Showing posts with label Islamic state. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islamic state. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 30, 2020

Is there a separation of church and state in Islam?

Millions of people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, even scores of academics, believe that in Islam, there is no separation of church and state. They point out to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) being a prophet as well as the head of the state. The period of the first four righteous caliphs, the Rashidun (632-661), is also presented as evidence.  The presence of close links between Muslim kings and ulema (scholars of Islam) and the implementation of Sharia by Muslim sovereigns strengthens the case and finally, views of noted Islamists and examples of governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia are used to close the argument.

Several assumptions are made in these arguments that have no basis in history. These assumptions are based on applying a normative framework based on European experience on Islam. Understanding Islamic religion and history using European and Christian experience as the model will, unsurprisingly, lead to distorted and/or sub-optimal results. Following is an example of Muslims and Islam being considered copies of Christians and Christianity and Christian history of Europe being considered a model for Muslims to adopt:

Consider the most famous waves of Christian violence, in the 16th and 17th centuries. Wars of religion devastated Europe, killing huge percentages of national populations. States disintegrated and acts of terror were commonplace. The main impetus for these wars was the question of which Christian sect - Protestantism or Catholicism - would rule each state. Clergy had great amounts of political power, dispensing law and owning huge tracts of land. Nationalism was, as yet, weak. The question of which religion would dominate in which area was also the question of who would rule. 

Eventually Europe’s religious wars calmed down, and a solution was reached. In the Peace of Westphalia, it was agreed that governments - not clergy - would get to decide which religion would prevail in their territories...

Nowadays, the Middle East is embroiled in a set of conflicts that look a bit reminiscent of the European Wars of Religion. A few powerful, cohesive states - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey - are fueling proxy wars in anarchic areas like Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen...Just as the European Wars of Religion featured Christians mostly killing Christians, the Islamic Wars of Religion feature mostly Muslims killing other Muslims...The obvious solution, it would seem, is for Islam to come to the same collective realization that Christianity came to after 1648 - that church and state make for a volatile mix, and should be separated. (Source: Noah Smith: Islam Needs To Separate Church and State)
The antagonistic relationship that Christianity had with the state for its initial three hundred years has no parallel in Islam, whose relationship with the state was without serious disagreements. Furthermore, and more importantly, there has never been a church in the form of the Catholic Church in Islamic history. One can search far and wide and will not find it. There has never been a pope, with his bishops, in Islamic history that could speak for God. In medieval Europe, there was one Pope (except for a few decades) and many rulers, making the Pope's opinion and approval important. In almost all Muslim realms, in contrast, there was one king and scores of Muslim scholars to choose from. There were many kings who may have been excommunicated by Muslim clerics but since there was no central religious authority so there were few repercussions for the king (excommunicating clerics, however, suffered imprisonment, exile, and even execution for their transgression). Kings and emperors always had many more clerics to endorse them than those who reject them.    



Graham E. Fuller, in his book A World Without Islam (2012) brilliantly unpacks the differences between sway and power of the Catholic Church and the lack of anything similar in the Islamic history (as given in Separation of “church and state” in Islamic history):

Islam actually had no parallel to the intimate links between church and state in the West, where the church itself wielded great political and economic power.  While Islamists today — those speaking for forms of political Islam — constantly emphasize the indissoluble unity of religion and state in Islam (din wa dawla), in fact, this perception is largely a modern ideological construct: state power in Islam was virtually always distinct from the clerics.  Religious officials in Islamic states never appointed leadership or controlled the state.  (Clerical domination of the state in today’s Iran is a glaring exception, a modern Shi‘ite innovation.)  Even in Saudi Arabia the monarchy in most contexts is far more powerful than are clerical institutions.

