Five stages of Kurdish nationalism

M. Hakan Yavuz divides the rise of Kurdish nationalism into five stages and argues that

The state's policies are the determinant factors in the evolution and modulation of the Kurdish ethno-nationalism. The major reason for the politicization of Kurdish cultural identity is the shift from multi-ethnic, multi-cultural realities of the Ottoman empire to the nation-state model.

Yavuz contends that there is nothing natural about the development of Kurdish nationalism as is true of other nationalisms. Kurdish nationalism has an 'ethnie' that Smith seems necessary for any nationalisms and this ethnie has been used by Kurdish ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize Kurds. The Kurds are, however, divided along the tribal, linguistic, region,al and religious lines. These divisions, which have been sustained due to rugged, mountainous geography, have been a major reason for weakness in Kurdish nationalism.

Yavuz declares the tribal structure as the core depository of Kurdish identity and argues that it has both helped and harmed Kurdish nationalism.

This tribal structure played a dual role: it prevented the formation of a Kurdish unity by keeping them fragmented, and preserved a heightened Kurdish particularism vis-a-vis the Turks, Persians, and Arabs.

Kurdish nationalism started to take shape due to the centralization policies of the Ottoman empire (1878-1924); it acquired an ethnic bent/consciousness under Kemalist reforms (1925-61); later influenced by the broader Turkish political struggles, class consciousness, and leftist dominated it (1962-83); the 1980 coup led to a military struggle (1983-99); and finally the capture of Ocalan and end of Kurdish insurgency has moved it to its present/last stage.

Stage 1: Anti-centralization Revolts and Politicization of the Islamic Identity

Centralization and modernization of the Ottoman empire led to revolts in Kurdish areas. However, one should be cautious in calling them national revolts as they were primarily local. As modernization reforms decreased the hold of tribal ties/loyalties, Sufi networks, like Naksibendi and Kadiri, increased their influence and Kurdish ethnic awareness rose in the forms of Islamic consciousness. While putting revolts against its policies, the Ottoman state also decided to use Kurds (and their Islamic consciousness) and Sultan Abdulhamid II formed the Hamidiye Regiments to counter Russians and Armenians. However, Islam didn't become a crucial part of Kurdish nationalism as it is part of Turkish nationalism.

Stage 2: National Secularization (1925-61)

The way the Ottoman empire was partitioned and the annulled Treaty of Sevres has left deep scars on the collective memory of Turks. British support for the Kurdish state and the inclusion of Kurdish autonomy in the unfair treaty is not forgotten.

After the war, Turkey became a predominantly Muslim nation and cosmopolitan Ottomanism gave way to secular nationalism that abhorred diversity. Ottoman legacy, however, resulted in a paradox that is still unresolved:

Due to the Ottoman legacy, Turkey embodies an irresolvable paradox in the foundation of the Republic in the 1920s. On the one hand, the state, formed as a result of demographic Islamization of the country, used Islam to unify diverse ethnolinguistic groups; on the other hand, it defined its 'progressive' civilizing ideology, known as Kemalism, in opposition to Islam.

However, the Turkish state wanted to promote its own brand of Islam that was not acceptable to both Turks and Kurds. The end of Caliphate in 1924 was one of the main reasons for the first Kurdish rebellion, known as the Sheik Said rebellion, and so it was based on ethnoreligious nationalism. Due to the authoritarian approach of the Turkish state and its promotion of Turkish ethnic nationalism, there were two more Kurdish revolts (the revolt of Agri in 1930-31 led by Ihsan Nuri Biltis and  Zaza/Alevi Kurds revolt in 1937-38 around Dersim).

Stage 3: Secularization of the Kurdish Question through Socialism (1961-83)

As Kurds became more educated, the tribal and religious leaders slowly lost their power and intellectuals became the new leaders. The Turkish state was always aligned with the West but, during the 1950s, it became a partner by joining NATO and sending its forces to support the US forces in the Korean War. The Kurdish intellectuals, like many other university students in the West, were disillusioned with the West and expressed their Kurdish grievances in socialist idioms. With the Turkish state in the Western camp, socialism seemed to be an apposite ideology for all those oppressed by the Turkish state, including the Kurds. Kurds, particularly Alevi Kurds, took a leading part in Leftist magazines (such as bilingual Turkish-Kurdish Deng and Dicle-Firat), political parties (such as Labor Party), and groups (such as Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (DDKO is its Turkish acronym)). After the 1970 coup, the Labor Party and DDKO were outlawed. The repression continued as well as the ambush and sabotage in the 1970s. In November 1978, Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK) was formed, with Abdullah Ocalan as its head. The 1980 coup declared radical Islam, the Left, and Kurdish nationalism as key threats to the Turkish state. Repression increased and all avenues of cultural expression were blocked. The terrorist activities of the PKK moved even outside Turkey as a Turkish consulate in France was bombed in November 1980. The key achievement of the PKK during this period was taking tribe and Islam out of Kurdish nationalism.

Stage 4: Emergence of PKK (1983-99)

The return of (partial) democracy did not change the state repression and the PKK militant campaign. The PKK during this time got help from other countries. Syria allowed it to establish training camps and Western European countries gave space for organization and propaganda. The PKK attacked not only the hybrid regime and its supporters but also Turkish nationalism. This increased Kurdish consciousness and politicization of Turkish nationalism. The killings and terrorist activities of PKK continued in the 1980s and 1990s. The target was not only the Turkish state but also Turkish civilians and Kurdish civilians who did not identify with the PKK. There were some unilateral ceasefires by the PKK but they did not last long. Later, Syria stopped its support for the PKK and the Turkish military used the Regional State Emergency Governorate (OHAL) which included almost all the Kurdish majority provinces to take special measures, ignoring normal constitutional protections, to defeat the PKK which even used children and female suicide bombings to fight them. The Turkish state also helped create Islamic Kurdish hit squads which killed PKK supporters in broad daylight, with state support. The scars of this conflict were deep and affected every person in the region.

PKK Flag

Source: Wikipedia

Stage 5: Kurdish problem as a European problem (2000- )

In 1998, Turkey increase its pressure on Syria and threatened to retaliate militarily if it did not completely stop helping the PKK. Turkey was emboldened by close support from the US and Israel and the Syrian military's problems because of old equipment and the non-availability of spare parts after the collapse of the USSR. Syria caved in and an agreement was signed with Turkey ending support to the PKK. Ocalan was forced out of Syria and Lebanon and was eventually captured from Kenya, with the US support. The PKK tried to up the ante and increase violence but it failed. Ocalan during his trial praised Ataturk and said that he was ready to serve the Turkish state and termed democratic struggle as the only feasible solution to the Kurdish question. He was awarded a death sentence that was later commuted to a life sentence. In its 7th Extraordinary Congress, the PKK gave up armed struggle and several of its members surrendered to Turkish authorities. After being declared a "candidate state" by the EU in December 1999, the pressure on the Turkish state also increased. It had to implement several decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had given several decisions against its brutal tactics against Kurds and it also had to be more concerned about human rights, rule of law, and minority rights. This led to a series of measures to allow cultural expression of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. The PKK also toned down its secularism and accepted Islam as part of Kurdish nationalism to increase its support.

