Showing posts with label secular nationalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label secular nationalism. Show all posts

Sunday, September 17, 2017

Nepal: Rare example of decline in religious nationalism

The blog post is based on the masters' thesis of David Rangdrol, Uppsala University (Sweden). The thesis was written in 2007 and is titled, "Religious Nationalism in Nepal: Understanding the Demise of the Hindu Kingdom." Most of my blog posts are about countries where religious nationalism is increasing but this one will be focusing on a country where religious nationalism declined, something rare as Mr. Rangdrol explains: 

Until 2006 Nepal was known as “the only Hindu Kingdom in the world.” The Hindu attribute has its roots in the creation of Nepal in the 18th century; it was written down in the highest law of the land in 1854 and finally enshrined in the constitution from 1962 onwards. But 2006 marked a year of important transitions for Nepal: from civil war to peace, from totalitarianism to democracy, and from religious nationalism to secularism. This last point is particularly interesting given the larger context. The above-mentioned study [of 120 armed conflicts that occurred in Asia between 1946 and 2005] has found that a majority of conflicts (21 out of 31) that had a religious incompatibility at their core involved rebel groups that fought governments against secularism in order to establish religious states. Nepal on the other hand is the unique case in Asia in the past 60 years where a rebel group, the Maoists, has fought a government and included a demand for secularism in its agenda. Though the Maoist People’s War cannot be characterised primarily as an anti-religious war, the demand for a secular state was an important part of it. In any case, the most outstanding event that we will try to explain in this essay is that Nepal has officially shifted from religious nationalism to secularism in May 2006, effectively erasing an important, centennial feature of Nepal – to the dismay of Hindu nationalists.(p-7 of  Mr. Rangrol's unpublished thesis)

The literature used to help answer the research question is: Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State; Nikki R. Keddie, The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do “Fundamentalisms” Appear?; and Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms Around the World.

According to Mr. Rangdrol, following were the four main reasons for the decline of religious nationalism in Nepal:

1. There was no failed post-colonial secular nation-building experience:. Most the nations where religious nationalism has arisen in the last three decades were witness to a high expectations period after independence from European powers when a primarily secular leadership took over and led the country. However, this leadership failed to deliver and there was marked disappointment. The ensuing soul-searching by the people (and efforts of the religious elite) made religious nationalism popular. Nepal was never colonized so there was no secular legacy. Nepal was united by Gorkha King Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1769 as a Hindu Kingdom and remained so till 2006. Rangdrol describes how Hinduism was linked to the Nepali Kingdom from the start and how Nepali Kings and Ranas promoted Hinduism and proclaimed Nepal as the real and the only Hindu Kingdom in the world as India, despite being bigger, was ruled by initially by the Mughals and then by the British:

In 1769, Prithivi Narayan Shah, brought small independent states, chiefdoms and principalities of different ethnicities and religions under his control and created modern Nepal. The first Gorkha King declared Nepal asali Hindustan, the “true land of Hindus,” and “garden of four varnas and thirty-six jats.” The kings became widely revered as an incarnation of god Vishnu, one of the main gods of the modern Hindu pantheon. Though scholars disagree on the intensity with which Hinduisation and cultural assimilation was thereafter implemented, it remains clear that Nepal espoused the identity of a Hindu state from its very inception, and that over time non-Hindu indigenous, nature-worshipping, animist or Buddhist people have been gradually ‘Hinduized’ as a result of the conquest of the Hindu Kings and the migration of Parbatiyas (high-caste hill people) to different parts of Nepal.” In 1846, members of a powerful family, the Ranas, relegated the Gorkha monarchy to a secondary role and effectively became the rulers of Nepal, establishing a legacy of dictatorial prime ministers that lasted over a century.
The Ranas chose to build on the Hindu foundations that the Gorkha Kings had laid before them: In 1854, Jangabahadur, the first Rana minister, introduced laws based on Hinduism and divided the country hierarchically, subordinating all other nationalities to the Brahmins and Kshetris (Khas) ruling class. The civil code of 1854 the Muluki Ain (law of the land) cemented the cast system and ensured that the rulers would exercise total control over a static society: “Grounded in the Hindu idea of ritual purity, the Muluki Ain regulated the lives of every citizen from birth to death, making social or political mobility almost impossible.” From then, the process of Hinduisation under the Ranas though not overtly aggressive but rather “gradual and almost imperceptible” had its effects, of which the slow, piecemeal adoption of Hindu traditions and the dominance of the Higher castes. One political function of this was to project a distinct image of Nepal vis-à-vis India which was seen as “defiled” by Mughal Muslim rule and called pejoratively “Muglan” (land of Mughals). Jang Bahadur Rana thus spoke: “We have our own country, a Hindu rajya [state], where laws prescribe the cows shall not be slaughtered; nor women and Brahmins sentenced to capital punishment…In this age of Kali this is the only where Hindus rule.” The Rana rule came to an abrupt end in the 1950s. This tumultuous decade also saw Nepal’s first democratic experiment, which lasted until 1960 when the Gorkha dynasty staged a royal coup and took back the power it has lost to the Ranas a century before. (p-24-25)

