Indonesia: Ahok's trial and religious right resurgence

Indonesia is not an ordinary Muslim-majority country (MMC). With a population of around 260 million, it is the biggest MMC in the world. In the 1940s, after getting independence from Netherlands, its elite decided to  adopt a secular Pancasila nationalism and ignored the demands for an Islamic state. The multiethnic, multireligious, and multilinguistic diversity of the Indonesian nation surely played a part in this decision. Since then, the hardliners in the religious right have been trying to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia but without much success (See the comparison of India and Indonesia). In 2014 elections, the religious right again tried to eke out a victory and to increase the role of Islam in state affairs but they were soundly beaten (See Indonesian Elections: A Victory for Pancasila Nationalism).

Currently, the religious right is again resurging in Indonesia as Jakarta's governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Chinese nickname Ahok) faces blasphemy charges. Ahok became governor of Jakarta after the previous governor Jokowi won the 2014 Indonesian presidential election. Ahok, a popular deputy governor, took charge of Jakarta governorship in November 2014. Well ahead of his rivals, Ahok was due to be re-elected as Jakarta's governor in February 2017, despite his double-minority status (a Christian Chinese in a Muslim-majority Javanese country). Ahok was expected to win around 40% of the votes polled. Ahok was such a strong candidate that the opposition parties initially tried to put up a single candidate to defeat him but failed to do so. One group of opposition parties, Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and Gerindra, then nominated former culture and education minister Anies Baswedana, who had fought against the PKS and Gerindra in the 2014 elections, demostrating lack of strong candidates for Jakarta governorship in these parties. Another group of opposition parties, the Democratic Party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the United Development Party (PPP), decided to support Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, the son of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Agus was a political newcomer as he had just resigned from the military (See The profiles of the Jakarta election contenders: Ahok, Agus, Anies).

Indonesian President Joko Widodo with Ahok (left) after the latter's swearing in as governor on November 19, 2014 (Source: Indonesian President cancels Australia trip after violent protests)


Ahok was supposed to win easily in the second round. But then something happened on 30th September that completely changed the scenario. Ahok, in a election rally, accused the Islamic hardliners of using the following quranic verse Al-Maida 51 to deceive voters to not vote for non-Muslims like him:

"O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you - then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people." (Al-Maida 51)

The verse, according to many religious scholars, is for a specific context and Prophet Muhammad had many Christian and Jewish allies during his lifetime. However, Indonesian hardliners were not letting Ahok get away and accused Ahok of insulting Quran/Islam:

Ahok provoked the ire of hardliners after he cited the Al Maidah 51 verse from the Qur’an during a campaign visit to the Thousand Islands in September. He said the verse had been used to deceive voters and justify the assertion that Muslims should not be led by non-Muslims. The governor later apologised, saying it was not his intention to cause any offence.

However, an edited version of those comments was subsequently circulated online, changed in a way to make the governor’s comments appear more offensive, angering hardliners further. As a Christian, and the first ethnic Chinese governor of Jakarta, Ahok is somewhat of an anomaly in Indonesia’s political scene. The capital’s willingness to be led by a man who represents a double minority has in the past been hailed a symbol of progress and pluralism, the latter a virtue enshrined in the Indonesian constitution.

In a country where 90% of its more than 240 million people follow Islam, the national motto is, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, or unity in diversity. (See Jakarta's Christian governor to face blasphemy trial over Islam insult claim)

Initially, Indonesian government led by Ahok's friend and former boss President Jokowi did not pay much attention to the blasphemy accusations but later religious groups managed to gather more than a hundred thousand protesters in Jakarta twice on November 4th (around 100,000-150,000) and December 2nd (around 200,000) forcing government on the backfoot. The government decided to charge Ahok under the blasphemy law and President Jokowi assured that he would be neutral. President Jokowi even joined the protesters in Friday prayers on December 2nd. Counter-protest rallies, organized by the Indonesian military, on November 30th across the country, affirmed the unity and diversity of Indonesia and may have helped government ignore more extreme demands of the protesters, like arresting Ahok.

Source: Jakarta protests: Muslims turn out in force against Christian governor Ahok

Ahok's trial is set to begin in December. Irrespective of the result of the trial, it is clear that religious forces, which were soundly defeated in 2014, are now resurgent and emboldened. Some have suggested that the whole idea of focusing on the 55 seconds of more than hundred minutes long Ahok's speech was to defeat Ahok and lessen the chances of an unbeatable Jokowi-Ahok presidential ticket in 2019 (See Commentary: Indonesia's Democracy Making Progress in Reverse).

There is no doubt that besides religious prejudice, racism and Ahok's aggressive personality has also contributed to the success of protest rallies:

Ahok has never been afraid of ruffling feathers. He is loathed as much as he is loved, with his policy of evicting slum dwellers angering the urban poor and his plans for the reclamation of Jakarta Bay attacked by environmentalists.

