Who are Wahhabis? What is Wahhabism? Is it different from Salafism?

Wahhabism is something controversial. Many of Wahhabis do not even like to be called Wahhabis as this term was initially used as an insult by the Wahhabi movement enemies. The following seminar video explains the different terms and the history of Wahhabism well in less than 40 minutes. 

The seminar was delivered by Dr. Cole Bunzel from Yale University at the Centre for Islamic and Middle East Studies (CIMS), Oslo University, Norway. The lecture was titled “Classical Wahhabism and Its Modern Revival” and was based on Dr. Cole's dissertation and forthcoming book. It took place at the University of Oslo on October 17, 2018

Here is an introduction about Cole from CIMS webpage:

Cole Bunzel is a postdoctoral research fellow in Islamic Law and Civilization at the Yale Law School, where his work focuses on the history of Wahhabism and the Jihadi Salafi movement in modern Islam. In 2017, he received the Porter Ogden Jacobus Fellowship, Princeton University’s top honor for graduate students. He is the editor of the blog Jihadica.

Cole talks about:

• What is Wahhabism?
• What are the two forms of Tawhid (monotheism) defined by ibn-Taymiyyah and how they were used to kill Muslims?
• What are the two types of Wahhabism?
• How Classical Wahhabism (from the 1740s to 1920s) is different from the Modern Wahhabism (after 1920s)?
• The three Saudi states (1740s-1818, 1823- 1891, 1902 - present)
• What was jihad in Classical Wahhabism? Hatred is not enough, show enmity, later violence
• How King Abdul Aziz tamed Wahhabis, reinterpreted doctrines of Al-Shiekh and entered into a settlement with Sunni Islam and the larger world?
• The revival of Classical Wahhabism under Al-Qaida and the Daesh (the ISIS)

Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh 

Source: Islamic Societies Review

The seminar video can be watched here

Wahhabism is often confused with Salafism as Wahhabis call themselves Salafis or Al-Muwahhidun (or monotheists). Following a commentary from S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore on the differences between Wahhabism and Salafism:

The terms Salafi and Wahhabi are often used interchangeably. Many confuse the two while others refer to them as one. What are the differences between the two? 

The study of modern Salafism will not be complete without looking into Wahhabism – a reference to the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and its relation to Salafism. In the current discourse on Islam, the term “Salafi” and “Wahhabi” are often used interchangeably. Many confuse the two while others refer to them as one.

Wahhabi is a label given to those who follow the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Wahhabis are always referred to as Salafis, and in fact they prefer to be called as such. As a rule, all Wahhabis are Salafis but not all Salafis are Wahhabis. The term Salafism did not become associated with the Wahhabi creed until the 1970s. It was in the early 20th century that the Wahhabis referred to themselves as Salafis. 

Who is a Salafi? 

The usage of the term Salafi today refers to those who embrace Salafism (Arabic: Salafiyyah). Salafiyyah is known to be the manhaj or way of the Salafis. The Salafis are Muslims who advocate literal and to some degree binary interpretation of Islamic teachings as enjoined by Prophet Muhammad and subsequently practised by the early pious predecessors known as the salaf al-salih. Following the salaf is the reason for their self-designation as Salafis. 

Linguistically, the term salafi is an ascription to the salaf. A Salafi is one who ascribes himself/herself to the way and teachings of the salaf. From the linguistic standpoint, if someone says, for example “ana Britani” (I am British), it means he comes from Britain or ascribing himself to Britain. 

The letter ‘i’ at the end of the word (e.g. Britani, Salafi) shows that the person saying the word is associating himself to the word. Hence, when a person says “I am a Salafi”, he is saying that he ascribes himself to the way/teachings of the salaf. 

Who is a Wahhabi? 

A Wahhabi is one who follows Wahhabism (Arabic: Wahhabiyyah) or the teachings of Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in Najd in 1703 in Uyainah, in present-day Saudi Arabia. He grew up in an atmosphere where there was widespread deterioration in the Muslim beliefs and practices. 

Many Muslims had fallen into acts considered shirk (associating Allah with others), and returned to the days of jahiliyyah (ignorance or pre-Islamic period). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to reform the Muslims under the banner of “true” Islam and get rid of these acts which he considered heretical. 

