, particularly Ahmadis, face persecution and prosecution. To make things more horrible, the Government of Pakistan, is now attempting to silence Ahmadis overseas.  

Aysha Khan in her article, titled Pakistan attempts to prosecute Ahmadi US citizens for digital blasphemy, informs us about the legal notices issued to US citizens:

Pakistani authorities have asked leaders of the American Ahmadiyya Muslim community to take down its official website, claiming that the U.S.-based site violates Pakistan’s strict blasphemy laws and new cybercrime regulations.

The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority said in a legal notice issued on Dec. 24 to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community USA’s spokesmen, Amjad Mahmood Khan and Harris Zafar, that failure to remove the website TrueIslam.com would result in fines of up to $3.14 million or criminal sanctions, including possible 10-year-prison sentences.

“This is a new frontier in persecution of Ahmadi Muslims in the digital space,” said Khan, a lawyer in Los Angeles who has testified before Congress about blasphemy and religious freedom. “Pakistan wants to impose its abominable blasphemy laws on the whole world by targeting U.S. citizens and U.S. websites.”

Brad Adams, who heads Human Rights Watch’s Asia Division, said “censoring Ahmadis and using blasphemy laws to airbrush them from Pakistani society” is part of the “widespread and rampant discrimination and social exclusion” Ahmadis face in Pakistan.

In Pakistan, home to about 4 million Ahmadis, the constitution and penal code declare members of the Ahmadiyya sect non-Muslims and impose harsh penalties — including death — for those who call themselves Muslims or publicly engage in religious activities. Ahmadis accepts the sect’s 19th-century founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, as the messiah and as a subordinate prophet to the Prophet Muhammad, a belief many Muslims consider blasphemous.

“This is a malicious attempt to chill free speech and expression by a Muslim American website,” attorney Brett Williamson of O’Melveny & Myers, which is representing TrueIslam.com pro bono, wrote in a letter to PTA on Monday (Jan. 11).

He described the takedown notice as “legally infirm, but also patently absurd in its reach.”

The website is registered and hosted in the U.S. and is aimed at an American audience. Zafar and Khan are both U.S. citizens and the threat of extradition is virtually nil, but both have relatives in Pakistan and say penalties would make it impossible to travel there.

Law professor Arturo Carrillo, who directs George Washington University Law School’s Global Internet Freedom Project, said this case shows that the Pakistan government is now using its controversial cybercrime laws in an effort “to repress online expression and content emanating from outside the country’s borders because the government has deemed it to be undesirable and unlawful.”

PTA officials did not respond to requests for comment.

In 2016, Pakistan enacted digital regulations that allowed authorities to block online content in the “interest of the glory of Islam.” Last year, the government passed blanket censorship laws that would allow authorities to order tech companies to remove digital pornography, blasphemy and anti-state content, drawing ire from Google, Facebook, Twitter and other platforms.

But human rights experts say the takedown notices also come amid increased targeting of Ahmadis’ online religious expression. 

One day after issuing the takedown notice to TrueIslam.com, PTA also sent notices to Google and Wikipedia, threatening penalties and prosecution if the platforms failed to remove “sacrilegious content” associated with the Ahmadi sect’s beliefs.

PTA said it was responding to complaints regarding an “unauthentic” Ahmadi translation of the Quran on the Google Play Store; “misleading” search results that returned the Ahmadi leader Mirza Masroor Ahmad’s name when the term “Khalifa (caliph) of Islam” was searched; and “deceitful” Wikipedia articles that suggested that the Ahmadi caliph is Muslim.

Officials also demanded that all internet service providers serving Pakistan block content from Ahmadi websites, including TrueIslam.com, the English-language magazine Al Hakam and the international satellite TV network MTA. 

Five of Pakistan’s top Ahmadi leaders have also had cases filed against them in recent weeks over religious activity on WhatsApp, Khan told Religion News Service.

