Pakistani deep state again using Islamists?

Though religious nationalism was, for a large part, responsible for the creation of Pakistan, Pakistan has seen ebbs and flows of religious nationalism. For instance, Pakistani state tried to limit religious nationalism to symbolism in the early part of Pakistani history. The leadership, like in many other Muslim-majority countries, was generally secular and did not want religious law implemented in Pakistan. 

However, after the separation of East Pakistan, the state leadership decided to use Islam. The instrumentalization of Islam led to Islamization in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The main culprit in this area was General Zia who used Islamists to kill, maim and threaten the democrats. The militancy he introduced and the violence he allowed the Islamists to do, both inside and outside Pakistan, was unmatchable. He not only changed the society but also the military (he is the longest-serving chief of Pakistan Army, from 1976-88), making it more religious and adept at using Islamists for achieving their institutional objectives. 

One of Pakistan military's main institutional objectives is to control Pakistan's defense and foreign policies and intervene in any other area they like until Pakistani democrats are mature (notwithstanding its own efforts to not let the politicians attain maturity). Two other institutional objectives are keeping the Kashmir issue alive and working for a friendly government in Afghanistan. For all these objectives, Islamists come in handy. Because Islamists have difficulty collectively winning more than 10% of popular elections, they do not like democracy and are usually ready to destabilize democratically elected governments. Two examples of such destabilizations are in 1977 and 1996. Not surprisingly, they are also ready to support the military-led governments to implement their agenda as coming to power through the ballot box is a long shot dream. They supported both General Zia and General Musharraf martial laws and were rewarded with unprecedented power. Islamists also share Pakistani military's suspicions about India and think that "Hindu" India and "Muslim" Pakistan can never be friends. Both of them want India out of Kashmir. Therefore, Islamists are used by the Pakistani military to create problems for India in Indian-held Kashmir. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the interests of the Pakistani military and Islamists are aligned. The Pakistani military wants a friendly government, which accommodates Pashtuns. Islamists want the Taliban in power who are mostly Pashtuns. The Taliban are also against "Hindu" India, like the Pakistani military. 

Currently, Pakistan is going through another period of visible civil-military tensions. Both the civilian government and the military are looking for allies and support. When the military started its military operation, Zarb-e-Azb,  against militant Islamists in June 2014, there was a hope that the more than three decades old alliance between the military and the Islamists have finally been broken. This notion gained strength after the Army Public School massacre in which around 150 children died at the hand of Islamist militants in a military-managed school. However, currently, it appears that military has again decided to use Islamists to destabilize/defeat the civilian government. What has changed is that along with the old Islamists, the military is now working with some newly created or refurbished Islamist outfits. 

Milli Muslim League (MML) is the latest incarnation of the Jamat-ud-Dawa (JD) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). It is a new political party. Its creation was announced in August 2017. Ostensibly, the reason for the creation of this new party is to make Pakistan a real Islamic state. The MML president Saifullah Khalid said to the reporters on the MML launch, “We have decided to make a new political party, so that Pakistan is made a real Islamic and welfare state” (See JuD launches political party to contest upcoming polls).

The creation of the MML, however, also serves two objectives, both close to the heart of Pakistan's military. First, it promotes the legitimization of the JD and LeT as a legitimate political party and decreases pressure on Pakistan to ban all its activities. Second, it divides the vote bank of PML(N) which is the ruling party as well as leading center-right party in Pakistan and which is currently in a tussle with the military for civilian ascendency.

Poster of Milli Muslim League clearly showing the picture of Hafiz Saeed

Source: Ibcurdu.com

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan (TLP) is a sign of increasing Barelavi militancy. In Pakistan's history, Deobandis have long been linked with extremism and militancy but Barelvis, which also follow Imam Abu Hanifa and hence belong to the same Hanafi sect as Deobandi Muslims, were considered to be more mellow, syncretic, acquiescent and peaceful. Barelvis were thought to be folkish, believers in local spirits and saints and less interested in power as compared to Deobandis, who were considered dogmatic, believers in high religion and interested in implementing Sharia. This is, of course, a general description and at the individual level, there were always militant Barelvis as well as amenable Deobandis in Pakistan.

