Malaysian Hudud Law Controversy

As discussed before on this blog (Malaysia's turn to Islamism? and Is Religious Nationalism in Malaysia an end in itself or just a mean to continue the erstwhile Malay Nationalism?), Islam had been part of Malaysian nationalism since independence and its role is increasing. Since the early 1980s, this religious nationalism is fueling Islamization of government in the multi-ethnic, multi-religious country. 

A bill to enhance Islamic punishments in Malaysia is currently dividing the country and the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN, Trans. National Front). The private member’s bill presented in the parliament on 27th May sought to amend the Shariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 and to enhance the power of Shariah Courts. This bill was introduced by the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) president Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang. The Islamist party, PAS, has been trying to introduce Hudud laws in Malaysia for decades. It had passed Hudud laws in states (Kelantan Syariah Criminal Code Enactment 1999 and the Syariah Criminal Offences (Hudud and Qisas) Enactment, Terengganu, 2002) under its control but as they were in conflict with Federal laws, they were never operational. The PAS is, therefore, trying to get a federal approval/exemption for its laws. It twice tried to present a similar bill in federal parliament last year but failed. This latest bill would have died but for the intervention of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) minister, Datuk Seri Azalina Othman Said. With only 14 members in the house of 222, the PAS did not have to power to get its bill pass even the first stage. The UMNO is the largest party in the Barisan Nasional and is led by Prime Minister Najib. The UMNO, with the help of its partners, has ruled Malaysia since independence. All Prime Ministers of Malaysia have been members of the UMNO.

Critics have denounced the Abdul Hadi Awang bill, calling it ‘Hudud law’ to link with Quranic punishments, such amputation and stoning. They contend that the law will be a disaster for Malaysia because of the following reasons:

• It will make Malaysia one step closer to being a theocratic state;
• It will introduce two criminal/judicial system in Malaysia, which is unconstitutional;
• It will be applicable to the whole country and not limited to the PAS-ruled states;
• It will be applicable to non-Muslims and at the very least affect their civil and political rights;
• Its support by the UMNO is illegitimate. Such an action should not have ignored the decision-making process of Barisan Nasional by bypassing the ruling coalition’s supreme council. – 

Proponents of the bill have argued that media and oppositional parties have made this bill controversial without much reason. They have responded to the critics:

• This bill is not unconstitutional and does not introduce a dual criminal/judicial system as it amends a fifty-years-old law and Shariat Courts have been operating in Malaysia for decades;
• Malaysia is ruled by a constitution, not by Shariah. It is not becoming a theocratic state;
• The bill will only enhance some punishments that the Shariah Courts can give. It does not introduce amputation or stoning in Malaysia, the not even in PAS-ruled states;
• It will not be applicable to non-Muslims;
• It is not against Barisan Nasional agreement.

Although some prominent Muslim Malays have criticized the bill, the non-Muslim associations and groups are particularly incensed and have spearheaded the charge against the bill. Even non-Muslim ministers coming from Barisan Nasional component parties have deplored the bill. Four out of eleven parties in the ruling coalition have criticized the bill. The Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress ministers have threatened to resign, if the bill is passed. Mr. Najib has tried to allay the fears of his coalition parties and others by saying that Hudud punishments would not be introduced, only Shariah Courts would be able to give some more strokes of rotan (Malay word for a cane). Currently, Shariah Court can only give 3-5-6 maximum punishments (three years' jail, an RM 5,000 fine or six strokes of the rotan).

Among them were three Malaysian Chinese Association ( MCA ) ministers and four deputy ministers who have vowed to block the bill at all costs, even to the extent of losing their Cabinet posts, while Malaysian Indian Congress ( MIC )'s president S. Subramaniam has also said he would quit as health minister if the bill gets passed.A news report in Jakarta Post informs:

Several major Chinese organizations in the country have also voiced their strong objection to the bill, stressing that the Islamic criminal law is not suitable to be implemented in a multiracial secular state like Malaysia.
MCA president Liow Tiong Lai announced that his party would launch a civic campaign to get more Malaysians to defend the country's constitution and oppose Islamist party PAS' tabling of the amendment bill on hudud in the parliament.
He reiterated that MCA would take further actions to lead the Chinese community and the rest of the country in this critically important civic movement.
He said he had approached several BN component parties over the campaign in hope of securing their cooperation to work together to defend the constitution for the sake of the country's future survival.