Earlier in December, Khan told a hearing of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom that extremists in Pakistan were intent on using the country’s cyber crime statutes to initiate blasphemy cases against Ahmadis.

But this latest action, Khan told Religion News Service, is “a very slippery slope in terms of what this could mean for other minorities. We’re the canaries in the coal mine. This would mean any potential website or digital content that is quote-unquote blasphemous can be the subject of criminal prosecution.”

USCIRF Commissioner Johnnie Moore described the takedown notices as “recklessly brazen” and said he expected fierce bipartisan condemnation from both the Trump and Biden administrations.

“Surely, the Pakistani government doesn’t intend on threatening American citizens within the United States?” Moore asked. “Surely, Prime Minister Imran Khan doesn’t want this controversy, now?”

 

Source: Battle for the internet

And if you thought that was the end of it. It is not. The Government of Pakistan intends to be more cruel as far as internet freedoms are concerned. The censorship will increase further and things will get worse. Asif Shehzad, in his Reuters story, explains what the government wants to do next (you can read the full story New internet rules to give Pakistan blanket powers of censorship):

Pakistan is all set to roll out new internet rules that critics say will give the government wide powers of censorship after rejecting requests from social media companies for consultation.

Muslim-majority Pakistan already has media regulations that adhere to conservative social customs. Last month, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) blocked TikTok for failing to filter out “immoral and indecent” content.

The new rules were approved initially by Prime Minister Imran Khan’s cabinet in February.

They give the PTA “removal and blocking” powers of digital content that “harms, intimidates or excites disaffection” towards the government or poses a threat to the “integrity, security and defence of Pakistan”.

A service provider or social media company could face a fine up to 500 million rupees ($3.14 million) for non-compliance, which would in turn trigger a mechanism preventing the uploading and live streaming, particularly related to “terrorism, hate speech, pornography, incitement to violence and detrimental to national security”.

A platform has to act within 24 hours or, in case of an emergency, six hours to remove content. The rules also empower the telecom authority to block an entire online system.

PTA spokesman Khurram Mehran told Reuters the rules were meant for a better coordination with foreign-based social media companies, which usually “don’t respond to legal requirements”.

Any platform that has more than half a million users in the country will have to register with the PTA within nine months and establish a permanent office and database servers in Pakistan within 18 months.

The new rules shocked rights activists who complained that there had been no consultation.

“The expansion of these powers is just horrendous,” Nighat Dad, a digital rights activist, told Reuters.

“The consultation never occurred,” said Jeff Paine, managing director, Asia Internet Coalition (AIC), a joint forum of social media platforms, urging the government to “work with industry on practical, clear rules”.

The AIC said in a statement: “The draconian data localisation requirements will damage the ability of people to access a free and open internet and shut Pakistan’s digital economy off from the rest of the world.

“It’s chilling to see the PTA’s powers expanded, allowing them to force social media companies to violate established human rights norms on privacy and freedom of expression.”

 

Atif Main, Imran Khan and Pakistan

The newly minted government in Pakistan removed Professor Atif Mian, an eminent economist belonging to the Ahmadi minority, from its Economic Advisory Council (EAC) on September 7th. This news was heard by many with profound disbelief. Pakistan is facing a balance of payment crisis and Princeton Professor Atif Mian, who was included in the list of the top 25 young economists in the world by the IMF, could have helped plan a fast recovery. But it was not to be. Religious nationalism and the fear of the other prevented not only Professor Atif Mian but also Harvard Professor Asim Khwaja and University College London Professor Imran Rasul, both of whom resigned from the EAC in protest over the removal of Professor Atif Mian. 

Pakistan became an independent state in 1947 but after more than seventy years and one bloody and traumatic separation (when East Pakistan became Bangladesh), the debate over whether Pakistan was created for Muslims to live their lives freely without persecution or for implementing Islamic Shariah goes on. However, almost everyone agrees that Islam’s contribution to Pakistani nationalism is significant and instrumental. Muslims, living in different parts of British India, did not have much else in common except the fear of Hindu persecution after independence. The marker of difference was Islam even if the desire for implementation of Islamic Shariah was not universal.

