MBS and the evolving Saudi Nationalism

Saudi Arabian is evolving but which way? This question was discussed here three years ago (See Saudi Arabian Nationalism, MBS, Salafism and Yemen War). At that time, the role of Islam in Saudi nationalism was ebbing but the same could not be said about Salafism. One could rightly argue that Salafism is a form of Islam but Salafism and (moderate) Islam can sometimes lead one in different directions. It would be difficult to promote Iran as the most dangerous enemy if Islam was a major component of Saudi nationalism but it would be a facile victory if Saudi state subscribes to Salafi nationalism as Salafism (or Wahhabism as its detractors call it) has long designated Shiism as its enemy. For many Salafis, Shiites are infidels, beyond the pale of Islam. The other debate in the 2016 blogpost was about the strength of secular nationalism in the holy kingdom. In 2016, Prince Mohammad bin Salam was still Deputy Crown Prince but was amassing power and trying to lead the kingdom in a new direction. He was speaking against strict religious control and restrictions on Saudi women. Yemen War was being used by him to project himself as the new leader and as someone who would bring Saudis to the 21st century. 

Since then, things have moved swiftly. MBS has become the crown prince while his cousin and previous crown prince is nowhere to be seen. MBS has shown his power by detaining dozens of princes and rich Saudis and getting billions of dollars from them. He has also moved to decrease gender discrimination, although it is still too high even compared to other Muslim-majority and developing countries (See Women can drive in Saudi Arabia but is it really a big change?). This has resulted in some criticism from Salafi religious establishment but MBS has forged ahead.

King Salman (sitting) and the de facto king (MBS)

Source: Why Saudi Arabia Is Embracing a New Nationalism

What about nationalism or more particularly religious/Salafi nationalism? Stratfor in an article contends that Saudi state and MBS have realized that religious nationalism's utility now has diminished and a more territorial nationalism would help achieve national goals (See Why Saudi Arabia Is Embracing a New Nationalism):

At this point in its history, nationalism has stronger benefits to the Saudi state than religious conservatism. Tying identity to a specific place weakens the power of non-Saudi Islamists at home, for example; in a nationalist culture, verbal attacks by Turkish, Egyptian and Iranian Islamists would not represent salient criticisms from fellow Muslims, but rather unwelcome foreign interferences in domestic affairs. Moreover, shifting the Saudi mindset away from the tradition-bound reverence of religion toward the immediacy and secularity of a geographically defined space also opens up the potential for innovation and new ideas — key ingredients for bringing Vision 2030 to fruition.  

Critically, nationalism allows royals to limit domestic policy challenges based on religious opinions, conveniently weakening a check on their power as they embrace unprecedented behavior such as considering once-unthinkable ties with Israel. This also undercuts the ability of the conservative clerics to object to some of the kingdom's social reforms, like gender mixing, encouraging women to work and drive, and encouraging previously banned forms of art and entertainment...

While the contrast between Saudi Islamism and the Christian religious community in the United States has long been a complicating element of U.S.-Saudi ties, Prince Mohammed's meeting with Christian leaders illustrated a more relaxed attitude toward Christianity, which the kingdom hopes will improve relations with the United States. And any stories about non-Islamic worship being permitted publicly in Saudi Arabia, even if just for expatriates, weakens the image of a Saudi culture defined by hard-liners and encourages nationalist thought to expand in schools, media and art.

A recent article by Vivian Nereim (Bloomberg.com) echos the analysis and argues that the Saudi state under MBS is moving away from Salafi nationalism (See ‘Traitor’ Is the New ‘Infidel’ as Nationalism Grips Saudi Arabia). She contends that an aggressive and exclusivist nationalism is still being promoted but it is not primarily based on religion or sect:

Saudi Arabia’s undergoing an aggressive nationalist rebranding, downplaying an austere religious doctrine associated abroad with terrorism, and promoting veneration of de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as he pursues an economic overhaul. Amid efforts to maintain domestic support while redesigning the contract between state and citizen, traitors, not infidels, are the enemy... 