Source: Nationalism vs. Patriotism: What will save Nepal?

In 1962, King Mahendra came up with a new constitution under which the king not only reigned but also ruled on top of a panchayat regime. The new constitution enshrined rights of all Nepalis but the position of Hinduism was also secured. Nepal was declared a Hindu kingdom and cow, the national animal, and promoting conversion of religion was prohibited. The king was the source of all power and he had to be a Hindu of Aryan descent:

Article 20: His Majesty-the Source of Power
(1) In this Constitution the words ‘His Majesty’ mean His Majesty the King for the time being reigning, being a descendant of King Prithivi Narayan Shah and adherent of Aryan culture and Hindu religion.
(2) The sovereignty of Nepal is vested in His Majesty and all powers-executive, legislative and judicial emanate from Him. These powers are exercised by His Majesty through the organs established by or under this Constitution and other laws for the time being in force keeping in view the interest and wishes of His Majesty’s subjects according to the highest traditions of the Shah dynasty. (1962 Constitution)
Furthermore, the Panchayat regime safeguarded the continuance of traditional Hindu customs and religion at the lower level.

This system continued till 1990 when large-scale demonstrations forced the king to give up power. In the aftermath, for the first time in Nepal, secularism was discussed as an alternative to religious nationalism. The 1990 constitution replaced the party-less Panchayat system with a democratic multi-party system. There were more rights for minorities and the hold of monarchy and culture and tradition (of which Hinduism was a big part) was reduced. However, Nepal was still a Hindu kingdom and cow the national animal (1990 Constitution).

The 1990 Constitution continued till 2006. The period under the 1990 Constitution was tumultuous. Nepali Maoists started a civil war in 1996 and a royal massacre happened in which Crown Prince Dipendra killed nine members of the royal family (including King and Queen) before killing himself. The new King Gyanendra also showed his assertiveness by dismissing several governments and, in the end, imposing a state of emergency to directly rule Nepal.

It is obvious from the above discussion that Nepal was never secular. It remained a united Hindu kingdom from 1769 till 2006, ruled by a Hindu god-king, who claimed to be an incarnation of one of the principal deities of Hinduism, Vishnu. 

2. Nepal was a fragile and poor country: Literature on religious nationalism indicates that a weak state may lead people and elites to look for answers to what went wrong. As mentioned above, it was the failure of the secular experiment (in terms of economic, social and political development) that has resulted in the rise of religious nationalism in many countries. Nepal had the opposite experience of these countries. It did not experience the failure of the secular experiment; it experienced the disastrous consequences of a religious experiment. As Rangdrol explains, Nepal, social and economic indicators were one of the worse in the world:

Things were not well in the Hindu Kingdom. Nepal has a history of totalitarianism, punctuated by coups, popular revolutions, and democratic experiments that only highlighted the governing elite’s political immaturity and proclivity for corruption. As the authors of People Politics and Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepal explain, legitimacy rests to a great extent on economic development.125 Nepal is one of the poorest nations in Asia. Four out of ten people live with less than one Dollar a day. Nepal ranks 138 and 147 out of 177 in the Human Development and Gross Domestic Product indexes.126 The infrastructure, especially in the capital, cannot support its growing population. Traffic is abysmal and dangerous; sewage overflows daily and spreads deadly disease in the monsoon rain, and the air quality ranks Kathmandu the second most polluted city in Asia.(p-38)
Therefore, people rejected the religious nationalism and opted for something new and different i.e. secular nationalism. 

