Pancasila Day, a new holiday in Indonesia

Today is Pancasila day. This is the first time Indonesians are celebrating this national holiday. Pancasila is the national ideology of Indonesia. As explained before (see Indonesian Elections: A victory for Pancasila nationalism), Pancasila, meaning 'five principles,' highlights five aspect of Indonesian national ideology: monotheism, humanism, unified nation, representative democracy and social justice. More than 80% of Indonesians were Muslim at the time of independence but its founding fathers to have a pluralistic civic nationalism, which was not strictly secular but rejected majoritarian religious nationalism. For a long time, Pancasila was not under threat, but with the return of democracy and the rise of a new elite, religious movements/groups are demanding a more conspicuous place for majority religion in the political sphere. The situation is increasingly comparable to India, which also rejected majority Hindu religious nationalism at the time of independence but is now ruled by the Bhartiya Janata Party, a revivalist Hindu chauvinist party:

Indonesia and India also share many characteristics which makes their comparison compelling. Both Indonesia and India were successor states of colonial empires. As there was almost no history of a united India or a united Indonesia before colonial times, nationalist elites of both countries had to perform an exhausting balancing act. They had to fight against the colonial state but also try to preserve it. Preservation of the colonial state was difficult as not only the boundaries of the colonial state were new (similar to many other colonial states), but these states also had mind-boggling diversity. To deal with the ethnic/linguistic/religious/caste/tribal diversity, nationalist elites of both India and Indonesia adopted civil nationalism so that all communities can identify with the new state, ignoring the demands of many Hindus in India and many Muslims in Indonesia. This decision was one of the main reasons why both these states have not only managed to stay intact for the last sixty years but also showed impressive progress.           

Another similarity between Indonesia and India is the recent rise of new elites; elites quite different from the leaders that had governed both these countries since independence. For more than half a century, the civic nationalism imposed by the founding fathers of both states was not under threat. There was some criticism but it lacked broad popular support. Nineteen nineties brought a big change in both countries. Economic crisis in both countries (India in 1990-91 and Indonesia in 1997-98) jolted people out of their slumber and the spell that founding fathers' ideas had on the nation was broken. Suharto and aged Congress leadership, defenders of the old ideas, lost their grip on the country and were thrown out. New elites were 'outsiders'. Never before they had held power collectively. Their defining characteristics were overt religiosity and aggressive nationalism. This combination posed a threat to the civic and secular nationalism, both nations had adhered too since independence.  (see Modi, Prabowo, and the threat to Indian and Indonesian civic nationalism)

Although Pancasila promotes inclusion and unity, for half a century, the day to commemorate Pancasila was linked with authoritarianism, exclusion and the killing of half a million Indonesians by their fellow countrymen in 1965-66. It was General/Acting President Suharto who first ordered the celebration of the Pancasila Day in 1967. At that time, it was called Hari Kesahtian Pancasila (Sacred or Devine Pancasila Day) and celebrated on October 1st each year. The day was used to justify the 1965 coup, the New Order regime led by Suharto and possibly the massacre that happened soon after the coup. The birth of Pancasila on June 1st, 1945 was downplyed. 

Much of what happened on October 1, 1965 is still contested but what is largely accepted by all sides is that six senior Indonesian military generals and one junior officer were killed by communists. This event gave the opportunity or forced General Suharto to take over the control of the government. Katherine McGregor, in her Asian Studies Review article published in 2002, writes about Suharto and the commemoration of the Hari Kesahtian Pancasila:

Suharto also made the decision in 1967, his first year as Acting President, to commemorate 1 October, the day on which the six generals were kidnapped and murdered and on which he, together with the army, suppressed the coup attempt. He was clearly determined to ensure that the official version of the coup attempt, in which the army victims were martyrs and Suharto the triumphant hero, would not be forgotten. For every year of the New Order Hari Kesaktian Pancasila was celebrated in a ceremony at Monumen Pancasila Sakti. The themes taken up in the ceremony replicate themes of the initial propaganda surrounding the coup including an emphasis on the coup attempt as a communist plot; the horror of the deaths of the army heroes; the religious and moral deviance of the communists; warnings about the return of communism; and 1 October as a day on which the Pancasila was resurrected. These messages were variously encapsulated in the reading of the Pancasila text, the Pancasila ikrar [pledge]4 and a prayer during the course of the ceremony. Suharto was inspector of the ceremony for every year of the New Order. As principal actor in the events of 1 October Suharto's presence added authenticity to the commemoration. The two main roles he performed in the ceremony were to lead a silent reflection and to inspect the monument at the conclusion of the ceremony.