Barelvi militancy showed its strength in the anti-Ahmadi movement in the 1950s and then again reared its head in the mid-1970s when anti-Ahmadi movement 2.0 was in full swing. However, with the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslim, the militancy again decreased. The third resurgence of Brelavi militancy was mostly concentrated in and around Karachi in the 1990s. The organization leading it was Sunni Tehrik or Sunni Tehreek. The ST, which was recently renamed the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek, was formed in 1990 to prevent the mosques and madrasas of the Barelvi school of thought in Karachi from being “captured” by Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups.

Analysts believe Barelvi groups; especially the ST, have started politically exploiting the issue of blasphemy and the execution of Qadri has provided them with an opportunity to show their strength to counter the growing influence of Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups in the country. The ST's slogan was ‘Tauheen rasalat ki ek saza, sar tan se juda."(See Ditching the tag of mysticism, Barelvi militancy rears head in form of Sunni Tehreek).

The TLP is a new Islamist political party but is very similar to the ST. It has made its name for inciting violence and promoting militancy. The TLP claims on its website that it will work to make Pakistan an Islamic state through gradual and legal struggle:

Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan also known as TLP is an Islamist political party. Its objective is to make Pakistan an Islamic state, governed by Shariat e Mohammadi, through a gradual legal, and political process. (See TLP website)

But its actions and statements belie such claims. The TLP was formed in 2015 in Karachi but gained support in 2016 after the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri, who had killed Punjab province's governor in 2011. Since then, it has been involved in protests, rallies and sit-ins, the most famous of which was in front of parliament (Who is leading this sit-in?)  in March 2016. Another of their rallies, in January 2017, disrupted traffic in Lahore.

TLP poster/banner

Source: Tehreek Labbaik Official (facebook page)

The nexus of military intelligence agencies and the TLP or Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasoolullah appears to have formed or strengthened after the disappearance of five bloggers in January 2017. These bloggers were liberal men who were critical of religious extremism and military's involvement in the political affairs of Pakistan. They were not involved in any kind of blasphemous activities. However, when they were picked up by the security/intelligence agencies, they were decried on the social media as anti-Islam bloggers who also wrote or promoted blasphemous ideas/writings. The abductors find it convenient to link the bloggers with blasphemy as in Pakistan, more than sixty people, who were accused of blasphemy, have been killed by vigilantes. Once one is accused of blasphemy in Pakistan, one is a sitting duck. As expected, the TLP immediately came out in support of jailing or killing bloggers. The chastened bloggers were released after a few weeks but the secret alliance of military with TLP appears to become closer. In recent elections, there were reports that TLP candidates were supported by the intelligence agencies. At present, in November 2017, the TLP has again resorted to "dharna politics" and have cut-off one part of Islamabad from the other for the last ten days.

Rise of Sectarianism and Pakistani Religious Nationalism

Religious nationalism often leads to sectarianism. As explained in a previous blogpost (See Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism), when religious affiliation  defines citizen from a non-citizen, sectarian issues attain a political, economic and social significance. Far from being the concern of few theologians and zealots, they became the concern of everyone. For example, if religious law is not the law of the state and there is no chance it ever becoming state law or source of state law, few care how the rival sect differs in interpreting a certain Biblical or Quranic verse or hadith. However, once religious law is considered to be the source of state law, then everybody is concerned as there is a chance that one's religious beliefs maybe declared illegal or these beliefs maybe legal but would not entitle one full citizenship rights. 

An example would clarify. In 1978, General Zia introduced zakat (annual alms tax) system in Pakistan and ordered compulsory deduction of 2.5% from bank accounts that have amounts above a certain minimum level. Beliefs of Shia and Sunni sects about who can collect zakat differ. Sunnis believe state can collect zakat, Shias do not. Not many people, Shias or Sunnis, thought this difference was important before 1978. However, when Zia introduced the new system, Shias immediately protested and when Zia ignored them, they took control of some of the important government buildings in Islamabad and vowed to fight. In the end, Zia gave in and Shias were exempted from compulsory deduction of zakat by state.

