Ataturk Cultural Center

Mr. Zik has written a fascinating account of the iconic Ataturk Cultural Center (One building, several facades: political showcasing in contemporary Turkey) on Open Democracy website. This historic building has now been demolished. Mr. Zik has linked this demolition with religious nationalism:

An iconic building is erased, together with the successive faces it has worn as Turkey hurtled from secular modernity via Gezi Park, to the latest experiment in religious nationalism. 

While Turkey's movement towards religious nationalism is undeniable and President Erdogan's animosity towards Republican project, with its aggressive secularism, is obvious and well-documented, is Ataturk Cultural Center's demolition related to religious nationalism? Mr. Zik is not convincing enough. Particularly, when one knows that the new building will retain some aspect of the old historic building, will be named Ataturk Cultural Center and will not have any distinguishing motifs of Islamic architecture. The architectural designs of the new building are shown below.

Source: Tabanlioglu Architects Revives Ataturk Cultural Center As A "World-Class" Arts And Culture Venue

Anyways, the article is engrossing as it recounts the history of this iconic building, linking it with the broader developments of the Turkish nation. Enjoy

Atatürk Cultural Center (the AKM) is gone. An iconic building for modernist architecture and prominent space for cultural production is to be replaced with a massive cultural complex that will host an opera house and exhibition center among other facilities, according to Turkey’s popular newspaper, Hürriyet Daily News.  

Atatürk Kültür Merkezi under demolition, March 2018. Wikicommons/MHIRM. Some rights reserved. 

Atatürk Cultural Center (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi in Turkish and AKM in short) was an important example of 1960s’ architecture and a physical focal point in Taksim Square in the Beyoğlu district, a major transport hub where crossroads connect the various multicultural neighborhoods of Istanbul. The square gives onto Istiklal Street, a street long synonymous with social and cultural events, eateries, bars, pubs, and entertainment around the clock. Being a popular spot for more than a century, it went through several architectural changes in its lifetime. 

Atatürk Cultural Center in Taksim quarter of Istanbul, Turkey, 2007. Wikicommons/ Chapultepec. Some rights reserved. 

Besides its architectural and topographical value, the AKM is considered a Republican project, a symbol of the Turkish modernism that aimed to westernize the country’s cultural life. It was no coincidence that the building was named after Atatürk in 1978, having  survived a fire that accompanied one of the peak moments of political polarization and violence. A number of institutes, departments and buildings in Turkey are named after him, which might be also seen as a statement, especially when (or where) the nation-state as such, democracy, and most of all, secularism are under challenge. Traditionally, these public buildings and sites are decorated with Turkish flags and Atatürk posters on national days. 

AKM, 2004. Wikicommons/ Bryce Edwards. Some rights reserved. 

The first president of the modern Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), is considered more than a mere national hero. When the Ottoman Empire was falling apart after the First World War, he was the leader of a national movement and succeeded in establishing a nation-state of a modern and secular character, taking a clear distance from all religious influences. The last step certainly was not favored by all, however, public and private efforts remained strong for decades to come in maintaining a repressive hegemony around this legacy. There was unquestioned, constant exposure to his legacy in every corner of daily life.
Following his rigorous secular agenda is considered by many to be the true way to maintain Turkey’s democracy. This replacement of religion by a quasi-sacred secularism, embodied in Atatürk, became a cult that was even protected by law against any insult. Such democracy came at the expense of repressive measures on freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the right to education, among other systematic violations of human rights of people who were found not to be secular enough – and also towards those who were not Turkish, heterosexual, white etc. enough. Several incidents in the 1990s, such as the ban on the veil in public institutions and universities, and the imprisonment of Erdoğan in 1998, then mayor of Istanbul, for inciting religious hatred through reading a poem, are still fresh in the living memory of Turks. When Erdoğan left prison and made his way to the parliament in 2002, many felt that secularism, synonymous to democracy in Turkey for decades, was at stake. When the AKM came onto the government’s radar, it was also suspected that Erdoğan wanted to erase Atatürk’s secular legacy from Taksim Square, a location that had served as a showcase on various occasions. The government’s move to pursue a long-existing idea of building a mosque in the square further supported this suspicion.
The plans to demolish the building began to be conceived as early as 2005 and were soon joined by several other urban transformation projects. The plan received considerable public criticism, claiming that the political and cultural legacy of AKM was more important than its material value. Several art and architecture platforms and grassroots organizations came together to start a legal process, which only succeeded in slowing down the overall project. Shut down and evacuated in 2008, AKM stayed unused for a decade. The demolishing work began on February 13, 2018 and President Erdoğan announced the date of inauguration of the new building as early 2019, while identifying those who were against the project as terrorists: “…Those Gezi protestors also yelled against this. You can yell as much as you want. Eat your hearts out! Rant and rave, (but) we demolished it.” It is no secret that Turkey’s president often adopts an angry tone, but one may still wonder quite what the building has to do with a social movement that started as a sit-in protest aimed at protecting a few trees in Gezi Park. 

