Gandhi's Ram Rajya: Inclusive, secular, and democratic

 Mahatma Gandhi talked a lot about Ram Rajya and the BJP and RSS are using this to show that Gandhi would have been okay with what they are doing now. In 2014, Modi said in an election rally in Ayodhya:

“Jab log Mahatma Gandhi ko puchha karte the ki raj kaisa hona chahiye… to Mahatma Gandhi ek shabd me samjha dete the ke agar kalyankari rajya ki kalpana karni hai to Ram Rajya hona chahiye. ( Trans. When people used to ask Mahatma Gandhi about what kind of rule should be...Mahatma Gandhi would explain it in only one phrase that if we want a Welfare State then it should be Ram Rajya).” 

A week after Ram Mandir's inauguration, CM Yogi Adityanath tweeted on Gandhi ji's anniversary:

Bapu's ideology calls for humanity, freedom, and harmony. His teachings pave the way for the realization of the concept of Ram Rajya and world peace.

 

Source: CNBCTV18

But is it true? Did Modi's and Yogi's want Gandhi's Ram Rajya? What Gandhi meant when he said he wanted Ram Rajya?

Mahatma Gandhi's Ram Rajya was not Hindu Raj

S. N. Sahu in his article Gandhi’s Ram Rajya Was No Hindu Raj in The Wire writes:

Speaking in Bhopal on 10th September 1929, Gandhi made it very clear that his idea of Ram Rajya was not theocratic in nature and scope  and remarked, ‘By Ramarajya’ I do not mean Hindu Raj”. “I mean by ‘Ramarajya’ the Divine Raj, the Kingdom of God… For me Rama and Rahim are one and the same deity”. Rahim, or the merciful, is one of the synonyms of Allah.

He added, “I acknowledge no other god but the one god of Truth and righteousness”. “Whether the Rama of my imagination ever lived or not on this earth, the ancient ideal of Ram Rajya is undoubtedly one of true democracy in which the meanest citizen could be sure of swift justice without an elaborate and costly procedure,” he added.

Muslims can understand Gandhi's Ram Rajya as Khudai Raj and Christians as the Kingdom of God

Gandhi ji tried to clarify further that Muslims should not be afraid of Ram Rajya as Ram Rajya is the same as the Khudai Raj. In Haimchar, Bihar, Gandhi ji said in 1947. 

My Rama is another name for Khuda or God. I want Khudai raj, which is the same thing as the Kingdom of God on earth.

 In the Harijan on 18th August 1946, he wrote:

When I visit the Frontier Province or address predominantly Muslim audiences I would express my meaning [of Ramrajya] to them by calling it Khudai Raj, while to a Christian audience, I would describe it as the Kingdom of God on earth (Source: A. K. Lal Secularism, p-106)

 Mahatma Gandhi's Ram Rajya was about freedom and democracy

Sahu further explains in Gandhi's own words that Gandhi's Ram Rajya was about freedom, without inequality, and a perfect democracy where there would be prompt and cheap justice and freedom of worship, speech, and the press.

Just two years before the attainment of independence, Gandhi outlined the religious and political dimensions of Ram Rajya. When one Sailendra Nath Chattopadhyaya asked him, “Why do you wish to live for 125 years, and what is Ram Rajya?”, he explained that his wish to live for 125 years depended on the quality of selfless service he would render. On the issue of Ram Rajya he explained that when  religiously translated this meant  Kingdom of God on Earth but its political components were “perfect democracy in which inequalities based on possession and non-possession, colour, race or creed or sex vanish.” He went on to add that in such a Ram Rajya “…land and State belong to the people, justice is prompt, perfect and cheap and, therefore, there is freedom of worship, speech and the Press.”

 

Mahatma Gandhi's Ram Rajya was about swift justice

Rishika Singh in her article With Ram Temple consecration in Ayodhya, recalling what Gandhi said about Ram Rajya in the Indian Express gives further evidence of Gandhi's Ram Rajya not being what Modi, the BJP, and the RSS are trying to make. She writes, "Gandhi's ideal State, 'Ramrajya', was not associated with a particular religion but was more about moral values – justice, equality, and truth, dispensed even to the most marginalised." It was never about the Hindu religion: 

He[Gandhi] wrote in the magazine Young India in the same year [1929], “Whether Rama of my imagination ever lived or not on this earth, the ancient ideal of Ramarajya is undoubtedly one of true democracy in which the meanest citizen could be sure of swift justice without an elaborate and costly procedure. Even the dog is described by the poet to have received justice under Ramarajya.”