3. No internal or external enemy that belonged to another religion: Threat from religious groups, different from one's own, is one of the primary reasons for the rise in religious nationalism in many countries. When a group identifies its enemy group on the basis of their religion, religion becomes not only a marker but also the primary reason for the conflict. The enemy group can be internal or external i.e. within the borders or outside it. According to the 2001 Census, Hindus constitute more than 80% of the Nepali population. The biggest religious minority are Buddhists, who are around 8% of the population, and most Hindus consider them a part of Hinduism, not a minority. Muslims and Christians, around 4% and 0.5% respectively, are the only "real" minorities but there was no history of tension between Hindus and Muslims and Christian as described by Rangdol:

Religious nationalist movements are typically exploiting threats of an “other,” which helps them mobilise people to their cause. But that “other” is difficult to locate in Nepal. Nepal was never a colony, neither Christians nor Muslims invaded it, it has experienced no large-scale inter-religious violence nor any other type of traumatic event that can be credibly blamed on this or that religious minority...it is clear that religious demographics show a solid Hindu majority with Buddhists for main minority. It is not customary to talk about Hindu-Buddhist confrontations, and it is very difficult for most Hindus to demonise or speak of a ‘Buddhist threat’ for the simple reason that they take Buddhism as a branch of Hinduism. (p-42)
Maoists, although instrumental in the fall of religious nationalism in Nepal, were also not considered enemy:
If not the secular west, the local secular elite, or religious minorities, who else then could personify an anti-Hindu enemy? The Maoists perhaps? After all, it is them who have asked for a secular state at the point of AK-47s, and they are communists and therefore should be in principle atheists? Although many religious nationalists perceive Maoists as enemies144 – being the brute force behind the fall of the Hindu Kingdom – they have not been widely portrayed directly in terms of an “anti-religious” force.145 In general, Maoists do not fit the anti-religious/atheist communist stereotype. The Maoists seem to have managed a skilled balancing act: on the one hand harvesting the grievances left by decades of pro-Hindu discrimination, and, on the other, being careful enough not to harm Hindu or traditional sentiments. Though the CPN-M official banners display the usual communist avatars146 alongside their leader Prachanda, they have differed from Mao and some of his acolytes in that they have not proactively promoted atheism and anti-religious policies. Although it is reported that there were incidents in the People’s War, especially at the beginning, that involved iconoclastic gestures such as destroying temples or intimidating priests, they were quick to realise the strategic downside of those methods. They have managed to recruit all the marginalised people of the Hindu state system while they have also displayed respect for the Hindu religion and its traditions. (p-43)

Similarly, although Rangdol does not talk about it, there was no external enemy that belonged to another religion. Nepal has no external enemies but Nepalis often feel resentment towards India due to historic land and water disputes, the annexation of Sikkim, both actual and perceived slights by the big neighbor as well as direct intervention by India in Nepali affairs (See Bollywood Meets Nepali Nationalism). The religious "other," therefore, does not even exist outside Nepal, contributing to the decline of religious nationalism in Nepal.

4. Top-down religious nationalist structure: There were no religious nationalist political parties in Nepal during the from the 1950s to 2006. The major reason for this was the presence of Hindu king and declaration of Nepal as a Hindu kingdom. With a four-fifths majority in population and the most powerful man in Nepal on Hinduism side, there was apparently no need for a Hindu nationalist party. Compared to India, there was no history of religious mobilization in Nepal by Hindu nationalists. Therefore, when the king was ousted, religious nationalism went with him:

Part of the reason why there were no Hindu nationalist parties even in the 1990s rests on the historical structure of religious nationalism in Nepal: its top-bottom configuration. Hindu nationalism had been imposed from the top with authoritarian means from the very beginning. The institution of Kingship always secured the Hindu state, and therefore no bottom-up religiopolitical activism was ever needed to maintain religious nationalism...If one compares this trajectory to India the contrast is telling. In India, Hindu nationalism has a century of training by trial and error...In Nepal, with the King in a corner and intensified Maoist pressure, no strong alternative mediums were there to protect the interests of the Hindu state, and none of the political parties saw it as a vital part of their agenda. Hindu political parties did not emerge because there was no demand or need for them; state Hinduness was secure with the King. The 1990 secular debate was an alarming moment Hindu nationalists did not heed, there was no such instinct, no such culture. But not much could be expected in such a short lapse of time because social networks take time to form. (p-48)





