Blasphemy convictions in Egypt increasing

Blasphemy trials and convictions are increasing under President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. This was not what many, who protested against Egypt's first and only fairly elected President (Morsi) in June 2013, expected. President Morsi was a member of Muslim Brotherhood and was accused to forcing religion on the Egyptian society. General Sisi, who led the coup against President Morsi, was supposed to be liberal and progressive. However, like all past military strong-men/dictators of Egypt, Sisi soon adopted authoritarian ways and decided to treat any opposition to his rule brutally. Human rights and liberalism were ignored and anyone talking about political freedoms was arrested or silenced in other ways. Accusitions of terrorism was used to silence religious opposition while liberal opposition to Sisi was condemned because it defamed Egyptian nation, Egyptian institutions and Islam allegedly on the behest of its foreign masters. Blasphemy charges is a very convenient tool as it can even be used against devout and practicing Muslims. Pakistani government and military has also used blasphemy to silence opposition.

Following are some of the articles on blasphemy trails in Egypt

From International Policy Digest:

While a spirit of critical thinking can be detected in the writings of many Egyptian intellectuals about sensitive religion-related topics, these intellectuals have been systematically subjected to hate campaigns and crimes according to Human Rights Watch. Here are two examples.
In the 1990s, the story of professor Farag Foda, an activist in the field of human rights, is a case in point. He was assassinated by Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya in 1992 not because of his atheism and infidelity but because of his harsh criticism of the violence of armed Islamic groups. While Foda was a critic of religious intolerance, his murderers, religious zealots, proved him right. Because the killers didn’t like Foda’s writings, they simply killed him.
The Egyptian liberal theologian and university professor, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, also suffered a major religious persecution in the 1990s and had to flee to the Netherlands. The crime of Abu Zayd was his academic work. When certain individuals refused to accept his academic research, they took it to the Egyptian court instead of the Egyptian debate. The court declared him an apostate and based on this sentence, he was not to remain married to his wife Ibtihal Younis, a French Literature professor. The logic behind the forced divorce is that Muslim women are not permitted to marry non-Muslims.
Constitutionally, blasphemy (contempt of monotheistic religions) is based on article 98 of the Egyptian Penal Code, which was added 1982 and then amended in 2006. According to this law, citizens who insult or ridicule heavenly religions, propagate extreme ideas for the purpose of inciting strife or contribute to damaging national unity can be confined for a period of no less than six months and no more than five years. This is, in other words, a legal license for the Egyptian state and its religious institution to persecute its own intellectuals. (read the article Don’t Blaspheme in Egypt)

From Ahram online:

Members of the satirical performance art troupe Atfal El-Shawaree (Street Children) posted a video online that some deemed "blasphemous," calling on authorities to charge them under a law that critics say is often misused to violate the right to freedom of expression. 

"Religion has its sanctity, the video posted by this group undoubtedly defamed Islam," Ahmed Kereima, a scholar of Islamic Sharia, said in a phone interview with TV host Ahmed Moussa on Saturday. "Therefore I immediately call on the top prosecutor to charge them with defaming Islam."

On Sunday, Alexandria prosecutors started looking into a complaint filed by a lawyer in Egypt's second biggest city against the group for "insulting religion." In May, the troupe posted a video mimicking the speech of anchors on the state-owned religious Al-Quran Al-Karim (The Holy Quran) radio station. 

Egypt's anti-blasphemy law – Article 98 (f) of the penal code – has been used recently to target several people in high-profile cases, including four Christian students who were sentenced to five years; renowned writer Fatma Naaout who was sentenced to three years; and TV presenter Islam El-Beheiry who was sentenced to one year.

Article 98 (f) criminalises “whoever exploits religion in order to promote extremist ideologies by word of mouth, in writing or in any other manner, with seditious intent, disparaging or contempt of any divine religion or its adherents, or threatening national unity, shall be punished with imprisonment from six months to five years, or pay a fine of at least 500 Egyptian pounds.”