His political rivals have successfully exploited anger over the alleged blasphemy comments to undermine both Ahok and his ally, President Joko. Ahok is now behind the other gubernatorial candidates in some polls.

There is also little doubt racism is at play. Only around 1 to 4 percent of Indonesia's 250 million people are ethnic Chinese, but their economic success has caused resentment to bubble away for centuries. Ahok has been described as both a "Chinese bastard" and "the Chinese Infidel". (See Verdict in Ahok blasphemy trial likely to put Indonesia's democracy in the dock)

Will Ahok succeed in his political and judical trails and  what will be the repercussions of these trails on Indonesia's religious pluralism? We will see.

Modi, Prabowo and the threat to Indian and Indonesian civic nationalism

It is fascinating to compare India and Indonesia, two nations at critical junctures of their history. Narendra Modi, the current Indian Prime Minister and Prabowo Subianto, leading contender in the Indonesian presidential elections, are similar in promoting a strong nationalistic cum religious agenda. Despite lingering doubts about Modi and Prabowo's leadership qualities, they seemed to have captured the minds and hearts of many of their countrymen (and women). Can these strongly (religiously) nationalist leaders succeed in very diverse societies that are based on civic nationalism?

No doubt, India and Indonesia are different. Though both are very populous countries, India is much larger. In terms of nominal GDP, again Indian economy is more than double the size of the Indonesian economy, although Indonesians are richer. Their political systems and history are also different. While India is a stable parliamentary democracy, Indonesia is a military-dominated state, still trying to find its feet as a fragile democracy. Moreover, majority religion of India is Hinduism whereas the majority of Indonesians are Muslims.

However, Indonesia and India also share many characteristics which make their comparison compelling. Both Indonesia and India were successor states of colonial empires. As there was almost no history of a united India or a united Indonesia before colonial times, nationalist elites of both countries had to perform an exhausting balancing act. They had to fight against the colonial state but also try to preserve it. Preservation of the colonial state was difficult as not only the boundaries of the colonial state were new (similar to many other colonial states), but these states also had mind-boggling diversity. To deal with the ethnic/linguistic/religious/caste/tribal diversity, nationalist elites of both India and Indonesia adopted civil nationalism so that all communities can identify with the new state, ignoring the demands of many Hindus in India and many Muslims in Indonesia. This decision was one of the main reasons why both these states have not only managed to stay intact for the last sixty years but also showed impressive progress.        

Source: India, Indonesia Sign Pact To Cooperate On Criminal Matters

Another similarity between Indonesia and India is the recent rise of new elites; elites quite different from the leaders that had governed both these countries since independence. For more than half a century, the civic nationalism imposed by the founding fathers of both states was not under threat. There was some criticism but it lacked broad popular support. The nineteen nineties brought a big change in both countries. The Economic crisis in both countries (India in 1990-91 and Indonesia in 1997-98) jolted people out of their slumber and the spell that founding fathers' ideas had on the nation was broken. Suharto and aged Congress leadership, defenders of the old ideas, lost their grip on the country and were thrown out. New elites were 'outsiders'. Never before they had held power collectively. Their defining characteristics were overt religiosity and aggressive nationalism. This combination posed a threat to the civic and secular nationalism, both nations had adhered to since independence.

While economic crisis was the immediate cause of changes in both countries, two long-term developments helped the cause of the new elite. First, inhabitants of these countries were socialized, using public education system and national print media, into myths of (inherent) national greatness and threats to this 'manifest destiny' from outsiders and insiders. This socialization process was not very different from what happens in other countries but, due to the huge size of these two countries, these myths became more real. Socialized on these myths of national greatness, many ordinary Indians and Indonesians supported the strong nationalistic stance of the new elite. Second, the opening of a large number of private TV channels in both these countries around the start of 21st century gave an enormous fillip to religious nationalism. To win the rating war, TV channels mass-produced programs on two themes which the majority of the public can understand and appreciate i.e. religion and nationalism. These large doses of religion and nationalism fed to the public for the last fifteen years are now showing results. Modi's spectacular win is one such result and Prabowo's success in presidential election might be another.

Though both are using religious nationalism to win support, Modi and Prabowo have very different backgrounds. Modi is a man with whom most poor Indians can relate to. He belongs to a low-caste and poor household and didn't have much education. Starting from the lowest rung of the political ladder, he rose to become the chief minister of Gujarat state of India in 2001 and then Prime Minister of India in 2014. 

Prabowo's background cannot be more different. One can argue, he was born into Indonesian royalty and married a princess. Prabowo's grandfather was one of the founding fathers of Indonesia and his father was a cabinet minister under President Suharto. Prabowo joined military and then married President Suharto's daughter. As a princeling, Prabowo got the most prized assignments and rose in military quickly. In 1998, he was serving as Lieutenant General, commanding the key garrison near Jakarta. After his retirement from the military, Prabowo became a successful businessman. More recently, he led the newly formed Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) that came third in 2014 legislative elections and now, according to some polls, he is leading the Indonesia's presidential race.