So, a sectarian or confessional bias is inherent in a religious nationalist state. If state adopts religious laws, it has to choose between different interpretations. For example, in Saudi Arabia, state has adopted a particular religious interpretation about how women should appear in public. This particular interpretation has been rejected by most Muslims but Saudi state has enforced it. In Israel, marriage registration is controlled by the Orthodox Chief Rabbinate. If rules set by the Orthodox rabbinate are not followed, state would not register a marriage. Even a marriage under Reform or Conservative Judaism (rules), two other major streams in modern Judaism, is not kosher for the state. 

In Pakistan, sectarianism became an issue after General Zia started Islamizing the government. Before General Zia, there were sects and differences and sometimes violence would happen but such instances were few and far between. The knowledge of sectarian differences and the animosity that one saw in the 1980s and later was not present before. Rise of sectarianism was primarily because of General Zia's Islamization program but not all reasons of this rise were internal. Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which made Saudi Arabia a very important player in Pakistan's religious landscape, also helped the rise of sectarianism.

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal as given at Who is killing Pakistan's Shias and why?

Sectarianism continue to increase and become more violent after Zia due to the following reasons:

• Madrassas and religious nationalism: Mushrooming of madrassas, which promote religious nationalism and train students along sectarian lines, under Zia started to have its effect on Pakistan in the 1990s. Madrassas provided recruits to religious parties and sectarian militias but were also proponents of Pakistani religious nationalism that Pakistani state was also promoting so taking action against them was difficult. Moreover, religious parties, which had overlapping membership with sectarian militias and leadership of both were trained in the same madrassas, made any strict action against sectarian militias difficult as it was termed as an action against Islam and against Pakistan;
• Political instability in the 1990s: The nineties decade was highly unstable, with average tenure of Prime Minister being a year (nine Prime Ministers from 1990 to 1999). It not only undermined democratic development but also affected economic growth and law and order. A long term coordinated action against sectarian militias was not taken. Military sometimes used religious parties, which were supported by sectarian militias, to counter politicians' attempt to stabilize their rule and reduce military's power;
• Sectarian militias as tools to promote religious nationalism abroad: Sectarian militias were used by military (particularly ISI) as tools for promoting religious nationalism in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Any attempt to take strict action against sectarian militias by the civilian governments was undermined by this link;
• Rise of Taliban: Taliban and Pakistani Sunni sectarian militias had close links as Taliban also believed in same violent sectarian ideology and many members of Pakistani militias and Taliban had studied at the same Pakistani madrassas and fought alongside each other in Afghanistan. Therefore, Taliban rise and success in Afghanistan not only increased the confidence of Pakistani sectarian outfits but also provided them a sanctuary. 

After 9/11, sectarian outfits were banned and there were some attempts to limit them but these attempts were halfhearted at best. Internationally, General Musharraf was fighting against Muslim extremism but in Pakistan, Musharraf was in alliance with religious parties (Muthidda Majlis-e-Amal) that had a soft corner for the sectarian militias and publically supported Taliban's struggle in Afghanistan. Later, rise of Pakistani Taliban provided Sunni militias confidence, support and sanctuary inside Pakistan.

Benazir Shah writing in Foreign Policy in August 2014 (See The Trouble Convicting LeJ's Malik Ishaq) writes about these links between Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, one of the most notorious sectarian militias: 

In Pakistan’s toxic mix of terrorist organizations, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi maintains ideological and operational links with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda. When need be, its foot soldiers have not hesitated to take their mission of sectarian strife across the border. In 2011, an offshoot of the radical group claimed responsibility for killing 55 Shiites in Kabul, possibly in cahoots with al Qaeda. Other jihadist groups, including Jaish-e-Muhammad, espouse its mission of establishing a Sunni state. More than 600 Shiites were killed in Pakistan in 2013, and over 1,000 were injured in a troubling uptick in sectarian attacks.

Shah also asked the question, will the state act against sectarian militias as it had started acting against Taliban?

For now the state is engaged. On June 15, it launched a comprehensive military operation in North Waziristan, long considered a deadly crucible of local and foreign terrorists. But there is a sectarian face-off brewing in the Punjab heartland, where Jhangvi is firmly rooted. But when the state’s gaze will turn to that fight remains to be seen.

All this history brings us to the recent killing of Malik Ishaq, his sons and other leaders of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. This will be discussed in the next blogpost.

Why not the other 49 Muslim-majority countries?