Naout was sentenced to three years in jail for saying on her Facebook page that the Eid Al-Adha tradition of slaughtering sheep was the "greatest massacre committed by human beings." El-Beheiry is currently serving a one-year sentence in prison after he stirred controversy by questioning the credibility of some sources of the Prophet Muhammad's sayings, a prime source of Islamic jurisprudence. In February, four Christian minors were sentenced to five years in jail after making a video mocking members of the Islamic State group beheading an individual after the militants finished Islamic prayers...

Many in Egypt – a conservative and deeply religious country where the predominant Sunni Muslim majority constitutes 88 percent of the population – consider religion a "red line" that should not be crossed, at least publicly,  not even by state officials. This "red line" was put in place by legislators in 1981 – during the El-Zawya El-Hamra religious strife – when the Egyptian penal code was amended to prohibit the "insulting of religions."

The law was enacted at the time to protect the rights of religious minorities. However, some lawyers and religious researchers believe that the law is now being abused.

Although the Egyptian constitution –passed in 2014 in a majority referendum – protects freedom of thought, belief and expression, many of the country's clerics, officials and religion institutions are against the questioning of established, mainstream religious beliefs.

The penal code has three articles that criminalise acts that can broadly be defined as blasphemous; articles 160, 161 and 98 (f). (read the article Egypt's anti-blasphemy law: Defence of religion or tool for persecution?)

A still image from the satirical performance by Atfal El-Shawaree (Street Children) 

Source: Egypt's anti-blasphemy law: Defence of religion or tool for persecution?

From Al-Monitor:

Hazem, like other activists who had hoped the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood regime would usher in a new era of greater freedom and more openness, is now deeply disappointed.

“I was optimistic back in 2015 when I heard President [Abdel Fattah al-] Sisi’s promises that religion would never again have a say in politics. I believed he would steer the country toward a more liberal direction. It hasn’t happened,” he said.

The prosecution of a prominent filmmaker over accusations of contempt of religion for a “controversial” scene in his film and an attack on a church in the district of Giza on Dec. 22 by a mob calling for the church’s demolition are just some of the recent developments signaling a trend of growing conservatism and increased intolerance in the society. Film director Amr Salama was summoned for interrogation by prosecutors on Dec. 18 over his film “Sheikh Jackson,” Egypt’s submission for the Oscars. This happened after a lawyer filed a legal complaint against the filmmaker and the film’s cast, accusing them of “defaming Islam.” The lawsuit was prompted by a scene in the film that shows a Michael Jackson lookalike dancing inside a mosque as worshippers pray. The film has since been referred by prosecutors to Al-Azhar for review to determine if it is indeed “blasphemous.”

Salama’s prosecution comes on the heels of several high-profile convictions over contempt of religion charges since the coup against Morsi in 2013. Blasphemy convictions have intensified under Sisi, with more such cases and convictions during his era than during the Morsi era. Despite his pluralistic discourse, Sisi is appeasing the ultraconservative Salafists who supported him in the 2014 presidential election in the conviction that any secularist tendencies on his part would undermine his base in the street, say analysts. (read the article Egypt’s parliament in bid to ban atheism)

Why a secular party is not allowed in Egypt?

Ahmed Fouad's article in Al-Monitor Is Egypt ready for a secular party? is about a recent attempt to form a secular party in Egypt. It is called Egyptian Secular Party (الحزب العلماني المصري). The article also traces three previous attempts to start such a party in Egypt. All of these attempts failed as Fouad explained:

1. In 2004, Mohsen Lotfi al-Sayed and other intellectuals submitted incorporation request for a secular party Hizb-Masr al-Um (Mother Egypt Party). This request was rejected by the chamber of political parties’ affairs. After removing the reference to secularism from the incorporation charter and changing the name to Al Hizb al-Masri al-Liberali (Liberal Egyptian Party), another request was submitted but it was also rejected by the Mubarak administration.
2. In 2011, novelist Alaa Hamed claimed that he wanted to start a secular party but was attacked by some Salafi leaders of Zifta city. Zifta residents denied his claim but no party was established. Fouad informs that Hamid was convicted of blasphemy in 1990 because of his book, The Void in a Man’s Mind: God’s Trial,
3. In July 2013, after President Morsi's ouster in a coup, Shiite leader Bahaa Anwar called for the establishment of a secular Fajr Party and demanded disbanding of all religious parties. The name of the party was later changed to Secular Egypt Party but again no party was registered.

