The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism

This lecture by Dr. Reza Zia-Ebrahimi is based on his book, "The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the politics of dislocation," published in 2016 by Columbia University Press. An abstract of the book from Dr. Reza's page on King's College website is given below:

Reza Zia-Ebrahimi revisits the work of Fath'ali Akhundzadeh and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, two Qajar-era intellectuals who founded modern Iranian nationalism. In their efforts to make sense of a difficult historical situation, these thinkers advanced an appealing ideology Zia-Ebrahimi calls "dislocative nationalism," in which pre-Islamic Iran is cast as a golden age, Islam is reinterpreted as an alien religion, and Arabs become implacable others. Dislodging Iran from its empirical reality and tying it to Europe and the Aryan race, this ideology remains the most politically potent form of identity in Iran.

Akhundzadeh and Kermani's nationalist reading of Iranian history has been drilled into the minds of Iranians since its adoption by the Pahlavi state in the early twentieth century. Spread through mass schooling, historical narratives, and official statements of support, their ideological perspective has come to define Iranian culture and domestic and foreign policy. Zia-Ebrahimi follows the development of dislocative nationalism through a range of cultural and historical materials, and he captures its incorporation of European ideas about Iranian history, the Aryan race, and a primordial nation. His work emphasizes the agency of Iranian intellectuals in translating European ideas for Iranian audiences, impressing Western conceptions of race onto Iranian identity.

Dr. Reza introduces his talk at Stanford University by clarifying what he means by Iranian nationalism.  The (dislocative) Iranian nationalism, according to Dr. Zia, was constructed in the late 19th century and was based on the ideas of European orientalists, many of whom were Islamophobes. This nationalism was not accepted or even discussed in Iran before the late 19th century. He defines Iranian nationalism as a cluster of following three myths or ideas.

• Iran is the land of Aryans. The Aryans are defined as a race that is generally in conflict with the Semitic race. Here, there is an attempt to link Iran with Europe and present Iranians as a European race. Many influential historians, who subscribed to this myth under Pahlavis, wrote Iranian history to affirm this myth;
• Everything in pre-Islamic Iran was great. It was the golden age of Iranian/Aryan history. If one wants to study true Iranian culture, before its adulteration, then he or she has to study this age. The decline of Iran started with the invasion of Arabs;
• Arabs are barbaric, uncouth, illiterate savages. Everything related to Arabs is brutish or boorish, including their culture (if it exists), their language, Arabic, and their religion, Islam.

As one can see Dr. Reza is talking about a particular type or a specific strand of Iranian nationalism. This strand rejects Islam, Arab and Semitic influences, including sometimes Shia Islam. So, Dr. Reza is telling the story of nationalism that is not accepted by millions of Iranians and the current Iranian government today. Dr. Reza explains how the myths above are ahistorical and European imports.

Some pictures that Dr. Reza used to illustrate Iranian dislocative nationalism:

Popularity of Farvahar: Symbol of pre-Islamic Iran, Zoroastrianism, etc.

Crown Prince Abbas asking a European to explain (after Iran's defeat by Russians):

Golden age archaism:

Arab invasion: Arabs are not only brutal savages that are killing Iranians and raping Iranian women, they are also brown while Iranians are white:

Aryan race theory borrowed from the Europeans, part of the state discourse under Pahlavis:

To understand the tussle between religious and ethnolinguistic nationalism in Iran, here are some previous blog posts on Iranian nationalism: Iranian identity and nationalism: Shahnameh's Jamsheed or Biblical Cyrus, Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity, Shiite and Persian Nationalism are both myths, Afraid of Ahmadinejad,  Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?, and More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran.