Monday, December 12, 2016

Indonesia: Ahok's trial and religious right resurgence

Indonesia is not an ordinary Muslim-majority country (MMC). With a population of around 260 million, it is the biggest MMC in the world. In the 1940s, after getting independence from Netherlands, its elite decided to  adopt a secular Pancasila nationalism and ignored the demands for an Islamic state. The multiethnic, multireligious, and multilinguistic diversity of the Indonesian nation surely played a part in this decision. Since then, the hardliners in the religious right have been trying to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia but without much success (See the comparison of India and Indonesia). In 2014 elections, the religious right again tried to eke out a victory and to increase the role of Islam in state affairs but they were soundly beaten (See Indonesian Elections: A Victory for Pancasila Nationalism).

Currently, the religious right is again resurging in Indonesia as Jakarta's governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Chinese nickname Ahok) faces blasphemy charges. Ahok became governor of Jakarta after the previous governor Jokowi won the 2014 Indonesian presidential election. Ahok, a popular deputy governor, took charge of Jakarta governorship in November 2014. Well ahead of his rivals, Ahok was due to be re-elected as Jakarta's governor in February 2017, despite his double-minority status (a Christian Chinese in a Muslim-majority Javanese country). Ahok was expected to win around 40% of the votes polled. Ahok was such a strong candidate that the opposition parties initially tried to put up a single candidate to defeat him but failed to do so. One group of opposition parties, Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and Gerindra, then nominated former culture and education minister Anies Baswedana, who had fought against the PKS and Gerindra in the 2014 elections, demostrating lack of strong candidates for Jakarta governorship in these parties. Another group of opposition parties, the Democratic Party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the United Development Party (PPP), decided to support Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, the son of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Agus was a political newcomer as he had just resigned from the military (See The profiles of the Jakarta election contenders: Ahok, Agus, Anies).


Indonesian President Joko Widodo with Ahok (left) after the latter's swearing in as governor on November 19, 2014 (Source: Indonesian President cancels Australia trip after violent protests)


Ahok was supposed to win easily in the second round. But then something happened on 30th September that completely changed the scenario. Ahok, in a election rally, accused the Islamic hardliners of using the following quranic verse Al-Maida 51 to deceive voters to not vote for non-Muslims like him:

"O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you - then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people." (Al-Maida 51)

The verse, according to many religious scholars, is for a specific context and Prophet Muhammad had many Christian and Jewish allies during his lifetime. However, Indonesian hardliners were not letting Ahok get away and accused Ahok of insulting Quran/Islam:

Ahok provoked the ire of hardliners after he cited the Al Maidah 51 verse from the Qur’an during a campaign visit to the Thousand Islands in September. He said the verse had been used to deceive voters and justify the assertion that Muslims should not be led by non-Muslims. The governor later apologised, saying it was not his intention to cause any offence.
However, an edited version of those comments was subsequently circulated online, changed in a way to make the governor’s comments appear more offensive, angering hardliners further. As a Christian, and the first ethnic Chinese governor of Jakarta, Ahok is somewhat of an anomaly in Indonesia’s political scene. The capital’s willingness to be led by a man who represents a double minority has in the past been hailed a symbol of progress and pluralism, the latter a virtue enshrined in the Indonesian constitution.
In a country where 90% of its more than 240 million people follow Islam, the national motto is, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, or unity in diversity. (See Jakarta's Christian governor to face blasphemy trial over Islam insult claim)

Initially, Indonesian government led by Ahok's friend and former boss President Jokowi did not pay much attention to the blasphemy accusations but later religious groups managed to gather more than a hundred thousand protesters in Jakarta twice on November 4th (around 100,000-150,000) and December 2nd (around 200,000) forcing government on the backfoot. The government decided to charge Ahok under the blasphemy law and President Jokowi assured that he would be neutral. President Jokowi even joined the protesters in Friday prayers on December 2nd. Counter-protest rallies, organized by the Indonesian military, on November 30th across the country, affirmed the unity and diversity of Indonesia and may have helped government ignore more extreme demands of the protesters, like arresting Ahok.