To be sure, the legitimacy of Muslim rulers historically depended upon their implementation of Shari‘a law, at least in theory, but a great deal of the time rulers did not seriously implement its spirit, and they rarely could be overthrown for such religious lapses.  In fact, some medieval Muslim clerics inadvertently dispensed virtual carte blanche authority to misrule by secular powers by declaring that anarchy (fitna) was worse even than oppressive rule (dhulm).  Indeed, no sultan or Muslim ruler in Islamic history ever kneeled to ask forgiveness before a grand mufti in the way that Henry IV was forced to do before the pope in 1077 in Canossa for challenging papal authority on some key secular matters. Henry VIII of England had to break with Rome entirely simply to secure the divorce he sought from his wife.  Thus, intimate linkage between religious and state power marked most of Christian history in a way that has had no parallel in Islam.  (122-123)

And this lack of a Church, with a capital C, in Islam is not a historical development. It is what flows from the Quran and the Sunnah (of the Prophet), two basic sources of Islam. Nowhere in the Quran is there mention of the establishment of a Church. Similarly, the Prophet, in his life, did not establish a Church. Islam propagates a direct relationship between an individual and her God, enjoins Muslims to study the Quran and seek guidance from it. Clearly, this set-up does not favor the establishment of a powerful church and a priesthood that can rival kings. 

Historically, after the Prophet, the religious authority of the leader was withdrawn. The Rashidun, whose period is considered to be a model, to be emulated by all future leaders, by the Sunnis, did not have religious authority. They did introduce some new things or promoted some actions but their decisions regarding religion were always contested and remain contested today. They did not have the religious authority of a prophet, not even a pope. There were many companions of the Prophet who were considered equally or more well-versed in Islamic precepts and edicts than the four caliphs. It is nor without reason that the four righteous caliphs never claimed to be in communication with God or receiving any direct instructions (like the Prophet did). The Prophet also clearly told in his lifetime that after him, there would no revelation. The door of revelation, the direct communication with God, was permanently closed for all times to come after him. There is also no claim for a superior esoteric knowledge that the leader will have had over and above others. None of the caliphs claimed it. Although Shiites do believe Ali, the last of the Rashidun, had superior esoteric knowledge of divine rules, he ruled for only four years and what to say of his religious authority, his temporal authority was contested like none of the other three previous caliphs. During his whole tenure, he fought to end a rebellion and he was martyred before the rebellion ended.

If Rashidun could not (or did not) claim religious authority, the caliphs that came afterward had no choice but to leave religious authority in the hands of clerics. The caliphs after Rashidun were not very different from Christian or Hindu kings. They had attained power not because of their close association with Islam or the Prophet, but due to their superior military might and political acumen. They knew it and most of the Muslims under than knew it so there were not many attempts to enforce something different. Of course, there were few dynasties that did claim divine right to rule, such as the Fatimids, but their religious authority was never completely accepted in their own realm, what to say in the whole Muslim world.

The relationship between Muslim kings and emperors on one hand and the chief judge (Qazi ul-quzat) and chief law interpreter (Shiekh ul-Islam) -- two powerful positions generally reserved for clerics -- was mostly similar to the relationship between the king and the (grand) vizir. Vizirs had authority but they served at the pleasure of the king. The king could appoint any of the scholars of Islam to the above-mentioned posts and usually, the selection was based on scholar's acceptance of the sovereign's authority. 

The king had to publically follow Islam and enforce Sharia. But here again, kings had options. They could suspend or ignore rules they did not like. They could also publicly flaunt their non-acceptance of some parts of Sharia and get away with it. Most of the Muslim kings murdered their rivals (including their brothers, nephews, etc.) and fought wars against other Muslim kings, leading to the deaths of thousands of Muslims. Many of them drank alcohol and had harams full of women. 