“If a person is neutral or stands with the enemy against this country, it’s our right to call him a traitor,” Abdullah Al Fozan, a member of the [Saudi] consultative council [the nominated advisory council that functions in lieu of a legislature], said in a televised diatribe that went viral late last year... 

There’s an echo of the nativist triumphalism that accompanied political earthquakes in Europe and the U.S., with Donald Trump-inspired slogans like “Saudi First” and “Saudi The Great.” But what’s happening also has local flavors.

Such an aggressive nationalism can derail MBS plans of economic revival, religious and non-religious mega-tourism, and foreign investment but the Saudi officials are not relenting:

The risk is that baiting people to turn on fellow citizens under the guise of patriotism might rupture a society already under strain from the costs imposed by Prince Mohammed’s “Vision 2030” reforms, and deter the foreign investors and visitors he wants to attract. 

For now, officials aren’t hurrying to squash the spiteful mood -- a “with us or against us” mindset seen by some Saudis as needed to steer the country through a tough transition...
“Nationalism came in at a time when Saudi Arabia was not only trying to curtail the religious identity inside the country, but was also following a more assertive foreign policy,” said Eman Alhussein, a Saudi visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations... 

Whoever is responsible, they’re changing behavior. Stand-up comedian Yaser Bakr was forced to give a public apology last month after an old video surfaced of him making fun of the religious police. A social media campaign labeled him a traitor and called for him to be arrested and banned from comedy. Another young Saudi said he’s abandoned Twitter and holds back in family gatherings to avoid questions over loyalty.

The biggest test yet faced by the made over Saudi state, besides Yemen War, was Saudi dissident journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi's murder. Khashoggi was once part of the ruling elite and close to the royal family. He was a Salafi and was against Iran. His only crime was criticizing MBS in the Western press and that cost him dearly in the hyper-nationalistic climate. 

Other analysts have also pointed to the close ties with the Trump administration, coordination with the Israeli government (although it is not publically acknowledged), and distance from the Palestinian administration as evidence of the lesser role of religion in the affairs of the Saudi state. True, but the lack of public acknowledgment also demonstrates that religious and Arab issues still carry weight. What is clear is that Islam and Salafism carry less weight now than they carried five years ago in Saudi Arabia. A new identity is being forged which is based not only on Islam or Salafism but also on territory and loyalty to Saudi royals.   

However, this new identity can create new problems. Stratfor article cautions that territorial nationalism can unite the people against the royal house as has happened in many other countries during the 20th century:

Though Saudi leaders are hoping that a swell of nationalism will reduce checks on royal power, nationalist thought itself — especially once regular citizens have fully embraced it — could replace those checks and even eclipse their power. Former Saudi kings saw nationalist thought as a danger to royal unilateralism, preferring the hierarchical and relatively predictable hard-line Islamists to the more rowdy and innovative nationalists of the 20th century. A new push for Saudi nationalism may challenge the monarchy in exactly the way that its 20th century rulers wanted to avoid. 

Identifying with a nation, after all, is far different than identifying with the ruling house of the nation's government. Asking Saudis for loyalty to national interests invites increasing citizen engagement with what, exactly, the national interests are — a question that until recently has been answered only by the royal family. As nationalism ascends, Saudi public opinion stands to grow more complex and less easily motivated by the tools of old, including handouts and religious scruples. 

Additionally, if nationalism is equated with the traditions of Najd province [the home of the royal family], where Riyadh is located, rather than being pan-Arabian, nominally suppressed or sidelined local identities may experience a resurgence. Places like Shiite-dominated Qatif in the Eastern province, Asir in the southwest and the Hejaz, which hosts the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, all have local identities that may be empowered by nationalism and may bristle against the state's imposition of Najdi symbols, rituals and culture.
 

Can Mohammad bin Salman win?

Yury Barmin, who is a Russian Middle East and North Africa expert, has highlighted the dangers of Prince Mohammad bin Salman's reforms as the prince is going against Saudi history, practice and nationalism of more than two hundred years:

"We are returning to what we were before - a country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions and to the world," MBS said to international investors in Riyadh in October 2017. 