Source: Jakarta protests: Muslims turn out in force against Christian governor Ahok

Ahok's trial is set to begin in December. Irrespective of the result of the trial, it is clear that religious forces, which were soundly defeated in 2014, are now resurgent and emboldened. Some have suggested that the whole idea of focusing on the 55 seconds of more than hundred minutes long Ahok's speech was to defeat Ahok and lessen the chances of an unbeatable Jokowi-Ahok presidential ticket in 2019 (See Commentary: Indonesia's Democracy Making Progress in Reverse).

There is no doubt that besides religious prejudice, racism and Ahok's aggressive personality has also contributed to the success of protest rallies:
Ahok has never been afraid of ruffling feathers. He is loathed as much as he is loved, with his policy of evicting slum dwellers angering the urban poor and his plans for the reclamation of Jakarta Bay attacked by environmentalists.
His political rivals have successfully exploited anger over the alleged blasphemy comments to undermine both Ahok and his ally, President Joko. Ahok is now behind the other gubernatorial candidates in some polls.
There is also little doubt racism is at play. Only around 1 to 4 percent of Indonesia's 250 million people are ethnic Chinese, but their economic success has caused resentment to bubble away for centuries. Ahok has been described as both a "Chinese bastard" and "the Chinese Infidel". (See Verdict in Ahok blasphemy trial likely to put Indonesia's democracy in the dock)

Will Ahok succeed in his political and judical trails and  what will be the repercussions of these trails on Indonesia's religious pluralism? We will see.

Saturday, June 11, 2016

India: Contest between Secular and Hindu Nationalism or between Developmental and Cultural Nationalism

Quoting Rabindranath Tagore (India has never had a real sense of nationalism), Amalendu Misra argues that there are many Indian nationalisms, not one. In his article, India has never had a single dominant nationalism – and it won’t any time soon, he writes that previously there was fight between two types of nationalisms, rightwing religious (Hindutva) nationalism and leftist secular (civic) nationalism but now the situation is different:
Interestingly, contemporary India is plagued by a miasma of voices who cannot agree on a unifying national identity. Indian nationalism has become a dog’s breakfast; it feels as if every day, a new group demands that the national imagination be reorganised according to its own vision and logic.
He gives examples of martial nationalism, cyber-nationalism, Marxism, and backward” castes' reactionary nationalism, etc. He concludes:
All the while, their sophisticated pundit and politician counterparts wage their dogfights over nationalism on live TV while cloaking themselves in one ideological colour or the other, all in the name of Indian identity. This all seems to vindicate Tagore’s original claim: the nature of Indian nationalism has never been a settled matter, and it doesn’t look set to organise itself any time soon.
It seems that Misra is not distinguishing between state and popular nationalism. At the popular level, there are always numerous types of nationalisms. In all countries, different ethnic, religious, economic and linguistic groups and classes disagree on what defines their nation. When pundits and politicians are talking about Indian nationalism, they are focusing on state nationalism. What kind of nationalism is or will be propagated by the Indian state? In India today, the fight appears to be clearly between religious and secular nationalisms. Or is it not?

For Radhika Desai, focusing on only the cultural aspects of nationalism and ignoring the economic aspects, is a reductionist approach. So, for her, religious and secular nationalisms present only a partial picture of the reality. She identifies two types of nationalism, developmental and cultural. She argues that nationalisms did not decline in the third quarter of the 20th century; they underwent went a transformation, from developmental nationalism to cultural nationalism. She explains the change in an article:

As the world entered the second half of the 20th century, nation-states could be divided according to whether they attempted to restrain (under social democratic regimes), eliminate (under communist ones) or harness (under developmentalist ones) the power of capital in the interest of wider groups. Japan’s ‘miracle’ years, Nehru’s, Nasser’s and Soekarno’s devel¬opmentalism, as well as Mao’s communism, stood in sharp contrast to the market-driven, capital-friendly regimes that replaced them two or more decades later and to the colonial and fascist ones which had preceded them. 