Unsurprisingly, there is also an Islamic tradition of God-fearing, learned, and illustrious clerics avoiding and refusing any relationship with the rulers. All founders of the five major schools of thought of Islam (Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Shafa'i, Imam Malik, Imam Hanbal, and Shiite Imam Jaafar) had an antagonistic relationship with their state authorities. A few of them, such Imam Abu Hanifa, were offered the posts of chief faqih (interpreter of law) and/or chief judge but they refused. There are also some hadiths (sayings of the Prophet) that discourage people from accepting powerful appointments or having a close relationship with rulers:

Whoever goes to the gates of the ruler will endure trail/temptation. A person does not move closer to the ruler except that he moves further away from Allah. (Source: Musnad Ahmad 8619)
He who has been appointed a judge among the people has been killed without a knife. (Source: Sunan Abu Dawud 3571)

The rule of ulema or theocracy is a concept alien to Islam. Medieval Islamic texts, many written by clerics themselves, almost never present clerics as an alternative to a bad or unislamic ruler. The concept of Walayet-e-Faqih or guardian jurist (developed by Imam Khomeini and later enshrined in the Iranian Constitution) is a new concept even in the long Shiite tradition. Even now, many of the Shiite clerics both inside and outside Iran reject this concept.  

The above discussion also invalidates the last argument. The Islamists and the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia might claim that there is no separation of church and state in Islam but it is clearly not the case. Therefore, they can keep justifying their desires or their actions by pointing to something imaginary but their proclamations do not make it real. Some rudimentary knowledge of the Quran, the Sunnah, and Islamic history settles the question that the church and state are separate in Islam.

  




Tuesday, January 2, 2018

Pakistan: Religious nationalism in retreat from 1947 to the mid-1970s

Pakistan was formed on the basis of religious nationalism but in its initial years,  Islamic modernism was the dominant paradigm as Nadeem Farooq Paracha explains in his article. The ruling elite, from 1947 to the mid-1970s, wanted to implement Islamic principles, not Islamic punishments. The mullah and the cleric did not have much to do with the affairs of the state.


In Questioning the Authority of the Past historian Dr Ali Usman Qasimi explains how from 1947 till about the mid-1970s, the state and subsequent governments consciously kept the ulema away from directly influencing government legislation.
Usmani adds that this was not due to the fact that those who ran the state and governments between the mentioned years were secular. Instead, their idea of faith and its role in the formation of Pakistani nationalism was different from those held by the ulema and the clerics.
The civil-military establishment which was at the helm of state and government affairs from 1947 till the early 1970s was an extension of the idea of faith and Muslim nationalism developed and evolved by the likes of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Syed Amir Ali, Chiragh Ali, Ahmaduddin Amritsari, Muhammad Iqbal, Ghulam Ahmad Parvez, Dr Khalifa Abdul Hakim, and to a certain extent, Dr Fazalur Rehman Malik.
These scholars were the main shapers of ‘Islamic Modernism’ in South Asia. As an idea it encouraged the acquirement of universal sciences and philosophies to facilitate a rational, practical and informed reading of Islam’s holy scriptures beyond the ‘dated’ interpretations penned by ancient ulema or contemporary clerics.
From the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries, these scholars, through hefty scholarly treatises and philosophical discourses, urged the snatching away of matters of faith from the clutches of clerics and ‘dogmatic ulema.’
They advocated addressing the faith’s ‘stagnant’ and ‘retrogressive’ state through modern scholarly, scientific and cultural means so that its ‘true form’ (which was vibrant and supple) could be brought back to life. To them this recouped form was to become the engine empowering the rejuvenation of South Asia’s Muslims into becoming an enlightened and dynamic polity.
The founders of Pakistan led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah were very much a part and parcel of this narrative and of the evolving tradition of Islamic Modernism in South Asia.
For example, just a few months after the country’s creation in August 1947, Jinnah green-lighted the creation of the Institute for the Reconstruction of Islam (IRI) headed by the celebrated Jewish-journalist-turned-Muslim-scholar, Muhammad Asad.

