Barrington's Five Variants of post- independence nationalism

Lowell Barrington in his book After Independence: Making and Protecting in Post-colonial and Post-communist States (2006)  differentiates between pre-independence and post-independence nationalism and identifies five possible variants of post-independence nationalism. He argues that all nations have to decide about their territorial (which areas are part of the nation?) and membership (which groups are part of the nation?) boundaries. The five variants show different nationalisms emphasize different boundaries and their relationship with the state. The first two variants focused on territorial boundaries or national 'homeland' while the other three focus on national identity or membership boundaries. 

1. External Territory Claiming Nationalism: Under this variant, nationalism defines nation as existing outside the boundaries of the state. There is a strong belief that an emotionally important part of the homeland remains outside the borders. 
2. Sovereignty Protecting Nationalism: Nationalism here is under threat from minorities as nation is considered smaller than the territory it is holding. Thus, it is the opposite of the first variant.
3. Civic Nation Building nationalism: If ‘who is the nation’ answered in a such a way that all group inside the new state are included -- a relatively civic way -- an overarching national identity is developed. Nationalism becomes a nation-building project.
4. Ethnic Nation Protecting Nationalism: Majority ethnic group (sometimes dominant minority groups) may still feel under threat after independence. Independence is nor perceived to have brought cultural security and so nationalists may reject civic nation-building and continue struggle as ethnic group. In such a state, minorities are discriminated.
5. Co-National Protecting Nationalism: Ethnic nationalism, while discriminating at home, may extend itself to protecting co-ethnics or co-nationals in other states. Nationalists may mobilize people by claiming that co-nationals are being physical threatened or being economically, socially or politically discriminated and so need their help. 

Where does religious nationalism fit in these variants?

Religious nationalism does not fit in any of these variants. However, it is very close to the last type. It discriminates at home against religious minorities while calling for protection of coreligionists in other countries. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Israel are example of this co-national protecting nationalism. Barrington argues that these types are not mutually exclusive and can be combined. So, we can argue that religious nationalism of Pakistan and Israel are examples of combination of first and last type as both lay claims on external territory. The religious nationalism of Iran and Saudi Arabia, however, could be considered examples of sovereignty protecting nationalism and nation protecting nationalism before their interventions in Syria. In short, religious nationalism can fit in all of the types except civic nation building nationalism.  

Rising Religious Nationalism in Turkey

It has been argued that Turkish nationalism has three different strands: civic nationalism based on Turkish constitution; ethnolinguistic nationalism based on Turkish language and ethnicity; and religious nationalism based on Sunni Islam. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Turkey, mainly meandered between the first two types. He tried to bring all groups living in Turkey together and develop an inclusive nationalism based on his modernist rhetoric. But he also promoted Turkish language and Turkish ethnicity and supported research that tried to promote Turks as the group that brought civilization to other groups in the world. To add to the complexity, despite his aggressive secularism, modernism and persecution of Islamic groups, Ataturk (and his allies) implicitly supported Sunni Islam as one of the markers of Turkish identity. So, it is not difficult to find support for all three strands of Turkish nationalism in the founding fathers' decisions and early day of Turkish Republic.

A book that discusses the three strands of Turkish nationalism

Source: The Top Hat, the Grey Wolf, and the Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic

The above discussion should, however, not be construed as proclaiming the equal importance of all three strands. Civic nationalism was dominant in the early 1920s but this period did not last long. Ataturk imagined a socially engineered nation out of the motley of groups present in Turkey. The state told the people how they should speak; how they should dress; how they should pray; how they should write; and even what they should call themselves. People were forced to accept these edicts and not surprisingly many rebelled, especially those who lived on the margins of Turkish society, away from the main Anatolian heartland. Kurds and Alevis took part in these rebellions and bore the brunt of an increasingly repressive response from the Turkish state. Ethnic nationalism became dominant as the state decided to suppress any kind of individuality, whether it was ethnic, linguistic or religious. There was only one nation in Turkey and its characteristics were determined by the state. These characteristics were obviously much closer to what the dominant group (ethnic Turks) had or believed in. So, minority ethnic groups, minority religion and minority sects all lost their constitutional and legal freedoms. This situation continued till the late 1970s and resulted in much polarization, instability, and violence. Left-wing/communist and right-wing nationalist paramilitaries fought each other in all regions of Turkey, with almost twenty fatalities each day.  This made the state or deep state (as the powerful military establishment was called) realize that they cannot control all the societal fissures and resulting violence.