Wahhabis do not prefer the term Wahhabiyyah or being called as Wahhabis. They prefer to be called Al-Muwahhidun (the people of monotheism) or Salafiyyun (the Salafis) in reference to the pious predecessors (salaf al-salih). But over time Ibn Abd al-Wahhab followers prefer the more generic term salafiyyun which signifies adherence to the faith and practices of the Prophet and the first three generations of Muslims. 

Unlike “Salafi” which is both a label and self-designated term, the term “Wahhabi” is a label given to the followers of the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, from whose name the term “Wahhabi” originates. Wahhabism simply means the way of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab which also denotes his ideology. Hence, linguistically, a Wahhabi is one who subscribes to Wahhabism. 

The main reason why Wahhabis have rejected the term Wahhabism is because it provides the impression that the teachings propagated by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is a new doctrine or belief within the Islamic faith, whereas they believe that it is merely a reflection and an extension of the teachings of the Prophet, his companions and the salaf al-salih. 

Due to the importance of following the footsteps of the salaf, Wahhabism has always been a form of Salafism. It subscribes to the methodology of the salaf in theology and law. In fact, the teaching spreads in the modern Muslim world under the banner of Salafism instead of Wahhabism. As Khaled Abou El-Fadl, a professor of Islamic law from the US observes, “the attachment of Wahhabism to Salafism was indeed needed as Salafism was a much more ‘credible paradigm in Islam’; making it an ideal medium for Wahhabism”. 

Ideology of Salafism and Wahhabism 

The ideology of Salafism and Wahhabism is built upon a narrowly defined religious text. Methodologically, they are literalist and puritanical in their approaches to Islamic theology and law. 

In matters of jurisprudence, Salafis and Wahabbis subscribe to the Hanbali mazhab (school of thought) and law. However, many of them claim no specific affiliation to any particular mazhab. Instead, they claim to follow the stronger opinion among the Salaf based on the Quran and the Sunnah (the Prophet’s Traditions). 

But one who studies their views in jurisprudence will find their origins in the Hanbali school of fiqh. Even Ibn Taimiyah, a famous Islamic theologian in the medieval period and his student, Ibn Qayyim, the two scholars most referred to by the Salafis and Wahhabis, adopted the methodology of the Hanbali school. 

To maintain the purity of Islam, Salafis and Wahhabis attempt to combat what they view as deviant and heretical practices such as offering prayers at tombs, glorifying ‘holy places’ and ‘saints’. Such are classified as shirk, kufr (infidelity), riddah (apostasy), and bid’ah (innovation). They strongly reject any belief and practices that are not enjoined by the Quran and the Prophet. 

For example, Salafis and Wahhabis claim that Sufi practices such as tawassul (intercession between man and God) which had accrued over the centuries since the pristine period of Islam threatens tawhid (monotheism or the belief in the oneness of God). They believe that bid’ah resulted from the adoption of local cultures by Islamic missionaries in their attempts to attract new converts. However, this blend of Islam and customs helped significantly the conversion process to Islam by making it accessible to wider audiences. 

Ideologically, Salafism is wider than Wahhabism. Salafi thought has existed for hundreds of years and has spread throughout the Muslim world and beyond. Wahhabism only existed from the mid 18th century. While it is true that Wahhabism is Salafism, it is only one of Salafism’s many orientations. Salafi and Wahhabi are not two sides of the same coin. 

About the Authors
Mohamed Bin Ali is Assistant Professor and Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University Singapore. Both studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and are counsellors with the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG).

In 2016, Cole Bunzel has written about the contest between the third Wahhabi state (Saudi Arabia) and what he calls the fourth Wahhabi state (ISIS) for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Following are the conclusions. The whole paper can be read here.

The Islamic State, which draws on the teachings of the Wahhabi school of Islam, finds inspiration in the example of the first Saudi-Wahhabi state (1744–1818), which engaged in expansionary jihad and cultivated a sectarian animus toward the Shia.

The Islamic State has declared three so-called provinces in Saudi Arabia and carried out some fifteen attacks there since November 2014.