Ishtiaq Ahmad in 1987’s The Concept of Islamic State quotes IRI’s first scholarly initiative as a detailed treatise which suggested that “no specific form of government had been prescribed by Muslim scriptures and it was up to the Muslims of every age to agree on one that suits their conditions.” The report emphasised that no matter what form of government Muslims decide to enact, it needed to be run on one of the central Islamic principles of “socio-economic justice.”
Even though the 1949 Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly declared that Pakistan was to become an ‘Islamic Republic’, Usmani reminds his readers that the Resolution did not envision any special authority for the ulema. (see Smokers' corner: Curbing the mullah for full article)

Tuesday, August 5, 2014

No-Nos for a Caliphate

Christian Caryl has written an interesting article on Islamic state or more precisely on how to establish a successful caliphate (See 9 Things to Avoid When Creating Your Own Caliphate). In a letter to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the newly (self) proclaimed caliph of IS, Caryl lists the following nine no-nos.
  1. You might want to think twice about wearing a Rolex
  2. Don't ban music
  3. Think twice about punishing girls for alleged immodesty
  4. Don't vandalize ancient cultural relics
  5. Try not to include too many foreigners in your army
  6. Don't alienate local notables
  7. Don't prohibit little pleasures
  8. Don't spread disunity among Muslims
  9. Don't declare yourself a caliph

Source: Was it a Rolex? Caliph’s watch sparks guesses

This list appears to be quite insightful, with all the nine measures linked to the mistakes made during recent attempts at establishing 'Islamic' states. Looking again, one can see that almost all of these no-nos can be subsumed under two broad themes.
  • Respect local culture and traditions
  • Do not be too strict with the people
These recommendations appear intuitive. Everybody knows that human beings have a powerful affinity with their culture and most of them find it difficult to live under strict rules. The very first Islamic state, established under Prophet Muhammad (PBH), also appears to be following these recommendations. Arab culture was largely adopted or accommodated in Islam. Moreover, the few things in which Islam went against Arab culture were very gradually introduced so that people do not feel burdened (e.g. prohibition of alcohol). Leniency, not strictness, was the hallmark of the first Islamic state.  
The question is then, why Muslim movements continue to go down the same destructive path of rigidity, sternness, and hostility toward local cultures?
The problem appears to be the way these states are created. These states are generally created by young zealots and fighters, not experienced thinkers, administrators, scholars etc. The later groups are largely absent not only in the most prominent leaders, but also in the second tier leadership as purity is appreciated and experience (with the previous regime) is considered a sign of hypocrisy and lack of true faith. In pre-modern history, zealots founded states could survive a bit longer because states had less control our people lives and people didn't demand much from their rulers. However, these primitive states also had to eventually accept the local culture and govern with compassion, if they had to survive long.
Not surprisingly, the zealous leadership of the recent 'Islamic' states, while comparatively good at conquering territory, find it hard to rule and govern. Killing, looting and destroying are the only skills they have and they continue using them, even when they are not required or disastrous. They long for certainties which are (perceived to be) available during wars but are difficult to keep adhering to when one is governing millions of people over large swaths of territory. Uncertainty is difficult to handle for these leaders and they might feel that God has left them. Iconoclasm is their way to show that they are still faithful to God and seek His support. Banning local traditions and small pleasures in another.    
But, are Caryl's warnings only applicable to successful caliphates or Islamic states? It is obvious no state can survive long, if it didn't pay close attention to these warnings. A very illuminating comparison can be made with the communist states of the twentieth century. While leaders that tried to strictly follow Marxist ideology couldn't survive long, leaders that blended Marxism with local culture survived and endured.
From a religious nationalism perspective, the lesson is that religion is important and people would do a lot to save their souls but local culture cannot be ignored.     

Friday, June 27, 2014

How 'Holy' Wars End?

'Holy' wars are grabbing our attention again. Whether it is ISIS in Iraq/Syria, kidnapping of teens in Palestine or Pakistan's military action against Taliban, religious issues loom large and more often than not are the major point of contention between the warring parties. There is also a danger of a future Shia-Sunni conflict that can engulf more than a dozen countries from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan.

Conventional wisdom (and there is some research to back this up) claims that religious conflicts are more intractable because of the non-negotiability of religious beliefs. It is argued that combatants, because of their other-worldly ends, continue to fight even after all reasonable analysis would demonstrate the impossibility of victory. Eyeing defeat or a long and costly stalemate, a pragmatic strategy would be to cut the losses and grab what is (maximally) achievable through negotiations. However, in case of religious conflicts, due to the indivisibility and sacredness of the core beliefs, negotiations for peace have no chance and fighting continues.    