Source: BBC

Yuvaz's article was written in 2001 so it ends with the hope that the situation will improve. With the arrival of the AKP and Erdogan on the scene, initially things improved but soon there was another insurgency in 2004. In 2009, Erdogan initiated a new social contract with the Kurdish minority ("Kurdish Opening") and took several measures to recalibrate the Kurdish-Turkish relations. However, relations again deteriorated and in 2015, the Turkish state and the PKK was fighting each other again. The misery of the Kurdish people is continuing. 

Role of non-religious parties in Islamization of Pakistan

Nadeem Farooq Piracha (NFP) has written a very detailed and excellent article on non-religious parties' role in Islamization of the government (Role of non-religious parties in fanning religious extremism). He calls it "fanning religious extremism" but the examples he gave and the speeches he cited cannot all be termed as religious extremism. NFP starts with the 1953 Ahmadi riots in Punjab that were covertly supported or encouraged by the then Chief Minister Mumtaz Daultana, who was not religious but wanted to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Others have argued that this instrumentalization of Islam for political ends in Pakistan much earlier than 1953. Some scholars point towards the passage of Objectives Resolution in March 1949 as the first instance of using Islam for political ends by non-religious parties and non-practicing leaders. Most Indian scholars, of course, term the whole independence movement of Pakistan as an example of using Islam to fan division, hatred, and communalism, all for mundane political objectives. 

The "selling of religion for political ends," as Pakistan's first President Iskander Mirza termed it while abrogating Pakistan's first (1956) constitution, continues unabated from 1953 onwards. General Ayub's tenure (1958-69) is considered by many as the apex of Islamic modernism. The article also hints at agreeing with this idea especially before 1965. However, digging a little deep, one can see that Ayub was not really against using Islam for his own political ends. Islamic modernism was employed by Ayub Khan to promote the development agenda of his regime. The fact that he included, not one (as in the 1956 Constitution) but two constitutional bodies to research on Islamic history, law, philosophy, etc., and to advise the government in the 1962 Constitution (articles 199 to 207) bespeaks of his willingness to instrumentalize Islam. We can agree that Ayub was not fanning extremism but he was also instrumentalizing Islam. Bengalis would also point out to his using of Islam to denigrate them and to deny them their political, democratic, and civil rights in Pakistan. Ayub infamously wrote in his book, Friends, Not Masters, "In addition, they [East Pakistanis] have been and still are under Hindu cultural and linguistic influence." Inferior Muslims (Bengalis) were, of course, not allowed to rule superior Muslims (West Pakistanis), even if the inferior ones are in majority. 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's story of caving in to religious parties or his unfortunate attempt to steal their thunder is often told as a modern-day replication of a Greek tragedy. Bhutto is proclaimed as a non-religious hero, who started with a secular vision, but was eventually defeated by the nefarious Islamist forces. The reality is, as always, more complex. Bhutto did pay homage to religious sentiment from the start, much before he came to power. The slogan of "Islamic socialism" was used by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Bhutto himself during the 1970 election campaign. Furthermore, as NFP informs in his article, Bhutto was forced to adopt religious clauses in the new 1973 Constitution and later other Islamization measures, including declaring Ahmadis non-Muslim, not only by the religious parties but also by non-religious parties which allied with religious parties in order to dent Bhutto's popularity and defeat him.

Source: Role of non-religious parties in fanning religious extremism

The 1990s saw Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League led the charge towards Islamization. Islam was used to browbeat and defeat PPP. Not surprisingly, the name of the opposition alliance, cobbled together by the military and led by Sharif, was Islami Jamhori Ittihad (Islamic Democratic Alliance). Benazir was portrayed as Western and not truly Muslim. She was linked with India and Israel.

After the restoration of democracy in 2008, using Islam for political purposes by the non-religious parties declined a bit. However, this changed when the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, and many other parties decided to support religious parties protest against an amendment in the Finality of Prophethood declaration by the electoral candidates. The PTI continued to smear Sharif, even after the amendment was taken back and the law minister resigned, of not really believing in the finality of prophethood. In addition to the help of the military, this usage of Islam to defame its opponent was crucial in its win in Punjab.

Hence, NFP is right. Non-religious parties have been using Islam to get a political or electoral advantage. The million-dollar question is why they are doing it? And why they have succeeded at least in some cases? Is it because of Pakistan's religious nationalism?

Is there a separation of church and state in Islam?

Millions of people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, even scores of academics, believe that in Islam, there is no separation of church and state. They point out to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) being a prophet as well as the head of the state. The period of the first four righteous caliphs, the Rashidun (632-661), is also presented as evidence.  The presence of close links between Muslim kings and ulema (scholars of Islam) and the implementation of Sharia by Muslim sovereigns strengthens the case and finally, views of noted Islamists and examples of governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia are used to close the argument.

Several assumptions are made in these arguments that have no basis in history. These assumptions are based on applying a normative framework based on European experience on Islam. Understanding Islamic religion and history using European and Christian experience as the model will, unsurprisingly, lead to distorted and/or sub-optimal results. Following is an example of Muslims and Islam being considered copies of Christians and Christianity and Christian history of Europe being considered a model for Muslims to adopt:

Consider the most famous waves of Christian violence, in the 16th and 17th centuries. Wars of religion devastated Europe, killing huge percentages of national populations. States disintegrated and acts of terror were commonplace. The main impetus for these wars was the question of which Christian sect - Protestantism or Catholicism - would rule each state. Clergy had great amounts of political power, dispensing law and owning huge tracts of land. Nationalism was, as yet, weak. The question of which religion would dominate in which area was also the question of who would rule. 

Eventually Europe’s religious wars calmed down, and a solution was reached. In the Peace of Westphalia, it was agreed that governments - not clergy - would get to decide which religion would prevail in their territories...