The Islamic State’s rise has reignited a debate in Saudi Arabia over the intolerant and aggressive nature of Wahhabism. Liberals have called for a revisionist movement, as they describe it, to expunge certain doctrines from Wahhabism.

In some ways the Islamic State’s claim to the Wahhabi heritage is not unfounded. The early Wahhabis advanced an exclusivist version of Sunni Islam that was universally seen as a heresy, founded a state that waged expansionary jihad against fellow Sunni Muslims, and killed Shia Muslims because they were seen as hopeless idolaters. The Islamic State has done the same on all three counts.

Other features of the Islamic State’s ideology—from the declaration of a caliphate to the use of extraordinary violence to the group’s apocalyptic fervor—do not find a mainstream Wahhabi precedent.

The Islamic State’s campaign in Saudi Arabia has slowed considerably since October 2015. Despite concerted propaganda efforts, the group appears to be making little headway against a state outfitted with one of the most advanced counterterrorism infrastructures in the world. But given the substantial Islamic State following in Saudi Arabia, more attacks, however occasional, can be expected.

Saudi Arabia is a long way from pursuing meaningful reforms of Wahhabi doctrine. Saudi liberals’ criticism of Wahhabism is tolerated as of early 2016 more than ever before, despite the kingdom’s religious scholars who would prefer the government silence them. But the new political leadership is busy consolidating power, while the religious leadership is defensive and mired in conspiracy theories.

MBS and the evolving Saudi Nationalism

Saudi Arabian is evolving but which way? This question was discussed here three years ago (See Saudi Arabian Nationalism, MBS, Salafism and Yemen War). At that time, the role of Islam in Saudi nationalism was ebbing but the same could not be said about Salafism. One could rightly argue that Salafism is a form of Islam but Salafism and (moderate) Islam can sometimes lead one in different directions. It would be difficult to promote Iran as the most dangerous enemy if Islam was a major component of Saudi nationalism but it would be a facile victory if Saudi state subscribes to Salafi nationalism as Salafism (or Wahhabism as its detractors call it) has long designated Shiism as its enemy. For many Salafis, Shiites are infidels, beyond the pale of Islam. The other debate in the 2016 blogpost was about the strength of secular nationalism in the holy kingdom. In 2016, Prince Mohammad bin Salam was still Deputy Crown Prince but was amassing power and trying to lead the kingdom in a new direction. He was speaking against strict religious control and restrictions on Saudi women. Yemen War was being used by him to project himself as the new leader and as someone who would bring Saudis to the 21st century. 

Since then, things have moved swiftly. MBS has become the crown prince while his cousin and previous crown prince is nowhere to be seen. MBS has shown his power by detaining dozens of princes and rich Saudis and getting billions of dollars from them. He has also moved to decrease gender discrimination, although it is still too high even compared to other Muslim-majority and developing countries (See Women can drive in Saudi Arabia but is it really a big change?). This has resulted in some criticism from Salafi religious establishment but MBS has forged ahead.

King Salman (sitting) and the de facto king (MBS)

Source: Why Saudi Arabia Is Embracing a New Nationalism

What about nationalism or more particularly religious/Salafi nationalism? Stratfor in an article contends that Saudi state and MBS have realized that religious nationalism's utility now has diminished and a more territorial nationalism would help achieve national goals (See Why Saudi Arabia Is Embracing a New Nationalism):

At this point in its history, nationalism has stronger benefits to the Saudi state than religious conservatism. Tying identity to a specific place weakens the power of non-Saudi Islamists at home, for example; in a nationalist culture, verbal attacks by Turkish, Egyptian and Iranian Islamists would not represent salient criticisms from fellow Muslims, but rather unwelcome foreign interferences in domestic affairs. Moreover, shifting the Saudi mindset away from the tradition-bound reverence of religion toward the immediacy and secularity of a geographically defined space also opens up the potential for innovation and new ideas — key ingredients for bringing Vision 2030 to fruition.  

Critically, nationalism allows royals to limit domestic policy challenges based on religious opinions, conveniently weakening a check on their power as they embrace unprecedented behavior such as considering once-unthinkable ties with Israel. This also undercuts the ability of the conservative clerics to object to some of the kingdom's social reforms, like gender mixing, encouraging women to work and drive, and encouraging previously banned forms of art and entertainment...