Conclusion

As Professor Ira Bhaskar writes on Gandhi's assassination anniversary, the Ramrajya of Gandhi and Modi/RSS are completely different:

As a devout Ram bhakt, Gandhi’s idea of Ram and of Ram Rajya was a completely different one from the exclusionist and majoritarian Hindutva one that we see in circulation today. Gandhi’s Ram was a benevolent leader whose “ moral quality and habitual adherence to truth” were  key for the realization of the peace, plenty and harmony of an imagined Ram Rajya. Unlike Gandhi’s imagining of the new modern nation as one based on “Hindu and Muslim unity” which was for him “the cornerstone of swaraj,” the Hindutva project from the 1980s onwards transformed Ram into a virulent crusader of the rights of the Hindus against the minorities. In contrast, Gandhi stood for “minority rights, religious freedom, justice and forgiveness” and is one who sacrificed his life for communal amity. 

What January 22 is, what it isn’t: Pratap Bhanu Mehta

One of the most prominent intellectuals of India, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, writes about the spectacle everyone witnessed on 22 January. The following article feels like an obituary of another India, an India where the Indian Constitution was supreme, Hinduism was religious, and pride came after the achievement.

There are moments in history that appear to drive wave after wave of people in a great torrent of catharsis, ecstasy, emotion and an elevated group mood that almost all conventional analysis, historical categories, moral measures and political prognosis seem beside the point. It would be foolish to deny that the pran pratishtha of Ram Lalla in Ayodhya is one such event. Just in sheer magnitude, of the tens of millions of people mobilised, whose identity, emotions and hopes are, at least for the moment, oriented towards Ayodhya, this event has almost no precedent in history. It is a watershed moment. The pran pratishtha following the foundation stone of Ayodhya, marks the consecration of Hinduism as a political religion pure and simple. It is not just a moment where the state, which has pulled all its mighty power behind this event, ceases to be secular. It is also the moment where Hinduism ceases to be religious.

           Source: prokerala
 

The sheer spectacle of the event, now fusing modified but still traditional yama and niyama, with mass broadcasting and mass mobilisation, is itself considered an achievement. The spectacle is the statement: That Hindus have asserted their collective power, reclaimed their historical agency, and overcome the deep sense of insecurity, and despite some murmurings, for once managed to make something a show of unity. The BJP has kept its promises. Prime Minister Narendra Modi now donning the mantle of Hindu kingship, has the ability to get millions of people to play their parts for an audience of One, with all institutions, corporations, sects, civil society, media singing the same tune. It is a terrifying spectacle on any proper measure of democracy. But as a form of deference to mass sentiment it is now carrying its own democratic imprimatur. There is something quite astonishing about this mobilisation of power. You have to struggle to remember its ominous origins and shadows.

Some parties may contest the ceremony. But everyone has to rush to declare their allegiance to Ram. Even Opposition parties are obliged to pay allegiance to Ram in the form that ironically was best described by Iqbal when he called Ram the Imam-e-Hind. The Ram whose role in Indian cultural and spiritual life was one whose centre was everywhere and circumference nowhere, has now been anchored to a centre. Ram has been transformed from a radiant glow of righteousness, compassion, and imaginative power into something merely instrumental: A litmus test for national loyalty. We are now more valorous devotees of Ram — more than Tulsidas or Gandhi, who rejected the logic of retaliation. You now have to swear allegiance to this Imam-e-Hind, or else.

In many ways, Bhagwad Gita 17.18 captures the spectacle being made out of this ceremony perfectly. It goes: satkara mana puja artham tapah dambehna cheva yat/kriyate tadiham proktam rajas am chalam adhruvam (Penance and austerities performed ostentatiously out of pride for the sake of gaining honour and recognition are all in the mode of a passion. Its benefits are unstable and fleeting). This is both an accurate description of this mode of worship and a warning. It names this worship for what it is: A spectacle. But the fact that the passions and emotional resonances it produces are transitory is not reassuring in this context. It will require that the deep insecurities and needs this spectacle has tapped into be constantly satiated. The passion around Ram is not a form of ecstasy finding its final repose in a radiant calm. It is going to be one in a long chain where our pride will have to be constantly fed. This is because in an inversion of dharma, the relation between pride and its object is reversed. We no longer take pride in genuine achievement; generating pride is considered the achievement.

In the Mahabharata there is an evocative word, Dharma Dhwajii. It is a pejorative for those who make a show of their worship in what is a sign of lack of real faith. The term Dharma Dhwajii refers to those who, as it were, care about the flag more than they care about dharma. The Dharma Dhwajiis have, for the moment, won the political, cultural and emotional battle fair and square. It is the overwhelming power of this moment, and the fact that we now inhabit a political universe solely dominated by power, that expressing even ambivalence about this pran pratishtha seems more like blowing straws in a hurricane. Bearing witness, fighting for republican ideals, are all now reduced to self-satisfied snarks or expressions of sour grapes. There is no real ideological counterpoint.