Nowadays, the Middle East is embroiled in a set of conflicts that look a bit reminiscent of the European Wars of Religion. A few powerful, cohesive states - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey - are fueling proxy wars in anarchic areas like Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen...Just as the European Wars of Religion featured Christians mostly killing Christians, the Islamic Wars of Religion feature mostly Muslims killing other Muslims...The obvious solution, it would seem, is for Islam to come to the same collective realization that Christianity came to after 1648 - that church and state make for a volatile mix, and should be separated. (Source: Noah Smith: Islam Needs To Separate Church and State)

The antagonistic relationship that Christianity had with the state for its initial three hundred years has no parallel in Islam, whose relationship with the state was without serious disagreements. Furthermore, and more importantly, there has never been a church in the form of the Catholic Church in Islamic history. One can search far and wide and will not find it. There has never been a pope, with his bishops, in Islamic history that could speak for God. In medieval Europe, there was one Pope (except for a few decades) and many rulers, making the Pope's opinion and approval important. In almost all Muslim realms, in contrast, there was one king and scores of Muslim scholars to choose from. There were many kings who may have been excommunicated by Muslim clerics but since there was no central religious authority so there were few repercussions for the king (excommunicating clerics, however, suffered imprisonment, exile, and even execution for their transgression). Kings and emperors always had many more clerics to endorse them than those who reject them.    

Graham E. Fuller, in his book A World Without Islam (2012) brilliantly unpacks the differences between sway and power of the Catholic Church and the lack of anything similar in the Islamic history (as given in Separation of “church and state” in Islamic history):

Islam actually had no parallel to the intimate links between church and state in the West, where the church itself wielded great political and economic power.  While Islamists today — those speaking for forms of political Islam — constantly emphasize the indissoluble unity of religion and state in Islam (din wa dawla), in fact, this perception is largely a modern ideological construct: state power in Islam was virtually always distinct from the clerics.  Religious officials in Islamic states never appointed leadership or controlled the state.  (Clerical domination of the state in today’s Iran is a glaring exception, a modern Shi‘ite innovation.)  Even in Saudi Arabia the monarchy in most contexts is far more powerful than are clerical institutions.

To be sure, the legitimacy of Muslim rulers historically depended upon their implementation of Shari‘a law, at least in theory, but a great deal of the time rulers did not seriously implement its spirit, and they rarely could be overthrown for such religious lapses.  In fact, some medieval Muslim clerics inadvertently dispensed virtual carte blanche authority to misrule by secular powers by declaring that anarchy (fitna) was worse even than oppressive rule (dhulm).  Indeed, no sultan or Muslim ruler in Islamic history ever kneeled to ask forgiveness before a grand mufti in the way that Henry IV was forced to do before the pope in 1077 in Canossa for challenging papal authority on some key secular matters. Henry VIII of England had to break with Rome entirely simply to secure the divorce he sought from his wife.  Thus, intimate linkage between religious and state power marked most of Christian history in a way that has had no parallel in Islam.  (122-123)

And this lack of a Church, with a capital C, in Islam is not a historical development. It is what flows from the Quran and the Sunnah (of the Prophet), two basic sources of Islam. Nowhere in the Quran is there mention of the establishment of a Church. Similarly, the Prophet, in his life, did not establish a Church. Islam propagates a direct relationship between an individual and her God, enjoins Muslims to study the Quran and seek guidance from it. Clearly, this set-up does not favor the establishment of a powerful church and a priesthood that can rival kings. 

Historically, after the Prophet, the religious authority of the leader was withdrawn. The Rashidun, whose period is considered to be a model, to be emulated by all future leaders, by the Sunnis, did not have religious authority. They did introduce some new things or promoted some actions but their decisions regarding religion were always contested and remain contested today. They did not have the religious authority of a prophet, not even a pope. There were many companions of the Prophet who were considered equally or more well-versed in Islamic precepts and edicts than the four caliphs. It is nor without reason that the four righteous caliphs never claimed to be in communication with God or receiving any direct instructions (like the Prophet did). The Prophet also clearly told in his lifetime that after him, there would no revelation. The door of revelation, the direct communication with God, was permanently closed for all times to come after him. There is also no claim for a superior esoteric knowledge that the leader will have had over and above others. None of the caliphs claimed it. Although Shiites do believe Ali, the last of the Rashidun, had superior esoteric knowledge of divine rules, he ruled for only four years and what to say of his religious authority, his temporal authority was contested like none of the other three previous caliphs. During his whole tenure, he fought to end a rebellion and he was martyred before the rebellion ended.

If Rashidun could not (or did not) claim religious authority, the caliphs that came afterward had no choice but to leave religious authority in the hands of clerics. The caliphs after Rashidun were not very different from Christian or Hindu kings. They had attained power not because of their close association with Islam or the Prophet, but due to their superior military might and political acumen. They knew it and most of the Muslims under than knew it so there were not many attempts to enforce something different. Of course, there were few dynasties that did claim divine right to rule, such as the Fatimids, but their religious authority was never completely accepted in their own realm, what to say in the whole Muslim world.

The relationship between Muslim kings and emperors on one hand and the chief judge (Qazi ul-quzat) and chief law interpreter (Shiekh ul-Islam) -- two powerful positions generally reserved for clerics -- was mostly similar to the relationship between the king and the (grand) vizir. Vizirs had authority but they served at the pleasure of the king. The king could appoint any of the scholars of Islam to the above-mentioned posts and usually, the selection was based on scholar's acceptance of the sovereign's authority. 

The king had to publically follow Islam and enforce Sharia. But here again, kings had options. They could suspend or ignore rules they did not like. They could also publicly flaunt their non-acceptance of some parts of Sharia and get away with it. Most of the Muslim kings murdered their rivals (including their brothers, nephews, etc.) and fought wars against other Muslim kings, leading to the deaths of thousands of Muslims. Many of them drank alcohol and had harams full of women. 

Unsurprisingly, there is also an Islamic tradition of God-fearing, learned, and illustrious clerics avoiding and refusing any relationship with the rulers. All founders of the five major schools of thought of Islam (Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Shafa'i, Imam Malik, Imam Hanbal, and Shiite Imam Jaafar) had an antagonistic relationship with their state authorities. A few of them, such Imam Abu Hanifa, were offered the posts of chief faqih (interpreter of law) and/or chief judge but they refused. There are also some hadiths (sayings of the Prophet) that discourage people from accepting powerful appointments or having a close relationship with rulers:

Whoever goes to the gates of the ruler will endure trail/temptation. A person does not move closer to the ruler except that he moves further away from Allah. (Source: Musnad Ahmad 8619)

He who has been appointed a judge among the people has been killed without a knife. (Source: Sunan Abu Dawud 3571)

The rule of ulema or theocracy is a concept alien to Islam. Medieval Islamic texts, many written by clerics themselves, almost never present clerics as an alternative to a bad or unislamic ruler. The concept of Walayet-e-Faqih or guardian jurist (developed by Imam Khomeini and later enshrined in the Iranian Constitution) is a new concept even in the long Shiite tradition. Even now, many of the Shiite clerics both inside and outside Iran reject this concept.  