PM Najib with PAS leader Hadi Awang

Source: Malay Mail Online

What is the motive of the UMNO for allowing the PAS to table the bill now? Some have argued that PM Najib wanted to divert attention from the corruption scandal but the corruption scandal has been going on for almost a year now. A more plausible explanation is that bill has been supported to win two by-elections in Malay-majority areas. PM Najib want to demonstrate that he remains popular with Malays that make-up a majority of Malaysians. The timing of the bill’s acceptance by the UMNO is crucial. The bill was tabled on the last day of the Parliament session so it will be debated in October. By that time, the June by-elections would have been won by the UMNO and so the bill, its utility expired, can then be rejected. Futhermore, the Hudud bill is divisive not only for the Barisan Nasional but also for the opposition. Opposition needs to be united to defeat the UMNO, which has dominated Malaysian politics for decades, but the Hudud bill makes alliance between the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the PAS close to impossible.

Is religious nationalism rising in South East Asia /ASEAN ?

Is religious nationalism increasing in South East Asia? Michael Sainsbury, a Bangkok-based journalist, certainly thinks so. While explaining the Thai junta's decision to repatriate hundreds of Uighurs refugees to China, he argues in his article, Understanding the plight of the Uighurs:

Yet this action is one more example of how politics in Asia is unintelligible without factoring in the significance of religion. The common frequently focus is on military, trade and national rivalries that culminate in decisive and dismaying actions. But increasingly religion tied to national identity is integral to the events....

It’s the latest visible example that religious fault lines and an emerging trend of religious nationalism is now beginning to appear right across the region. It is one that poses a fresh threat to the ambitions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economic Nations Community that will come into being on December 31, 2015.

He mentions increasing Buddhist nationalism in Thailand, Cambodia, and Myanmar; Muslim nationalism in Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia; and Hindu nationalism in India.  

However, the decision to repatriate Uighurs, as Sainsbury also acknowledges is more to do with Thai military junta's need for powerful allies than to rise in religious nationalism in Thailand. Moreover, in Indonesia, the most populous Muslim-majority country in the world, last year elections results showed that religious nationalism is stagnant, if not in retreat (See Indonesian Elections: A Victory for Pancasila Nationalism)

In Bangladesh too, although it is not in South East Asia, religious nationalism is losing to ethnolinguistic Bengali nationalism (See Bangladesh's secular nationalism asserts itself). Similarly, religious nationalism suffered a defeat when Philippines government agreed to accommodate concerns of Muslims in the Southern islands last year. 

Moreover, like Thailand and Cambodia, Muslim-majority Malaysia also deported fellow Muslim Uighurs to China in 2013 ( See Malaysia Hit for Deporting Uyghurs). More recently, both Malaysia and Indonesia (along with Bangladesh) were reluctant to accept fellow Muslims Rohingyas, who were fleeing worst kind of religious persecution (See Malaysia's Duty to the Rohingyas), making a mockery of Muslim brotherhood and Muslim nationalism. Only after international pressure, some Rohingya refugees were accepted.

So, religious nationalism is South East Asia presents a mixed picture. It is rising in some countries but losing in others.