Rallying around the dhwaja is clear. What dharma it portends is less clear. The content of this new Ramrajya, is, for a moment, founded in a logic of retaliation and blood, rancour and division, that India’s post-1951 constitutional ideals sought so hard to avoid. That project was, first and foremost, betrayed in many different ways by its own custodians. The Dharma Dhwajiis, with popular acclaim, have reduced whatever was left of the dharma of that republic to ruins. The only content to the new dharma one can see on the horizon is, ironically, to intensify the logic of the 1930s: To create an ethno nationalist state with its cult of power and violence, its worship of purity and concentration of power. This is a project that never ends well. It produced devastating wars in Europe, and the partition of India.

This time the partition is more intimate and close: It is running through families. It is also a fissure within Hinduism. Worshipping idols is central to Hinduism, no matter what deracinated intellectuals might tell you. It gave Hinduism a playful intimacy. But the idols we worship are no longer intimate; they are mega showpieces. More grievously, concentration on the idol was a path to self-consciousness. But now, as the philosopher, Arindam Chakrabarti, once wrote, the idol has been replaced by the I-doll, the worship of the “I”. We are consecrating our own collective narcissism in the image of God.

In the Ramayana, in any version, there is always a sense of sadness around Ram himself. Bhavabhuti captured it beautifully: Ram has been filled with the rasa of pity/ kept hidden by his profound demeanour/the sharp pain of it held deep within/ like a clay pot baking in embers. This moment of triumphalism is also accompanied by a pain that cannot even be expressed. It will cook in the embers of this moment. Ram’s dhwaja has been planted. But the question of dharma is met only with a yawning and ominous silence.

Hindu Civilizationism: Make India Great Again

Abstract

Hindu civilizationism is more than a century old phenomenon that has been steadily gaining strength. Its recent amalgam with populism has made it ascendant, popular, and mainstream in India. This paper explores how Hindu civilizationism is not only an essential part of the Hindutva and BJP’s narrative but also the mainstay of several government policies. The “other” of the BJP’s populist civilizationist rhetoric are primarily Muslims and Muslim civilization in India and the aim is to make India “vishwaguru” (world leader) again after 1200 years of colonialism. The evidence of this heady mixture of civilizationism and populism is numerous and ubiquitous. This paper analyzes topics such as Akhand Bharat, the golden age, denigrating Mughals, Hindutva pseudoscience, and Sanskrit promotion to highlight the evidence.

Article

1. Introduction

Civilizationism uses a religio-civilization classification of people to define national identity. Territorial nationalism is deemphasized as the nation is imagined beyond national boundaries. Citizens, who are considered part of the civilization-nation based on religion, are asked to defend or save their civilization which is considered under threat. The state becomes a means to achieve the objective which is civilizational longevity and success.

This civilizational rhetoric has become more common as populist leaders around the world have used it to attract voters who are dissatisfied with the dominant ideologies and established mainstream parties. Numerous authors have pointed out how rightwing populist European parties and leaders defined self and the other not in national but in broader civilizational terms. Christian civilization, Christian heritage, or Judeo-Christian civilization and traditions are considered in crisis and under threat from Islam and Muslims. The “patriots” are told they have only two choices, act or go extinct (Brubaker 2016, 2017; Kaya and Tecmen 2019; Ozzano and Bolzonar 2020; Yilmaz and Morieson 2021; Marchetti et al. 2022).

Populism is generally considered a thin ideology that attaches itself to rightwing or leftwing ideologies to give coherence, strength, and program to its rhetoric. Yilmaz and Morieson (2022a) have identified civilizationism as another thick ideology that populism attached itself to. Civilizationism, for them, is an idea that divides and categorizes people based on “civilizations” that are primarily based on religion. This is different from the usual division of people based on nations and populists’ framing of “the people” as people of a country.

Hindu civilizationism, like in many other countries, is closely associated with rightwing nationalism and populism. Hindutva (literally Hindu-ness) is a popular political ideology that defines Indian values and nationalism primarily in terms of Hinduism and Hindu civilization, lays claim that only Hindus have the right to rule in India, and aims to replace a secular Indian constitution with a Hindu state (Hindu Rashtra). Hindutva political parties, organizations, and social movements raised the flag of civilizationism before Indian independence in 1947, and more than a century later, they are still its torchbearers. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is just the latest and most successful of the political rightwing conservative organizations. In terms of making Hindu civilizationism popular, the BJP plays second fiddle to almost a hundred-year-old Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a militant Hindutva organization.