There are fifty Muslim majority countries in the world. BBC's Wusat Ullah Khan has asked a pertinent question. Why Pakistan is the only 'jihad' laboratory in the world (See Baqi unchas kuyu nahee (Why not the other 49)?.

He has argued that Pakistan should not be a safe heaven for Muslim extremists because Pakistan has a large, well-organized and efficient army that can control its borders. However, currently extremists enjoy control of almost one-fourth of Pakistan's territory. Why?  

Khan then debunks another myth. He contends that if extremism is linked to the first Afghan war in the 1980s, then extremists should also be present in other Muslim-majority states bordering Afghanistan but they are not. Extremists are only in Pakistan. Why?

Moreover, Khan clarifies that most of the young people who came for jihad in 1980s are now in their 60s while the extremists now seen in Pakistan are in their teens or twenties so they are not from the earlier era. So earlier Afghan jihad explains little. 

So, at the end of his article, he has asked why Pakistan is the only one ?

I think Pakistan is the only one infested with extremism because (unfortunately) several factors came together here in Pakistan at the same time:

1. Pakistan is a state based on religious nationalism so nationalist feeling helped population accept Muslims coming from other countries in the 1980s and 2000s. Even now there is large reservoir of sympathy for Taliban in Pakistan.
2. Pakistani state or state agencies helped extremists previously and some of them continue to help them. So, these extremists never felt the consistent power of Pakistan army for a long time. 
3. The area under extremists control (Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)) was never under direct Pakistan control. Despite its name, it was never really administered. These were lawless borderlands so people in this area never knew state. There was hardly any political, economic or social development in this area in the first fifty years of Pakistan life. Obviously, now Pakistan and its people are paying the price of this neglect.
4. The border with Afghanistan is hilly and difficult to monitor. With people of same ethnicity living on both sides of the border, border management is not easy. Drug trade further complicate the situation, presently huge incentives to people who want this area to remain unstable. 

Pakistani Rulers and Council of Islamic Ideology

In states based on religious nationalism, guiding religious discourse and decisions is extremely important for the state. As national identity is based on religion, religious decisions have widespread implications, affecting the economy, social relations and political set-up.

Looking at Iran and Saudi Arabia, we see a religious establishment closely aligned with the state, safeguarding its interests. In Iran, religious establishment controls the state so state interests are well-protected. Since the Revolution, Iranian religious establishment has changed its religious preferences many times keeping in view state needs. Religious establishment has even rejected marjas and Imam Khomeini's own family to protect what it perceives as interests of the state (See Khamenei vs. Khomeini).

Family planning is just one example of prioritization of state needs over religious rules. After Revolution, Imam Khomeini called for more children so that there is a bigger Islamic nation. However, by the end of the 1980s, the state had realized that it cannot cope with the population explosion resulting from this policy. So, the religious establishment changed its stance and started propagating family planning and this resulted in the most successful family planning project in human history.

The election of current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was another example of how loyalty to the state was preferred over religious credentials. Ali Khamenei was not a Marja or Grand Ayatullah at the time of his election as Supreme Leader and Iranian constitution required the Supreme Leader to be one. The religious establishment had the option of electing a Marja or Grand Ayatollah but it elected Khamenei and went for the more problematic course of amending the constitution to make Khamenei's lesser religious credentials acceptable/legal. 

In Saudi Arabian religious establishment has been so close to the monarchical state that members of the establishment have been called bureaucrats. In the 1990s, when there were protest and misgiving in Saudi Arabia about the presence of the US forces, religious establishment supported the state wholeheartedly. This was the main reason why the state was able to defeat the opposition to its rule and policies. Previously, religious establishment supported state against puritanical Ikhwans in the 1920s despite Ikhwans being very religious. Again, in the 1960s, it supported state when television was first introduced in the kingdom, despite its own misgivings and protests in the kingdom, in which even a prince (nephew of the king) was killed. 