Head of state must be a member of a certain religion

In a factank article, Pew Research  Center lists the countries that require their heads of states to have a specific religion (See In 30 countries heads of state must belong to a certain religion). It found thirty countries (15% of all countries) that have such a requirement. The list shows that it is mostly the Muslim-majority countries that have religion-related restrictions on the selection of their heads of state. Out of the total thirty countries with restrictions, seventeen (17) are Muslim-majority. For example, Jordan, Tunisia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Mauritania have such a restriction. The article informs that only two countries each require their heads of state to be Christian (Lebanon and Andorra) and Buddhist (Bhutan and Thailand). However, this is obviously not true as the article later explains that there are other 19 Christian-majority countries that do the same. So, the true count should have been forty-nine (49) countries with restrictions, twenty-one (21) Christian-majority and nineteen (19) Muslim-majority:

In addition to the 30 countries in this analysis, another 19 nations have religious requirements for ceremonial monarchs who serve as their heads of state. Sixteen of these, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, are members of the Commonwealth of Nations with Queen Elizabeth II – also known as the Defender of the Faith – as their head of state. The other countries in this category are Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 

Most of the world’s countries (85%) allow citizens of any religious affiliation to be head of state. In the United States, the Constitution specifically prohibits any kind of “religious test” as a qualification for holding federal or state public office. At the same time, a number of states still have laws on the books prohibiting nonbelievers from holding office. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that First Amendment’s prohibition on the establishment of religion clearly prohibits states from requiring office-holders to profess a belief in God.

Source: In 30 countries heads of state must belong to a certain religion

Several comments on the Pew's website questioned the validity of the analysis. For example, some commentators considered Pew's coding of Pancasila (nationalist philosophy of Indonesia) as a religion was considered strange. Others commented on the absence of the Vatican state from the analysis. I also found the analysis problematic and posted the following comment:

If the focus of the article is whether the position of head of state is restricted to members of a specific religion, then all countries that have such restrictions should be listed first. The distinction between the ‘ceremonial monarchs’ and other heads of state, if need be, should have been made later. The way article is organized, it gives a distorted picture. 

The headline says, ‘In 30 countries, heads of state must belong to a certain religion’ and these 30 countries are listed and shown on the graph. This gives the impression that other countries do not have such restrictions. It is only later that the author remembers that there are some other countries that also restrict head of state to a certain religion. The obvious question is why these countries are not included in the headline count or the first list? The answer is not clearly given but the implicit suggestion is that these heads of state do not have real power. 

This distinction is false as many countries included in the first list also have heads of state that do not have real power. One pertinent example is that of Malaysia. Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy, just like Australia, Canada, New Zealand etc. The Malaysian king (head of state) does not have real power, like the British monarch. But still Malaysia is not in the same list as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Similarly, Pakistan’s presidency (though not a monarchy) is also a ceremonial position with no real powers but still Pakistan is in the first list. 

The issue discussed in the article was whether head of state has to be a member of a certain religion. Unfortunately, from the very start, this specificity was lost and other factors like power and type of political system influenced the choices/results of analysis.

Religious Conversion Laws and Religious Nationalism

Religious conversion laws are generally anti-religious conversion as they try to make the process of religious conversions difficult. These laws can be an indicator of growing religious nationalism. Religious nationalist countries usually have these laws as conversion from majority religion is considered tantamount to disloyalty to the state. As religion is conflated with the state, a change in religion (usually from state-preferred religion to another religion) is considered not only a rejection of previous religion but also a rejection of the state. 

Today, religious conversion was in the news because Myanmar/ Burmese authorities published the draft of a bill that would make it difficult to convert from one religion to another. The draft was published to get the opinion of the public. The proposed law is the result of efforts by Buddhist groups to stop/slow/restrict religious conversion. Although the draft law does not mention any specific religion, it is clear the effort is to stop conversion from the majority religion (Buddhism), rather than to it. News report gives the following details ( See  Myanmar Publishes Draft of Religious Conversion Bill):

Myanmar’s government on Tuesday published a draft bill on religious conversion, calling for public opinion on rules proposed by nationalist Buddhist monks which would require those who want to change faiths to first obtain permission from local authorities. Under the proposed law, anyone who wants to change their faith is required to apply to local registration teams—consisting of religious affairs, immigration, women’s affairs, education, and administration officials—for permission.