Iranian identity and nationalism: Shahnameh's Jamsheed or Biblical Cyrus

Professor Ali Ansari gave a very enlightening talk on Iranian identity at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver. He is a professor at St. Andrews and has written extensively on Iran, Iranian identity, Iranian nationalism, and Iran-US relations. He has written seven books on Iran: 

• Iran: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2014),
• The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
• Crisis of Authority: Iran's 2009 Presidential Election, (Chatham House, 2010), 
• Iran Under Ahmadinejad (Routledge, 2008), 
• Iran, Islam & Democracy - The Politics of Managing Change ( RIIA, London, 2000), 
• The History of Modern Iran Since 1921: the Pahlavis & After (Longman, Pearson Education, London, 2003), and 
• Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust, (C Hurst and co, 2006).

Professor Ansari starts his talk by criticizing the ahistorical approach of studying Iranian history through the lens of the 1979 Revolution. He laments that scholars start from the 1979 Revolution and then look back for reasons why it happened as if it was the most important event in modern Iranian history. He contends that it is actually the 1906 Constitutional Revolution that is the most significant event and if one wants to understand Iran, one has to prioritize the 1906 Revolution. 

Professor Ansari explains that his talk is not about the politics of nationalism but about the ideas and myths that formed the basis or have fashioned Iranian identity and nationalism. He argues that it is the national mythology that defines nations, informs people who they are. 

In his talk, Professor Ansari dismisses the usual five periods division of modern Iranian history that he has also used in some of his works: the Constitutional Revolution, Reza Shah and modernization, Second World War and Mussaddeq, Second autocracy under Muhammad Reza Shah, and the post-Islamic Revolution period. He divides modern Iranian history into three periods on the basis of ideas prevalent about Iranian identity:

1. The age of enlightenment (1890-1963?)
2. The age of extremes (1963-1989): the unhappy consciousness?
3. The age of contestation (1989-present)

The age of enlightenment was the key period, according to Professor Ansari. During this formative age, ideas about nation and nationalism were absorbed from the West and then applied to Iran. Surprisingly, the level of engagement between the two sides was pretty sophisticated and a small but influential group of Iranians was debating ideas and was not ready to accept everything Western. The key problem faced by these Iranians was how to disseminate the ideas of civic nationalism to the wider public. They understood that for a nation, both history and myth are necessary. The myth they choose was Ferdowsi's Shahnameh (The Book of Kings). 

Professor Ansari does not explain Shahnameh as most of the people interested in Iran already know what it is but many readers here may be ignorant of its importance, so here is a short introduction. Shahnameh is a long epic Persian poem, consisting of some 50,000 couplets (two-line verses). It was written by Ferdowsi at the turn of the first millennium (977-1010 CE). It is the national epic of Greater Iran. The British Library website has the following Ferdowsi quote and a very, very short synopsis of the epic (more details about Shahnameh on the website can be read here):

"The houses that are the dwelling of today will sink beneath shower and sunshine to decay but storm and rain shall never mar the palace that I have built with my poetry." Ferdowsi.

The Shahnameh, literally meaning 'Book of Kings,' is structured according to the mythical and historical reign of 50 Persian Kings. The epic can be roughly divided into three parts: the first part tells of the mythical creation of Persia and its earliest mythical past; the second part tells of the legendary Kings and the heroes Rostam and Sohrab; the third part blends historical fact with legend, telling of the semi-mythical adventures of actual historical Kings.

Shahnameh was chosen because it was known to the Iranians. For centuries, millions of Iranians had listened to the epic and debated about the qualities of Jamsheed, Rostam, and Sohrab even when there was no historical evidence of their existence.  Even the British recognized the importance of Shahnameh and were using it to seek ordinary Iranians support for allies cause in WWII. In the propaganda pamphlet (published in 1942) below, Kaveh (the mythical blacksmith in Shahnameh who led the popular uprising against the cruel foreign ruler, Zahak) leads, while Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin follow him and Hitler (shown as Zahak) is bound on a horseback.

Source: Alamy.com

It's better to listen to Professor Ansari's lecture for understanding his argument, however, following is a summary of the rest of the talk. 