Hindu civilizationism, therefore, is not a new phenomenon. It started as part of Hindu revivalism in the early 19th century. Hindu revivalists, such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy, the founder of Brahmo Samaj, wanted to reform Hinduism and Hindu society so that it could rise above the social evils and iniquitous rituals and regain its position as a great civilization. Later, in the last century, civilizationist organizations were formed whose main objectives were political even when they were not working as a political party. For a long time, from the 1940s to the 1970s, these organizations and the political parties they supported remained unpopular. However, civilizationists started winning elections at the state level in the 1980s and won national elections in the late 1990s. They ruled India under Prime Minister Vajpayee (1999–2004) but as they did not have the majority of Lok Sabha seats, they were always dependent on other parties and could not fully implement their agenda. The second decade of the 21st century brought a sea change in their fortunes as, like many rightwing civilizationists in other countries, they discovered an affinity between their ideology and populism. The embrace of populism under Prime Minister Modi made them the supreme political force and, currently, Hindu civilizationism is the dominant ideology in India. PM Narendra Modi has trounced the opposition in the 2014 and 2019 national elections and he is by far the most popular leader in India, most likely to win the 2024 national elections (Pradhan 2022).

Modi riding a chariot reminiscence of ancient Hindu Gods, Avatars, Rajas and Hindu civilization

Source: Narendra Modi Twitter

During the last decade, Hindu civilizationism rhetoric has been rising steadily, with the support of populism. The people-elite divide of populism has been used to discredit the Congress Party and Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. Similarly, the people-outsider divide, another regular feature of populist politics, was used to declare Hindus as the only original inhabitants of India and Muslims and Christians as outsiders. Fear, threat, and crisis were used by Modi, like other populists, to force ordinary Hindus to be afraid (Hindu khatray main hai: Hindus are in danger) and act as advised by Modi. Finally, Modi’s image as the only strong, decisive leader in India was carefully crafted, as in the case of many other populist leaders, to sway voters (Modi hai to mumkin hai: If there is Modi, then it is possible) (Sinha 2021; Saleem 2021; Saleem et al. 2022; Yilmaz and Morieson 2022b).

The othering of Muslims and other political forces as anti-nationals and non/fake Hindus is increasing in India. Hinduism has been presented as under threat from Muslims despite Hindus being close to eighty percent of the Indian population. Indians are being made to believe that Muslims and Westerners are again plotting to subjugate Hindus as they did many times during the previous twelve hundred years. The BJP has achieved what was unimaginable a few decades ago (Varshney 2019; Amarasingam et al. 2022).

However, it must be clear that Modi is not more civilizationist than previous civilizationists. The key difference between Modi and Hindu civilizationists of the 1960s and 1970s is the degree of populism, not the degree of civilizationism. Like Modi, Hindu civilizationists of the 20th century were also talking about Akhand Bharat, the golden Vedic age, oppressive Muslim/Mughal invaders, superiority of Hindu civilization, and Sanskrit promotion. Hindutva party manifestos of Hindu Mahasabha and Bharatiya Jana Sangh give ample evidence of civilizationalism (Saleem 2021). Populists are quite successful in the use of transnational solidarity today due to a number of reasons, such as revolution in information and communication technologies, globalization, increase in economic inequality and distrust in democratic institutions in numerous countries, rise in ethnic/religious attachments with the concurrent decline in liberalism, etc. However, they were not the first ones to use transnational solidarity. For instance, between 1987 and 1989, during the Ram Mandir movement, hundreds of thousands of bricks were donated for the eventual construction of Ram Mandir in Ayodhya. These bricks were donated in response to a campaign by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a Hindutva organization. The Ram Mandir movement and VHP campaign were pro-Hindutva and Hindu civilizationist. They were also transnational as bricks for the mandir were donated not only by people living in India but also by people of 55 other countries of the world (Udayakumar 1997; Hindustan Times 2021)....

In the following section, the prominence of Hindu civilizationism in present day India and Hindutva leaders’ consistent efforts to prove the grandeur and glorious achievements of Hindu civilization will be shown. The section will also demonstrate how Hindu civilizationism is being promoted by denigrating Muslim civilization and its achievements. Most of the papers on civilizationism focus on Christian-majority and Muslim-majority countries. This paper analyzes civilizationism in India, a Hindu-majority country. The key theoretical contribution of this paper is that it presents the evidence that civilizationism as a concept is as applicable and functional in a Hindu majority country as it is in Christian, Jewish, and Muslim majority countries.

Rest of the article can be read here.

Hindutva civilizational populist BJP’s enforcement of digital authoritarianism in India

 

Source: https://www.thefinancialexpress.com.bd/

Abstract:

The largest democracy in the world is now moving towards authoritarianism under the Hindutva civilizational populist prime minister Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s rule. This article focuses on digital rights in India that have seen a sharp decline in recent years. It explores the transformation of the internet and social media, from a relatively open and liberal space to a restricted one. This survey of India’s digital landscape finds that the rise of civilizational populist Modi and his eight years long rule have led to an upsurge in digital surveillance and control and has fostered an environment of online harassment and bullying for those who are critical of the BJP’s views and politics. The article uses a four-level framework (Full Network, Sub-Network, Proxies, and Network Nodes) to explore digital authoritarianism by the BJP government. At each of these levels, the Hindutva populist government has closed avenues of open discussion and exchange of views by enforcing new rules and regulations.

