Five stages of Kurdish nationalism

M. Hakan Yavuz divides the rise of Kurdish nationalism into five stages and argues that

The state's policies are the determinant factors in the evolution and modulation of the Kurdish ethno-nationalism. The major reason for the politicization of Kurdish cultural identity is the shift from multi-ethnic, multi-cultural realities of the Ottoman empire to the nation-state model.

Yavuz contends that there is nothing natural about the development of Kurdish nationalism as is true of other nationalisms. Kurdish nationalism has an 'ethnie' that Smith seems necessary for any nationalisms and this ethnie has been used by Kurdish ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize Kurds. The Kurds are, however, divided along the tribal, linguistic, region,al and religious lines. These divisions, which have been sustained due to rugged, mountainous geography, have been a major reason for weakness in Kurdish nationalism.

Yavuz declares the tribal structure as the core depository of Kurdish identity and argues that it has both helped and harmed Kurdish nationalism.

This tribal structure played a dual role: it prevented the formation of a Kurdish unity by keeping them fragmented, and preserved a heightened Kurdish particularism vis-a-vis the Turks, Persians, and Arabs.

Kurdish nationalism started to take shape due to the centralization policies of the Ottoman empire (1878-1924); it acquired an ethnic bent/consciousness under Kemalist reforms (1925-61); later influenced by the broader Turkish political struggles, class consciousness, and leftist dominated it (1962-83); the 1980 coup led to a military struggle (1983-99); and finally the capture of Ocalan and end of Kurdish insurgency has moved it to its present/last stage.

Stage 1: Anti-centralization Revolts and Politicization of the Islamic Identity

Centralization and modernization of the Ottoman empire led to revolts in Kurdish areas. However, one should be cautious in calling them national revolts as they were primarily local. As modernization reforms decreased the hold of tribal ties/loyalties, Sufi networks, like Naksibendi and Kadiri, increased their influence and Kurdish ethnic awareness rose in the forms of Islamic consciousness. While putting revolts against its policies, the Ottoman state also decided to use Kurds (and their Islamic consciousness) and Sultan Abdulhamid II formed the Hamidiye Regiments to counter Russians and Armenians. However, Islam didn't become a crucial part of Kurdish nationalism as it is part of Turkish nationalism.

Stage 2: National Secularization (1925-61)

The way the Ottoman empire was partitioned and the annulled Treaty of Sevres has left deep scars on the collective memory of Turks. British support for the Kurdish state and the inclusion of Kurdish autonomy in the unfair treaty is not forgotten.

After the war, Turkey became a predominantly Muslim nation and cosmopolitan Ottomanism gave way to secular nationalism that abhorred diversity. Ottoman legacy, however, resulted in a paradox that is still unresolved:

Due to the Ottoman legacy, Turkey embodies an irresolvable paradox in the foundation of the Republic in the 1920s. On the one hand, the state, formed as a result of demographic Islamization of the country, used Islam to unify diverse ethnolinguistic groups; on the other hand, it defined its 'progressive' civilizing ideology, known as Kemalism, in opposition to Islam.

However, the Turkish state wanted to promote its own brand of Islam that was not acceptable to both Turks and Kurds. The end of Caliphate in 1924 was one of the main reasons for the first Kurdish rebellion, known as the Sheik Said rebellion, and so it was based on ethnoreligious nationalism. Due to the authoritarian approach of the Turkish state and its promotion of Turkish ethnic nationalism, there were two more Kurdish revolts (the revolt of Agri in 1930-31 led by Ihsan Nuri Biltis and  Zaza/Alevi Kurds revolt in 1937-38 around Dersim).

Stage 3: Secularization of the Kurdish Question through Socialism (1961-83)

As Kurds became more educated, the tribal and religious leaders slowly lost their power and intellectuals became the new leaders. The Turkish state was always aligned with the West but, during the 1950s, it became a partner by joining NATO and sending its forces to support the US forces in the Korean War. The Kurdish intellectuals, like many other university students in the West, were disillusioned with the West and expressed their Kurdish grievances in socialist idioms. With the Turkish state in the Western camp, socialism seemed to be an apposite ideology for all those oppressed by the Turkish state, including the Kurds. Kurds, particularly Alevi Kurds, took a leading part in Leftist magazines (such as bilingual Turkish-Kurdish Deng and Dicle-Firat), political parties (such as Labor Party), and groups (such as Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (DDKO is its Turkish acronym)). After the 1970 coup, the Labor Party and DDKO were outlawed. The repression continued as well as the ambush and sabotage in the 1970s. In November 1978, Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK) was formed, with Abdullah Ocalan as its head. The 1980 coup declared radical Islam, the Left, and Kurdish nationalism as key threats to the Turkish state. Repression increased and all avenues of cultural expression were blocked. The terrorist activities of the PKK moved even outside Turkey as a Turkish consulate in France was bombed in November 1980. The key achievement of the PKK during this period was taking tribe and Islam out of Kurdish nationalism.