During the second period, according to Professor Ansari, the focus shifts from Shahnameh to Biblical Cyrus. The change is the result of the affinity that Mohammad Reza Shah felt for Cyrus, the Great. He perhaps thought Cyrus, the Great more useful for his own projection as an enlightened, liberal monarch who would emancipate his people and others from darkness, cruelty, and subjugation. The change also prioritizes 'real' history over myth. During the third period, Cyrus was initially rejected and Shahnameh was again promoted by the state as the basis of Iranian identity but more recently, Cyrus has also seen a revival. Can we see a synthesis in the near future?

To understand the tussle between religious and ethnolinguistic nationalism in Iran, here are some previous blog posts on Iranian nationalism: Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity, Shiite and Persian Nationalism are both myths, Afraid of Ahmadinejad,  Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?, and More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran.

Grand Ayatollah criticized by Religious Nationalists for not toeing the line

As discussed previously in this blog, religious nationalist states (and many other states) have three prominent groups in politics, the secularists, the religious nationalists and the deeply religious, who do not feel comfortable with how religious nationalists instrumentalize religion to achieve their political ends. While the focus is always on the tussle between the secularists (who are mostly not atheists or agnostics) and the religious nationalists, it is much more enlightening to probe the scrimmage between the religious nationalists and the deeply religious ones who do not agree with each other.

Marja' (Grand Ayatollah) Mousa Shubairi Zanjani is a 90-year-old marja-e-taqlid (meaning authority to be followed) or marja', the highest authority in Twelver Shiite religious tradition. This highest rank is the attained after decades of scholarship and only a few ayatollahs reach this rank. By the strict standards of the tradition, even Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei does not qualify to be one, although he is accepted by many as a marja'. Every Shia is bound to follow one of the living marja'.

The recent controversy, which pitted religious nationalists against a marja', started in early October 2018 when former president Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) and some other members of the reformist camp met Marja' Mousa Shubairi Zanjani. Khatami has been rejected by the official conservative circles since the end of his presidency but hardliners, close to Rahbar (Supreme Leader) Ali Khamenei, became especially angry after he supported Mir-Hossein Mousavi candidacy and mass protests after the controversial 2009 elections. He has since been banned from official media and is not allowed to leave the country.

Ayatollah Yazdi(L) and Marja' Zanjani (R)

Source: Radio Farda

The meeting drew a severe rebuke from a hardline conservative Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who is close to Khamenei. Khamenei has repeatedly appointed him as one of the members of the influential Guardian Council and also helped him get elected as the current Chairman of the Assembly of Experts. Previously, Khamenei appointed him the head of judiciary for 10 years (1989-99). Ayatollah Yazdi not only wrote a stinging letter to Marja' Zanjani but also released it to the public. He wrote:

Following the publication of pictures on social media of you alongside some problematic individuals who have no respect for the system of the Islamic Republic and the supreme leader, I hereby state that this issue has caused concern and upset among followers and in the seminaries...I would like to remind you that your status and respect are tied to your respect for the ruling Islamic system, the leadership and the status of marjas... and take steps to ensure such matters are not repeated again. 

This was unprecedented in many ways. Ayatollahs usually do not indulge in public spats and nobody criticizes marja's, especially not the lower-ranked ayatollahs. Marja' are the highest authority in the Shiite hierarchical system after are meant to be followed reverently and blindly, not questioned.

The response of Marja' Zanjani was befitting his office as Al-monitor explains:

Zanjani’s office released a statement saying that the senior cleric would not respond to the letter and would remain silent, but that his students and junior clerics who study under him would respond. The Qom Seminary, the largest and oldest Islamic seminary in Iran, issued a statement condemning the letter, saying, “Slandering a grand ayatollah for a personal action and determining [who he can meet with], with the excuse of defending the Islamic Republic and the supreme leader, will have no result but weakening the Islamic Republic and the seminary." The letter, which was signed by 84 clerics, stated ominously, “No government which insults its figures and threatens them is sustainable.”