Read the article at the European Center of Populism Studies

Hinduism, Hindutva and Hindu Populism in India: An Analysis of Party Manifestos of Indian Rightwing Parties

Abstract:

Since the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a lot has been written on Hindu nationalism. Prime Minister Modi’s ascendency has similarly resulted in a plethora of books and articles on Hindu populism. However, most of the literature does not distinguish between the two. Hindu nationalism and Hindu populism overlap, particularly in Modi’s India and Modi’s BJP, but they are not the same. In this article, after a discussion on Hinduism’s affinity to populism, an attempt has been made to distinguish between Hindu nationalism and Hindu populism based on an analysis of Hindutva parties’ election manifestos. Since independence, three Hindutva parties have made a name for themselves at the national level: Hindu Mahasabha, Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), and BJP. Based on their importance and success at the national level, one manifesto of Hindu Mahasabha, two manifestos of BJS and four manifestos of the BJP were analyzed based on criteria chosen after the literature review. The results show that while Hindu nationalism was strong and visible in early Hindutva parties (Hindu Mahasabha and BJS), Hindu populism was weak and sporadic. Interestingly, for the BJP, there is a rise and then drop in Hindu nationalism while Hindu populism has consistently increased. 

Article:

1. Introduction

Prime Minister Modi’s approach and strategy to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic has been universally acknowledged as a disaster. The second wave exposed the deficiencies of his leadership style and his overall grasp of problems facing his 1.3 billion people. Many experts are blaming it on his populist politics and pointing as evidence to other populist leaders, such as Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro, who also failed to manage the pandemic (Collinson 2021; Friedman 2021; Santoshini et al. 2021). Others have criticized his Hindutva ideology, disregard for science and constitutionally ordained secularism and the othering of minorities that divided the nation instead of uniting it against the pandemic (Guha 2021; Viswanath 2021). Hindutva and Hindu populism have been part of Modi’s success story from the start. He is a man from a very humble background who dethroned the famed Nehru-Gandhi dynasty and their party, the Indian Nation Congress, which was the dominant political party in India for more than fifty years. While Modi is not the first Hindu nationalist Indian prime minister, he is certainly the first one who has used both Hindu nationalism and populism. Although there has been a plethora of scholarship on Hindu nationalism, Hindu populism is mostly studied as an auxiliary component of Hindu nationalism or of the broader rightwing1 populist movement that has taken the world by storm during the last decade. There is a need to trace Hindu populism’s history in India and to distinguish it from Hindu nationalism.

2. Religion and Populism

Populism is a concept that is difficult to define and highly contested. Populism can be leftwing or rightwing and it can instrumentalize the majority religion and exacerbate religious conflicts in the society or it can stay away from religion. It can be national or civilizational (Brubaker 2017). Scholars have defined it based on ideology, rhetoric or policies but no definition can accommodate the protean concept and efforts to conceptualize this intriguing idea are continuing (Yilmaz and Morieson 2021; Mackert 2019; Plagemann and Destradi 2019). For this article, populism refers to a kind of politics that divides the population into two parts, a small, corrupt ruling elite and an oppressed, exploited pure majority. Sometimes, besides this vertical dimension, there is also a horizontal dimension where the righteous majority is threatened by perfidious insiders and outsiders that are in cahoots with the corrupt elite. A temporal dimension is often also part of the populist politics where populist leaders disown and repudiate the present while singing about the glories of an imagined past and an impending future if the populist leader is allowed to lead.

Before the 1970s, for almost a hundred years, secularization theory was the dominant sociological paradigm. The major assumption of the theory was that religion would gradually decline as human societies progress. Its role in the public sphere would probably completely disappear while its role in the private sphere would be limited. The idea seemed to make sense as the increased knowledge about nature, scientific and technological progress, pluralization of religious field, functional differentiation, enlightenment, theory of evolution, more archaeological data falsifying religious myths, sexual revolution, etc., made a modern person less amenable to accept certainties of divine edicts. The functions that religion used to perform in the ancient and medieval world were performed by secular concepts in the modern world. The secularization of Western Europe, since the 17th century, seemed to be the model that other regions were destined to follow as they moved up the ladder of human progress.