The above discussion also invalidates the last argument. The Islamists and the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia might claim that there is no separation of church and state in Islam but it is clearly not the case. Therefore, they can keep justifying their desires or their actions by pointing to something imaginary but their proclamations do not make it real. Some rudimentary knowledge of the Quran, the Sunnah, and Islamic history settles the question that the church and state are separate in Islam.

  

The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism

This lecture by Dr. Reza Zia-Ebrahimi is based on his book, "The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the politics of dislocation," published in 2016 by Columbia University Press. An abstract of the book from Dr. Reza's page on King's College website is given below:

Reza Zia-Ebrahimi revisits the work of Fath'ali Akhundzadeh and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, two Qajar-era intellectuals who founded modern Iranian nationalism. In their efforts to make sense of a difficult historical situation, these thinkers advanced an appealing ideology Zia-Ebrahimi calls "dislocative nationalism," in which pre-Islamic Iran is cast as a golden age, Islam is reinterpreted as an alien religion, and Arabs become implacable others. Dislodging Iran from its empirical reality and tying it to Europe and the Aryan race, this ideology remains the most politically potent form of identity in Iran.

Akhundzadeh and Kermani's nationalist reading of Iranian history has been drilled into the minds of Iranians since its adoption by the Pahlavi state in the early twentieth century. Spread through mass schooling, historical narratives, and official statements of support, their ideological perspective has come to define Iranian culture and domestic and foreign policy. Zia-Ebrahimi follows the development of dislocative nationalism through a range of cultural and historical materials, and he captures its incorporation of European ideas about Iranian history, the Aryan race, and a primordial nation. His work emphasizes the agency of Iranian intellectuals in translating European ideas for Iranian audiences, impressing Western conceptions of race onto Iranian identity.

Dr. Reza introduces his talk at Stanford University by clarifying what he means by Iranian nationalism.  The (dislocative) Iranian nationalism, according to Dr. Zia, was constructed in the late 19th century and was based on the ideas of European orientalists, many of whom were Islamophobes. This nationalism was not accepted or even discussed in Iran before the late 19th century. He defines Iranian nationalism as a cluster of following three myths or ideas.

• Iran is the land of Aryans. The Aryans are defined as a race that is generally in conflict with the Semitic race. Here, there is an attempt to link Iran with Europe and present Iranians as a European race. Many influential historians, who subscribed to this myth under Pahlavis, wrote Iranian history to affirm this myth;
• Everything in pre-Islamic Iran was great. It was the golden age of Iranian/Aryan history. If one wants to study true Iranian culture, before its adulteration, then he or she has to study this age. The decline of Iran started with the invasion of Arabs;
• Arabs are barbaric, uncouth, illiterate savages. Everything related to Arabs is brutish or boorish, including their culture (if it exists), their language, Arabic, and their religion, Islam.

As one can see Dr. Reza is talking about a particular type or a specific strand of Iranian nationalism. This strand rejects Islam, Arab and Semitic influences, including sometimes Shia Islam. So, Dr. Reza is telling the story of nationalism that is not accepted by millions of Iranians and the current Iranian government today. Dr. Reza explains how the myths above are ahistorical and European imports.

Some pictures that Dr. Reza used to illustrate Iranian dislocative nationalism:

Popularity of Farvahar: Symbol of pre-Islamic Iran, Zoroastrianism, etc.

Crown Prince Abbas asking a European to explain (after Iran's defeat by Russians):

Golden age archaism:

Arab invasion: Arabs are not only brutal savages that are killing Iranians and raping Iranian women, they are also brown while Iranians are white:

Aryan race theory borrowed from the Europeans, part of the state discourse under Pahlavis:

To understand the tussle between religious and ethnolinguistic nationalism in Iran, here are some previous blog posts on Iranian nationalism: Iranian identity and nationalism: Shahnameh's Jamsheed or Biblical Cyrus, Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity, Shiite and Persian Nationalism are both myths, Afraid of Ahmadinejad,  Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?, and More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran.

A victory for indigenous faiths in Indonesia

Indonesia's official ideology is Pancasila, which includes belief in one God but otherwise, it is quite secular. Indonesia officially recognizes only six religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism. Believers of other religions faced discrimination, particularly after the introduction of new legislation in 2006. The Indonesian Constitutional Court has rejected the new legislation.

Source: Religion in Indonesia

An excerpt from a news article explaining the change is given below:

Indonesia’s top court has overturned a law that denied recognition and legal rights to followers of indigenous faiths, in a surprise advance for religious freedom in the world’s most populous Muslim nation.

The Constitutional Court, in a unanimous ruling Tuesday (Nov. 7) from its nine-judge panel, said articles in the Civil Administration Law were discriminatory and violated the principle of equality before the law.

“These articles are not legally binding as they contradict the 1945 constitution,” presiding Judge Arief Hidayat told the court.

The ruling is an unexpected victory for moderates at a time when religious conservatives have demonstrated growing political influence and undermined the country’s reputation for tolerance.

The discriminatory articles, in place since 2006, effectively required followers of faiths not among the six recognized by the government to list one of the official religions on their national identity card or be denied basic rights such as marriage registration and land titles.

They also had the option of leaving the religion category blank but that would risk being accused of being an atheist, an offense under Indonesia’s blasphemy law, said Andreas Harsono, Indonesia researcher for Human Rights Watch.

Full article can be read here 

Women can drive in Saudi Arabia but is it really a big change?

Saudi Arabia is not the place from where one can expect good news for women. It is the most restrictive country for women in the world. It's not for nothing that it has been called the most masculine state and anti-woman kingdom. Though many blame Islam for women plight in Saudi Arabia, there are around fifty other Muslim-majority countries in the world and none of these countries control and regulate women lives as much as the Saudi state.Those blaming Islam for the Saudi state's misogyny, however, have one powerful supporter inside the kingdom, the Saudi state, which justifies its invidious discrimination of women on the basis of Islam, Sharia and tradition.