It was made the most important day in the national calender and a national monument and a museum were later added to make the official version of October 1, 1965 events difficult to deny or contest. 

Pancasila sakti monument, with its seven victims under Garuda, Javanese eagle that is the national symbol of Indonesia (Source tripadvisor.com.sg)

Sacred Pancasilla Day was used to delegitimie enemies of the New Order. Initially, it was the communists, both foreign and domestic, and those working for democracy. Later, in the 1980s, religious Muslims were added to list but in the 1990s, they were excluded. In 1995 and 1996, Suharto's political party Golkar and the a faction in Indonesian military used the day to rally Muslims to support Suharto.

After fall of President Suharto in 1997, there was an attempt to revisit the reasons for the Sacred Pancasilla Day on October first. Many gaps in the official story promoted under Suharto were discovered and the celebrations were subdued. Although President Abdur Rehman Wahid apologized to the former members of the Indonesian communist party and proposed to the end ban on their party in early 2000, but he decided to continue official celebrations on October 1st as Pancasila was owned by him and Vice Megawati Sukarnoputri as the national ideology. Megawati, infact, rightly linked Pancasila to her father, the founder and first President of Indonesia, Sukarno. It was he who first came up with the term (and five principles) on June 1st, 1945 to unite all Indonesians. Suharto hijacked the national ideology to use it for his own purposes. President Wahid and Megawati, however, change the name of the day to 'Peringatan Hari Pengkhianatan (terhadap) Pancasila' (the Commemorative Day for the Betrayal of the Pancasila). This change kept the Pancasila but changed the focus of the day from Suharto's heroism in saving the nation from communists to his coup and the massacre afterward. Megawati led the day's celebration ceremonies in 2000 (in place of President Wahid), but did not visit the musuem or the monument. When Megawati herself became President, she did not attend the ceremonies in 2003 and 2004, although the day was celebrated and ceremonies held at the monument. In 2004, Megawati was defeated by former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and he started leading the October 1st ceremmonies again.

In 2014, Joko Widodo (a.k.a Jokowi) of Megwati's party became the seventh President of Indonesia. He dutifully led the October 1st ceremonies at the monument in 2015 and 2016 but was under pressure to act. In 2015, Megawati urged him to declare June 1 as the Pancasila Day to link Pancasila with Sukarno (her father) and its birth in 1945 and disentangling it from its fifty year Suharto past:

In an emotional speech, Megawati said that without Pancasila, there would be no such thing as the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, as Pancasila was not merely the nation’s ideology, but also a tool that unified the nation. Therefore, she added, the country should commemorate the founding of Pancasila. 

“Happy anniversary of Pancasila; let the nation rise with the spirit of Pancasila,” she said. “Let’s make the Pancasila of June 1, 1945, the way of life for our nation, to keep moving forward,” she said, her voice shaking as she held back tears. (See Jokowi grants Megawati’s wish on Pancasila)

Nahdatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, also supported Megawati's call. In 2016, President Jokowi announced June 1st as Pancasila Day and a national holiday in the presence of Megawati. 

The saga of the Pancasila Day reaffirms the constructivist nature of national ideologies. National ideologies are not premordial but are conceived, proclaimed and later discarded and replaced by men. Sometimes, the name of the ideology remians the same, but the ideas linked to it change,

Rising Religious Nationalism in Turkey

It has been argued that Turkish nationalism has three different strands: civic nationalism based on Turkish constitution; ethnolinguistic nationalism based on Turkish language and ethnicity; and religious nationalism based on Sunni Islam. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Turkey, mainly meandered between the first two types. He tried to bring all groups living in Turkey together and develop an inclusive nationalism based on his modernist rhetoric. But he also promoted Turkish language and Turkish ethnicity and supported research that tried to promote Turks as the group that brought civilization to other groups in the world. To add to the complexity, despite his aggressive secularism, modernism and persecution of Islamic groups, Ataturk (and his allies) implicitly supported Sunni Islam as one of the markers of Turkish identity. So, it is not difficult to find support for all three strands of Turkish nationalism in the founding fathers' decisions and early day of Turkish Republic.