The 1970s, however, reasserted or re-established the role of religion not only in the private sphere but also in the public sphere. The Iranian Revolution, the emergence of the moral majority movement in US politics and rise of religious parties and fundamentalist movements in many developing countries were few of the many indications of the change. The re-emergence of religion that was supposed to be consigned to the dustbin of history as a key explanatory factor in domestic, regional and international politics was surprising for many scholars (Grzymala-Busse 2012). The 1980s and 1990s came up with further evidence of the impact of religion on politics. The religious fervor and avidity of Pope John Paul II, President Reagan and Islamist mujahideen in the fall of Communism and the Soviet “evil” empire was critical. These developments perhaps forced Samuel Huntington to come up with his controversial theory of “Clash of Civilizations”, where civilizations are primarily defined on the basis of religion (Huntington 1993). The start of the 21st century totally debunked secularization theory or thesis as 9/11 attacks made religion one of the most significant factors in international politics, although there are still some scholars that believe in a much-diluted form of the secularization theory...

6. Two Distinctions: Hindu Nationalism (Hindutva) vs. Hindu Populism and Populist Political Leaders vs. Populist Parties

Hindu nationalism started to become popular in the late 19th century. It came out of the Hindu revivalist movements which tried to “modernize,” unite and Semitize Hinduism. For these Hindu revivalist movements, the British were a source of both envy and threat. Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj are two of the most famous revivalist movements. These movements and developments created a Hindu consciousness which later became the basis of Hindu nationalism. The first ideologue of Hindu nationalism was V. D. Savarkar who wrote the book Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? in the early 1920s and associated Hindutva with not only religion but also with land, culture and language (Hindu, Hindi, Hindustan). He argued Hindu is the one who considers India as the land of his forefathers (pitribhumi) as well as his holy land (punyabhumi). Savarkar was a nationalist but there is debate whether his politics in the Hindu Mahasabha party can be called populist or not. Savarkar was certainly rousing a large majority of people against the corrupt elite, but his prime target changed depending on the time, from British, the Congress, to Muslims. Moreover, as far as strategy and style were concerned, he was not a populist leader, trying to lead an unorganized mass against the enemy using dirty rhetoric and bad manners (Visana 2020; Tharoor 2018, pp. 40–50). Similarly, his party Hindu Mahasabha cannot be called a populist party as it was not anti-elite. It was much more pro-British than Congress and relied for support on Hindu aristocracy, gentry and business elite, and had urban, high caste roots, similar to the pre-Gandhian Congress (Bapu 2013, pp. 26–43). So, Hindu Mahasabha was Hindu nationalist but not Hindu populist. This difference between rightwing nationalism and rightwing populism is important to keep in mind.

Although numerous rightwing populist parties are nationalist and a few nationalist parties have become populist, this does not mean that nationalist and populism are the same or always exist together. Rightwing nationalism has been growing since the 1970s. Israel had thirty years of leftwing governments before it had its first rightwing nationalist government in the late 1970s. However, since then, Israel has steadily moved rightward and this rightwing shift has helped make Benjamin Netanyahu the longest serving prime minister of Israel, without being populist. There were less remarkable rightwing shifts in both the US and British politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Populism in the US and Europe is a comparatively new phenomenon and with the rise of rightwing populism, there is also a less consequential rise in leftwing populism. Former President Trump was a rightwing nationalist populist but he was not the first rightwing nationalist president, and the Republican Party had long espoused rightwing nationalism. Almost every rightwing populist is a nationalist, but every rightwing nationalist is not a populist.

Keeping in view the above, while discussing the rise of Narendra Modi there is a tendency to extend Modi populism to the BJP early days in the 1980s or even to Hindu nationalists before India independence. As discussed above, Hindu nationalism has existed since the start of the 20th century. Hindu sabhas were formed and later many joined to form the first Hindutva or Hindu nationalist party. Now, one can argue that Hindu Mahasabha was also populist but just because Modi was populist, all Hindu nationalist parties cannot be painted populist. If one has to demonstrate the link between Hinduism and populism since the early 20th century, then one has to define populism, select a measuring scale and show the existence of populism. Modi populism is even insufficient to declare the BJP populist before Modi’s rise. In fact, some scholars have argued that the BJP before Modi was not populist. The anti-elitism was missing before 2013. Plagemann and Destradi (2019) argue that Hindutva, although itself fuzzy, is the core and “thick” part of the BJP ideology and has defined the BJP during its whole life. In contrast, (Modi’s) populism is the “thin” ideology and is a recent addition to BJP’s repertoire. It may or may not survive Modi. This raises many questions. Was the BJP populist in 1984 or 1994 or even in 2004 under Vajpayee and Advani? There are no rigorous studies to decide one way or the other...

The rest of the article can be read here.