Pakistan is perhaps the only state based on religious nationalism that does not have a religious establishment. There is only one body, Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), of less than twenty members that can be termed as state's representative on matters pertaining to religion. As in the case of the countries discussed above, the purpose of this small religious establishment/CII  is to advise the government on religious injunctions and to vet laws passed by the Parliament. However, as is clear from above, one of the unwritten purposes of the religious establishments is to defend the state policies from an attack from the right. Like in other states based on religious nationalism, CII has largely supported state's decisions, However, more recently, CII  has been ambiguous in supporting state policies. In the last one year, it has given three decisions that are completely at odds with the vision of the state. Following are the decisions in brief:

1. In September, CII decided the DNA cannot be the primary evidence in rape cases (See CII rules out DNA as primary evidence in rape cases). This was completely out of tune with international practice and with the trend of increased protection of women. 
2. In March, CII decided that first wife's permission is not necessary for second marriage. This was a major concession won by Pakistani women back in the 1960s (See First wife's nod for 2nd marriage un-Islamic: Council of Islamic Ideology). No major political party supports this decision. In fact, this issue was not even on the radar of religious parties.
3. Again in March, CII decided that there is no minimum age for marriage. Children can be married at any age. The only issue is the consummation of marriage and that should be delayed until puberty of both parties (See Laws prohibiting underage marriage not Islamic: Council of Islamic Ideology ). This is again a major step backwards. According to CII decision, children can be married in their cribs and marriage can be consummated in early teens. 

Why this is so? And what is the solution?

The recent decisions of the CII can be seen in terms of short-term politics. The CII is currently chaired by Maulana Sherani, who is also the provincial head of Jamiat Ulema Islam-Fazal-ur-Rehman Group (JUI-F) (See CII Chairman Profile). Since the May 2013 elections, JUI-F pressure was rejected by the Federal Government headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in at least three areas. First, JUI-F wanted Nawaz Sharif to form a coalition government with them in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Nawaz Sharif rejected their overtures and allowed the majority party, Tehreek-e-Insaf, to form a government in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Second, JUI-F wanted to join both the central/federal and Balochistan government. While Nawaz Sharif invited them to join federal government, he accepted the request of Baloch nationalists (heading the coalition government in Balochistan) not to be forced to accept JUI-F as a coalition partner. Finally, Nawaz Sharif didn't give importance to JUI-F chief Fazal-ur-Rehman in his negotiations with Taliban. All these factors might have forced JUI-F to make life difficult for Nawaz Sharif by coming up with such decisions. However, this theory flounders when we take into consideration the fact that three JUI-F members joined the federal cabinet just a month ago (See JUI-F Represented: Three new ministers take oath).

Source: Slice of cake: JUI-F demands share in Balochistan cabinet

A more plausible explanation of what is happening is the change in the chairman's education. Maulana Sherani is only the second person appointed as chairman CII, who does not have a Western styWestern-style Earlier Maulana Kasur Niazi remained chairman CII for only four months in the mid-1990s. However, Maulana Niazi had a much more pluralist outlook and criticized conservative ulema all his life and was in turn criticized by them. So, from 1962 to 2010, when Maulana Sherani became chairman CII was headed by men who were not only scholars of Islam but also had  knowledge of the modern world and requirements of the state. Maulana Sherani was first one to break this trend. 

The next logical question is how Maulana was able to break the trend. The answer lies in the ineptness of the last government. while chairmanship of CII had been used as political largesse to be distributed to supporters before, it was never given before to traditional ulema. This was the first time a traditional alim was made chairman CII and the state and the people of Pakistan will suffer the consequences. 

It's time Pakistani rulers realize that chairman CII is not like the chairman of a steel mill or president of a university. It is a much more important position. Without a religious establishment, this is the only institution that protects the state from any attack from the right or the left. When national identity of  a state is based on religion, it's better for that state and its rulers to give importance to religious institutions. 

Even before these decisions, there were calls to abolish the CII (See DNA Controversy: Abolition of Council of Islamic Ideology demanded). However, as discussed above, state needs CII. A far more easier step and the right step is to appoint such members and chairmen who have a more anti-traditional and pluralist outlook. More women members will definitely decrease the bias and misogyny that one can see in the latest decisions of CII. It is worthwhile to mention that the constitution stipulates that there should be at least one woman member of CII and the only member of present CII died in August last year. So, these decisions are illegal as CII is incomplete according to the Constitution of Pakistan. 

Taliban argue it's not drones or Afghanistan, it is the unislamic system

In a recent statement, the Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)'s spokesman clarified (one more time as they clarified before too, see TTP wants enforcement of sharia: Spokesman) that it is not the US drone attacks on tribal areas or Pakistani leaders being US slaves or presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan that is their reason for fighting. 