This episode informs us about the working of religious nationalist states. Such states give great prominence to religion and its political leadership regularly reaffirms its loyalty to the religious leadership and doctrine but, in reality, their loyalty is instrumental and when there is a choice between religion and power, the power always triumphs.

Shiite and Persian nationalism are both myths

An interesting article by Kaveh Mousavi in which he presents the similarities in Shiite and Persian nationalism in Iran. He explains that both these nationalisms are flawed and, although considered antagonistic, they share a distrust of minorities, promote exclusivism and use myths and selective reading of history to glorify emperors and religious leaders who were responsible for the deaths or misery of millions of average Iranians. Some of the excerpts of the article are reproduced below.

And I reject both of these identities and consider them equally shitty. Here’s why:

1) Both of them are false myths.
Neither the Arab colonized Iran nor the Zoroastrian Iran before it were good periods.
In Iran, there’s a great tendency among the chauvinists to be proud of the nation’s cultural heritage. They proudly mention how great the country’s culture and civilization is, and what a great role Iranians had in the past. Whether they are in favor or against the current regime this fictional utopia in the historic past changes its time. To Islamists the period after the Arab Invasion on Iran and to Chauvinists (Pan-Iranists) the period of the Emperors of the ancient Persia are the epitomes of Iran’s cultural climax. But the truth is both the said historical periods are bleak and are marked with immense hardships for average folks, and at that time Iran was a colony of Muslim Empires, And both empires before and after the Arab Invasion were repressive bloodthirsty conquerors. Therefore we can say that the greatness of Iran’s culture is a lie. The Iranian “civilization” is nothing but a blank page on the wall, and the Iranian nation is a blind stupid old man praising himself (and indeed the Iranian nation is a “he”) for something which isn’t there.
Cyrus was an emperor conqueror. His “human rights declaration” only grants religious freedom to the people he’s conquering, provided they kneel before him and pay him money. While religious freedom might sound appealing to Iranians under theocracy, Cyrus is far from a democratic model and no person in 21st century should aspire to him.
But apart from that, both of these “identities” are equally equally divorced from the reality of people’s lives. There is no Iranian or Persian culture without Islam. Islam is so entrenched in every aspect of our culture that it can’t survive without Islam. And that is why they go back and create a fictional Persia in pre-Islamic era that no one cares or remembers. And the Islamists make the same mistake. Their own Islam has been Iranianized more than they think. Not only we are Shiites and not Sunnis but our Shiism is designed during the Safavid Dynasty and has nothing to do with Arab or global Islam. Nationalism and religion cannot be separated from each other.

2) Both of them come at the expense of excluding “Others”.
Islam excludes all non-Muslims. It excludes some non-Muslims in a way harsher manner than other non-Muslims. This is well documented. But the nationalists are no better.
Even if we ignore the prevalent anti-Arab and anti-Kurd racism that exists in many of nationalists, which we shouldn’t, the fact remains that Iran is a multicultural country with Arabs and Kurdish and Turkoman and Armenians and Turks and many other minorities. Even at its most benevolent and benign shape, Persian nationalism marginalizes other ethnicities because it makes Persian and Persian culture the “main” and the “real” culture of Iran, and it doesn’t matter if those minorities don’t share our culture and language. But oftentimes the racism is not benign or benevolent, it’s straight up hatred.
Iranian nationalists pay lip-service to democracy and human rights. But they support many policies that are outright fascist.
Personally, I have no problem with rejecting both. I’m an atheist, and I am also an internationalist, and I think both religion and nationalism are poisonous and immoral. I want to live in a world with no religion and one global democracy. That is my ideal and I fight for it.
There is Muslim prayer I like very much. It says Allah, let oppressors be busy in war with other oppressors. Indeed.

Although there are some parts of the article that I would not agree with (such as the following sentences), overall Mr Mousavi is presenting some uncomfortable truths and the article is elucidative.

Therefore we can say that the greatness of Iran’s culture is a lie. The Iranian “civilization” is nothing but a blank page on the wall, and the Iranian nation is a blind stupid old man praising himself (and indeed the Iranian nation is a “he”) for something which isn’t there.