If passed, those found to be guilty of violating a list of prohibitions—which includes obstructing someone from converting—would be subject to a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment and a fine of 200,000 kyats (U.S. $200). Anyone found guilty of proselytizing could face up to a year in prison, though there is no mention of whether any action would be taken against someone who did not obtain permission to convert.

Organization of Protection of Race, Religion and Belief, a Buddhist group, pressurized the government to propose these laws after a public campaign that collected 1.3 million signatures last year. Myanmar is drifting toward religious nationalism as discussed in this blog before (See Buddhist Fundamentalism: Is it possible?).

Many Muslim religious nationalist states have religious conversion laws or restrict conversion from Islam through courts. In Saudi Arabia, for example,  religious conversion from Islam is termed as apostasy, a crime that carries the death sentence. Similarly, Iran criminalizes apostasy. In Pakistan, apostasy is not a crime despite religious parties efforts but apostates can be charged under the blasphemy law that carries the death penalty. 

Many countries that are drifting toward religious nationalism, like Myanmar, have been consistently pressurized by their majority religious groups to pass religious conversion laws. In some federations, like Malaysia and India, although there are no specific national laws on religious conversion, there are laws at the state/provincial level that restrict religious conversion.

The recent landslide victory of BJP, a Hindu nationalist party, have revived aspirations or fears of a national (anti) religious conversion law. BJP has supported religious conversion laws at the state level (See Narendra Modi (BJP) election win good for Indian economy, but scary for Christian minority) and BJP leaders have vowed to bring such law, if they win elections in 2014 (See ‘BJP will bring law against religious conversions if voted to power’).


Anti-conversion laws in Indian states

Source: Conversion of religion: India (legal aspects) 

Religious conversions are bound to increase as people have more opportunities to know about other religions so pressure from majority religious groups in states based on religious nationalism would also increase to restrict/ban religious conversions (from the majority religion, not to the majority religion). 

    

 Update: Myanmar Parliament passed the anti-conversion law in August 2015.

Mahathir and Erdogan: Similarities and use of nationalism

A lot has been written about the superb economic stewardship of both leaders and it has certainly been crucial for their popularity and electoral success. However, not many people know of another key ingredient behind their success – their management of ‘nationalism’.

My article published on Express Tribune Blog. A portion is reproduced below, rest can be read at Will Sharif be able to follow Mahathir and Erdogan?

Like Pakistan, the basis of nationalism is still open for debate in both Malaysia and Turkey. There are ethnic nationalists, religious nationalists and a large group of civic nationalists fighting over the raison d’être of their respective countries.

Mahathir and Erdogan both used this disagreement to their advantage and led coalitions of different nationalists at different times in their careers. Both adopted civic, ethnic or religious nationalism as the situation demanded.

Source: Will Sharif be able to follow Mahathir and Erdogan?

Mahathir began his career as an ethnic nationalist but later won popularity and even premiership as a Malay nationalist. He wrote a controversial book, The Malay Dilemma, to promote special policies for the people of Malaysia. However, once he attained power, he moved to the centre and tried to win overall Malaysians. And by the end of his rule, he started propagating a form of ethnoreligious nationalism, highlighting the special role of Malays and Islam in the creation of Malaysia.

On the other hand, Erdogan began his political career as a civic nationalist and despite his Muslim roots, presented himself as a leader for all Turkish people. He disparaged discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender or religion. However, in order to curtail the power of the Turkish military, he later became an ethnic nationalist and unashamedly claimed to be the redeemer of the ethnic nationalism of Ataturk and the early Turkish Republic.

His current stance is that of an ethnoreligious nationalist fighting against the world for his country, just like Mahathir near the end of his career.