Nehru, Nkrumah, Nasser, Soekarno & Tito at Bandung, 1961 (Source: R. Desai's article)

Developmental regimes featured distinct developmental nationalisms. In Asia, they emerged in anti-imperialist struggles. Popular mobilisations (or minimally, as in Sri Lanka, the requirements of popular legitimacy) required these nationalisms to attempt to construct political economies of development by promoting productivity and relative equality, although accomplishment varied among the resulting capitalist developmental or communist states. While the cultural politics of these nationalisms certainly featured some more or less uncritical celebration of the ‘national culture’, developmental nationalisms typically adopted a critical stance towards important aspects of the inherited culture, as for example, the critical view of caste in Indian nationalism, or the criticism of the imperial and Confucian heritage in China. In the developmental vision, national cultures were to evolve in more scientific, rational and progressive, even internationalist, directions. In short, developmental nationalisms looked forward to brighter national futures as modern egalitarian cultures and polities and as economies of generalised prosperity in a comity of nations: they typically promised a better tomorrow. 
Rather than declining in the last quarter of the 20th century, nationalisms seemed to acquire greater force, and not just in reaction to ‘globalisation’. And their nature changed. The cultural nationalisms that displaced the earlier developmental nationalisms had different names in different nations— ‘Asian values’, ‘Hindutva’, ‘Confucianism’ and ‘Nihonjinron’, for example. The cultural politics and political economy they now embodied also underwent changes and the emphasis shifted from the latter to the former. The political economy of cultural nationalisms was typically neoliberal—flagrantly unequal and not primarily concerned with increasing production or productivity so much as with the enrichment of the (expanded but still tiny) dominant middle, propertied and capitalist classes. The new nationalisms’ cultural politics—whether conceived in religious, ethnic or cultural terms— conceived culture as static, pre-given, and original although, amid the intensified commercialism and commodification of neoliberal capitalism, it was less so than ever before, and attributed to it almost magical powers of legitimation and pacification over potentially restive forsaken majorities. Thinking of cultural nationalisms as majoritarian and homogenising is easy, but also mistaken: for in the neoliberal context, cultural difference—different levels of competence in and belonging to the national culture—served to justify the economic inequalities produced by neoliberal, market-driven policies. Cultural nationalisms often took apparently multicultural and ‘tolerant’ forms as markets performed the work of privileging and marginalization more stealthily and more effectively. In contrast to the popular mobilisations on which developmental nationalisms rested, cultural nationalisms throve on the relative political disengagement and disenfranchisement which neoliberal inequalities produced. The extremist wings that cultural nationalisms had in many countries were a function of this lack of popular support. In harking back to more or less distant ‘glorious pasts’, it seemed as though what cultural nationalisms offered was not a better tomorrow, but a ‘better yesterday’. 
In a presentation on Hindutva, Desai presents the following differences between developmental nationalism, which was dominant in India in the past, to cultural nationalism (Hindutva), which is dominant now.

Indian (Developmental) Nationalism
Hindu (Cultural) Nationalism
Developmental
Neo-liberal
Secular
Communal/Religious
Material gains
(share of ) Cultural glory
Inclusive
Exclusive
Popular
Elitist
Egalitarian
Inegalitarian
Better tomorrow
Better yesterday

While Desai's exposition of change from developmental to cultural nationalisms is certainly enlightening, it is difficult to accept that egalitarianism and popularity are intrinsic characteristics of developmental nationalism. One of the reasons, developmental nationalism could not survive, or remain dominant, was that it was not egalitarian and became less and less popular. It purported to be concerned about the lower classes and promised to build an inclusive society but it was elitist and mostly enriched upper classes, politicians, and bureaucrats. Conversely, one of the main reasons for the success of cultural nationalism is that it is less elitist and probably more popular now. If Nehru is the quintessential developmental nationalist and Modi is the quintessential cultural nationalist, it is clear that Nehru was much more elitist than Modi. Neo-liberalism, an important part of cultural nationalism according to Desai, is focused on this life and future, not on the next life and past. So, it is injudicious to claim that cultural nationalism is only about the past glories. Cultural nationalists certainly harp on the past but they also promise a better tomorrow. For instance, Modi's national campaign in 2014 was probably as much focused on the future as on the past.

In conclusion, the distinction between developmental and cultural nationalism is not clear and using Desai's framework muddles our understanding of Indian nationalism. I think secular and religious nationalism is a much better way to understand the changes Indian nationalism has witnessed since independence in 1947.