While the contrast between Saudi Islamism and the Christian religious community in the United States has long been a complicating element of U.S.-Saudi ties, Prince Mohammed's meeting with Christian leaders illustrated a more relaxed attitude toward Christianity, which the kingdom hopes will improve relations with the United States. And any stories about non-Islamic worship being permitted publicly in Saudi Arabia, even if just for expatriates, weakens the image of a Saudi culture defined by hard-liners and encourages nationalist thought to expand in schools, media and art.

A recent article by Vivian Nereim (Bloomberg.com) echos the analysis and argues that the Saudi state under MBS is moving away from Salafi nationalism (See ‘Traitor’ Is the New ‘Infidel’ as Nationalism Grips Saudi Arabia). She contends that an aggressive and exclusivist nationalism is still being promoted but it is not primarily based on religion or sect:

Saudi Arabia’s undergoing an aggressive nationalist rebranding, downplaying an austere religious doctrine associated abroad with terrorism, and promoting veneration of de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as he pursues an economic overhaul. Amid efforts to maintain domestic support while redesigning the contract between state and citizen, traitors, not infidels, are the enemy... 

“If a person is neutral or stands with the enemy against this country, it’s our right to call him a traitor,” Abdullah Al Fozan, a member of the [Saudi] consultative council [the nominated advisory council that functions in lieu of a legislature], said in a televised diatribe that went viral late last year... 

There’s an echo of the nativist triumphalism that accompanied political earthquakes in Europe and the U.S., with Donald Trump-inspired slogans like “Saudi First” and “Saudi The Great.” But what’s happening also has local flavors.

Such an aggressive nationalism can derail MBS plans of economic revival, religious and non-religious mega-tourism, and foreign investment but the Saudi officials are not relenting:

The risk is that baiting people to turn on fellow citizens under the guise of patriotism might rupture a society already under strain from the costs imposed by Prince Mohammed’s “Vision 2030” reforms, and deter the foreign investors and visitors he wants to attract. 

For now, officials aren’t hurrying to squash the spiteful mood -- a “with us or against us” mindset seen by some Saudis as needed to steer the country through a tough transition...
“Nationalism came in at a time when Saudi Arabia was not only trying to curtail the religious identity inside the country, but was also following a more assertive foreign policy,” said Eman Alhussein, a Saudi visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations... 

Whoever is responsible, they’re changing behavior. Stand-up comedian Yaser Bakr was forced to give a public apology last month after an old video surfaced of him making fun of the religious police. A social media campaign labeled him a traitor and called for him to be arrested and banned from comedy. Another young Saudi said he’s abandoned Twitter and holds back in family gatherings to avoid questions over loyalty.

The biggest test yet faced by the made over Saudi state, besides Yemen War, was Saudi dissident journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi's murder. Khashoggi was once part of the ruling elite and close to the royal family. He was a Salafi and was against Iran. His only crime was criticizing MBS in the Western press and that cost him dearly in the hyper-nationalistic climate. 

Other analysts have also pointed to the close ties with the Trump administration, coordination with the Israeli government (although it is not publically acknowledged), and distance from the Palestinian administration as evidence of the lesser role of religion in the affairs of the Saudi state. True, but the lack of public acknowledgment also demonstrates that religious and Arab issues still carry weight. What is clear is that Islam and Salafism carry less weight now than they carried five years ago in Saudi Arabia. A new identity is being forged which is based not only on Islam or Salafism but also on territory and loyalty to Saudi royals.   

However, this new identity can create new problems. Stratfor article cautions that territorial nationalism can unite the people against the royal house as has happened in many other countries during the 20th century:

Though Saudi leaders are hoping that a swell of nationalism will reduce checks on royal power, nationalist thought itself — especially once regular citizens have fully embraced it — could replace those checks and even eclipse their power. Former Saudi kings saw nationalist thought as a danger to royal unilateralism, preferring the hierarchical and relatively predictable hard-line Islamists to the more rowdy and innovative nationalists of the 20th century. A new push for Saudi nationalism may challenge the monarchy in exactly the way that its 20th century rulers wanted to avoid. 