Stage 4: Emergence of PKK (1983-99)

The return of (partial) democracy did not change the state repression and the PKK militant campaign. The PKK during this time got help from other countries. Syria allowed it to establish training camps and Western European countries gave space for organization and propaganda. The PKK attacked not only the hybrid regime and its supporters but also Turkish nationalism. This increased Kurdish consciousness and politicization of Turkish nationalism. The killings and terrorist activities of PKK continued in the 1980s and 1990s. The target was not only the Turkish state but also Turkish civilians and Kurdish civilians who did not identify with the PKK. There were some unilateral ceasefires by the PKK but they did not last long. Later, Syria stopped its support for the PKK and the Turkish military used the Regional State Emergency Governorate (OHAL) which included almost all the Kurdish majority provinces to take special measures, ignoring normal constitutional protections, to defeat the PKK which even used children and female suicide bombings to fight them. The Turkish state also helped create Islamic Kurdish hit squads which killed PKK supporters in broad daylight, with state support. The scars of this conflict were deep and affected every person in the region.

PKK Flag

Source: Wikipedia

Stage 5: Kurdish problem as a European problem (2000- )

In 1998, Turkey increase its pressure on Syria and threatened to retaliate militarily if it did not completely stop helping the PKK. Turkey was emboldened by close support from the US and Israel and the Syrian military's problems because of old equipment and the non-availability of spare parts after the collapse of the USSR. Syria caved in and an agreement was signed with Turkey ending support to the PKK. Ocalan was forced out of Syria and Lebanon and was eventually captured from Kenya, with the US support. The PKK tried to up the ante and increase violence but it failed. Ocalan during his trial praised Ataturk and said that he was ready to serve the Turkish state and termed democratic struggle as the only feasible solution to the Kurdish question. He was awarded a death sentence that was later commuted to a life sentence. In its 7th Extraordinary Congress, the PKK gave up armed struggle and several of its members surrendered to Turkish authorities. After being declared a "candidate state" by the EU in December 1999, the pressure on the Turkish state also increased. It had to implement several decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had given several decisions against its brutal tactics against Kurds and it also had to be more concerned about human rights, rule of law, and minority rights. This led to a series of measures to allow cultural expression of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. The PKK also toned down its secularism and accepted Islam as part of Kurdish nationalism to increase its support.

Source: BBC

Yuvaz's article was written in 2001 so it ends with the hope that the situation will improve. With the arrival of the AKP and Erdogan on the scene, initially things improved but soon there was another insurgency in 2004. In 2009, Erdogan initiated a new social contract with the Kurdish minority ("Kurdish Opening") and took several measures to recalibrate the Kurdish-Turkish relations. However, relations again deteriorated and in 2015, the Turkish state and the PKK was fighting each other again. The misery of the Kurdish people is continuing. 

Separatist movements - the peaceful route to independence?

Scotland, in the end, decided not to be independent. However, it did encourage other separatist movements, many of which supported Scottish referendum. There is evidence that Catalonians from Spain helped the ‘Yes’ vote campaign and many Kashmiris in Scotland and England supported Mr. Salmond’s Scottish National Party, not for any love for an independent Scotland but for its positive implications for Kashmir region. Despite the negative results, referendum has shown that there is no need for fighting or killing for independence in the 21st century. As Jonah Blank, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, writes in the Foreign Policy after the Scottish referendum (See From Glasgow to Kashmir) :

Almost every modern nation has some sort of local separatist movement, and the international community views nearly all of them either with indifference or contempt. Merely to be considered a quasi-legitimate candidate for independence, a group generally has to suffer generations of brutality bordering on genocide. Even then, the odds aren't great. Just ask the Kurds.

The vote in Scotland shows what modern-day secessionism should look like. What if an ethnic group didn't have to justify its bid for a separate state through a saga of historical oppression, or seek to achieve it through a violent insurgency? What if the standard for independence were nothing more than the statement: "We want out." London agreed to take aye for an answer.

Rest of the blog can be read http://www.calgarycgc.org/blog/separatist-movements-the-peaceful-route-to-independence

Rising Religious Nationalism in Turkey

It has been argued that Turkish nationalism has three different strands: civic nationalism based on Turkish constitution; ethnolinguistic nationalism based on Turkish language and ethnicity; and religious nationalism based on Sunni Islam. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Turkey, mainly meandered between the first two types. He tried to bring all groups living in Turkey together and develop an inclusive nationalism based on his modernist rhetoric. But he also promoted Turkish language and Turkish ethnicity and supported research that tried to promote Turks as the group that brought civilization to other groups in the world. To add to the complexity, despite his aggressive secularism, modernism and persecution of Islamic groups, Ataturk (and his allies) implicitly supported Sunni Islam as one of the markers of Turkish identity. So, it is not difficult to find support for all three strands of Turkish nationalism in the founding fathers' decisions and early day of Turkish Republic.