Shashi Tharoor:The Battle of Belonging: On Nationalism, Patriotism, and What it Means to Be’

Shashi Tharoor has delivered another tour de force. We have already discussed his book Why I am a Hindu on this blog Hinduism and Hindutva Debate. In 2020, he has come up with another book that broadly focuses on the same issues but from a different perspective. While Hinduism and Hindutva Debate unpacked the differences between Hinduism and Hindutva, the Battle of Belonging examines the differences between patriotism and nationalism and what it means to be patriotic and nationalist in India. He then contrasts the idea of India and the Hindutva idea of India. In the ongoing battle of belonging chapter, he analyzes various recent actions of the BJP government, such as the building of Ram temple, revocation of Article 370 for Jammu & Kashmir state, and Citizenship (Amendment) Act, and attempts to impose of Hindi language. In the final chapter, writing in a prophetic mode, he explains how the battle for the Indian soul can be won against the forces of Hindutva.

Source: Secularism as principle and practice in India is in danger': Shashi Tharoor

Following is a link to Shashi's 35-minute interview with Karan Thapar in which he talks about his book.

Are Some Indians More Indian than Others?'— Shashi Tharoor Echoes the Pigs in Orwell's Animal Farm

Following are some excerpts from Shashi's interview with the PTI (More excerpts can be found here 'Secularism as principle and practice in India is in danger': Shashi Tharoor):

I don't agree, because the 37% vote won by the BJP last year is not a majority! Yes, Hindutva has successfully exploited fear of the 'Other', just as most reactionary ideologies do. The Hindutva ideologues in power have also had no qualms about appropriating or undermining the ostensibly independent branches of governance, from autonomous bodies like the Election Commission or the RTI (Right To Information) commissioners or the Reserve Bank to even media and the courts, in the service of their version of nationalism. This creates a sort of self-reinforcing echo chamber, in which the government is able to constantly push Hindutva ideas.

That is why I would caution against the idea of Hindutva being 'popular', as you suggest. How can we tell? Sure, the BJP holds a commanding parliamentary majority, but it has worked overtime to suppress dissenting voices. In that sense, it is difficult to get an accurate gauge of support for Hindutva among ordinary Indians. I do not think that a majority of the country supports the hateful rhetoric and exclusionary nature of Hindutva...

Judging by the number of times I have been asked this question, I do recognise that there's a very real and tangible concern for some liberal Indians. But as I have often pointed out, we in the Congress Party are very clear that we cannot allow ourselves to become a BJP-Lite. I have long argued that any attempt to emulate 'Pepsi Lite' by 'BJP Lite' will end up with us becoming like ‘Coke Zero' that is, Congress Zero. Congress is not BJP in any shape or form, and we should not attempt to be a lighter version of something we are not. Nor are we trying to, in my view.

The Congress party makes a distinction between Hinduism and Hindutva. The Hinduism we respect is inclusive and non-judgemental, whereas Hindutva is a political doctrine based on exclusion. So we are not offering a watered-down version of the BJP's political messaging: Rahul Gandhi has made it explicitly clear that, for all avowing of his personal Hinduism by going to temples, he does not support any form of Hindutva, neither soft nor hard. 

As a Congressman, I understand that whereas Hinduism is a religion, which is the personal concern of every individual, Hindutva is a political doctrine that departs fundamentally from the principal tenets of my Hindu faith. While Hinduism is inclusive of all ways of worship, Hindutva is indifferent to devotion and cares principally about identity. Hinduism is open to reform and progress, which is why it has flourished for 4,000 years; Hindutva is reactionary and regressive, with its roots in the racial pride' ethos that spawned fascism in the 1920s, which is why it is unlikely to outlast its current peak this century.

Also, see Shashi discussing his book and his ideas with Shekhar Gupta:

Shashi Tharoor on ThePrint Off the Cuff with Shekar Gupta

BJP government's committee to write a revisionist history of India

A Reuter's report last month, for the first time, revealed the existence of a committee of scholars appointed by the BJP government "to rewrite the history of the nation." The investigations for the report reveal that the revisionist history would be based on Hindutva ideology. Some excerpts from the report are reproduced below:

Minutes of the meeting, reviewed by Reuters, and interviews with committee members set out its aims: to use evidence such as archaeological finds and DNA to prove that today’s Hindus are directly descended from the land’s first inhabitants many thousands of years ago, and make the case that ancient Hindu scriptures are fact not myth. 

Interviews with members of the 14-person committee and ministers in Modi’s government suggest the ambitions of Hindu nationalists extend beyond holding political power in this nation of 1.3 billion people - a kaleidoscope of religions. They want ultimately to shape the national identity to match their religious views, that India is a nation of and for Hindus. 

In doing so, they are challenging a more multicultural narrative that has dominated since the time of British rule, that modern-day India is a tapestry born of migrations, invasions and conversions. That view is rooted in demographic fact. While the majority of Indians are Hindus, Muslims and people of other faiths account for some 240 million, or a fifth, of the populace. 