Malaysian Malaysia and Algerian Algeria

Malaysia and Algeria are two multi-ethnic nations. Both got independence from Europeans and attained their present boundaries in the 1960s. Both are dominated by a majority ethnic group that has controlled the state since then. As I was reading about Algeria what stuck me was the similarity of slogans of minorities in both countries. In Malaysia in 1960s, Lee Kwan Yew (before Singapore was expelled from Malaysia) called for a 'Malaysian Malaysia', not a Malay Malaysia or Chinese Malaysia or Indian Malaysia. Lately, opposition alliance has picked up this theme and called for changes in the Malaysian state (see Lee Kuan Yew's 'Malaysia for Malaysians'). In Algeria, minorities, mainly Berbers, called for Algerie algerienne (an Algerian Algeria) (see Religion, Ethnicity and State Formation in Algeria). They resisted Arabization of Algeria after independence.

Of course, these countries are dissimilar. For one, minorities in Malaysia are much more distinct and numerous as compared to Algeria. Possibly, because of that, discrimination in Malaysia has been incorporated in the legal regime, while in Algeria it is much more general and subtle. In Malaysia, minorities are acknowledged and then discriminated. In Algeria, Berbers are rarely acknowledged as a separate ethnic community. There are many reasons for this situation in Algeria. First, many Berber do not know or see themselves as separate from their Arab neighbors because inter-marriage is quite common and many Berbers have been Islamized and Arabized. Second, many Algerians see talk of Berber rights as attempts by outside powers to divide the nation, just as French tried to do (and failed) during the War of Independence. 

Recently, both countries have tried to accommodate some of the minorities demands. Malaysia has decreased preferences for Malays or Bhumiputras while Algeria has has recognized Tamazight (Berber language) as national language.

The question from our frame of reference is whether the ethnic identity (Malay/Arab) is the main force behind the domination of majority or is it Islam?  

   

Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism

When a state argues to be based on religious nationalism, religion becomes important in defining who are full citizens of that state. It is a case similar to countries based on ethnic nationalism. Japanese, Turkish, Korean or German nationalisms are based on specific ethnicities and those ethnicities are sometimes consciously and blatantly and sometimes unconsciously prioritized. Not long ago, a Russian, having German ancestry, who could not speak German and had never lived in Germany had a stronger claim to German citizenship than a Turk, who had not only been born in Germany but had lived in Germany all his life.

In such 'ethnic' nations, it becomes very important to clearly define who has the 'correct' ancestry and who has not. It becomes important for the state to know, for example, whether both your parents of a citizen were born in the country or not, even if both of them are also citizens. These defining markers are controlled by the state as means of informing the masses who they are and what should be important to them and punishing those who ignore these markers. Recently, the highest court of Dominican Republic court stripped thousands of people of citizenship because their parents had entered the country illegally decades ago (see Haitian-descended residents of Dominican Republic stripped of citizenship by high court). 

In case of religious nationalism, the focus is on religion or sect so defining who is a Muslim, Jew or Catholic becomes important. An Irish joke makes this point clear. In Northern Ireland, a car is stopped at a checkpoint and policeman asks the driver, 'Are you a Catholic or a Protestant?' The driver answers, 'I am an atheist.' The policeman thinks for a few seconds and then asks, 'A Catholic-atheist or a Protestant-atheist?'

The first nationality marker is of course whether one is a member of the national church. This marker discriminates against those who are not members but states with religious nationalism usually ignore this criticism as many states based on ethnic nationalism also do when they discriminate against those not belonging to prioritized/majority ethnic group.

However, as citizenship comes with significant social, cultural and economic benefits, markers of nationalism (ethnic or religious) are contested. Minorities try to dilute these markers to be part of the mainstream while diverse social groups within the titular group try to narrow them to get a larger share of benefits. As a result, in case of ethnic nationalism, the titular group experiences more ethnic fragmentation and infighting. And in states with religious nationalism, sectarianism rages unless state decisively intervenes. Readers of this blog will remember that Malaysian lawmakers from ruling party UMNO recently suggested that Islam should be limited to Sunni sect. A much horrible aspect of sectarianism is visible in Pakistan where there are attacks on religious places and leaders of rival sects (Sectarian killings soar in Pakistan, raising fears of regional spillover).