Explaining his ambition to "return" Saudi Arabia to the path of moderate Islam, the crown prince told the Guardian that "what happened in the last 30 years is not Saudi Arabia." He explicitly blamed the kingdom's turn towards ultraconservatism on the Iranian revolution in 1979 and Tehran's attempts to spread the revolution across the Middle East. 

These comments are remarkable for two reasons: first, because they acknowledge that moderation is lacking in the interpretation of Islam that the Saudi state has followed; second, because they reflect the notion that the religious system currently in place hinders socioeconomic development and is not compatible with the demands of the young generation. 

Yet they are also somewhat misleading as they try to deflect responsibility for the situation inside Saudi Arabia to external factors, namely the 1979 Islamic Revolution. But was it really revolutionary Iran that pushed Saudi Arabia towards ultraconservatism?

Source: Can Mohammed bin Salman break the Saudi-Wahhabi pact?

Mr. Barmin rightly argues that it was the seizure of Grand Mosque (Holy Kaaba) by ultra-conservative Wahhabis in 1979, not the Iranian Revolution, that was the main reason for the return to the ultraconservatism of pre-Faisal era. However, even Kaaba's seizure was secondary to the orthodox, hide-bound dictates of Wahhabi nationalism on which Saudi Arabia was founded in the 18th century. 

Wahhabism, cited as the official Saudi religious doctrine for which the country's leadership has been so vehemently criticised and which MBS is looking to rebrand, is based on the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). 

Abd al-Wahhab was an Islamic scholar from the Nejd region of the Arabian Peninsula, an avid traveller and the author of The Book of Unity, which was rejected by most of his contemporaries in Mecca and Medina. Abd al-Wahhab preached returning to the Quran and the Hadith, rejected religious innovation (bidaa) and advocated eliminating practices (such as Sufi rites and veneration of saints) that are not grounded in the Quran. He even accused other Muslims of being infidels for following practices that were, in his opinion, un-Islamic and called for strict adherence to traditional Islamic law (sharia). 

There was nothing new in Abd al-Wahhab's teachings which were based on some old ideas and constituted a revival of the Hanbali doctrine in the most ultraconservative form. It was, however, his religious zeal that ultimately drove him close to the Saud family. 

Muhammad ibn Saud ruled over the area of al-Diriya, today on the outskirts of Riyadh, around the time when Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was unsuccessfully preaching in Mecca and elsewhere across the Middle East. In 1744, fleeing from Medina, Abd Al-Wahhab arrived in al-Diriya and sought protection from ibn Saud. The two formed an alliance dividing power and responsibilities: ibn Saud ruling over the military and political matters and Abd al-Wahab over the religious ones. Armed with religious legitimacy, ibn Saud expanded his rule beyond al-Diriya, establishing the first Saudi state. 

The death of Abd al-Wahhab did not impact the power-sharing arrangement that had been solidified during his lifetime. The descendants of Abd al-Wahhab (the Sheikh family) remained in charge of religious affairs under Saudi rule. To this day, they legitimise the political power of the House of Saud by approving succession and endorsing the king's decisions. In exchange, the Sheikh family enjoys a privileged position in the state structures and plays a key role in the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs.

Mr. Barmin contends that what Prince Mohammad bin Salman is doing is dangerous as it goes against what was normal for so long and he is making many enemies:

The Wahhab-Saud pact survived more than 250 years, guaranteeing religious legitimacy for Saudi power in the Arabian Peninsula. So has its time finally come? Has it run its course and is no longer needed by the House of Saud? 

In the past few years, the Saudi authorities have been gradually and cautiously limiting the extent of the Sheikh family's power. In August 2010, for example, the late King Abdullah issued a decree that only state-vetted scholars were allowed to issue fatwas.
Under King Salman, and his son - MBS, more drastic measures have been taken. In April 2016, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice was stripped of arresting powers which curbed its policing functions. In December 2016, the king appointed more moderate clerics to the Council of Senior Scholars, the highest religious body in the country. And in 2017, music concerts were allowed, mixed public events for both genders were held, and cinemas were scheduled to reopen after 35 years. 