The military took direct control in 1980 through a coup and decided to make changes. To decrease the support of communism and left, it was decided to increase religious education and to accept it part of Turkish identity. However, the public role of religion was still abhorrent and more restrictions were introduced such as the ban on hijab in public universities. Despite these restrictions, this era is remembered as the start of religious nationalism in Turkey. Sunni Islam was always an implicit marker of Turkish national identity but after the 1980s, it started becoming more explicit. This change was called the 'Turkish-Islam Synthesis'. As William Armstrong writes in Hurriyat (See The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey)       

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was originally formulated by the right-wing nationalist Intellectual Hearths (Aydınlar Ocakları) in the 1970s, but after the 1980 coup it rose to become the de facto state ideology. In practice, this meant more than just General Kenan Evren reciting Quranic verses during public speeches. It also meant huge budget increases for the Religious Affairs Directorate, rapid building of new mosques and opening of Quran courses, the introduction of mandatory religion classes in state schools (only on Sunni Islam), more tolerance for religious bureaucrats, active encouragement of religious organizations, and a widening of opportunities for graduates of religious imam hatip high schools.

Military hoped to manipulate Islam without letting it go out of its control but the socialization of masses in a religious environment, supported and funded by the state itself, led to changes beyond military's  imagination. Merton's law of unintended consequences came into play and Sunni Islam gradually became a very important part of the Turkish identity. Right-wing and Left-wing parties gradually gave way to the winning of election by an Islamist party in 1996. Although that party was forced out by the military within a year, the power of religious nationalism continued to grow due to increase in Islamic-oriented media, foundations and businesses. Eventually, AK Party, whose leadership had been trained in Islamist parties, came to power.

AK Party (Freedom and Justice Party) win brought the reformed Islamists to power. They claimed to be like Christian conservative parties of the Western Europe and pledged to work with the secular establishment, consisting of the President, judiciary and the military. Although, in their initial years, AKP didn't take an overtly religious step, the very presence of AKP at the helm gave confidence to media, educational institutions and businesses run by the religious Anatolian Turks. Good economic management helped AKP win elections repeated eventually controlling the presidency, judiciary and military.

Religious nationalism implies that national identity is now based on religion. This logically means that religion is now not only a personal matter (between a person and her God or gods) but a matter of law and state. Therefore, who is a (true) member of the state religion becomes a big issue. Tellingly, defining a true Muslim is a big issue in Turkey now. While there is hope that Kurdish issue (which is mainly an ethnolinguistic issue) will be resolved soon, Alevi issue is raising its head. The state defines Islam to include Alevis as deviant Sunni Muslims but Alevis consider themselves as members of different sect/religion. Everybody from Prime Minister to opposition leaders to religious leaders is weighing in (See What does Erdogan mean by 'Alevis without Ali'?)

Moreover, there is fighting between AKP and Gulanists, followers of an influential preacher Fethullah Gulen, one-time allies of the AKP. The witch-hunts and inquisitions mean that religious nationalism is rising (See Turkey’s intra-Islamic witch hunt).      

When two religious nationalisms fight, is it different?

There are many examples of intractable world conflicts where it appears that two religious nationalisms are fighting each other. India- Pakistan, Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine conflicts immediately come to mind. It has been argued that resolution of these conflicts has been more difficult because of the presence of religious nationalisms. The main reason given is that as religious nationalists (believing they are following God's orders or believing that even if they suffer now, they would get big rewards later) are less ready to make compromise, resolution of conflicts in which they are fighting each other is improbable, if not impossible.

Are these conflicts different than those conflicts where ethnic nationalisms are fighting each other or a civic nationalism is fighting with a religious nationalism? 

This question is important because to resolve conflicts, one has to first understand them. However, to answer it, one has to believe or at least accept that religious nationalisms are different and distinct from other types of nationalisms. Looking around, one can see most of the religious nationalisms have developed an ethnic dimension, if they didn't had it from the start. Jews have always been proud of a separate ethnic identity. There are Jews who think themselves only ethnically Jewish, so is their identity religious or ethnic? (See how this issue confounded researchers surveying American Jewry Who counts as a Jew?) Similarly, Irish and Scots have strong attachment to their ethnicities and religious identity has been the dominant collective identity for Iranians more recently but a belief in Persian/Iranian identity is not far from surface.