Professor Atif Mian

Source: Princeton University

Pakistan is not known for ensuring equal rights for its religious minorities. In fact, it is known to be one of the countries where religious minorities regularly face official and social discrimination. So, Pakistanis and others should not have been surprised by Professor Atif Mian’s expulsion but it was a shock for a number of reasons. First, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, which won the 25th July elections, claimed to be the harbinger of a more inclusive Pakistan. Its election slogan was Do Nahi Aik Pakistan (translation: Not two, but one Pakistan). Second, Prime Minister Imran Khan, the charismatic cricketer-turned politician that led Pakistan the PTI to victory, does not subscribe to conservative religious views, though he has not refrained from using Islam to gain an edge over his political rivals.  Imran Khan lived in the United Kingdom for almost twenty years and his children are British citizens, living, with his former wife, Jemima Goldsmith, a rich journalist and heiress of Jewish descent, near London.,

Finally, the PTI government knew that Professor Atif Mian was an Ahmadi and not only still appointed him to the EAC but also forcefully defended his appointment when the backlash started. Fawad Chaudhry, the Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting, called those protesting against the appointment extremists and said that the government would not bow to the extremists. He also announced ‘Protecting minorities is our responsibility. It is the religious duty of each Muslim, not just the government, to protect minorities and respect those that they live with.’ However, two days after this statement, the PTI government capitulated and removed Professor Atif Main from the EAC. 

What contributed to this capitulation? Many analysts would blame religious nationalism but that is not the whole truth. Besides religious nationalism, weak political institutions and the lack of a democratic culture also contributes to surrender before the religious hardliners. Prime Minister Imran Khan is socially a liberal but joined an onslaught of religious groups last year to weaken the previous government. The issue was again related to Ahmadis. The Ahmadis or Ahmadiyyah consider themselves Muslim but do not consider Prophet Muhammad as the last and final prophet. They were initially considered a Muslim sect but gradually many Muslim-majority countries and societies have come to regard them as heretic and non-Muslim. They are persecuted not only in Pakistan but also in Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Gulf sheikhdoms, Iran, Indonesia and Malaysia. Pakistan declared Ahmadis non-Muslim is 1974 and then placed additional restrictions on their freedom of religion in the 1980s. The last government, while working on electoral reforms, proposed an inconsequential change in the oath of major office holders that contained an assertion that there was no prophet after Prophet Muhammad. This proposal was approved by the opposition parties, including the PTI, after lengthy deliberations. However, when some religious groups started protesting against the change and claimed that the government had made the change on the demand of the Ahmadis, all the opposition parties joined them. The Pakistan military, which because of four successful coups has ruled Pakistan for more than thirty years and is the strongest political player, also not so clandestinely supported the religious groups to weaken the civilian government. The media, under pressure of the military, also bolstered the opposition and in the end, the change was dropped and the law minister had to resign. The issue did not end even after that and the PTI and other opposition parties portrayed the previous government as a supporter of Ahmadis and this contributed to the loss of its support – and defeat –  in the July national elections.

The succumbing to the religious groups by the current PTI government is thus linked to religious nationalism and a political landscape where democratic governments cannot assert themselves because the religious groups and the military constantly harass them. Sometimes, media groups, opposition parties and the judiciary also join them in keeping civilian democratic governments weak and ineffective. Three different political parties have ruled Pakistan since 2008. Each one of them has faced opposition from the same quarters and each one of them has yielded to pressure from the religious right because the religious right is not alone. 

Why street protests work in Pakistan?

Daniel Markey recently wrote an article on the success of street protests in Pakistan?' (See Why street protests work in Pakistan?). His main arguments is that democratically elected leaders in Pakistan face such protests not only because they face very difficult challenges and weak political institutionalization but also because of their own tendencies to centralize power.