However, the most monumental shifts are yet to take place in the Saudi power structure. The country's legal system operates within Islamic law, which is the ultimate source of legislation in Saudi Arabia. Strictly abiding by traditional interpretations of Islamic law is a crucial element of the worldview Abd al-Wahhab introduced. This is why, in simplified terms, breaking the Saudi-Wahhabi pact would mean breaking up with this traditional interpretation and potentially codifying law rather than relying on judges to interpret it. 

A more important question at this point is whether the country needs to part with its Wahhabi roots at all in order to implement reforms and open up to foreigners. The diminishing significance of religious authorities is a general trend across Gulf monarchies and it seems that Saudi Arabia is set to slowly embrace a similar model. 

The Saudi religious establishment has been publicly supportive of the crown prince's war on corruption and the weakening of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice even if they feel disadvantaged as a result of these developments. The centuries-old monolithic religious structure might turn out to be a paper tiger whose fate is in the hands of the monarch. 

Yet, MBS breaking up with the decades-long policy of cosying up to the religious elites in favour of modernisation, could provoke some to call it corruption and an embrace of Western influence again. It is also likely that the policies MBS is introducing would force a lot of dissenters among the clerics underground. Discontent could simmer for years before surfacing in some form or another. 

MBS's policies are catering to young Saudis, but they do not hold the key to power. It is the older generation that has lived through decades of conservative rule, the disenfranchised princes whose access to power has shrunk and the vast religious elites who are now in a position of vassals that legitimise the Saudi royal family.

Many of them feel marginalised which could drive them to extremes and bring about a repeat of 1979. (see Can Mohammed bin Salman break the Saudi-Wahhabi pact?)

Women can drive in Saudi Arabia but is it really a big change?

Saudi Arabia is not the place from where one can expect good news for women. It is the most restrictive country for women in the world. It's not for nothing that it has been called the most masculine state and anti-woman kingdom. Though many blame Islam for women plight in Saudi Arabia, there are around fifty other Muslim-majority countries in the world and none of these countries control and regulate women lives as much as the Saudi state.Those blaming Islam for the Saudi state's misogyny, however, have one powerful supporter inside the kingdom, the Saudi state, which justifies its invidious discrimination of women on the basis of Islam, Sharia and tradition.

So, knowing Saudi state's general puritanism and its stance on gender equality, it was a surprise to read a series of news that advance the empowerment of Saudi women. Following are the positive news received over the last two months:

• King Salman issued a historic decree removing the ban on issuance of driving licenses to women. Women will be able to drive by June 2018 (See King Salman’s decree allows women to drive in Saudi Arabia):
• Iman Bint Abdullah was appointed as Assistant Mayor of the Al-Khobar municipality, with special responsibility for information technology. She is the first Saudi woman to hold such a senior position (See First Saudi woman appointed as assistant mayor);
• Fatimah Baeshen was appointed as the first female spokesperson for the Saudi Embassy in Washington DC (See First spokeswoman appointed at Saudi embassy in Washington);
• As part of the independence day celebrations, Saudi women were allowed to enter the King Fahd International Stadium (Riyadh) for the first time to attend a pageant operetta. They were also allowed to attend a concert in Jeddah (See National celebrations open Saudi sports stadium to women for [the] first time);
• Saudi Ministry of Education issued a decree that will allow girls to participate in physical education classes for the first time. The government also agreed, again for the first time, to issue female gym licences. Female gyms previously operated as salons and faced threats of closure (See Saudi Arabia will finally allow girls to take PE — that's a big deal).

Besides openings for Saudi women, the Saudi government also proclaimed at least one future relaxation for foreign women. In August, it was announced that a new 50 island Red Sea luxury resort would be built and this resort would be “governed by laws on par with international standards.” The government did not explicitly say it but the meaning of "international standards" was mostly interpreted as freedom for women to wear whatever they like, including bikinis, at the resort (See Saudi Arabia to open luxury beach resort where women can wear bikinis).