Source: The Various Strands of Shiite-Sunni Discord

Can religious nationalists stop sectarianism? I personally think the answer is no.

Is Religious Nationalism in Malaysia an end in itself or just a mean to continue the erstwhile Malay Nationalism?

Michael D. Barr and Anantha R. Govindasamy discuss this issue in their article 'The Islamisation of Malaysia: religious nationalism in the service of ethnonationalism' in Australian Journal of International Affairs (2010). The abstract is copied below.

The relationship between religious, ethnic and national identities in Malaysia has long been fraught with uncomfortable tensions especially for the 50 percent of Malaysians who are outside the dominant Malay- Muslim communal grouping. Until the accession of Dr Mahathir to the prime ministership at the beginning of the 1980s, it was clear that ethnic identity trumped religious identity, even though being Muslim was already intrinsic to being accepted as Malay. Being a non-Malay Malaysian was to accept a subordinate, but not a drastically uncomfortable role in the nation. Since the 1980s, however, religious identity appears to have replaced ethnicity as the central element of nation identity as the society has been systematically even aggressively Islamised. Yet appearances can be deceiving, and there is a strong case to be made that Islamisation in Malaysia is basically a variation of the original Malay ethnonationalism, using the nearly complete symbiosis between Malay and Muslim identity as the point of articulation that allows religious nationalism to serve as a cipher for ethnonationalism but a version of ethnonationalism that is much less accommodating of minorities than was traditional Malay nationalism. This article places contemporary events in a historical context and then focuses on just one aspect of Malaysia’s program of Islamisation that is both contemporary and central to national identity developments in the education system, and particularly within the secondary school history curriculum to demonstrate that in this instance at least, religious nationalism is operating as a surrogate for ethnic nationalism and has, in fact, intensified ethnic nationalism by raising the stakes for the communities that are outside the core national group.

Source: Early Malay nationalism

As the title and abstract shows, authors think that the current Islamization is just a way to promote Malay nationalism which has been diluted over the years because two of its main pillars, Malay language and adat, have been widely adopted and are not the distinguishing features anymore. So, Islam is the only distinguishing feature of Malay identity and so it is being used to keep the Malay ascendancy intact and promote the centrality of Malay identity in the national identity.  As authors contend:

It should rather be regarded as a tool in the service of that ethnic agenda -- a program of hegemony designed to reinforce Malay occupation at the heart of Malaysia’s nation-building project and to condition non-Malays and non-Muslims to accept their assimilation into the Malaysian nation as subordinate, peripheral partners. We also argue that this project has had the entirely predictable effect of reducing the comfort levels of the non-Muslim minorities.

To prove their point, authors trace the history of Malaysia and show that Islam was previously only a part of Malay identity and was not given much prominence. Since Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981, however, Islamization of state has made great strides. Islamic diet, dress, architecture etc. have been promoted by the state. There also have been changes in laws and constitution and non-Malay partners of UMNO have been unable to stop these changes which make them peripheral partners in the national project. Authors also present a detailed analysis of history books of two grades that show how Islam is prioritized.

That Malaysia has been more Islamized since the 1980s is, without doubt, true and almost all of the article gives evidence of that. However, the evidence that authors give for it being a facade for continuing Malay dominance is not strong. Evidence from many Muslim-majority countries shows Muslims societies being more concerned about religious practice and behavior and governments enacting laws to promote them. Why cannot Malaysian elite be following this global trend? Why the change in Malaysian state is not the result of the change in society which is now more religious than thirty years ago? Why is it not the result of identity issues becoming more important for Malays (the main voting bloc for UMNO) as they become more prosperous, making previously dominant economic issues recede in significance?  

Malaysia's turn to Islamism?