The whole article Islamic Identity vs. Persian Identity in Iran, and Why I Reject Both can be read at Patheos.com. 

A rare combination of Persian and Shiite nationalism at the state level (one side of the 1950s coin depicts the last Shah and his queen while the other side has the invocation lā fata ʾillā ʿAlī; lā sayf ʾillā Ḏū l-Fiqār (Trans. There is no hero like Ali; There is no sword like Dhu-l-Fiqar), praising the first Shiite Imam (Ali) and his sword (Dulfiqar or Zulfiqar).

Source: Unicoinz

Some of the previous blog posts on Iranian nationalism are Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity, Afraid of Ahmadinejad,  Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?, and More on the tussle between and merging of Islamic and Persian identity in Iran.

Religious Nationalism Course

I taught a course on  'Religious nationalism' at George Mason University, managed by Encore Learning. Here are the slides of the lectures.

Religious Nationalism: Introduction

Pakistan: Religious (Muslim) Nationalism

Iran: Religious (Muslim/Shia) Nationalism

Israel: Religious (Jewish) Nationalism

Saudi Arabia: Religious (Muslim/Wahhabi) Nationalism

Sending people to heaven by force or a whip

A recent controversy in Iran brought into focus the use of the state to enforce religion, a tactic used by states based on religious nationalism.

According to Al-monitor, six young men and women Iranians were arrested after they posted a video of them dancing to Pharrell Williams’ hit song, Happy (See Rouhani, critics debate 'path to heaven' ). President Rouhani, who doesn't control justice department, was not amused and remarked, 

Do not interfere so much in people’s lives, even out of compassion. … Let people choose their own path to heaven. We cannot send people to heaven by force or a whip. 

Source: Rouhani encourages political freedom in Iran

Conservative clergy establishment that controls justice department and is wary of Rouhani's overtures to the West, blasted him for these remarks and not only questioned his excellent clerical credentials but also accused of moving away from Imam Khomeini's path ( See Rouhani accused of trying to separate religion, administration). Hard-line cleric Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a member of the Assembly of Experts and director of the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute in Qom said, 

That some say the administration does not have a responsibility for the people’s religion, but that the administration’s only responsibility was to remove the sanctions — and not through resistance but through diplomacy — is against Imam [Khomeini]’s path. Did Imam start an uprising because of sanctions and the economy? Did this many martyrs sacrifice their lives for their stomachs and sanctions?

Saudi Arabian and Pakistani states have also tried to send people to heaven using a whip. Under They have tried to legislate and enforce good behavior. Good behavior or good religious behavior, however, can only come from people's own free will. Enforcement usually leads to false piety and hypocrisy. 

In Pakistan, during the last two decades, there has been a manifold increase in people travelling to Saudi Arabia for visits to the holy sites. In a poor country in need of foreign exchange, millions of dollars are spent each year on these travels. Similarly, millions more are spent to arrange festivals relating to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)'s birthday. Although I do not have statistics, generally it is agreed that more people are praying in mosques than before. But has Pakistanis also witnessed a corresponding increase in piety or spirituality or humility or a decrease in fraud or corruption in the last two decades? Very few Pakistanis can answer this question in affirmative. So, Islamization has only lead to superficial and overt religiosity. As Rouhani said, 'whip' has not moved them any closer to God or heaven.      

Iran and Israel: Changing Places?

Being two states based on religious nationalism and also critical for world peace and economy, Israel and Iran have been focus of this blog. So, it is fascinating to read a comparison of these two states. 

Two academics, one Iranian and the other Israeli, from the prestigious Stanford University have penned a wonderful op-ed in New York Times Sunday Review (See Are Iran and Israel trading places?). They argue that Iran and Israel are trading places in terms of religious nationalism, democracy, human rights and international acceptance. Iran is now considered undemocratic, authoritarian, radically religious nationalist and international pariah while Israel is considered democratic, liberal and is internationally accepted. Soon, however, Iran can become today's Israel and Israel today's Iran, if Israelis and Iranians do not change their current trajectories. 