So, why this change and why so fast? This was the kingdom which believed in evolution, not revolution. This was the kingdom where tradition and Wahhabi style Islam reigned supreme unfettered by modernity. Most analysts have pointed out that the force behind these changes is the new Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Since his father ascended to the throne in January 2015, he has gradually acquired more and more power. In the first cabinet of his father, Prince Mohammed was appointed Minister of Defense and he was also the head of the Royal Court. Also in January, he was named the chair of the newly established Council for Economic and Development Affairs. In April 2015, he was appointed Deputy Crown Prince and Second Deputy Prime Minister, just two heartbeats away from the throne. So after April 2015, he was controlling both economic and defence policies of the kingdom (For his pivotal role in the Yemen war see Saudi Arabian Nationalism, Religion and Yemen War, an earlier blog post).

A year later, "Mr. Everything," a name given to Prince Mohammed because of his all-pervasive influence (See Why Saudi's Mohammed bin Salman is 'Mr Everything'), presented Vision 2030, a roadmap for the Saudi economy and society for the next 15 years. In his final promotion, Prince Mohammed bin Salman was made Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister by his father in June 2017. 

There are several reasons why openings for the Saudi women are being linked to Prince Mohammed. First, he has said many times that he favors women joining the workforce. In 2016, when he was asked, "Do you think having a greater proportion of women in the workforce would be good for Saudi Arabia?" He replied, "No doubt. A large portion of my productive factors are unutilised. And I have population growth reaching very scary figures. Women’s work will help in both of these issues." Second, he is the main force behind the Vision 2030 which declares:

Saudi women are yet another great asset. With over 50 percent of our university graduates being female, we will continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of our society and economy.

Third, the timing of the reforms is too difficult to ignore. In late June, Prince Mohammed vanquishes his last major rival (cousin and former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Naif) and becomes Crown Prince and in the next two months, a series of reforms happen. Finally, because of his failure to deliver a victory in the Yemen War, he wants a big win to consolidate his power and these changes can give him that, if he can manage the conservative Wahhabi religious establishment. 

Source: Saudi Arabia to allow women to obtain driving licences

The question is whether these changes are going to be a game changer for Saudi women or not. The major change is, of course, permission to drive. Many analysts have pointed out that while important, this change still does not give freedom to drive to Saudi women. After June 2018, Saudi women will still need to have consent from their male guardians:

The key change is that there is no longer any legal prohibition for women to drive. And nor, according to the statements of the formerly reluctant clerics, is there a basis for a ban in sharia law, which governs most aspects of Saudi society. The onus of decisions about whether women can sit behind the wheel has been shifted from the state to families.

Under repressive guardianship laws, male relatives have veto over whether wives or daughters can leave the home unaccompanied. While a woman can be granted a licence and is allowed to drive, a male family member can still stop her from doing so. (See Saudi Arabia: Prince Mohammed plays his biggest card yet)

Madawi Al-Rashid, a Suadi Arabian scholar, has argued not much is going to change. According to her, it is a "public relations stunt" and women are still going to be oppressed in Saudi Arabia and the changes have been solely done to mollify Western critics and get their support:

The Saudi state is one of the most male-dominated in the world. Now it is compelled to look as if it is treating women better to win over critics in the west. As a result, it has embarked on a series of cosmetic reforms...History is littered with dictators who have promoted women, from Turkey’s Atatürk, the Iranian Shah, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Appearing to support women has won dictators applause, especially in the west, where women’s rights have become an axis against which to measure nations and evaluate regimes.

Today’s authoritarian regimes will win extra praise when they appear to be liberating Muslim women from the oppression of Islam. Saudi Arabia is no exception. Here, Muslim women are depicted either as survivors of their patriarchal religion or as heroes who are challenging such a dominant and primitive culture. Like their counterparts in Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan and elsewhere, Saudi women had been framed in this binary image. Dictators conveniently depict themselves as liberators of these downtrodden women while society is shown to be the oppressor. In particular, in recent times, Islam and sharia law are portrayed as the cause of women’s suffering.