Egyptian Secular Party is formed by a group of people, most well-known of which is Hesham Ouf. Ouf is an Egyptian businessman and his previous political experience is limited to owning a marketing research firm that worked for Mohamed ElBaradei’s and Amr Moussa’s campaigns in the 2012 presidential elections. Egyptian Secular Party, according to New secular party to 'challenge religious dominance', wants to separate religion from politics, abolish religious education, and limit the power of Al-Azhar University that according to the party has become a state within a state.

Egyptian Secular Party formation has been widely criticized. Its leaders have been called crazy, atheists, extremists and collaborators and its agenda has been declared unconstitutional and against religious values of the Egyptian people. The charge of unconstitutionality is based on two grounds. First, secularism is a termed a religion (as Islam, Judaism etc.) and as Egyptian constitution bans all religion-based political parties, it is declared that a secular party is also unconstitutional. Second, secular party is deemed unconstitutional because it is against sharia, which is a part of the Egyptian constitution.

Fouad is not very enthusiastic about this latest attempt to establish secular party because of the lack of support from the Egyptian state:

The chances of establishing the party remain remote, especially in light of the lack of a clear position by the state. Establishing the party anytime soon could be difficult, given the question of its constitutionality and opposition from those who consider it a violation of religious beliefs.

With it strong stance against political Islam and religion-based parties, it appears strange that Sisi's administration is not only not promoting this party but also reluctant to register it. Registering this party would have paid dividends outside Egypt as many Western governments would have more inclined to consider President Sisi a liberal and support him. However, the attitude of Sisi administration is non-committal. Why governments against political Islam are not supporting secularism when it also helps them improve their international standing and prospects of aid?

The main reasons appear to be an increasing mixing of Islam with nationalism and a general anger against the Western governments in the Muslim societies. These reasons can also be considered as a form of nativism that rejects the Western influences (but accepts its technological, scientific accomplishments) and searches for authenticity. Secularism, in this discourse and environment, is linked with the West, extreme liberalism and atheism and thus becomes illegitimate on two grounds. First, it is wrong because it is linked with the West which is termed as source of most of the troubles; hence the use of terms collaborators and traitors for secularists. Second, it is castigated because it is against Islam that is considered a 'native' religion and an Arab religion. Both these arguments are obviously false as there is a rich tradition of secularism in Islam and one can be a deeply religious Muslim as well as a secularist.

Muslim/Islamic secularism appears to be an oxymoron but it is not. Nader Hashmi in Islam, the State, and Political Authority: Medieval Issues and Modern Concerns (edited by Asma Afsaruddin) talks about a Muslim secularism which accepts (political, not philosophical) secularism 'while still maintaining a commitment to the principles and rituals of Islam.' This indigenous secularism is authentically Islamic, based on Islamic precepts, but is functionally secular. State is not against religion and religious groups are allowed in the public/political sphere but civil rights of minorities, women and others are rigorously protected.

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im in his book Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a  goes further and claims that secularism and secular state are more consistent with Sharia and history of Muslim societies than Islamic state and Sharia enforcement as a state law (p-268)

Despite criticism, Ouf is hopeful that his party would be registered:

The Constitution bans religious political parties, yet there are religious political parties operating. Why would the (government) committee then ban a secular political party, established in accordance with the Constitution?

Arab Nationalism: The end?

Adeed Dawisha's article remember's Arab nationalism (See Requiem for Arab Nationalism), once a powerful force, aiming to revive the glory of Arab nation.

He talks about Nasser, the undisputed leader of Arab nationalism, and the effect of 1967 defeat.

It took some time for the light to go out on Arab nationalism, but its power generator went down in June 1967. After the Six-Day War, the slide of Arab nationalism toward political marginality became irreversible. And what finished it was the fact that Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser, lost the war. Egypt's devastating defeat was Arab nationalism's mortal loss, for the fate of Arab nationalism during the struggles, triumphs, and reversals of the 1950s and 1960s was inexorably linked to Egypt and its charismatic president.