Malaysia's two characteristics has always pulled it in opposite directions. Its multi-ethnic/religious composition forces it to move away from political Islam but its religious/Malay nationalism drives it toward political Islam. If one looks at Malaysian history, one can see a clear trend of its ruling party United Malays National Organization (UMNO) using more religious rhetoric and agreeing to more legislation linked to Islam, despite always governing with a coalition of Chinese and Indian parties. Recently, UMNO has taken more steps in the same direction:

• For the first time, it has agreed to consider the applicability of Hudud punishments in Malaysia.
• Some of its leaders have called for narrowing the definition of Islam to Sunni sect, thus excluding the Shias. UMNO can now claimed to be defender of Islam, not only from outside but also from the inside.
• In the recent general assembly of UMNO, Prime Minister Najib has largely ignored the UMNO's slogan for last election '1Malaysia', propagating a Malaysia in which all are equal partners. PM Najib has also given in to conservatives in his party over the use of the word 'Allah' by Christians.

Analysts have given several reasons for this recent religious turn in UMNO. 

• UMNO has won the lowest number of seats in last elections since 1969 and Chinese and Indian voters largely rejected UMNO-led coalition. UMNO, therefore, feels it has no option but to shore up its core Muslim Malay constituency.        
• UMNO wants to break the opposition alliance by weening away Islamist Pan-Malaysian Islamic party (PAS) by showing its commitment to Islam.
• UMNO's previous strategy of getting votes by providing economic benefits to Malays has been less effective recently due to economic slowdown and other parties committing to Malay interests.

However, UMNO also understands that too sharp a trend toward Islam-based politics will not only be a bad election strategy but will also be disastrous for ethnic harmony in Malaysia. 

Is religious nationalism a necessary condition for state Islamization?

Defining Islam’s role in state affairs is an issue that has bedeviled most Muslim majority countries (MMCs) since their independence from colonial rule. Debates about how Islam/sharia relate to constitutional provisions, policies and penal laws polarize the populace in thee countries and national consensus on this issue is a rarity. Sometimes it appears that a consensus has emerged about state Islamization in an MMC and the country has moved on to more mundane and less polarizing issues. However, soon events bring the issue back to the fore. As more MMCs democratize, new parties and social classes assume power and take a fresh look at their country’s problems. Public debates become more open in these fragile democracies and new constitutions, laws and policies are approved. Islamic precepts are part of these debates, implicitly or explicitly, because Islam is a powerful social force in these societies. Governments cannot ignore it even if they want to.

Yet, despite the similarity of circumstances in many MMCs, the success of state Islamization is varied. In some countries, it has succeeded to transform the state but in others, it’s conspicuous because of its absence. Some analysts have argued that this variance is due to differences in the popularity of Islamic movements/parties in the MMCs. They contend that popular Islamic parties cause state Islamization directly by implementing it after coming to power or indirectly by pressurizing those in power. Others have countered these arguments by pointing out that most of the successful state Islamization projects have been completed under autocratic regimes. They argue that authoritarian regimes use state Islamization to acquire legitimacy.

Source: The Islamization of Pakistan

Both these propositions have weak support. Recent news coming from the Middle East also does not support the argument that Islamic parties’ victories necessarily lead to state Islamization as Islamic parties have largely failed to Islamize the state even after winning elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey. Similarly, linking autocracy with state Islamization is difficult as most autocratic regimes in the MMCs have brutally suppressed Islamists and rejected state Islamization. So, what are the causes of state Islamization? Why, in some MMCs, Islam plays a large role in state affairs, while in others it has almost no influence on state laws and policies? 

It can be argued that it is Islam’s role in the nationalism of an MMC that influences the extent of state Islamization in that country. Scholars have pointed out that the relationship of religion with nationalism and religion’s role in the state may be closely linked. Successful state Islamization by authoritarian regimes or by Islamist parties may be possible only in MMCs where nationalism and Islam are intertwined. Even in non-Muslim countries, religion plays a much larger role in the public sphere and in the governmental affairs of countries where national identity is linked with a particular religion than in countries where nationalism is based on ethnolinguistic ties or has a civic character. Religious leaders in countries like Israel, Malta and Ireland have regularly influenced political issues and legitimized this intervention on the basis of their religion’s special relationship with the state.