So, knowing Saudi state's general puritanism and its stance on gender equality, it was a surprise to read a series of news that advance the empowerment of Saudi women. Following are the positive news received over the last two months:

• King Salman issued a historic decree removing the ban on issuance of driving licenses to women. Women will be able to drive by June 2018 (See King Salman’s decree allows women to drive in Saudi Arabia):
• Iman Bint Abdullah was appointed as Assistant Mayor of the Al-Khobar municipality, with special responsibility for information technology. She is the first Saudi woman to hold such a senior position (See First Saudi woman appointed as assistant mayor);
• Fatimah Baeshen was appointed as the first female spokesperson for the Saudi Embassy in Washington DC (See First spokeswoman appointed at Saudi embassy in Washington);
• As part of the independence day celebrations, Saudi women were allowed to enter the King Fahd International Stadium (Riyadh) for the first time to attend a pageant operetta. They were also allowed to attend a concert in Jeddah (See National celebrations open Saudi sports stadium to women for [the] first time);
• Saudi Ministry of Education issued a decree that will allow girls to participate in physical education classes for the first time. The government also agreed, again for the first time, to issue female gym licences. Female gyms previously operated as salons and faced threats of closure (See Saudi Arabia will finally allow girls to take PE — that's a big deal).

Besides openings for Saudi women, the Saudi government also proclaimed at least one future relaxation for foreign women. In August, it was announced that a new 50 island Red Sea luxury resort would be built and this resort would be “governed by laws on par with international standards.” The government did not explicitly say it but the meaning of "international standards" was mostly interpreted as freedom for women to wear whatever they like, including bikinis, at the resort (See Saudi Arabia to open luxury beach resort where women can wear bikinis).

So, why this change and why so fast? This was the kingdom which believed in evolution, not revolution. This was the kingdom where tradition and Wahhabi style Islam reigned supreme unfettered by modernity. Most analysts have pointed out that the force behind these changes is the new Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Since his father ascended to the throne in January 2015, he has gradually acquired more and more power. In the first cabinet of his father, Prince Mohammed was appointed Minister of Defense and he was also the head of the Royal Court. Also in January, he was named the chair of the newly established Council for Economic and Development Affairs. In April 2015, he was appointed Deputy Crown Prince and Second Deputy Prime Minister, just two heartbeats away from the throne. So after April 2015, he was controlling both economic and defence policies of the kingdom (For his pivotal role in the Yemen war see Saudi Arabian Nationalism, Religion and Yemen War, an earlier blog post).

A year later, "Mr. Everything," a name given to Prince Mohammed because of his all-pervasive influence (See Why Saudi's Mohammed bin Salman is 'Mr Everything'), presented Vision 2030, a roadmap for the Saudi economy and society for the next 15 years. In his final promotion, Prince Mohammed bin Salman was made Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister by his father in June 2017. 

There are several reasons why openings for the Saudi women are being linked to Prince Mohammed. First, he has said many times that he favors women joining the workforce. In 2016, when he was asked, "Do you think having a greater proportion of women in the workforce would be good for Saudi Arabia?" He replied, "No doubt. A large portion of my productive factors are unutilised. And I have population growth reaching very scary figures. Women’s work will help in both of these issues." Second, he is the main force behind the Vision 2030 which declares:

Saudi women are yet another great asset. With over 50 percent of our university graduates being female, we will continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of our society and economy.

Third, the timing of the reforms is too difficult to ignore. In late June, Prince Mohammed vanquishes his last major rival (cousin and former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Naif) and becomes Crown Prince and in the next two months, a series of reforms happen. Finally, because of his failure to deliver a victory in the Yemen War, he wants a big win to consolidate his power and these changes can give him that, if he can manage the conservative Wahhabi religious establishment. 

Source: Saudi Arabia to allow women to obtain driving licences

The question is whether these changes are going to be a game changer for Saudi women or not. The major change is, of course, permission to drive. Many analysts have pointed out that while important, this change still does not give freedom to drive to Saudi women. After June 2018, Saudi women will still need to have consent from their male guardians:

The key change is that there is no longer any legal prohibition for women to drive. And nor, according to the statements of the formerly reluctant clerics, is there a basis for a ban in sharia law, which governs most aspects of Saudi society. The onus of decisions about whether women can sit behind the wheel has been shifted from the state to families.

Under repressive guardianship laws, male relatives have veto over whether wives or daughters can leave the home unaccompanied. While a woman can be granted a licence and is allowed to drive, a male family member can still stop her from doing so. (See Saudi Arabia: Prince Mohammed plays his biggest card yet)

Madawi Al-Rashid, a Suadi Arabian scholar, has argued not much is going to change. According to her, it is a "public relations stunt" and women are still going to be oppressed in Saudi Arabia and the changes have been solely done to mollify Western critics and get their support:

The Saudi state is one of the most male-dominated in the world. Now it is compelled to look as if it is treating women better to win over critics in the west. As a result, it has embarked on a series of cosmetic reforms...History is littered with dictators who have promoted women, from Turkey’s Atatürk, the Iranian Shah, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Appearing to support women has won dictators applause, especially in the west, where women’s rights have become an axis against which to measure nations and evaluate regimes.

Today’s authoritarian regimes will win extra praise when they appear to be liberating Muslim women from the oppression of Islam. Saudi Arabia is no exception. Here, Muslim women are depicted either as survivors of their patriarchal religion or as heroes who are challenging such a dominant and primitive culture. Like their counterparts in Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan and elsewhere, Saudi women had been framed in this binary image. Dictators conveniently depict themselves as liberators of these downtrodden women while society is shown to be the oppressor. In particular, in recent times, Islam and sharia law are portrayed as the cause of women’s suffering.

Such a narrative is appealing to both Arab dictators and certain constituencies in the west. But allowing women to obtain a driving licence is little more than a public relations stunt designed to cement this notion of the Saudi regime as the liberator of women. (See Women are still not in the driving seat in Saudi Arabia)

Al-Rashid is correct in her assessment that Saudi women lives will not transform because of these few changes. However, she also argues that Saudi Royals are following Ataturk, Muhammad Reza Shah and Bourguiba and like them trying to please the West. If she is correct, this is a big change. It may not be a big change for the Saudi women but it is a metamorphosis for the Royals. Saudi Arabia is based on religious nationalism and Ataturk, Muhammad Reza Shah and Bourguiba were enemies of religious nationalism in their countries. These leaders derived their power by standing against the religious conservatives and Shariah while Saudi Royals justify their rule on the basis of Shariah. So, I would argue that the hold of religious nationalism on Saudi Arabia has loosened a bit because of these changes. If Prince Mohammad keeps on (slowly) moving away from religious nationalism, Saudi Arabia will feel the changes in other areas too. One should be thankful for the small mercies.