Had Syria or Jordan, or even both, lost the war, it would not have been the unmitigated disaster for Arab nationalism that it proved to be. But Arab nationalism could not survive the abject humiliation inflicted on its acknowledged prophet, who, through his shrill and overzealous propaganda machine, had promised a fabled triumph in al-Ma'raka al-Masiriya, the battle of destiny.

Arab countries and their flags 

Source: Islam and Arab Nationalism الإسلام و العربية الجنسية in the 21st century

The main competitor of Arab nationalism was, of course, individual country/territorial nationalisms. Arab nationalism was all about unity and indivisibility of the proud Arab nation but gradually borders between Arabs became important. 

Part of the reason for this "sanctification" of borders was that Arab political and economic elites developed a vested interest in the survival of each particular state. Not surprisingly, these elites were loath to put themselves at risk for the sake of Arab unity.So they argued that Arab nationalism was really just a license for some elites to browbeat others. The advocates of territorial nationalism also relied on geo-political and cultural arguments in making their case. They insisted that Arab nationalists had failed to understand that while various Arab states might accept an overarching Arab identity, geographic and even cultural differences were real enough to preclude an organic unity. And they were right: the decline of Arab nationalism from 1961 validated their argument.

But territorial nationalisms were not the only enemy. Many sub-state and supra-state identities also damaged the Arab nationalist's cause. Tribal loyalties, argues Adeed, were powerful in many Arab countries and didn't disappear as Arab nationalism and territorial nationalisms fought for the primary loyalty of the Arabs.

In some states, tribal affiliations formed the backbone of popular support that shielded local leaderships from the advancing tide of revolutionary Arab nationalism. Such was the case in Saudi Arabia, where the tribal-based demographic structure contributed to the stability of the political order.Successive Saudi monarchs, in the process of shifting the loyalty of the Bedouin from tribe to state, made sure to act and be perceived as tribal overlords.

Bedouin military personnel were also responsible for the survival of Jordan's young King Hussein, in the face of seemingly impossible odds. Jordan's "Arab Legion" was initially formed to combat Bedouin anarchy in the new country. In a stroke of genius, the Arab Legion's founder, the British officer John Bagot Glubb, decided to harness the warlike qualities of the Bedouins by recruiting them into the army. Very quickly, the Arab Legion became the Arab world's most disciplined fighting force. But one thing that Glubb did not change was tribal solidarity, which he nurtured every step of the way to make the Arab Legion "the Bedouin prop of the Hashemite polity.

Source: Arab League, Wikipedia

Coming to the focus of this blog, religious identities also didn't allow Arab nationalism to take hold. Sectarian loyalties divided Arabs and in many countries, especially when they were politicized as in Iraq. These loyalties were weakened and laid dormant during the heyday of Arab nationalism and Nasser but they were back with a vengeance in the 1970s.

Iraq's sectarian divisions formed another hurdle in the Arab nationalist march. The country's Shi'ite majority never overcame its suspicion of Arab nationalism as a Sunni project. Shi'ite grievances against the Sunnis were primarily political, pertaining to Sunni dominance over Iraq's political order. The Shi'ites would point to the paucity of their numbers among the decision-making elite and in the ranks of the administrative and military institutions.

It is not that the Shi'ites did not believe in Arab nationalism, or that they did not consider themselves to be Arabs. Shi'ite men of letters penned some of the marvels of Arabic literature. Iraqis of all religions and denominations flocked to the Arab nationalist cause under Abdel Nasser's leadership in the 1950s and 1960s. But that did not mean that tribalism and sectarianism were erased. They were too deeply ingrained to disappear; they simply retreated into the recesses of people's consciousness. Once Arab nationalism began to suffer reverses and setbacks, and Abdel Nasser's ability to work his magic came into question, all the particularistic, anti-national tendencies reemerged and even surged to the forefront.