A book that discusses the three strands of Turkish nationalism

Source: The Top Hat, the Grey Wolf, and the Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic

The above discussion should, however, not be construed as proclaiming the equal importance of all three strands. Civic nationalism was dominant in the early 1920s but this period did not last long. Ataturk imagined a socially engineered nation out of the motley of groups present in Turkey. The state told the people how they should speak; how they should dress; how they should pray; how they should write; and even what they should call themselves. People were forced to accept these edicts and not surprisingly many rebelled, especially those who lived on the margins of Turkish society, away from the main Anatolian heartland. Kurds and Alevis took part in these rebellions and bore the brunt of an increasingly repressive response from the Turkish state. Ethnic nationalism became dominant as the state decided to suppress any kind of individuality, whether it was ethnic, linguistic or religious. There was only one nation in Turkey and its characteristics were determined by the state. These characteristics were obviously much closer to what the dominant group (ethnic Turks) had or believed in. So, minority ethnic groups, minority religion and minority sects all lost their constitutional and legal freedoms. This situation continued till the late 1970s and resulted in much polarization, instability, and violence. Left-wing/communist and right-wing nationalist paramilitaries fought each other in all regions of Turkey, with almost twenty fatalities each day.  This made the state or deep state (as the powerful military establishment was called) realize that they cannot control all the societal fissures and resulting violence.

The military took direct control in 1980 through a coup and decided to make changes. To decrease the support of communism and left, it was decided to increase religious education and to accept it part of Turkish identity. However, the public role of religion was still abhorrent and more restrictions were introduced such as the ban on hijab in public universities. Despite these restrictions, this era is remembered as the start of religious nationalism in Turkey. Sunni Islam was always an implicit marker of Turkish national identity but after the 1980s, it started becoming more explicit. This change was called the 'Turkish-Islam Synthesis'. As William Armstrong writes in Hurriyat (See The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey)       

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was originally formulated by the right-wing nationalist Intellectual Hearths (Aydınlar Ocakları) in the 1970s, but after the 1980 coup it rose to become the de facto state ideology. In practice, this meant more than just General Kenan Evren reciting Quranic verses during public speeches. It also meant huge budget increases for the Religious Affairs Directorate, rapid building of new mosques and opening of Quran courses, the introduction of mandatory religion classes in state schools (only on Sunni Islam), more tolerance for religious bureaucrats, active encouragement of religious organizations, and a widening of opportunities for graduates of religious imam hatip high schools.

Military hoped to manipulate Islam without letting it go out of its control but the socialization of masses in a religious environment, supported and funded by the state itself, led to changes beyond military's  imagination. Merton's law of unintended consequences came into play and Sunni Islam gradually became a very important part of the Turkish identity. Right-wing and Left-wing parties gradually gave way to the winning of election by an Islamist party in 1996. Although that party was forced out by the military within a year, the power of religious nationalism continued to grow due to increase in Islamic-oriented media, foundations and businesses. Eventually, AK Party, whose leadership had been trained in Islamist parties, came to power.

AK Party (Freedom and Justice Party) win brought the reformed Islamists to power. They claimed to be like Christian conservative parties of the Western Europe and pledged to work with the secular establishment, consisting of the President, judiciary and the military. Although, in their initial years, AKP didn't take an overtly religious step, the very presence of AKP at the helm gave confidence to media, educational institutions and businesses run by the religious Anatolian Turks. Good economic management helped AKP win elections repeated eventually controlling the presidency, judiciary and military.

Religious nationalism implies that national identity is now based on religion. This logically means that religion is now not only a personal matter (between a person and her God or gods) but a matter of law and state. Therefore, who is a (true) member of the state religion becomes a big issue. Tellingly, defining a true Muslim is a big issue in Turkey now. While there is hope that Kurdish issue (which is mainly an ethnolinguistic issue) will be resolved soon, Alevi issue is raising its head. The state defines Islam to include Alevis as deviant Sunni Muslims but Alevis consider themselves as members of different sect/religion. Everybody from Prime Minister to opposition leaders to religious leaders is weighing in (See What does Erdogan mean by 'Alevis without Ali'?)

Moreover, there is fighting between AKP and Gulanists, followers of an influential preacher Fethullah Gulen, one-time allies of the AKP. The witch-hunts and inquisitions mean that religious nationalism is rising (See Turkey’s intra-Islamic witch hunt).