Guardian Council, 12 Holy Men

The Council of Guardians or Guardian Council of the Constitution (Shoraye Negahban-e Qanun-e Assassi) is the most powerful constitutional body in the current Iranian political system, much more important than the Iranian elected legislature (Majlis: Islamic Consultative Assembly). Guardian Council has been called Iran’s most powerful body (that controls Iranian democratic framework), most influential body, one of the most significant institutions under by the Supreme Leader, and de-facto Upper house of the Iranian legislature (p-41). Why the Guardian Council is so powerful when there are a host of other constitutional bodies, such as Majlis, Expediency Council, Assembly of Experts, etc?

Let's first see how the Guardian Council is constituted.

According to the Iranian Constitution of 1979, the Council has 12 members. Six of these members are Islamic jurists and are selected/nominated by the Supreme Leader. The other six civil jurists are specialists of other branches of law and are elected by the Majlis from among the list of Muslim jurists provided by the Head of Judiciary (Article 91). The term of the Guardian Council is six years (Article 92).

It appears that at least six members of the Guardian Council are (indirectly) elected and, therefore, they would be more concerned about the popular opinion. However, this is a facade as the six "elected" members are also from the list provided by the Head of the Judiciary, who is in turn selected by the Supreme Leader (Article 157). The Majlis cannot independently elect even one member of the Council. Hence, one can safely say that the Supreme Leader has almost complete control on who serves on the Council.

Source: Iran's Guardian Council

Why Guardian Council is considered so powerful?

First, the Iranian Constitution gives the Guardian Council many powers. Some of its most important powers are the following:

• Vetting all the candidates for the President, Majlis and the Assembly of Experts before the elections: This means that one cannot become a member of the Majlis or the Assembly of Experts or become President without the approval of the Guadian Council. Even if all the Iranian voters want to elect a particular person as President, they cannot do it unless the Guardian Council approves. The Guardian Council can and has not allowed many popular candidates to run in the elections. Furthermore, the Guardian Council also supervises any referenda or any other direct recourse to the public opinion  (Article 99);
• Approving every piece of legislation passed by the Majlis: All legislation passed by the elected Majlis needs the approval of the Guardian Council to become law. The Council judges all legislation on basis of its conformity with the official religion (Islam- Twelver Shia sect) and the Constitution. If Council does not approve, a draft law, even if it is passed by all members of the Majlis, will remain a draft law. There is no provision to bypass the Guardian Council. Majlis itself cannot overrule Council's rejection by a two-thirds or three-fourths supermajority. In fact, according to the constitution, the Majlis does not hold any legal status if there is no Guardian Council in existence. If there is disagreement between the Council and the Majlis, the case goes to the Expediency Council, which like the Guardian Council is a body nominated by the Supreme Leader and usually has all the members of the Guardian Council as its members (Article 4, 72, 91, 93 and 96);
• Sole interpreter of the Constitution: Like the Supreme Court in many countries, the Guardian Council has the power to interpret the constitution and its judgment is final (three-fourths majority required). The Council is also part of the constitution-amending process (Article 98 and 177).

Source: Deep-Seated Entanglements, RAND

Second, the Guardian Council consists of only twelve members. Comparing it with the membership of Majlis (290 members), Expediency Council (usually 30+ members) or Assembly of Experts (usually 80+ members), one can fathom how much more power an individual member of the Guardian Council would have, even if powers of all these constitutional bodies were equal. The fact is that the Guardian Council has greater powers than all these bodies and it is smaller then all of them, making it extremely powerful.

Third, the Guardian Council is powerful because its decisions, in most cases, are final. Its decisions regarding interpretation of the constitution cannot be contested. Similarly, its decisions regarding the vetting of candidates or election results are legally conclusive.

Finally, Council is powerful because constitution does not bar re-appointment of its members. Therefore, Guardian Council members can stay on for decades, if they retain the confidence of the Supreme Leader. The current Chairman of the Guardian Council, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, has been a member of the Council since its first establishment in 1980 (37 years) and has been its chairman since 1992 (25 years). Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, another member, has been part of the Council since 1988 (29 years). Ayatullah Sayed Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, another member, was earlier also part of the Council from 1992 to 1999. Then, he was appointed as the Head of Judiciary (1999-2009) and in that capacity was nominating Guardian Council candidates to the Majlis and then he again became a member of the Council in 2009. 

90 years old Ayatollah Jannati, head of the Guardian Council, with the Supreme Leader

Source: ‘Election Violations’ Used Against Rouhani

From the above analysis, it is clear that the Guardian Council plays a crucial role in the continuous clerical control of the Iranian political system. If Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) protects it militarily, the Guardian Council protects it constitutionally and legally.

Related blog post: Is Iran's Supreme Leader subject to oversight? Constitutionally yes, but...

Music Concerts: Tussle between Reformist Government and Conservative Judiciary

President Rouhani's government has been struggling to keep its promises. Not only the economic benefits of the nuclear agreement have been slow to materialize, the judiciary, revolutionary guards and other levers of government controlled by the hard conservatives have also stymied all attempts to allow a more open cultural space. President's Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Ali Jannati has faced resistance from hardliners from day one. Ali is certainly not an outsider as he is the son of Ahmad Jannati, the ultra-conservative Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, chairman of both the Assembly of Experts and the Guardian Council. Heading both these bodies at the same time makes Ayatollah Jannati the third most powerful political player (after Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Rouhani) in Iran. Ali Jannati views are, however, very moderate as compared to his father and aspire to lessen religious restrictions imposed on Iranian society and culture. In January 2014, he said to Al Jazeera:

President Hassan Rouhani is making more room for freedom of the press for the publishing sector and the film industry and we are trying to create a more open atmosphere for artists...Certainly there are elements inside Iran who are opposed to any kind of talks with the West, I believe that after signing of the agreement and considering the broad support that the people of Iran have given the president, these elements have retreated to a great extent.

    A concert in Tehran by a Korean pop group in May 2016

The latest controversy in this Iranian culture war is about holding of concerts which the hardliners oppose. The reformists, on the other hand, consider them an innocuous entertainment or a way to revive Iranian music and culture. Minister Jannati has tried to walk a fine line and, unsurprisingly, no one is happy. Rohollah Faghihi writes in Al-Monitor:

During the past decade, concerts have rarely made waves, but ever since Rouhani took office, concert organizers have repeatedly faced obstruction and consequent cancellation. To avoid concert cancellations, which damage Rouhani’s approval ratings, the administration has issued a circular to prevent other state bodies such as the judiciary and the police from calling them off. The circular states that police are not allowed to stop concerts. Jannati has said that based on the new law, singers are to request permission to hold a concert from the Ministry of Culture, while the police are only to deal with traffic around the venue. In response, the deputy head of Iran’s armed forces, Gen. Masoud Jazayeri, ordered police to continue “dealing with ethical and misbehavior anomalies in places, including concert venues.”