It is more like there are many ethno-religious nationalisms, rather than pure religious nationalisms as Omer and Springs in Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook (2013)

Another related issue is mixing of territorial nationalism and religious nationalism. Many conflicts that were initially only territorial later developed religious justifications because the two combatants belonged to different religions. 

Was Northern Ireland conflict religious/sectarian from the start and always remained so? Keeping in view that both Israelis and Palestinians were initially led by secular leaders/parties/organizations for decades, it can questioned whether the initial conflict between them was defined by their religions? Similarly, India has always claimed to be a secular entity, so claiming that the Indo-Pakistan conflict is between rival religious nationalisms does not seem right.

I personally think that religious identity is just like other collective identities. When conflicts become entangled with identities, they become difficult to resolve. A long-term conflict between two groups links the identities of the groups with the conflict and an explanation of the bad behavior of the 'other' becomes part of both collective identities. These collective identities are difficult to change. Leaders and elites, who might (or might not) have once promoted the social construction of 'other', would find that re-interpretation or re-orientation of collective identity based on mutual respect was not easy as Dov Waxman argues in Democracy and Conflict Resolution: The Dilemmas of Israel's Peacemaking (2014)

National identities cannot just be revised at will. Attempts by policymakers and political elites to redefine national identities from above are by no means always successful and risk provoking fierce domestic opposition, as Rabin’s assassination tragically demonstrates.

One can also give the example of Mahatma Gandhi who was killed by a Hindu nationalist when Mahatma was perceived to be working against Hindus interests. Benazir Bhutto can also be thought of the victim of religious nationalists who thought Bhutto was trying to change/damage their interests/identity.   

        

Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism

When a state argues to be based on religious nationalism, religion becomes important in defining who are full citizens of that state. It is a case similar to countries based on ethnic nationalism. Japanese, Turkish, Korean or German nationalisms are based on specific ethnicities and those ethnicities are sometimes consciously and blatantly and sometimes unconsciously prioritized. Not long ago, a Russian, having German ancestry, who could not speak German and had never lived in Germany had a stronger claim to German citizenship than a Turk, who had not only been born in Germany but had lived in Germany all his life.

In such 'ethnic' nations, it becomes very important to clearly define who has the 'correct' ancestry and who has not. It becomes important for the state to know, for example, whether both your parents of a citizen were born in the country or not, even if both of them are also citizens. These defining markers are controlled by the state as means of informing the masses who they are and what should be important to them and punishing those who ignore these markers. Recently, the highest court of Dominican Republic court stripped thousands of people of citizenship because their parents had entered the country illegally decades ago (see Haitian-descended residents of Dominican Republic stripped of citizenship by high court). 

In case of religious nationalism, the focus is on religion or sect so defining who is a Muslim, Jew or Catholic becomes important. An Irish joke makes this point clear. In Northern Ireland, a car is stopped at a checkpoint and policeman asks the driver, 'Are you a Catholic or a Protestant?' The driver answers, 'I am an atheist.' The policeman thinks for a few seconds and then asks, 'A Catholic-atheist or a Protestant-atheist?'

The first nationality marker is of course whether one is a member of the national church. This marker discriminates against those who are not members but states with religious nationalism usually ignore this criticism as many states based on ethnic nationalism also do when they discriminate against those not belonging to prioritized/majority ethnic group.

However, as citizenship comes with significant social, cultural and economic benefits, markers of nationalism (ethnic or religious) are contested. Minorities try to dilute these markers to be part of the mainstream while diverse social groups within the titular group try to narrow them to get a larger share of benefits. As a result, in case of ethnic nationalism, the titular group experiences more ethnic fragmentation and infighting. And in states with religious nationalism, sectarianism rages unless state decisively intervenes. Readers of this blog will remember that Malaysian lawmakers from ruling party UMNO recently suggested that Islam should be limited to Sunni sect. A much horrible aspect of sectarianism is visible in Pakistan where there are attacks on religious places and leaders of rival sects (Sectarian killings soar in Pakistan, raising fears of regional spillover).

Source: The Various Strands of Shiite-Sunni Discord

Can religious nationalists stop sectarianism? I personally think the answer is no.