Message of the authors is clear. While Israelis should change their trajectory, Iranians should stick to it.

After first listing the similarities between Iran and Israel (old civilizations; primarily non-Arab states in a mostly Arab region; and bastions of secular nationalism in the 1950s), Milani and Waismel-Manorapril contend that a critical cultural and demographic shift is happening and Israelis and Iranians are changing both inside their countries and outside. 

Iranian intellectuals, previously supporting religious authoritarianism, are now voicing their dissent against the regime. The argument that democracy and human rights are against Islam has been rejected. The patriarchal society established by the ruling elite, disproportionately old and male, has been challenged by Iranian women, who make up almost two-third of country’s science and engineering graduates. Gender apartheid has failed and Iranian women are asserting themselves. Birthrate in Iran is falling. Most of the Iranians are under thirty and believe in individual liberty. The rise of Mr. Rouhani and the current pragmatism is the consequence of these major changes. So, expect more pragmatism, democracy and better relations with the West. These trends inside Iran are supported by Iranian diaspora that is strong, liberal and increasingly successful.

Milani and Waismel-Manorapril then contrast this situation with Israel. While Iranian elite are moving toward West/US, Israeli elite are increasingly antagonistic as seen by their recent statements. These changes are again based on an underlying cultural and demographic shift. Orthodox Jews are gradually controlling the state that was once more liberal. Demographically, they have grown much faster as their average birthrate of 6.5 children per family is much more than the 2.6 children per family for the rest of Israelis. This change has obvious political consequences. Orthodox Jewish parties hold about around one-fourth of Knesset seats. They want to make Israel less democratic and more Jewish, with not many rights for its Arab population. Most of them are also against any agreement with the Palestinians and support settlements. Their support has been critical for continued expansion of settlements and rejection of any real peace deal. Internationally, these Israeli policies have led to increasingly strong support for the boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israeli companies and institutions, an existential threat to Israel. Jewish diaspora is also changing and is becoming less religious and less uncritically pro-Israel. European and American Jews are mostly liberal and have difficulty accepting Israel's attitude toward Palestinians and its refusal to end occupation.

While I agree with much of Milani and Waismel-Manorapril's argument, there are few observations I want to make:

• Both Israel and Iran were not bastion of secularism in 1950s. Muhammad Reza Shah was for modernization but if secularism means separation of religion from politics, Shah clearly didn't want secularism. He used to pray at religious shrines; tell stories about how he had dreams in which he met Shia Imams; used to seek supplications from Tehran's prayer leader before going to foreign visits; and had no problems with the ascendancy of Shia sect. While his father (Reza Shah)'s regime can be called a 'bastion of secularism', his cannot. 
• Israel was even less of a bastion of secularism. Although, it was ruled by secular Jews, Judaism had a special place in Israel from the start. Israel's national anthem, language and flag and more particularly establishment of Chief Rabbinate clearly showed a tendency against secularism. Interestingly, it was in the 1950s that religious courts established their control over matters of marriage and divorce in Israel. So, while both countries have become more religious, they were not secular in 1950s.
• It is true that Iranians want a more liberal and open society but do they want a Western society? There is a difference and it should be recognized. Iranians maybe against their ruling clerics but they are also strongly nationalistic and this nationalism is largely based on West's injustice and its efforts to control Iran since 1850s. Therefore, expect better Iranian relations with the West but if Iranian felt they are being unjustly humiliated (again), then all bets are off. The recent refusal of the US government that it would not give visa to Iran's designated ambassador to the UN is one example how things can go the 'other' way.  

Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity

In religious nationalist states, the basis of national identity is usually contested. As religious nationalism is a dominant theme, a large number of groups claim a specific religion or sect as the basis of national identity. However, this view is always contested by others who claim the ethnic, linguistic or simply territorial basis of national identity.