By rights, however, Sharif (and Zardari before him) should not face such a high deficit of popular legitimacy as the one that loomed over Musharraf's tenure. Whatever the flaws of national elections in 2008 and 2013, they were better than what came before, or at least no worse. It is hard to accept that the motivating energy behind the latest round of protests is truly a consequence of voting irregularities. No, today's opposition leaders Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri are opportunistically latching on to whatever charges can be leveled against Prime Minister Sharif and company. Vote rigging, like corruption, is a perennially effective club to wield against most Pakistani politicians and their parties. 

Part of Sharif's present vulnerability to popular protests can be explained by his own policy missteps that have dissipated enthusiasm for his rule. His dealings with the army, for instance, have been rife with tensions over the Musharraf case and the timing of negotiations and military operations against the TTP. In addition, although Pakistan's economy is no worse off than it was before Sharif assumed office (and by many measures, it is probably stronger), the common Pakistani has seen little material benefit. To be fair, even the best schemes for new power plants and Chinese-financed infrastructure cannot be realized overnight, but decades of unfulfilled promises by Pakistani politicians have jaded the public. The summertime heat and persistent power outages undercut Sharif's appeal as a can-do businessman, his calling card in the last election. 

 Yet lots of democracies face setbacks; the anti-incumbent theme of "throwing the bums out" is a universal rallying cry. In countries where democratic institutions are firmly entrenched, however, opposition parties work through parliamentary and electoral systems to accomplish those ends. It is primarily in democratic systems where institutions are weak and ineffective that unconventional forms of political participation, like street protests, are the norm. At least, this is the principal finding of an insightful political analysis comparing democratic states across Latin America by the Inter-American Development Bank in 2009.

By this logic, Nawaz Sharif's main failing -- the one that makes him most vulnerable to street protest today -- is his lack of investment in the institutionalization of democratic politics. That deficit is indeed glaring. Sharif's critics are right to chastise his do-nothing parliament and hyper-centralization of political authority in the hands of a tiny group of cronies.

I argued in my comments that what Markey is saying is right but the role of Pakistan's military cannot be ignored. It is one of the main reasons why such protests (with proportionally very small number of people) succeed:

A more pertinent question is why such SMALL street protests work in Pakistan. The current protest marchers in Islamabad  are around fifty thousand. Pakistan's population is more than 180 million. So, the question is why 0.003% of population can topple a government. Governing through parliament is important and there is no doubt that Nawaz Sharif' has centralized power but many other world leaders have a similarly centralized power and faced big protests and still continue to rule. Two prominent examples are Erdogan and Putin. Both these leaders have a centralized style of governance and faced proportionally bigger protests but still continue to rule. 

It is true that in countries where democratic institutionalization is weak, unconventional forms of political participation (e.g.  street protests) are the norm but do they topple governments? A pertinent example in that of Mexico where in 2006, there were large protests against vote rigging, similar to what is happening in Pakistan now. What was the end result? The Mexican government patiently waited and eventually protests ended.
There is also no need to resort to ruthless force as the Mexican example shows. Protesters in Mexico city camped for months. Pakistani government has to just wait and there is every reason to believe that Imran Khan supporters (who have a more valid case for protest) would fizzle out.
So, why Pakistani government is worried? The answer is history of military involvement in politics and the perception in Pakistan that military is not happy with Nawaz Sharif. This perception of military's displeasure emboldens Sharif's opponents and makes many others to hedge their bets or go against Sharif to protect their interests. For example, most of the news channels in Pakistan report news with a clear bias against Sharif government. They hardly question the legitimacy of having 0.003% of people demanding dissolution of national assembly, using undemocratic means.
Perhaps looking at Turkey in 1997 and in 2013 will clarify my contention. In 1997, a democratically elected government was toppled one year after being elected only by a memorandum by the Turkish military. In 2013, a democratically elected but much more centralized (and maybe more corrupt too) are not toppled. The main difference in 1997 and 2103 was the absence of military's political power in 2013.