Although Adeed talks about 'radical Islam', as the last competitor of Arab nationalism, how he explains it, this 'radical' Islam is closer to what others have called political Islam or religious nationalism ('Radical' Islam is usually used to describe militant Islam). Political Islam and Arab nationalism share many myths. The glory and grandeur of Arab nation happened after Arabs accepted Islam and Islam is empty without Arab contribution.

In one sense, this competition is surprising. The vast majority of Arabs are Muslims, and the most glorious periods of Arab history occurred during the dazzling medieval Islamic empires. Similarly, all Muslims, moderates or radicals, could not but admit the central role of the Arabs in their religion. After all, Islam was born in the Arabian Peninsula, the Prophet Muhammad was Arab, and God's message was revealed in Arabic. One would think that the two social movements would share a cooperative relationship.

Instead, it was downright hostile. Arab nationalists, from Husri to Abdel Nasser and Michel Aflaq, founder and philosopher of the Baath Party, accepted the special place that Islam occupied within the Arab nationalist movement. But they stressed only those aspects of Islam that were moral and spiritual in nature. They resolutely rejected Islam's political and constitutional implications and insisted on its complete subordination to Arab nationalism. The nationalists vehemently argued that it was not religious but linguistic and historical ties that would knit the Arab nation into a cohesive whole.

Religious nationalists, of course, could not accept religious loyalty being relegated by ethnolinguistic loyalty. They denounced Arab nationalists and claimed Arab nationalism means denying the primacy of Islam/God/Prophet. Adeed, in the following section, only talks about militants but there were many more Arab Muslims who silently disliked Arab nationalism than those who attacked it militarily.

This was sheer blasphemy to the radical Muslim groups, and nationalists became the target of these groups' jihad. The concept of jihad, holy struggle, was central to the lexicon of Islamic militancy. Jihad was to be waged against the perceived enemies of Islam—i.e., all those who would try to infuse Muslim society with alien and blasphemous ideas, imported primarily from the West. To the Muslim radicals, perhaps the greatest offenders were the secular nationalists, who propagated ethnicity at the expense of religion and advocated the separation of Islam from politics.

Adeed then talks about causes of Arab nationalism failure. But let's leave it for some other time. 

Is General Sisi leading a coalition of civic nationalists?

Crown Center of Brandies University has posted an interesting brief on the US-Egypt relations ( See "Resetting" U.S.-Egypt Relations). The authors talk about the competing narratives of the US and Egyptian policymakers about the events since July 2013 and the gap and lack of understanding about the other side. The US policymakers see the last few months as the return of military authoritarianism and the abandonment of democracy. Although the mistakes of President Morsi are acknowledged by the US and the US government has refused to label the military takeover as a coup, nevertheless, it is hesitant to engage fully with the current Egyptian regime because it is clearly undemocratic. Banning of protests and mass killing of protesters has further alienated the US policymakers.

Egyptians, however, see the events of last ten month in a completely different light. They feel that July 2013 was a revolution against authoritarianism (comparable to January/February 2011 revolution) and saved Egypt from becoming a theocratic state. Muslim Brotherhood is considered a front for terrorists and its actions since July 2013 have left no doubt in Egyptian policymaker's minds that Brotherhood is against Egyptian national interest. Many Egyptians feel angry at the suspension of the US aid and consider that US/Obama administration bent on bringing Morsi back, completely ignoring Egyptian public opinion.

Source: Egypt's General al-Sisi: The man behind the image

What is interesting from our perspective is authors, Abdel Monem Said Aly and Prof. Shai Feldman, call the group, opposed to Muslim Brotherhood and leading Egypt now (defining the competing narrative), as 'Egypt's civic nationalists' or madaniyya and define them as follows:    

Egyptian civic nationalists accept Islam as the religion of the state, as stipulated in all Egyptian constitutions since 1923, but insist that all laws be enacted by the peoples’ elected representatives in Parliament, and that disputes be adjudicated by the judiciary—that is, by civilian courts. Accordingly, they objected strongly to Article 4 of the constitution proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, providing that laws enacted would be subjected to review by al-Azhar University, which would be entrusted with verifying that they were consistent with Sharia law. They also objected to Article 219, which limited interpretation of Sharia law to a narrow school of Sunni thought, insisting instead that this task be left to the High Constitutional Court.