A book that discusses the three strands of Turkish nationalism

Source: The Top Hat, the Grey Wolf, and the Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic

The above discussion should, however, not be construed as proclaiming the equal importance of all three strands. Civic nationalism was dominant in the early 1920s but this period did not last long. Ataturk imagined a socially engineered nation out of the motley of groups present in Turkey. The state told the people how they should speak; how they should dress; how they should pray; how they should write; and even what they should call themselves. People were forced to accept these edicts and not surprisingly many rebelled, especially those who lived on the margins of Turkish society, away from the main Anatolian heartland. Kurds and Alevis took part in these rebellions and bore the brunt of an increasingly repressive response from the Turkish state. Ethnic nationalism became dominant as the state decided to suppress any kind of individuality, whether it was ethnic, linguistic or religious. There was only one nation in Turkey and its characteristics were determined by the state. These characteristics were obviously much closer to what the dominant group (ethnic Turks) had or believed in. So, minority ethnic groups, minority religion and minority sects all lost their constitutional and legal freedoms. This situation continued till the late 1970s and resulted in much polarization, instability, and violence. Left-wing/communist and right-wing nationalist paramilitaries fought each other in all regions of Turkey, with almost twenty fatalities each day.  This made the state or deep state (as the powerful military establishment was called) realize that they cannot control all the societal fissures and resulting violence.

The military took direct control in 1980 through a coup and decided to make changes. To decrease the support of communism and left, it was decided to increase religious education and to accept it part of Turkish identity. However, the public role of religion was still abhorrent and more restrictions were introduced such as the ban on hijab in public universities. Despite these restrictions, this era is remembered as the start of religious nationalism in Turkey. Sunni Islam was always an implicit marker of Turkish national identity but after the 1980s, it started becoming more explicit. This change was called the 'Turkish-Islam Synthesis'. As William Armstrong writes in Hurriyat (See The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey)       

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was originally formulated by the right-wing nationalist Intellectual Hearths (Aydınlar Ocakları) in the 1970s, but after the 1980 coup it rose to become the de facto state ideology. In practice, this meant more than just General Kenan Evren reciting Quranic verses during public speeches. It also meant huge budget increases for the Religious Affairs Directorate, rapid building of new mosques and opening of Quran courses, the introduction of mandatory religion classes in state schools (only on Sunni Islam), more tolerance for religious bureaucrats, active encouragement of religious organizations, and a widening of opportunities for graduates of religious imam hatip high schools.

Military hoped to manipulate Islam without letting it go out of its control but the socialization of masses in a religious environment, supported and funded by the state itself, led to changes beyond military's  imagination. Merton's law of unintended consequences came into play and Sunni Islam gradually became a very important part of the Turkish identity. Right-wing and Left-wing parties gradually gave way to the winning of election by an Islamist party in 1996. Although that party was forced out by the military within a year, the power of religious nationalism continued to grow due to increase in Islamic-oriented media, foundations and businesses. Eventually, AK Party, whose leadership had been trained in Islamist parties, came to power.

AK Party (Freedom and Justice Party) win brought the reformed Islamists to power. They claimed to be like Christian conservative parties of the Western Europe and pledged to work with the secular establishment, consisting of the President, judiciary and the military. Although, in their initial years, AKP didn't take an overtly religious step, the very presence of AKP at the helm gave confidence to media, educational institutions and businesses run by the religious Anatolian Turks. Good economic management helped AKP win elections repeated eventually controlling the presidency, judiciary and military.

Religious nationalism implies that national identity is now based on religion. This logically means that religion is now not only a personal matter (between a person and her God or gods) but a matter of law and state. Therefore, who is a (true) member of the state religion becomes a big issue. Tellingly, defining a true Muslim is a big issue in Turkey now. While there is hope that Kurdish issue (which is mainly an ethnolinguistic issue) will be resolved soon, Alevi issue is raising its head. The state defines Islam to include Alevis as deviant Sunni Muslims but Alevis consider themselves as members of different sect/religion. Everybody from Prime Minister to opposition leaders to religious leaders is weighing in (See What does Erdogan mean by 'Alevis without Ali'?)