Such a narrative is appealing to both Arab dictators and certain constituencies in the west. But allowing women to obtain a driving licence is little more than a public relations stunt designed to cement this notion of the Saudi regime as the liberator of women. (See Women are still not in the driving seat in Saudi Arabia)

Al-Rashid is correct in her assessment that Saudi women lives will not transform because of these few changes. However, she also argues that Saudi Royals are following Ataturk, Muhammad Reza Shah and Bourguiba and like them trying to please the West. If she is correct, this is a big change. It may not be a big change for the Saudi women but it is a metamorphosis for the Royals. Saudi Arabia is based on religious nationalism and Ataturk, Muhammad Reza Shah and Bourguiba were enemies of religious nationalism in their countries. These leaders derived their power by standing against the religious conservatives and Shariah while Saudi Royals justify their rule on the basis of Shariah. So, I would argue that the hold of religious nationalism on Saudi Arabia has loosened a bit because of these changes. If Prince Mohammad keeps on (slowly) moving away from religious nationalism, Saudi Arabia will feel the changes in other areas too. One should be thankful for the small mercies.

Saudi Arabian Nationalism, MBS, Salafism, and Yemen War

A mix of dynastic and Salafist nationalism is on the rise in Saudi Arabia. Intervention in the Yemeni Civil War (named the 'Decisive Storm') has the intended rally around the flag effect. Simeon Kerr wrote about it in the Financial Times in May 2015:

Lines of green Saudi flags hang proudly along Riyadh’s wide highways while screens around the capital broadcast footage on a loop of warplanes flying into combat and massive explosions.Local companies have taken out giant billboards pledging allegiance to the “decisive and determined” King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, while ordinary Saudis have taken to social media to show their support for the new king and the county’s military campaign in Yemen.An unprecedented jingoism — hidden for decades — has swept through Saudi Arabia since King Salman ascended to the throne in January and the launch in March of the aerial campaign against Shia Houthi rebels.Although the air strikes have raised international concern and heightened tensions with Iran, its rival for regional dominance, they have been cheered in Saudi by an increasingly nationalist and sectarian sentiment.

Saudi cartoon showing Iranian cleric being hit by a missile on which Decisive Storm (عاصفة الحزم) is visible.

Source: Al-Watan, Saudi Arabia, March 27, 2015

The royalists, nationalists, and the servile media also have a young, tall, dark and handsome prince to gush about. In one year, Deputy Crown Prince and Second Deputy Prime Minister Prince Mohammad bin Salman has risen from being one of the dozens of grandsons of King Abdul Aziz al-Saud (the founder of Saudi Arabia) to arguably the most powerful man in the kingdom. Prince Mohammad is currently holding three posts:

• He is the head of the Royal Court, meaning he is not only King Salman's son but also his closest advisor; 
• He is the Defense Minister and as Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir is not a royal, Prince Mohammad is more powerful of the two men leading Saudi foreign engagements;
• He is the key economic decision-maker in Saudi Arabia. He chairs the Council of Economic Affairs and Development, the main decision-making body on economic and financial issues in Saudi Arabia. In his capacity as the lead economic player, Prince Mohammad announced his plans for Saudi economy and for the Aramco (the national energy company that drives the Saudi economy) in January 2016. In March 2016, he announced the Saudi Arabia’s Vision for 2030. 

For a country that has been ruled by septuagenarians and octogenarians for decades, it's unprecedented for a thirty-years old to hold such power. His youth and action-oriented leadership have made him popular but many are wary of such concentration of power.

Source: The National Interest

Is Saudi nationalism moving away from Salafism or is Salafism becoming more entrenched in the Saudi nationalism under King Salman?

There is evidence to support both sides of the argument. Since the late 1990s, Saudi Arabia has promoted a more dynastic and ecumenical religious nationalism and has tried to move away from Salafi nationalism. Official media and educational and cultural institutions have focused more on the exceptionalism of Saudi land and royal family than on the exceptionalism of Salafism. Some of the measures taken are given below:

• A cult of King Abdul Aziz has been cultivated;
• King Abdullah curtailed the power of Salafi clerics and religious police; 
• National Museum was founded in Riyadh;
• A new subject 'national education' was introduced in the schools (Saudi Arabia in Transition 2015, page 4-5);
• The first co-educational university in Saudi Arabia was established in 2009 by King Abdullah. He gave it his own name (King Abdullah University of Science and Technology) and quashed criticism of Salafi critics;
• In the early 2000s, Saudi Royals for the first time made some non-Salafi Sunnis and Shias (and women) included in the Shura Council, the highest advisory body. King Abdullah also started a dialogue with the Shiites, who are ten percent of Saudi population and more crucially are a majority in the oil-rich Eastern province;
• Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 announced recently called for 'a tolerant country with Islam as its constitution and moderation as its method.' It declared that the 'values of moderation, tolerance, excellence, discipline, equity, and transparency will be the bedrock of our success.' Emphasis on toleration and moderation show a change of focus and decrease in the power of Salafi religious establishment;
• Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 also had good news for women. It asserted that 'Saudi women are yet another great asset. With over 50 percent of our university graduates being female, we will continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of our society and economy.' This was another defeat of Salafi clerics who want women to stay at home;
• The Saudi Arabian leadership has repeatedly said that Yemeni intervention was not  Salafi/Sunni fight with Shi'ism. They have clarified that it was a fight against Iran, which was trying to control the Middle East and carving a new Persian Empire. They have also condemned the sectarian rhetoric of the Daesh (Islamic State), which is mainly Salafi, and called for unity of all Muslims.

Abdullah Hamidaddin, a scholar, has also argued in Al-Arabia that the power of (Salafi) clerics is on the wane in Saudi Arabia:

In recent weeks, the Saudi government has been sending a clear message to its people and the world that economic development and religious extremism cannot coexist. This message is in line with the launch of Saudi Vision 2030, which depends on a social vibrancy that is antithetical to extreme religious values. Of course, people have the right to be religious, but religious institutions - formal and informal - shouldn't be allowed to be above the law to forcefully impose or propagate their views. 

Many analysts consider the recent government announcement to limit the ability of the “Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice" which is known in many foreign media outlets as "religious police,” to arrest and interrogate a significant move. But a much more important decision was the appointment during last week’s cabinet reshuffle of Sulaiman Aba al-Khayl as president of the University of Imam Mohammad bin Saud. I personally believe this cements the government’s focus to work closely with the religious institution for the greater good. His appointment came as a pleasant surprise to moderates and reformers. The university had been considered by some that it promotes nationally and internationally hardline views.

However, there is also evidence of the rise in Salafi nationalism after the ascendance of King Salman and Yemeni intervention. While Saudi government has tried to avoid stroking anti-Shia hatred, many official clerics and others people linked with the government have publicly portrayed Yemen and Syrian civil wars as a conflict between real Islam (Salafism/Sunnism) and false Islam (Shiism) and resorted to scaremongering after the start of Saudi campaign against Yemeni Houthis. Angus Mcdowall of Reuters gave examples of such instances:

"If they (Shi'ites) manage to win and control the state, they ravage Sunnis: clerics, women, children, the rulers and the ruled. They attack just like the lion attacks his prey," said Farid al-Ghamdi, a cleric at Mecca's Umm al-Qura seminary in a sermon visible on YouTube...."Decisive Storm came to sever any ambition of the Safavids to besiege Muslims in their own homes," wrote cleric Saad al-Breik to his 1.15 million Twitter followers after the air strikes began last month. 

That kind of scare-mongering has been evident in the Saudi press as well. A report in the daily al-Medina newspaper last week cited "military experts" as saying the Houthis wanted to turn Yemen's capital Sanaa into "an entirely Shi'ite city by 2017" and that the air strikes would thwart "this Iranian plan"....

An analysis of over seven million Arabic tweets from February to August 2015 done by Alexandra Siegel, a PhD student at the New York University showed that while both sides are using social media for hate speech, such tweets from Saudi Arabia are much more common (although it might be said that this conclusion would have something to do with only looking at Arabic tweets).

In the years following the escalation of the Syrian civil war, six main derogatory terms have been frequently used to disparage Shia Muslims online: rafidha (rejectionist), Hizb al-Shaytan (party of the devil), Hizb al-Lat (party of Lat), Majus (Magianism or Zoroastrianism), Nusayri (followers of Nusayr), and Safawi (Safavid). Rafidha refers to Twelver Shias, the largest of the Shia sects, and implies that they have rejected “true” Islam as they allegedly do not recognize Abu Bakr, the first caliph, and his successors as having been legitimate rulers after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. For example, Salafi cleric Abdulaziz al-Tarifi tweeted to his approximately 800,000 followers in February, “Jews and Christians did not used to collude with the rafidhaas they do today in this country and every country.”