The committee’s chairman, K.N. Dikshit, told Reuters, “I have been asked to present a report that will help the government rewrite certain aspects of ancient history.” The committee’s creator, Culture Minister Mahesh Sharma, confirmed in an interview that the group’s work was part of larger plans to revise India’s history...

 Source: Reuters Investigates: By Rewriting History, Hindu Nationalists Aim to Assert Their       Dominance Over India

Referring to the emblematic colour of the Hindu nationalist movement, RSS spokesman Manmohan Vaidya told Reuters that “the true colour of Indian history is saffron and to bring about cultural changes we have to rewrite history.”

Balmukund Pandey, the head of the historical research wing of the RSS, said he meets regularly with Culture Minister Sharma. “The time is now,” Pandey said, to restore India’s past glory by establishing that ancient Hindu texts are fact not myth. 

Sharma told Reuters he expects the conclusions of the committee to find their way into school textbooks and academic research. The panel is referred to in government documents as the committee for “holistic study of origin and evolution of Indian culture since 12,000 years before present and its interface with other cultures of the world.” 

Sharma said this “Hindu first” version of Indian history will be added to a school curriculum which has long taught that people from central Asia arrived in India much more recently, some 3,000 to 4,000 years ago, and transformed the population. 

Hindu nationalists and senior figures in Modi’s party reject the idea that India was forged from a mass migration. They believe that today’s Hindu population is directly descended from the land’s first inhabitants. Historian Romila Thapar said the question of who first stood on the soil was important to nationalists because “if the Hindus are to have primacy as citizens in a Hindu Rashtra (kingdom), their foundational religion cannot be an imported one.” To assert that primacy, nationalists need to claim descent from ancestors and a religion that were indigenous, said Thapar, 86, who taught at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi for decades and has authored books on ancient Indian history. 

The theory of an influx of people from central Asia 3,000 to 4,000 years ago was embraced during British rule...

 According to the minutes of the history committee’s first meeting, Dikshit, the chairman, said it was “essential to establish a correlation” between ancient Hindu scriptures and evidence that Indian civilization stretches back many thousands of years. Doing so would help bolster both conclusions the committee wants to reach: that events described in Hindu texts are real, and today’s Hindus are descendants of those times... 

Culture Minister Sharma told Reuters he wants to establish that Hindu scriptures are factual accounts. Speaking of the Ramayana, the epic that follows the journey of a Hindu deity in human form, Sharma said: “I worship Ramayana and I think it is a historical document. People who think it is fiction are absolutely wrong.”  The epic tells how the god Rama rescues his wife from a demon king. It still informs many Indians’ sense of gender roles and duty. 

Sharma said it was a priority to prove through archaeological research the existence of a mystical river, the Saraswati, that is mentioned in another ancient scripture, the Vedas. Other projects include examining artifacts from locations in scriptures, mapping the dates of astrological events mentioned in these texts and excavating the sites of battles in another epic, the Mahabharata, according to Sharma and minutes of the committee’s meeting... 

Modi did not order the committee’s creation - it was instigated by Sharma, government documents show - but its mission is in keeping with his outlook. During the 2014 inauguration of a hospital in Mumbai, Modi pointed to the scientific achievements documented by ancient religious texts and spoke of Ganesha, a Hindu deity with an elephant’s head: “We worship Lord Ganesha, and maybe there was a plastic surgeon at that time who kept the head of an elephant on the torso of a human. There are many areas where our ancestors made large contributions.” Modi did not respond to a request from Reuters that he expand on this remark. 

Nine of 12 history committee members interviewed by Reuters said they have been tasked with matching archaeological and other evidence with ancient Indian scriptures, or establishing that Indian civilization is much older than is widely known. The others confirmed their membership but declined to discuss the group’s activities. The committee includes a geologist, archaeologists, scholars of the ancient Sanskrit language and two bureaucrats... 

After he was named culture minister in 2014 following Modi’s victory, Sharma, a doctor and chairman of a chain of hospitals, said he received guidance from the RSS. Sharma, a genial man with a wide smile, has a portrait of Bharat Mata, or Mother India, hanging above the doorway of a meeting room in his bungalow in central Delhi. Below it are portraits of past RSS leaders.

During the last three years, Sharma said, his ministry has organized hundreds of workshops and seminars across the country “to prove the supremacy of our glorious past.” The aim, he said, is to build a fresh narrative to balance the liberal and secular philosophy espoused by India’s first prime minister, Nehru, and furthered by successive governments for most of the nation’s post-independence history. 

The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, now controlled by Sharma’s ministry, these days mixes in sessions about right wing Hindu leaders and causes. At one such event in 2016, the president of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, Amit Shah, took the opportunity to lambast Nehru as a man influenced by the western world. “We have always believed that our policies should have the smell of Indian soil,” Shah said. It was time for a history of India that concentrates on “facts about our great past.”