Source: Does Religion Cause War?

Isak Svensson & Emily Harding contend that peace is achievable in religious conflicts as combatants do not have to necessarily compromise on their core beliefs (How Holy Wars End: Exploring the Termination Patterns of Conflicts With Religious Dimensions in Asia, Terrorism and Political Violence). Their main argument is as follows:
We argue that there is a possibility for conflict resolution that does not require concessions on core beliefs and aspirations. Religious aspirations, we contend, are primarily associated with conflicting parties’ ultimate goals, and less concerned with the particular means of achieving such goals. They are also not the sole aspirations of parties: conflicting actors can have territorial, structural, economic or other ambitions as well. This opens up space for two conflict resolution mechanisms that can be applied in religious armed conflicts. First, drawing on the distinction between means and ends in regard to religious demands, there is a theoretical possibility for enabling political procedures to replace the fighting. Second, by disentangling religious demands from other non-religious demands, horse-trading procedures can be utilized in order to reach agreement without requiring concessions on the religious dimensions.

As evidence of their contention, authors chose six different conflicts in Asia that have ended and argue that most of these conflicts have been resolved through negotiations based on means-end differentiation, in case of core beliefs, or horse-trading on non-religious issues. The following table (from Svensson & Harding) presents the basic outline of the conflicts.

Selection of cases of terminated religious armed conflicts

  Country               Incompatibility                   Rebel-side                    Religious dimension
Philippines         Territory: Mindanao                MNLF                    Islamic State in Mindanao
Indonesia             Territory: Aceh                        GAM                       Islamic State in Aceh
Uzbekistan           Government                          IMU; JIG                            Islamic State
India                  Territory: Punjab                 Sikh Insurgents                Sikh State in Punjab
Nepal                  Government                           CPN-M                            Secular State
Tajikistan             Government                           UTO                                 Islamic State

Svensson & Harding analysis demonstrates that peace was achieved mostly through negotiations.

Outcomes of conflicts with religious dimensions

 Conflict termination               Religious           Horse         Political      Government/
        patterns                      goals achieved?     trading         process       Rebel victory 
Indonesia, GAM                           X                                         X
Philippines, MNLF( 2)                 X                    X                  X
India, Sikhs                                                                                                     X
Nepal, CPN-M                             X                                         X
Tajikistan, UTO                                                                       X
Uzbekistan, IMU                                                                                            X
Uzbekistan, JIG                                                                                              X

The article is very thought-provoking but there are few issues that need more elaboration. First, while conventional wisdom argues that religious conflicts are more difficult to resolve and authors have tried to prove it wrong empirically, this idea that religious conflicts are different than other conflicts has increasingly been contested. Scholars have argued that it is very difficult to declare a conflict as a religious conflict. Svensson & Harding define religious conflict in the following way:
A conflict has a religious incompatibility when one of the conflict parties makes in their stated goals a specifically religious demand that involves the nature of the state. Such demands can have to do with concern, for example, about the religious characteristics of the state. The demands could have to do with concern that the state, or part of the state, should give certain preferences to one particular religion...
While the definition seems reasonable, it is difficult to define the above conflicts as purely religious conflicts. In each of these conflicts, religious demands were intertwined with demands for democratic, political or civil rights. Authors have to clarify why they consider these conflicts as religious conflicts and other conflicts (such as East Timor) as non-religious conflict. 

Second, if Svensson & Harding's aim is to show that peace can be achieved through negotiations in religious conflicts (as is the case of other conflicts) than outright victories of government/opposition should not be presented as evidence. In case of victories, winning party imposes whatever it likes. The indivisibility or sacredness of losing party's beliefs matter little. Some concession may be made but they are wholly at the discretion of the winning side. 

Finally, authors have to explain why Nepal is not considered a 'rebel victory' in their analysis. The government, led by King Gyanendra, bowed out after Maoists controlled almost eighty percent of Nepalese territory and blockaded Kathmandu, the capital. It was not other opposition parties' pressure that forced monarchy out, it was the Maoists.