The killing of Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr was considered as another sign of anti-Shiite bias although the Saudi government pointed out that dozens of Sunni terrorists were also executed on the same day as Sheikh Nimr and claimed that executions were against terrorism, not against Shia or Shiaism. Furthermore, the coalition of Muslim countries that was announced in December 2015 to fight terrorism does not have one Shia-ruled Muslim country as its members. Bahrain is the only Shia-majority country that is a member of the coalition but it is ruled by a Sunni monarchy. So, it appears that not only Iran but all Shia-ruled countries (Iraq and Lebanon) were excluded from this alliance.

Frederic Wehrey is not very hopeful of future and considers that Salafism has increased its role in Saudi nationalism under King Salman  (Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy, p-111-12)

At its core, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remains an authoritarian state with a ruling family wedded to monarchical privilege and backed by a deeply anti-liberal and sectarian religious establishment. If anything, it appears to be becoming more so under King Salman. In contrast to King Abdullah, Salman has been wooing the Kingdom’s religiously conservative base of power to shore up public support for his domestic policies and to demonize Iran in the region. The result has been a rollback of Abdullah’s limited reforms and a new, more virulent Sunni-based nationalism. 

Professor Madawi al-Rasheed, one of the most eminent scholars of Saudi politics, claims that the Yemen war is the latest incarnation of militarized Wahhabi nationalism. Writing in Politico, in a column titled "Wahhabi religious nationalism turns ugly," she traces the history of Wahhabi nationalism:

In the Arab world, religious nationalism was invented early in the 20th century in Saudi Arabia, a kingdom whose goal was to unite dispersed people and purify their religious beliefs and practices under the leadership of the Al-Saud. This unification took place as a result of a fringe Islamic revivalist tradition, commonly known as Wahhabiyya, which morphed into a military religious nationalist movement. With time, the project went beyond simple piety: Sharia law and conformity to Islamic teachings were rigorously applied. Under state patronage, this Wahhabiyya was turned into a quasi-nationalist project. Its ideology has proliferated and now inspires Muslims across the globe, fueled by petrodollars and globalization.

Early in the 20th century, an all-encompassing Wahhabi religious nationalism inflamed the imagination of a substantial section of the population of Arabia. It provided the ideological tool to band together to achieve independence from an ailing Ottoman empire that had little control over this peripheral region of its Empire. With a political leadership eager to expand throughout Arabia and to assert its control over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, Al-Saud militarized the fragmented tribal population, united them under an Islamic flag and mobilized them to wage war against all those who refused their homogenizing theology and radical Wahhabi message.

From the heart of Arabia they spread across the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. They created a state that has remained hostage to the Wahhabi agenda, bigoted interpretations of religious texts, and violent strategies whose aim is to control the behavior of Muslims and non-Muslims in its jurisdictions.

Yemen war, according to Professor al-Rasheed, is linked with the Wahhabi nationalism's quest to obliterate its rivals, who are all heretics and idolators, and bring the people back to its "pure" version of Islam and she argues there is only one way to end the terrorism and recurrent sectarian wars:

The zeal of religious nationalism turns ugly when it moves from the mosque to the military. And even uglier when it becomes the religion of the state. Whether in Saudi Arabia or in the nascent so-called Islamic State, where religious nationalism holds people together by the power of the sword, it is difficult to imagine an alternative way of being Muslim.

In Saudi Arabia, the airstrikes on Yemen launched in March proved a shrewd move for the government: They sparked the imagination of many Saudis who saw them through the prism of their old Wahhabi tradition as countering the hegemony of a rival Shiite power, namely Iran and its alleged Zaydi Houthi clients. The Saudi leadership could not simply watch a rival power such as the Islamic State take all the credit for eradicating heretics. Both Saudi Arabia and the Islamic State came into being as a result of the same type of ideology. Their interests may clash but they share a common goal.

Unless religious nationalism is replaced by new identities about being citizens in a bounded nation in which people enjoy equality and rights, we will continue to see a repeat of the terrorist atrocities committed in the name of Islam.