Mashhad has led the Iranian major cities in concert cancellations. Many Iranians think Mashhad as the religious capital of Iran because of the mausoleum the eighth Shiite imam Imam Reza, the only mausoleum of a Shiite Imam in Iran (others consider Qom because of its seminaries, Ayatollahs, and the mausoleum of Imam Reza's sister, Fatemeh Masomeh). Jannati was not happy and said on August 8 after the latest cancellations, 'This will be costly for the judiciary...We should talk with high-ranking officials in the judicial system to resolve the issue. It is not possible for a province not to act under the law. A province is not a separate island.' The Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli supported Ali and wrote a letter to the Judiciary questioning the cessation of all music concerts in Mashhad. Addressing the Chief of Judiciary Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani on August 7, he argued, 'We cannot prejudge the intentions [of musicians] and base decisions on the possibility that something will go wrong during all concerts. That would not be right.' 

These arguments led to a serious rebuttal from the hardliners and the Judiciary. Ayatollah Ahmad Alamolhoda, the hardline Friday prayer leader of Mashhad and representative of the Iranian Supreme Leader, compared the sanctity of Rome and Mashhad and said on August 12, 'We should know that we live in the city where Imam Reza is buried. It is not possible to hold concerts in the city of Imam Reza, and we shouldn’t argue with people and some narrow-minded officials regarding this. If you want a concert, go live somewhere else.' Ali Jannati backed out after this comment and said that the ministry was not going to support holding concerts in Mashhad. Now, it was the turn of reformers to criticize Ali. President Rouhani, Deputy parliament Speaker Ali Motahari and the moderate newspaper Jomhuri Eslami all condemned Ali's retreat. President Rouhani said, 'As far as I am concerned, no minister should give in to any pressure...We have the Islamic parliament. If a law is going to be adopted, lawmakers will pass it.' A letter endorsed by five thousand artists and other people in the Iran's music industry was also published which called the ban on concerts in Mashhad as a 'catastrophe that sacrifices music today, and the rest of the culture and the reputation of this country tomorrow.'

It appears that the conservative hardliners have won this battle of the culture war but this may be a temporary victory. 

Malaysian Hudud Law Controversy

As discussed before on this blog (Malaysia's turn to Islamism? and Is Religious Nationalism in Malaysia an end in itself or just a mean to continue the erstwhile Malay Nationalism?), Islam had been part of Malaysian nationalism since independence and its role is increasing. Since the early 1980s, this religious nationalism is fueling Islamization of government in the multi-ethnic, multi-religious country. 

A bill to enhance Islamic punishments in Malaysia is currently dividing the country and the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN, Trans. National Front). The private member’s bill presented in the parliament on 27th May sought to amend the Shariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 and to enhance the power of Shariah Courts. This bill was introduced by the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) president Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang. The Islamist party, PAS, has been trying to introduce Hudud laws in Malaysia for decades. It had passed Hudud laws in states (Kelantan Syariah Criminal Code Enactment 1999 and the Syariah Criminal Offences (Hudud and Qisas) Enactment, Terengganu, 2002) under its control but as they were in conflict with Federal laws, they were never operational. The PAS is, therefore, trying to get a federal approval/exemption for its laws. It twice tried to present a similar bill in federal parliament last year but failed. This latest bill would have died but for the intervention of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) minister, Datuk Seri Azalina Othman Said. With only 14 members in the house of 222, the PAS did not have to power to get its bill pass even the first stage. The UMNO is the largest party in the Barisan Nasional and is led by Prime Minister Najib. The UMNO, with the help of its partners, has ruled Malaysia since independence. All Prime Ministers of Malaysia have been members of the UMNO.

Critics have denounced the Abdul Hadi Awang bill, calling it ‘Hudud law’ to link with Quranic punishments, such amputation and stoning. They contend that the law will be a disaster for Malaysia because of the following reasons:

• It will make Malaysia one step closer to being a theocratic state;
• It will introduce two criminal/judicial system in Malaysia, which is unconstitutional;
• It will be applicable to the whole country and not limited to the PAS-ruled states;
• It will be applicable to non-Muslims and at the very least affect their civil and political rights;
• Its support by the UMNO is illegitimate. Such an action should not have ignored the decision-making process of Barisan Nasional by bypassing the ruling coalition’s supreme council. – 

Proponents of the bill have argued that media and oppositional parties have made this bill controversial without much reason. They have responded to the critics:

• This bill is not unconstitutional and does not introduce a dual criminal/judicial system as it amends a fifty-years-old law and Shariat Courts have been operating in Malaysia for decades;
• Malaysia is ruled by a constitution, not by Shariah. It is not becoming a theocratic state;
• The bill will only enhance some punishments that the Shariah Courts can give. It does not introduce amputation or stoning in Malaysia, the not even in PAS-ruled states;
• It will not be applicable to non-Muslims;
• It is not against Barisan Nasional agreement.

Although some prominent Muslim Malays have criticized the bill, the non-Muslim associations and groups are particularly incensed and have spearheaded the charge against the bill. Even non-Muslim ministers coming from Barisan Nasional component parties have deplored the bill. Four out of eleven parties in the ruling coalition have criticized the bill. The Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress ministers have threatened to resign, if the bill is passed. Mr. Najib has tried to allay the fears of his coalition parties and others by saying that Hudud punishments would not be introduced, only Shariah Courts would be able to give some more strokes of rotan (Malay word for a cane). Currently, Shariah Court can only give 3-5-6 maximum punishments (three years' jail, an RM 5,000 fine or six strokes of the rotan).

Among them were three Malaysian Chinese Association ( MCA ) ministers and four deputy ministers who have vowed to block the bill at all costs, even to the extent of losing their Cabinet posts, while Malaysian Indian Congress ( MIC )'s president S. Subramaniam has also said he would quit as health minister if the bill gets passed.A news report in Jakarta Post informs:

Several major Chinese organizations in the country have also voiced their strong objection to the bill, stressing that the Islamic criminal law is not suitable to be implemented in a multiracial secular state like Malaysia.
MCA president Liow Tiong Lai announced that his party would launch a civic campaign to get more Malaysians to defend the country's constitution and oppose Islamist party PAS' tabling of the amendment bill on hudud in the parliament.
He reiterated that MCA would take further actions to lead the Chinese community and the rest of the country in this critically important civic movement.
He said he had approached several BN component parties over the campaign in hope of securing their cooperation to work together to defend the constitution for the sake of the country's future survival.

