Official Ulema: Can they provide legitimacy?

Abdullah Saeed in his chapter titled 'The official ulema and religious legitimacy of the modern state' in Islam and Political Legitimacy (Edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed) argues that official ulema can provide little legitimacy to the modern state. 

Defining alim (plural ulema) as anyone formerly trained in Islamic religious disciplines, Saeed divides ulema into two categories based on their relationship with the state. The official ulema are economically dependent on state and are usually part of a bureaucratic structure. The unofficial ulema are largely independent of state and depend on income from sources other than state coffers.

Development of institution of ulema

Before delving into the issue of legitimacy of the modern state, Saeed has traced the history of ulema-state relationship in Muslim history. He argues that at the time Prophet Muhammad there was no real distinction between his political and religious authority but this should not mean, religious authority always dominated the political authority. The gradual application of different laws and specific timing of their promulgation clearly showed political and social considerations. After the death of Prophet, the Rashidun (rightly-guided) Caliphate ruled Muslims (632-661 AD). During this period, the unity of religious and political authority continued but due to the absence of revelation (and the direct divine attribution and sanction that comes with it), caliphs orders could be debated and challenged. However, there was still no particular clerical class.   

Umayyad dynasty (661-750 AD) established the first Muslim monarchy. As its rule was devoid of any Islamic sanction, its legitimacy was circumspect from the start. Religious and temporal affairs were now separate but there were still no ulema. According to Saeed, it was only in the early Abbasid period (750-1258) that a clear distinct class of ulema can be detected. The factors that led to this development were development of Islamic disciplines and need of specialists; Abbasid's use of notion of divine rule; ulema's legitimacy of political authority to avoid chaos/fitna; some attempts by caliphs to impose a particular theology using political power; need of legal framework for expanding empire and qadis; and caliph loss of political authority to sultans.

Ulema in modern period: role, status, and legitimacy
Saeed contends that in pre-modern period ulema enjoyed a privileged status:

As scholars, judges and muftis they developed law. As judges (qadis) they administered justice and as administrators of awkaf (endowments) they often had substantial economic independence. The ulema also controlled the training of students, basing this on a model in which religious disciplines were given priority. The influence of religion in all aspects of life in the society thus confirmed the social role of ulema.

But the modern period, with its trend toward secularization, transformed the state and ulema's position in society. First, colonial authorities and then modern nation-states took over most of the functions previously performed by the ulema. Some of the measures taken by the modern state that minimized the role of ulema were the marginalization of Islamic law; regulation of the training of ulema; bureaucratization of ulema; state control of mosques; establishment of a public education system and regulation of religious education in schools; and state management of the awkaf.

State legitimacy
Saeed argues that ulema have historically been used by the state to gain legitimacy. Often (official) ulema would issue a fatwa of heresy against political opponents of those in power so that these opponents could be imprisoned/killed. But the current attempts of modern state to gain legitimacy through official ulema have not resulted in much success due to the lack of piety/knowledge and economic dependence of ulema and sharp criticism they suffered from Islamists (prominent among them are Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, and Syed Qutb) who regarded them corrupt and lacking the knowledge of 'real' 'true' Islam. With their own legitimacy eroded, Saeed contends, it is a myth that they could provide legitimacy to the state.

Chairman, Council of Islamic Ideology (Pakistan) meeting with the President of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Turkey), 2012

Source: Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan visit to Turkey

Critical review
Saeed's arguments are focused and clearly lay down the reasons why official ulema cannot provide legitimacy to the modern state. However, two developments, hinted by Saeed but not fully explored, still point toward the substantial utility of the official ulema in increasing the legitimacy of a modern Muslim state. First, with the control of public education, the state with the help of official ulema can socialize the populace into its own version of Islam. This process takes time but it is possible. This happened, for example, in Turkey. Second, the state needs to defend its policies in an Islamic discourse and official ulema can provide that.  The alternative would be to defend state policies on the basis of some other ideology which is possible but has not been much successful in many Muslim states.

Another issue that needs to be discussed is how Muslims define legitimacy. Have the criteria changed over the last fourteen centuries or remained the same? Modern states, whether Muslim-majority or not, need to perform many new tasks to be considered legitimate. These tasks were previously not considered part of Islamic legitimacy of the state but now they are. Islamists have successfully increased the requirements of Islamic legitimacy of the state in line with the modern times and most Muslim states have failed to live up to this new modern-Islamic criteria. As modern Muslim states accept these criteria and then fail to keep up with it, official ulema have a very difficult task.          