The debate about Iranian identity has always featured two broad groups: the Persian nationalists and the Islamic nationalists. The Persian nationalists claim that Iranian identity has an ethnolinguistic basis. Iranians were Iranians long before Islam came to Iran. In contrast, the Islamic nationalists contend that Islam has become the primary constituent of Iranian identity since Iran was conquered by Arabs in the 7th century. 

However, it would be a mistake to consider both groups as mutually exclusive and some scholars, even partisans, do not completely reject the arguments of their rivals. Except for the opinionated, the difference between the two groups is whether the emphasis is placed on religion or ethnolinguistic characteristics as the primary constituent to the Iranian identity.

For example, many Persian nationalists claim that Islam in its true form is only practiced (i.e. Shia/Twelver sect Islam) in Iran and Islam was saved from Arabs and others only by Iranians. So, they view Islam as part of Iranian identity but do not accept that Islam gave Iranians a new identity. Instead, they claim that it was Iranians, a group at a much higher level of civilization than Arabs, that saved Islam by adopting it, otherwise, Islam's achievements would have been few and it would have been far less successful. 

Similarly, Islamic nationalists accept that Iranian Islam (Twelver sect) is superior and give homage to ethnolinguistic identity perspective by arguing that Iranians have a special affinity with the true religion, Islam, as they are special, seekers of what is true and right. For them, the Aryan/Iranian/Shiite Islam was and is the real Islam while the Semitic/Arab/Sunni Islam is the adulterated false version, despite Prophet Muhammad being an Arab.

Source: Wikimedia Commons 

Afshin Matin-Asgari gives a detailed account of the debate within the Persian nationalist camp in her chapter, 'The Academic Debate on Iranian Identity: Nation and Empire entangled' in Iran Facing Others, edited by Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani (2012). 

Matin-Asgari's chapter gives a comprehensive overview of the different authors and their positions on Persian nationalism, I will try to give a summary here. Matin-Asgari contends that from the late 19th to late 20th century, Persian nationalists -_ the ethnolinguistic camp__ was the dominant thesis in Iranian identity debate. This camp was influenced by Orientalists (such as German Ernst Herzfeld and British Edward Granville Browne) who linked Iranians with Aryans and old Persian empires with the modern state of Iran and claimed a continuity over centuries/millennia. Archaeological discoveries in the 19th century also helped in the strengthening of this thesis. Called the 'Aryan Neo-Achaemenid nationalism', its proponents believed:

1. Iranian identity is ancient, with an archaic core existent for thousands of years. 
2. The Persian language is at the center of Iranian identity. Persian language has been dominant in Iranian territory for centuries and has a major contribution in making non-Iranian inhabitants, immigrants, and conquerors, Iranians. 
3. Since at least Achaemenid times (6th century-4th century BC), Iranian and Persian identities are synonymous. The Persian language has preserved Iranian identity and/or 'the spiritual unity of Iranian history'. 
4. Iranian identity has a racial component based on (Aryan) racial affiliation. 
5. The 'national religion' of Iran was Zoroastrian and Islam is an imposition but Iranian have changed Islam to make it fit their 'Persian Psyche'.

Iranian Flag with Ahura Mazda(God of Zoroastrianism)

Source: Wikimedia Commons

Based on the ethnolinguistic superiority of Iranians and taking pride in ancient 'Persian' empires, this paradigm __ not surprisingly __ takes a dim view of Arabs. Arabs are considered inferior and uncivilized. For example, Abbas Ashtiyani, a 20th century nationalist wrote:

The Iranians spent a hundred years of severe humiliation under the yoke of Arab domination...Yet he did not give up on acquiring knowledge, something that Arab then lacked..

This Persian nationalist thesis, an orthodoxy in the field of Iranian Studies according to Matin-Asgari, has been challenged lately.