There are several problems with this labeling. First, the Salafist Al-Noor Party and al-Azhar University administration were part of the coalition that General Sisi used to topple President Morsi. These groups can hardly be defined as civic nationalists. Both of them argued for more role of religion in the constitution and were supporters of the Article 4. Second, although a large part of the group that supported July 2013 coup/revolution was civil nationalists, many were not. Egyptians criticized Morsi and Brotherhood not only because of their religious orientation but also due to the lack of governance and rising poverty, inequality and inefficiency. The dire economic conditions in Egypt played a prominent role in persuading Egyptians to join protests against Morsi (See Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s Biggest Challenge? The Economy, Stupid). To argue, without evidence, that all or most of the Egyptians joining the protests were angry because of Morsi/Brotherhood's religious nationalism is not correct. Moreover, since July 2013, it is clear that it is the Egyptian military that is controlling the state and civic nationalists are being used. Whenever civil society/nationalists tried to reign in the military or increase their freedoms, they were brutally suppressed (See Egypt another step backward on civil-society and Egypt’s Death Sentences, Ban of ‘April 6' Criminalize Political Opposition).  Therefore, the argument that Obama administration is not understanding civil nationalists' narrative is again not correct. Obama administration is willing to work with civil nationalists and has tried to accommodate them but military junta's undemocratic and brutal campaign against all types of opposition (including civic nationalists) cannot be ignored.

In conclusion, the brief tries to explain a very complex situation in terms of Islamists and civic nationalists. This simplifying attempt can be termed as simplistic at best and deceiving at worst. It extends the 'clash of civilizations' narrative, despite clear evidence to the contrary.      

Egyptian Politics, Islam and Muslim Brotherhood

This week an Egyptian academic and journalist Atef Said posted a blogpost on Immanent Frame: Secular, Religion and the Public Sphere. The blogpost is about the current impasse in Egyptian politics and Muslim Brotherhood future (See Three Observations on Religion, Politics and the Muslim Brotherhood).

Said made three observations. Commenting on 'Religion and Politics', he argued that religion is not out of Egyptian politics because General Sisi is himself arguing that he is saving moderate Islam from extremism and has tried to woo Salafi Al-Nour party; Sisi has also received religious endorsements; and despite somewhat less than the Constitution approved in 2012, Islam remains part of new constitution. Secondly, Said does not see an explicit participation of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in electoral politics in the near future. Said argues that although MB was banned under Mubarak too, it is different than under general Sisi because of anti-MB hysteria promoted by the current military regime; alienation and (possible) dissatisfaction of MB youth with electoral politics because of recent severe repression; and absence of any negotiations between MB and regime, a contrast to MB's negotiated electoral participation under Mubarak. Finally, Said called for a new theoretical framework to explain the four paradoxes of MB politics. MB is both an organization and a movement; it is both religious and political; it is working for both a democratic state and a Islamic state; and it is dogmatic internally and pragmatic externally.

My comments on the post are reproduced below.

An interesting article that highlights the present paradoxes and contradictions of Egyptian politics but shies away from taking sides, a difficult task in the current polarized atmosphere.

I would, however, like the author to use his detailed knowledge of Egyptian society and wider Muslim world in a more clear way. For example, while talking about religion and politics in the current Egypt, he ignores the similarities of what is happening in Egypt now with what happened under other authoritarian regimes in the past. What Sisi is doing is nothing new. Starting from Reza Shah Pahlevi of Iran (1925-41), authoritarian regimes have often posed as defender of moderate/real Islam against extremism (i.e. Islam of their enemies). They have often gotten endorsements from some religious authorities and Islam has remained part of constitutions/national identities. Other rulers that followed this trend were Afghanistan’s King Amanullah Khan (1919-29), Pakistan’s General Ayub Khan (1958-69), Iran’s Muhammad Reza Pahlevi (1941-79), Qaddafi (1969-2011), General Musharraf of Pakistan (1999-2008) and of course Egypt’s Nasser and Sadat.