Modi at a Hindu hardline RSS function, giving the RSS salute

Source: The Hindu hardline RSS who see Modi as their own

However, what unites Modi and Prabowo is their use of religious nationalism and the threat they pose to civic nationalism. They have been criticized for abetting or allowing the massacre of religious minorities. While one can argue Modi really believes in Hindutva and Prabowo's attachment to religious nationalism is more instrumental, but we really do not know. Prabowo has a strong support of the religious right and they obviously would demand more religion-based laws, if Prabowo won the presidential election. Prabowo's supporters, however, point to his brother and the major financier of his campaign (who is a Christian) and argue that Prabowo belief in civic nationalism (Pancasila ideology) is paramount.

Another factor that will affect the rise of religious nationalism under Modi and Prabowo is the economy. Both of them are very pragmatic and know that economy is the make-or-break criterion for their success as leaders. Therefore, it is hoped that they will try to unite the nation and move ahead, rather than dividing the nation along religious lines. However, if the economy falters, it is not difficult to see them using religion to win again. 

Indonesian Elections: A Victory for Pancasila Nationalism

Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the world. Despite impressive economic development in the last four decades, it is still a fledgling democracy. Indonesia’s national ideology is Pancasila (literal meaning ‘five principles). These five principles are monotheism, humanism, unified nation, representative democracy and social justice. Pancasila is culturally, ethnically and religiously neutral, except perhaps the idea of monotheism (though the number of non-monotheist Indonesians is very small). Despite being predominantly Muslim and Javanese, Indonesian founding fathers chose a non-discriminatory civic nationalism over religious or ethnic nationalism. And Pancasila has been regarded as one of the main reasons of the continued unity of Indonesia.   

After the fall of General Suharto in 1998, many analysts argued that Indonesia is under threat from Islamism. They were afraid Pancasila would be replaced by religious nationalism. Last week, Indonesia held its fourth legislative elections. These elections showed that the news of the demise of Pancasila has been greatly exaggerated.

The 2014 Indonesian elections for its lower house of Parliament, DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) were a victory of the Pancasila in many ways.

First, Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), led by the daughter of Indonesian’s founder Soekarno, won the 2014 DPR elections. Soekarno was the leader who gave Pancasila its shape and popularized it. With PDI-P’s Joko Widodo (called Jokowi), currently, the mayor of Jakarta, most likely to win presidential elections in July, Pancasila’s future is in secure hands. 

Moreover, Golkar, the party formed by General Suharto, took the second largest share of votes. Despite his differences with Soekarno, Suharto never deviated from Pancasila. He rather forcefully imposed it on Indonesians during his three decades in power. The wins of PDI-P and Golkar parties, staunch believers in Pancasila, is good news for Indonesia. 

Source: Indonesian Legislative election 2014 – Provisional results

It is true that Democratic Party of President Yudhoyono, that won DPR elections in 2009, also supported Pancasila. However, lately, it seemed that Democratic Party, despite its commitment to Pancasila, was ready to give in to discriminatory policies against minorities.

Party	Vote share in 2004	Vote share in 2009	Vote share in 2014
PDI-P	19%	14%	19%
Golkar	22%	14.5%	14.3%
Democratic Party	8%	20.9%	9.7%

Secondly, while Islamic parties defied predictions and achieved their traditional 30% share of votes, the division of votes between different Islamic parties was a victory for Pancasila. The fight among the Islamic parties was won by the Pancasila-believing traditional Islamic forces and those believing in Islamism lost. National Awakening Party and National Mandate Party won the elections. The main loser was the Prosperous Justice Party. Modeled on Muslim Brotherhood, it became the biggest Islamic party in the DPR in 2009 and aspired to become one of the big three political parties and the pre-eminent Islamic party in Indonesia. However, 2014 election results crashed its dreams as its vote share dropped. In contrast, all traditional Islamic parties, devotees of Pancasila, increased their vote share as shown below.

Islamic Party	Vote share in 2004	Vote share in 2009	Vote share in 2014
National Awakening Party	11%	4.9%	9.2%
National Mandate Party	6%	6%	7.5%
Prosperous Justice Party	7%	7.9%	6.9%
United Development Party	8%	5.3%	6.7%

Finally, the major change in the elections was the rise of Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), another victory for Pancasila. Gerindra doubled its vote share, from less than 7% in 2009 to around 12% in 2014. It is led by former Special Forces commander and former son-in-law of Suharto, Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto. He intends to use his party’s success to win the July presidential elections. Gerindra, as its name shows, is a nationalist party and Prabowo poses himself as the only true believer in Pancasila. 

So, Pancasila is secure and religious nationalism does not have much scope in Indonesia, in the short term at least.