1. Mostafa Vaziri rejected the notion of ancient Iranian identity and claimed that pre-modern usage of term 'Iran' referred to a geographic entity only.
2. Austrian scholar Bert Fragner argued that the Persian language is central to Iranian consciousness but Persian was initially a language of the elite and a small portion of people living in today's Iran. It was more a ' Persian linguistic hegemony as crafted and sustained via dominant elite cultures, and not as a "national" heritage shared by a homogeneous Iranian people'. 
3. Italian scholar Gherardo Gnoli argued that 'Iran' as a political concept was an imperial project started by Sassanids( 3rd century -- 7th century).
4. Tavakoli-Targhi contended that Iran was re-imagined in the 19th century in line with the rising consciousness. Various terms like millet, siyaset, and Iran were 're-articulated'. The 'Iranzamin' of ancient texts has quite different boundaries from modern Iran. He also challenged Persian language link with today's Iran.

These challenges forced the at least some of the Persian nationalists to moderate their thesis and they accepted that many dynasties ruling Iran, including the Greeks and Parthians, were not Iranian so there is no seamless continuity from ancient to modern. There is also some acceptance of the argument that 'Iran' in pre-modern times was an imperial, not a national, conception and Persian might not be the language of most people living in Iran in the past. However, most Persian nationalists have not been able to accept the new research and so their thesis continues to suffer from contradictions.

Matin-Asgari suggests the issues in Persian nationalist thesis can be resolved by abandoning the essentialist 'continuity' aspect and accepting that

1. Pre-modern Iran was an imperial concept and imperial Iran was multi-lingual and multi-ethnic, with a shifting heartland.
2. Persian linguistic hegemony did not create ethnic and national homogeneity across history.

An interesting article. Author's position on Iranian nationalism is close to Smith's argument about nationalisms in general i.e. nationalism is neither strictly primordial nor wholly imagined. It appears both Persian nationalist and religious nationalist Iranians are moderating their positions and accepting that the other side is not completely off base. Moderation of Persian nationalist thesis has been discussed above and religious nationalists moderation could be seen in Ahmadinejad's politics in his second term, discussed in this blog on 8th February, 2014.

Ahmadinejad fought for Iranian (territorial) nationalism against religious nationalism

Reza Aslan, an Iranian-American and author of Zealot: The life and times of Jesus of Nazareth, argues that former Ahmadinejad was the first president to challenge the power of Iranian clerics and so we will soon miss him, despite our contempt for what he stood for. (See Missing Mahmoud_(Ahmadinejad)?)

Ahmadinejad promoted Iran's glorious past and an 'Iranian Islam', showing his preference for Iran over Islam. He also claimed to be in communication with the Hidden Imam, thus striking at the heart of clergy's argument that they are ruling on behalf of the Hidden Imam.

During the 20th century (and maybe even before), Iranians and their leaders have swayed between linguistic/territorial nationalism and religious nationalism.Some of the leaders promoted their choice of nationalism and tried to stamp out the other one, like Reza Shah/Khan and Imam Khomeini. Others preferred one type but didn't tried to forcefully negate other. Reza Shah's son and the last Shah, Muhammad Reza Shah  falls into this category though many people would not agree. Muhammad Reza Shah, like Ahmadinejad, tried to mix territorial nationalism with religion. Although, his preference was clearly territorial nationalism focusing on monarchy, he used religion too. He visited religious shrines, claimed to be visited/protected by Shia Imams and imam of Tehran was present on airport to give blessings to Shah every time Shah went for a foreign trip. 

Similarly, contrary to the popular image, leaders after Islamic revolution in 1979 have also tried use territorial/Persian nationalism while preferring religious nationalism. Imam Khomeini tried to end nauroz festival but backed out after resistance from Iranians. Currently, nauroz is main annual holiday in Islamic Republic and Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomenei addresses the nation on this festival that has nothing to do with Islam. Similarly, Iran's religious rulers have preferred Christian Armenians over fellow Muslims and fellow Shia brethren of Azerbaijan to support Iranian integrity.