Moreover, there is fighting between AKP and Gulanists, followers of an influential preacher Fethullah Gulen, one-time allies of the AKP. The witch-hunts and inquisitions mean that religious nationalism is rising (See Turkey’s intra-Islamic witch hunt).      

Is General Sisi leading a coalition of civic nationalists?

Crown Center of Brandies University has posted an interesting brief on the US-Egypt relations ( See "Resetting" U.S.-Egypt Relations). The authors talk about the competing narratives of the US and Egyptian policymakers about the events since July 2013 and the gap and lack of understanding about the other side. The US policymakers see the last few months as the return of military authoritarianism and the abandonment of democracy. Although the mistakes of President Morsi are acknowledged by the US and the US government has refused to label the military takeover as a coup, nevertheless, it is hesitant to engage fully with the current Egyptian regime because it is clearly undemocratic. Banning of protests and mass killing of protesters has further alienated the US policymakers.

Egyptians, however, see the events of last ten month in a completely different light. They feel that July 2013 was a revolution against authoritarianism (comparable to January/February 2011 revolution) and saved Egypt from becoming a theocratic state. Muslim Brotherhood is considered a front for terrorists and its actions since July 2013 have left no doubt in Egyptian policymaker's minds that Brotherhood is against Egyptian national interest. Many Egyptians feel angry at the suspension of the US aid and consider that US/Obama administration bent on bringing Morsi back, completely ignoring Egyptian public opinion.

Source: Egypt's General al-Sisi: The man behind the image

What is interesting from our perspective is authors, Abdel Monem Said Aly and Prof. Shai Feldman, call the group, opposed to Muslim Brotherhood and leading Egypt now (defining the competing narrative), as 'Egypt's civic nationalists' or madaniyya and define them as follows:    

Egyptian civic nationalists accept Islam as the religion of the state, as stipulated in all Egyptian constitutions since 1923, but insist that all laws be enacted by the peoples’ elected representatives in Parliament, and that disputes be adjudicated by the judiciary—that is, by civilian courts. Accordingly, they objected strongly to Article 4 of the constitution proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, providing that laws enacted would be subjected to review by al-Azhar University, which would be entrusted with verifying that they were consistent with Sharia law. They also objected to Article 219, which limited interpretation of Sharia law to a narrow school of Sunni thought, insisting instead that this task be left to the High Constitutional Court.

There are several problems with this labeling. First, the Salafist Al-Noor Party and al-Azhar University administration were part of the coalition that General Sisi used to topple President Morsi. These groups can hardly be defined as civic nationalists. Both of them argued for more role of religion in the constitution and were supporters of the Article 4. Second, although a large part of the group that supported July 2013 coup/revolution was civil nationalists, many were not. Egyptians criticized Morsi and Brotherhood not only because of their religious orientation but also due to the lack of governance and rising poverty, inequality and inefficiency. The dire economic conditions in Egypt played a prominent role in persuading Egyptians to join protests against Morsi (See Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s Biggest Challenge? The Economy, Stupid). To argue, without evidence, that all or most of the Egyptians joining the protests were angry because of Morsi/Brotherhood's religious nationalism is not correct. Moreover, since July 2013, it is clear that it is the Egyptian military that is controlling the state and civic nationalists are being used. Whenever civil society/nationalists tried to reign in the military or increase their freedoms, they were brutally suppressed (See Egypt another step backward on civil-society and Egypt’s Death Sentences, Ban of ‘April 6' Criminalize Political Opposition).  Therefore, the argument that Obama administration is not understanding civil nationalists' narrative is again not correct. Obama administration is willing to work with civil nationalists and has tried to accommodate them but military junta's undemocratic and brutal campaign against all types of opposition (including civic nationalists) cannot be ignored.

In conclusion, the brief tries to explain a very complex situation in terms of Islamists and civic nationalists. This simplifying attempt can be termed as simplistic at best and deceiving at worst. It extends the 'clash of civilizations' narrative, despite clear evidence to the contrary.