Identifying with a nation, after all, is far different than identifying with the ruling house of the nation's government. Asking Saudis for loyalty to national interests invites increasing citizen engagement with what, exactly, the national interests are — a question that until recently has been answered only by the royal family. As nationalism ascends, Saudi public opinion stands to grow more complex and less easily motivated by the tools of old, including handouts and religious scruples. 

Additionally, if nationalism is equated with the traditions of Najd province [the home of the royal family], where Riyadh is located, rather than being pan-Arabian, nominally suppressed or sidelined local identities may experience a resurgence. Places like Shiite-dominated Qatif in the Eastern province, Asir in the southwest and the Hejaz, which hosts the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, all have local identities that may be empowered by nationalism and may bristle against the state's imposition of Najdi symbols, rituals and culture.
 

Are Taliban religious nationalists or Pukhtun nationalists?

This issue has bedeviled analysts for a long time. The question keeps popping up as the solution of the Taliban insurgency in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is linked to it. Are they Pukhtun or Pashtun nationalists fighting to liberate their homeland or are they holy warriors fighting for the pristine Islam of the 7th century? Or if they are are a combination of both, which is the dominant ideology for the Taliban, Pukhtun nationalism or Islam/Islamism/pan-Islamism? 

In 2009, this issue was discussed with different shades of opinion making their case. Some claimed that Pukhtun nationalism was dominant and contended that the Taliban were the 'latest incarnation of Pukhtun nationalism' and 'the radical Islamist insurgency is itself a reassertion of the concept of Pushtunistan on both sides of the  Afghanistan-Pakistan border' as Kaplan did here (Saving Afghanistan). Others, and certainly the Taliban themselves, claim that they are Islamist or pan-Islamist i.e. believers in religious nationalism (like I Didn't Want To). Others have been more nuanced opinion as Michael Totten discussed this issue in 2009 (The Taliban and Pashtun Nationalism).  

The Taliban are more than an expression of Pashtun nationalism, of course. They represent a reactionary movement that idealizes the simplicity and extreme conservatism of 7th century Islam. By burnishing this ideology, the Taliban is able, absurdly, to attract support beyond its Pashtun base. 

The ethnic component, though, is a formidable one. It all but guaranteed a certain degreeof success by the Taliban in all of “Pashtunistan,” in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Yet all the while, the ethnic map imposes constraints, if not limits, on how far the Taliban can expand.

While many would argue that the Pakistani Taliban are different from the Afghan Taliban, the debate about their ideology does not change much. There is a popular perception in Pakistan that Pakistani Taliban were noble savages living in the blissful 'state of nature' before Pakistan army on the directives of the US entered tribal areas and destroyed the heaven. Imran Khan, leader of the party getting the second largest number of votes in last elections, believes in this theory of Pukhtun nationalism and claimed recently that sharia imposition was never one of Taliban demands, thus rejecting religious nationalism of Taliban ( Imposition of shariah is not Taliban demand: IK). His party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf won the provincial elections in the Pukhtunkhwa province, the province having Pukhtun majority and bordering Afghanistan. However, his coalition partners Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist party, believes otherwise and considers the Taliban as fellow religious nationalists, fighting to revive the glory of Islam. 

The current peace talk going on between the umbrella group of Taliban organizations, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has again focused attention on this issue. While Government of Pakistan (GOP) has tried to localize them and claimed that negotiations are about the specific tribal areas where Taliban are mostly based, Taliban and their negotiators have argued that the fight of Taliban is about Islam and so negotiations are about how to implement Shariah in the whole of Pakistan (Govt's committee waiting for Taliban's response).

One of the ways to tackle the issue will be to look whether the Taliban are ready to give up their tribal customs (or what they think as their culture) for Islam or vice versa? For instance, almost all Muslims believe that women education is recommended in Islam and this includes education of non-religious subjects. While the Taliban have tried to dodge the issue in the recent past, it is clear from their conduct and policies adopted during their five-year rule that they would prefer women limiting their study to basic Quran and Sunnah lessons. Similarly, while the Quran clearly speaks against the killing of innocents, the Taliban have shown their willingness to kill innocents, if they do not adhere to their (Taliban's) strict interpretations. After the US invasion, they have also engaged in kidnappings for ransom and drug trade, despite earlier acknowledging that these actions were forbidden in Islam. Drug trade was banned when the Taliban were ruling Afghanistan but now the Taliban not only allow it but profit from it. Clearly, the Taliban are not fully adhering to Islamic injunctions and using it to achieve their cultural, ethnic, group or personal objectives. 