PM Najib with PAS leader Hadi Awang

Source: Malay Mail Online

What is the motive of the UMNO for allowing the PAS to table the bill now? Some have argued that PM Najib wanted to divert attention from the corruption scandal but the corruption scandal has been going on for almost a year now. A more plausible explanation is that bill has been supported to win two by-elections in Malay-majority areas. PM Najib want to demonstrate that he remains popular with Malays that make-up a majority of Malaysians. The timing of the bill’s acceptance by the UMNO is crucial. The bill was tabled on the last day of the Parliament session so it will be debated in October. By that time, the June by-elections would have been won by the UMNO and so the bill, its utility expired, can then be rejected. Futhermore, the Hudud bill is divisive not only for the Barisan Nasional but also for the opposition. Opposition needs to be united to defeat the UMNO, which has dominated Malaysian politics for decades, but the Hudud bill makes alliance between the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the PAS close to impossible.

Does more democracy mean more Islam? A look at Pakistan’s constitutional history

Writing about post-invasion Iraq, Feldman and Martinez (2007) argued, 

as the constitutional process became increasingly participatory and democratic in the period from the fall of Saddam Hussein to ratification, the constitution itself became increasingly Islamic in orientation and detail…To put it simply, more democracy meant more Islam. 

If one reviews the political developments in other Muslim-majority countries (MMCs) during the last few decades, more democracy means more Islam (hereafter Feldman’s aphorism) seems to be true. Democratic advancement has resulted in more Islam in Jordan, Indonesia, Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Recently, Hamid (2014) also contended that democratic openings in the MMCs might lead to more Islamization and not to a more liberal polity. This blogpost reviews Pakistan’s constitutional history to see whether democratic progression in Pakistan has also led to more Islamization. It concludes that during the first thirty years of Pakistan (1947-77), more democracy did lead to more Islam in the constitutions but since then, Feldman’s aphorism is no longer true.  

Rest of the blog can be read at Calgary Centre of Global Community here

Religious nationalism: A new development in the Middle East

Nationalism is a concept linked with modernity and so are its numerous variants, including religious nationalism. Although Islam has been the dominant religion in the Middle East for the last 1500 years, religious nationalism is a recent phenomenon. Like European feudal states and empires, Muslim feudal states and empires of the pre-modern era did not propagate or even espouse religious nationalism.

Brian A. Catlos, the religious studies professor at the University of Colorado at Boulder, has written an excellent column in the Washington Post on religious nationalism in the Middle East. Following are some excerpts, but do read the Religious Nationalism finds a footing in the Middle East

With many reports of this violence come adjectives such as “barbarous” and “medieval,” along with the intimation that this sort of intolerance is particularly characteristic of Islam and antithetical to the enlightened and rational secularism of the West.

But brutal as this sectarian violence may be, the fact that there are so many religious minorities in the Middle East stands testament to the reality that, despite long-standing antagonisms, myriad ethnic groups and religious denominations have not only survived but even thrived in this region through some 1,500 years of Islamic domination. The richness of the culture, where many of the ancient sects and arcane languages — often surviving only in small, highly localized communities — predate Christianity, Islam and even modern Judaism, has no parallel in Europe. The Yazidi religion, for example, goes back to Mesopotamia; Aramaic, the language of Jesus, continues to be spoken in a clutch of villages near Damascus...

This reflects an entirely different model of political compromise than that which has developed in the West, and it may seem regressive to us. But it is an arrangement that developed organically and has functioned for about 14 centuries.

The breakdown of religious tolerance and plurality in today’s Middle East is not, then, a manifestation of some particularly Islamic barbarism or evidence of a return to the Middle Ages. Nor is it religious in motivation, although it may be in expression. It is a symptom of what we call modernization, and its political framework: nationalism...

Head of state must be a member of a certain religion

In a factank article, Pew Research  Center lists the countries that require their heads of states to have a specific religion (See In 30 countries heads of state must belong to a certain religion). It found thirty countries (15% of all countries) that have such a requirement. The list shows that it is mostly the Muslim-majority countries that have religion-related restrictions on the selection of their heads of state. Out of the total thirty countries with restrictions, seventeen (17) are Muslim-majority. For example, Jordan, Tunisia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Mauritania have such a restriction. The article informs that only two countries each require their heads of state to be Christian (Lebanon and Andorra) and Buddhist (Bhutan and Thailand). However, this is obviously not true as the article later explains that there are other 19 Christian-majority countries that do the same. So, the true count should have been forty-nine (49) countries with restrictions, twenty-one (21) Christian-majority and nineteen (19) Muslim-majority:

In addition to the 30 countries in this analysis, another 19 nations have religious requirements for ceremonial monarchs who serve as their heads of state. Sixteen of these, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, are members of the Commonwealth of Nations with Queen Elizabeth II – also known as the Defender of the Faith – as their head of state. The other countries in this category are Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 

Most of the world’s countries (85%) allow citizens of any religious affiliation to be head of state. In the United States, the Constitution specifically prohibits any kind of “religious test” as a qualification for holding federal or state public office. At the same time, a number of states still have laws on the books prohibiting nonbelievers from holding office. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that First Amendment’s prohibition on the establishment of religion clearly prohibits states from requiring office-holders to profess a belief in God.

Source: In 30 countries heads of state must belong to a certain religion

Several comments on the Pew's website questioned the validity of the analysis. For example, some commentators considered Pew's coding of Pancasila (nationalist philosophy of Indonesia) as a religion was considered strange. Others commented on the absence of the Vatican state from the analysis. I also found the analysis problematic and posted the following comment:

If the focus of the article is whether the position of head of state is restricted to members of a specific religion, then all countries that have such restrictions should be listed first. The distinction between the ‘ceremonial monarchs’ and other heads of state, if need be, should have been made later. The way article is organized, it gives a distorted picture. 

The headline says, ‘In 30 countries, heads of state must belong to a certain religion’ and these 30 countries are listed and shown on the graph. This gives the impression that other countries do not have such restrictions. It is only later that the author remembers that there are some other countries that also restrict head of state to a certain religion. The obvious question is why these countries are not included in the headline count or the first list? The answer is not clearly given but the implicit suggestion is that these heads of state do not have real power. 

This distinction is false as many countries included in the first list also have heads of state that do not have real power. One pertinent example is that of Malaysia. Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy, just like Australia, Canada, New Zealand etc. The Malaysian king (head of state) does not have real power, like the British monarch. But still Malaysia is not in the same list as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Similarly, Pakistan’s presidency (though not a monarchy) is also a ceremonial position with no real powers but still Pakistan is in the first list. 

The issue discussed in the article was whether head of state has to be a member of a certain religion. Unfortunately, from the very start, this specificity was lost and other factors like power and type of political system influenced the choices/results of analysis.