According to a news report, Shahidullah Shahid said it is the system that was imposed on Pakistan after 1947. It is clear TTP want their own system ( which they call Islamic system or sharia) imposed on Pakistan. And they think they have large support and are getting more popular in Pakistan (TTP claims its popularity graph is going north )

I hope this will clear the minds of some Taliban apologists but I am not very confident. See this statement by Imran Khan Taliban never sought imposition of Sharia in previous agreements Imran. 

Some will argue that TTP did initially accept talks under the Constitution of Pakistan. Yes, they did but there was no clear statement. It was only the negotiators that negotiated with the TTP negotiators (isn't it absurd) that assured us that TTP accepts Pakistan's Constitution. However, this lukewarm acceptance would last only for a few days and TTP's demands made clear that they do not accept the constitution or democracy.

Are Taliban religious nationalists or Pukhtun nationalists?

This issue has bedeviled analysts for a long time. The question keeps popping up as the solution of the Taliban insurgency in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is linked to it. Are they Pukhtun or Pashtun nationalists fighting to liberate their homeland or are they holy warriors fighting for the pristine Islam of the 7th century? Or if they are are a combination of both, which is the dominant ideology for the Taliban, Pukhtun nationalism or Islam/Islamism/pan-Islamism? 

In 2009, this issue was discussed with different shades of opinion making their case. Some claimed that Pukhtun nationalism was dominant and contended that the Taliban were the 'latest incarnation of Pukhtun nationalism' and 'the radical Islamist insurgency is itself a reassertion of the concept of Pushtunistan on both sides of the  Afghanistan-Pakistan border' as Kaplan did here (Saving Afghanistan). Others, and certainly the Taliban themselves, claim that they are Islamist or pan-Islamist i.e. believers in religious nationalism (like I Didn't Want To). Others have been more nuanced opinion as Michael Totten discussed this issue in 2009 (The Taliban and Pashtun Nationalism).  

The Taliban are more than an expression of Pashtun nationalism, of course. They represent a reactionary movement that idealizes the simplicity and extreme conservatism of 7th century Islam. By burnishing this ideology, the Taliban is able, absurdly, to attract support beyond its Pashtun base. 

The ethnic component, though, is a formidable one. It all but guaranteed a certain degreeof success by the Taliban in all of “Pashtunistan,” in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Yet all the while, the ethnic map imposes constraints, if not limits, on how far the Taliban can expand.

While many would argue that the Pakistani Taliban are different from the Afghan Taliban, the debate about their ideology does not change much. There is a popular perception in Pakistan that Pakistani Taliban were noble savages living in the blissful 'state of nature' before Pakistan army on the directives of the US entered tribal areas and destroyed the heaven. Imran Khan, leader of the party getting the second largest number of votes in last elections, believes in this theory of Pukhtun nationalism and claimed recently that sharia imposition was never one of Taliban demands, thus rejecting religious nationalism of Taliban ( Imposition of shariah is not Taliban demand: IK). His party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf won the provincial elections in the Pukhtunkhwa province, the province having Pukhtun majority and bordering Afghanistan. However, his coalition partners Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist party, believes otherwise and considers the Taliban as fellow religious nationalists, fighting to revive the glory of Islam. 

The current peace talk going on between the umbrella group of Taliban organizations, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has again focused attention on this issue. While Government of Pakistan (GOP) has tried to localize them and claimed that negotiations are about the specific tribal areas where Taliban are mostly based, Taliban and their negotiators have argued that the fight of Taliban is about Islam and so negotiations are about how to implement Shariah in the whole of Pakistan (Govt's committee waiting for Taliban's response).

One of the ways to tackle the issue will be to look whether the Taliban are ready to give up their tribal customs (or what they think as their culture) for Islam or vice versa? For instance, almost all Muslims believe that women education is recommended in Islam and this includes education of non-religious subjects. While the Taliban have tried to dodge the issue in the recent past, it is clear from their conduct and policies adopted during their five-year rule that they would prefer women limiting their study to basic Quran and Sunnah lessons. Similarly, while the Quran clearly speaks against the killing of innocents, the Taliban have shown their willingness to kill innocents, if they do not adhere to their (Taliban's) strict interpretations. After the US invasion, they have also engaged in kidnappings for ransom and drug trade, despite earlier acknowledging that these actions were forbidden in Islam. Drug trade was banned when the Taliban were ruling Afghanistan but now the Taliban not only allow it but profit from it. Clearly, the Taliban are not fully adhering to Islamic injunctions and using it to achieve their cultural, ethnic, group or personal objectives. 