However, the Taliban have always proclaimed themselves as soldiers of Islam and are very strict in observing Islamic ibadah and rituals. Using their pan-Islamic message, they have been successful in decreasing the strength of tribal loyalties that are very important for Pukhtun culture. This success, albeit, has remained confined to Pukhtuns and non-Pukhtun Muslims have rejected the Taliban's pan-Islamism. In fact, ethnic and sectarian divisions and boundaries in Afghanistan, 99% Muslim, have deepened after the Taliban emergence. In Afghanistan, the Taliban represent not Muslim nationalism but Sunni nationalism or even more restricted Salafi (Wahhabi) or Deobandi nationalism. They have failed to present themselves as an Islamic force to other ethnic and sectarian groups in Afghanistan and commentators are talking of two Afghanistans, one for Pukhtuns and other for non-Pukhtuns.

So, if the Taliban are not true Islamic warriors, are they true adherents of Pashtunwali, ancient code of Pukhtun nationalism? Not really. When the Taliban rose, they first rejected the tribal elders and jirga (an assembly of elders to settle disputes), both essential tenets of the Pashtunwali.  According to the code, badal or revenge was limited to the perpetrator, his family or his tribe. Under the Taliban, badal of a Taliban was extended to any anti-Taliban, a gross misinterpretation. Massacres of innocents and abduction of women of rivals are again not part of Pashtunwali but were part of the Taliban tactics.

Pukhtun Jirga (assembly of elders)

Source: Foreign Policy

So, are the Taliban religious nationalists or Pukhtun nationalists? They are both, meaning they are neither true religious/Muslim nationalists nor true Pukhtun nationalists. Like most groups, their history, ethnicity, religion, society, and culture has influenced them. The Taliban cannot eliminate any of these influences even if they want to. They are a farrago of Pakhtunwali, Deobandi school, and Salafism (Wahhabism) so they do not entirely and precisely follow the predominant practices of Pakhtunwali, Deobandi school, and Salafism.

The Taliban were students of madressahs of Deobandi sect of Islam, but quite different than the Deobandism practiced in other parts of South Asia. What Taliban practiced was a hotchpotch of Pashtunwali-Deobandism[12] with Saudi-inspred practices. The Saudi influence came up with the Saudi money in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.[13] They attempted to create more or less a state modeled on the principles of Saudi Arabia.[14] The Taliban ideology could be understood from their imposition of ‘Sharia’ based laws and banning of certain practices which they deemed against Islamic traditions. The Taliban ideology could be clearly examined by analyzing their acts and implementation of tribal-based practices. 

This elusive mix resulted in the edifice which Taliban tried to erect and which shocked the world. The Taliban clerics defined their state as true manifestation of an ideal Islamic one. In that sense they tried to implement a tribal customs-mixed Islam on Afghan populace that the world had never seen before. The Taliban’s Saudi influences were harsher than that of Saudis as they lacked oil wealth to appease the masses and Afghan society though tribal but not homogeneous Taliban went further in following the Saudi model and considered all of their practices as ‘true’ interpretations of Quran. As Deobandism is more of an urban phenomenon in India and Pakistan[15] the Deobandism of Taliban was much different and their practices were more inspired of Saudi system and the laws.[16] Despite of the world’s abhorrence of their imposed laws the Taliban laws were considerably well received in Pashtun dominated areas as most of these edicts were already part of Pashtun culture. (See Understanding Taliban through the prism of Pashtunwali code)

Okay, but can we ascertain which is the major influence on the Taliban, Islam or Pashtunwali? It is difficult as the Taliban are a collection of groups fighting under the overall command of the Taliban leader Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada. Most of these groups are close-knitted men, sometimes from one tribe, fighting under the command of one tribal leader in a particular area. Based on the preference of leader or tribe, either of the three influences (Pashtunwali, Deobandi or Salafism) can be dominant.