Afraid of Ahmadinejad?

On June 4, Al-Monitor correspondent in Tehran reported about a possible return of former Iranian President Ahmadinejad (See Is Ahmadinejad plotting a comeback?).

On June 3, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made his first major speech since leaving office last year. He praised Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who died 25 years ago on June 4, and said that Iran’s enemies have not yet realized that Iranians would defend the Iranian revolution “until the last breath.” Ahmadinejad, however, did not speak about the one thing that has been a source of speculation: his political return.On May 31, his brother Davoud Ahmadinejad said that the chances of the former president running for the presidency again were “very high.”while Davoud’s comments did not receive the usual Ahmadinejad-type attention, it seems that other forces in Iran are taking his return to politics seriously, and are intent on preventing it.The arrest of two political figures with close ties to Ahmadinejad, as well as the constant criticism directed at the former president by some of his own former ministers, indicates that the possibility of Ahmadinejad returning to the political arena is being taken seriously by the country's right-wing political elite.

Source: Is Ahmadinejad Coming Back In From The Cold?

However, correspondent also reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to give importance to Ahmadinejad.

Although Ahmadinejad's faction was eliminated from politics following the presidential elections, Khamenei appointed Ahmadinejad as a member in the Expediency Discernment Council. Also, last fall, during the mourning ceremony of Ashoura, he was sitting next to the supreme leader. Two months ago, other images were published showing Ahmadinejad and Khamenei next to each other during the second night of the mourning ceremony of "Fatimiyah."

What these images might mean is that, in spite of his disagreements with Ahmadinejad, Khamenei still views him as an influential political figure or that at least Ahmadinejad is not yet completely removed from the list of people close to Khamenei.

Given this tacit support by Khamenei, neither Ahmadinejad nor his supporters seem deterred. Davari said in April, “I assure you that currently we do not have an organized plan for the next elections. However, this might change in the future.” He continued, "If these anti-people policies of the current administration continue, then I think Ahmadinejad will restart his political activities to defend the people's rights."

That right-wing clerics, ministers and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e-Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami) are against former president's return is understandable. Though a loyal protege of the Supreme Leader during his first term, Ahmadinejad became increasingly independent in his second term and tried to chart a more nationalistic and less religious course (See Missing Mahmoud?). He even tried to defy the Supreme Leader and contested his authority. The final act of Ahmadinejad's betrayal was trying to get his chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, elected as President in 2013 presidential elections. Mashaei was intensely disliked by the right wing because of his promotion of Iranian territorial nationalism, among other things (Mashaei was eventually disqualified by the right wing Guardian Council that vets all presidential candidates) (See Who's Afraid of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?).

The question is why the Supreme Leader is giving importance to Ahmadinejad thereby giving confidence to his supporters and fueling rumors while also ordering (or at least consenting to) the arrest of Ahmadinejad's supporters. Judiciary and police are in control of the Supreme Leader so the arrests could not have happened without his knowledge. Some analysts argue that the Supreme Leader is supporting Ahmadinejad to keep the pressure on the new Rouhani government:

As BBC Persian analyst Hossein Bastani noted, it's highly unlikely that former President Mohammad Khatami would be allowed to sit near the supreme leader in public. Khatami, a reformist, was never considered to be close to Khamenei, who publicly expressed support for Ahmadinejad's anti-Western stances. 

Bastani believes that Khamenei could use Ahmadinejad to put pressure on Iran's new government team, which has been accused by hard-liners of giving in to the West and the United States.(See Is Ahmadinejad Coming Back In From The Cold?)

However, there are many other ways to keep the Rouhani government on the "straight path." The reason Khamenei is courting Ahmadinejad perhaps lies in what Ahmadinejad represents. He has impressive nationalist credentials and is also religiously devout. The question is why Iranians need the rule of the clergy (velayat-e-faqih doctrine) when they can elect people like Ahmadinejad? The whole argument that only clergy can save Iran and Islam from external threats becomes doubtful. Ahmadinejad has not helped his case by claiming to be in communication with the Hidden Imam (thus debunking clergy legitimacy because they claim to rule in the name of the Hidden Imam) and also promoting pre-Islamic Iran (thus trying to harness the votes of those who believe in territorial/Persian nationalism). 

So, the Supreme Leader is perhaps trying to impress on the former president that he can enjoy a leisurely secure retirement during which he would be feted at the state functions and given due respect (even perhaps consulted) or he can think of running again and make his and his friend's lives difficult. The choice is yours. Ahmadinejad!