However, the Taliban have always proclaimed themselves as soldiers of Islam and are very strict in observing Islamic ibadah and rituals. Using their pan-Islamic message, they have been successful in decreasing the strength of tribal loyalties that are very important for Pukhtun culture. This success, albeit, has remained confined to Pukhtuns and non-Pukhtun Muslims have rejected the Taliban's pan-Islamism. In fact, ethnic and sectarian divisions and boundaries in Afghanistan, 99% Muslim, have deepened after the Taliban emergence. In Afghanistan, the Taliban represent not Muslim nationalism but Sunni nationalism or even more restricted Salafi (Wahhabi) or Deobandi nationalism. They have failed to present themselves as an Islamic force to other ethnic and sectarian groups in Afghanistan and commentators are talking of two Afghanistans, one for Pukhtuns and other for non-Pukhtuns.

So, if the Taliban are not true Islamic warriors, are they true adherents of Pashtunwali, ancient code of Pukhtun nationalism? Not really. When the Taliban rose, they first rejected the tribal elders and jirga (an assembly of elders to settle disputes), both essential tenets of the Pashtunwali.  According to the code, badal or revenge was limited to the perpetrator, his family or his tribe. Under the Taliban, badal of a Taliban was extended to any anti-Taliban, a gross misinterpretation. Massacres of innocents and abduction of women of rivals are again not part of Pashtunwali but were part of the Taliban tactics.

Pukhtun Jirga (assembly of elders)

Source: Foreign Policy

So, are the Taliban religious nationalists or Pukhtun nationalists? They are both, meaning they are neither true religious/Muslim nationalists nor true Pukhtun nationalists. Like most groups, their history, ethnicity, religion, society, and culture has influenced them. The Taliban cannot eliminate any of these influences even if they want to. They are a farrago of Pakhtunwali, Deobandi school, and Salafism (Wahhabism) so they do not entirely and precisely follow the predominant practices of Pakhtunwali, Deobandi school, and Salafism.

The Taliban were students of madressahs of Deobandi sect of Islam, but quite different than the Deobandism practiced in other parts of South Asia. What Taliban practiced was a hotchpotch of Pashtunwali-Deobandism[12] with Saudi-inspred practices. The Saudi influence came up with the Saudi money in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.[13] They attempted to create more or less a state modeled on the principles of Saudi Arabia.[14] The Taliban ideology could be understood from their imposition of ‘Sharia’ based laws and banning of certain practices which they deemed against Islamic traditions. The Taliban ideology could be clearly examined by analyzing their acts and implementation of tribal-based practices. 

This elusive mix resulted in the edifice which Taliban tried to erect and which shocked the world. The Taliban clerics defined their state as true manifestation of an ideal Islamic one. In that sense they tried to implement a tribal customs-mixed Islam on Afghan populace that the world had never seen before. The Taliban’s Saudi influences were harsher than that of Saudis as they lacked oil wealth to appease the masses and Afghan society though tribal but not homogeneous Taliban went further in following the Saudi model and considered all of their practices as ‘true’ interpretations of Quran. As Deobandism is more of an urban phenomenon in India and Pakistan[15] the Deobandism of Taliban was much different and their practices were more inspired of Saudi system and the laws.[16] Despite of the world’s abhorrence of their imposed laws the Taliban laws were considerably well received in Pashtun dominated areas as most of these edicts were already part of Pashtun culture. (See Understanding Taliban through the prism of Pashtunwali code)

Okay, but can we ascertain which is the major influence on the Taliban, Islam or Pashtunwali? It is difficult as the Taliban are a collection of groups fighting under the overall command of the Taliban leader Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada. Most of these groups are close-knitted men, sometimes from one tribe, fighting under the command of one tribal leader in a particular area. Based on the preference of leader or tribe, either of the three influences (Pashtunwali, Deobandi or Salafism) can be dominant.