Nasser’s absence is particularly conspicuous as author is himself Egyptian and we can learn a lot about what is happening now to MB from what happened to MB under Nasser. Author’s second observation offers three reasons why politics were possible under Mubarak but are not possible under Sisi:

• There is anti-MB hysteria

• MB’s youth are alienated because of repression and may opt for violence instead of electoral politics

• MB’s political participation under Mubarak was negotiated

All three of these elements were present under Nasser in the late 1950s and 1960s. Supporters of General Sisi compare him to Nasser and while Sisi is different from Nasser (due to the absence of vision, ideology and other endearing features), he is a Nasser redux in terms of his relationship with MB. Nasser banned MB; used extreme repression against them; and courts under him sentenced hundreds of MB supporters to death, including Sayyid Qutb.
Author is right to call for a new theoretical framework to analyze MB and its politics. This framework can learn from research on West European Communist parties. These ‘anti-system’ parties faced all the four paradoxes that MB faces today:

• West European Communist parties were both parties and movements as becoming a member had strict requirements and some negative consequences;

• West European Communist parties were both ideological and political. Doctrinal purity regularly clashed with the reality of politics.

• Communist ideology had some anti-democratic features so these parties were both for and against democracy. They were trying to bring a worker’s revolution while running in elections;

• West European Communist parties were internally dogmatic but had a pragmatic behavior externally. Internal debate was not encouraged in these parties but their leaders were ready to form coalitions with other political parties.

In ‘When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics’, Nathan J. Brown explores the contradictions in Islamist organizations and compares them with Communist and Green parties.

Is religious nationalism a necessary condition for state Islamization?

Defining Islam’s role in state affairs is an issue that has bedeviled most Muslim majority countries (MMCs) since their independence from colonial rule. Debates about how Islam/sharia relate to constitutional provisions, policies and penal laws polarize the populace in thee countries and national consensus on this issue is a rarity. Sometimes it appears that a consensus has emerged about state Islamization in an MMC and the country has moved on to more mundane and less polarizing issues. However, soon events bring the issue back to the fore. As more MMCs democratize, new parties and social classes assume power and take a fresh look at their country’s problems. Public debates become more open in these fragile democracies and new constitutions, laws and policies are approved. Islamic precepts are part of these debates, implicitly or explicitly, because Islam is a powerful social force in these societies. Governments cannot ignore it even if they want to.

Yet, despite the similarity of circumstances in many MMCs, the success of state Islamization is varied. In some countries, it has succeeded to transform the state but in others, it’s conspicuous because of its absence. Some analysts have argued that this variance is due to differences in the popularity of Islamic movements/parties in the MMCs. They contend that popular Islamic parties cause state Islamization directly by implementing it after coming to power or indirectly by pressurizing those in power. Others have countered these arguments by pointing out that most of the successful state Islamization projects have been completed under autocratic regimes. They argue that authoritarian regimes use state Islamization to acquire legitimacy.

Source: The Islamization of Pakistan

Both these propositions have weak support. Recent news coming from the Middle East also does not support the argument that Islamic parties’ victories necessarily lead to state Islamization as Islamic parties have largely failed to Islamize the state even after winning elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey. Similarly, linking autocracy with state Islamization is difficult as most autocratic regimes in the MMCs have brutally suppressed Islamists and rejected state Islamization. So, what are the causes of state Islamization? Why, in some MMCs, Islam plays a large role in state affairs, while in others it has almost no influence on state laws and policies? 

It can be argued that it is Islam’s role in the nationalism of an MMC that influences the extent of state Islamization in that country. Scholars have pointed out that the relationship of religion with nationalism and religion’s role in the state may be closely linked. Successful state Islamization by authoritarian regimes or by Islamist parties may be possible only in MMCs where nationalism and Islam are intertwined. Even in non-Muslim countries, religion plays a much larger role in the public sphere and in the governmental affairs of countries where national identity is linked with a particular religion than in countries where nationalism is based on ethnolinguistic ties or has a civic character. Religious leaders in countries like Israel, Malta and Ireland have regularly influenced political issues and legitimized this intervention on the basis of their religion’s special relationship with the state.