The Gezi movement Before growing into one of the biggest social movements in modern Turkish political history, the Gezi movement, or Gezi in short, initiated as a small resistance with an environmental aim: to prevent Gezi Park, right next to the AKM, from turning into a shopping mall. From the first day of the protests, May 28, 2013 until the first week of September, approximately 3.6 million people joined the protests in the streets, participating in 5,532 actions in 80 provinces out of 81, according to official reports.
Clashes with the police left more than 10 dead and thousands injured. Failure of the mainstream media to properly cover the protests resulted in protesters finding alternative ways to communicate and reach out. A dramatic increase in social media subscription numbers was followed by creative practices and interactions filled with humor, satire, and irony, which were unprecedented in this country’s annals of collective activism. The movement stood against the transformation of Gezi Park into another in that series of massive urban projects that pose a threat to environment and neglect the intangible values of the asset. The AKM was certainly on the list as well. As a familar showcase, the facade of the AKM was soon to be singled out for attention (and decorated) by the Gezi activists. 

Screenshot detail of posters, banners and flags on AKM building, 7 June 2013. Wikicommons/ Infestor. Some rights reserved. 

This photograph tells us a lot about the composition and the atmosphere of the Gezi movement. In addition to the urban and environmental issues, the movement sported a great diversity in the motivations of participants, varying from women’s rights to LGBTQI issues, from worker’s rights to Internet bans. A major concern also crystallized around the deterioration of the secular state and popular belief in the government’s growing tendency towards involving religious values in politics.
The first banner, which is top centre in the image reads BOYUN EĞME (meaning “do not bow down” in Turkish), and was placed on AKM’s facade on June 2, shortly after the start of the protests in Gezi Park. Several other banners quickly followed this first one and gave the building a colorful look. BOYUN EĞME is the title of the weekly magazine of the Turkish Communist Party, although the title itself and the visual features of the banner (a red brush effect on a white background with text in black and white font) do not reveal much about the party identity for an average viewer with untrained eyes.
But it was a privilege to be placed top centre as the first-comer, and obviously it had to share the spot with a Turkish flag and Atatürk’s poster portrait. Another flag in the centre of the facade, is joined by one on the rooftop right. These were probably arranged arbitrarily or due to the practicalities of fixing banners. The rest of the composition is an odd but straightforward depiction of how unusual people rubbed against each other, shoulder to shoulder at Gezi. A photo of Didier Drogba, an Ivorian football player, then playing for Galatasaray football club, soon joined the collection, placed right under the banner of ÇARŞI, which is the ultra group of Beşiktaş. It read in English: “We have Drogba, they don’t!” Both clubs, as well as Fenerbahçe, were well-known to be eternal foes. However, the prominent presence and friendly collaboration of all three in the protest actions, and their humorous posts on social media attracted thousands, regardless of team affiliation.
Another easily recognizable face is of Deniz Gezmiş (1947-1972), who was a political activist sentenced to death for attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, after engaging in armed struggle. Images of some other martyrs of the political left and renowned figures such as Marx, Stalin, and Lenin are also on the facade, along with banners of several other grassroots initiatives and groups with slogans such as “shut up tayyip!” (addressing Erdoğan by his second name). One banner added later read “Don’t Touch Mor Gabriel!” (aiming to protect an Assyrian monastery in the city of Mardin from being confiscated by the government), joining calls that invited the Government to resign and trade unions to go on strike, and demands for women’s rights. A number of banners are written in Kurdish or Turkish/Kurdish bilingual.
When compared to all the other protest actions that have taken place in Turkey, the number and size of images of Atatürk and the Turkish flag must be regarded as modest. These two visual elements were extremely high profile in earlier protests and demonstrations, especially those concerned with secularism. The photograph of the facade shows that besides being “safe symbols” to represent democracy, secularism, and national identity, both the Turkish flag and Atatürk’s poster were only a small part of the mosaic that constituted Gezi. Indeed, a number of groups that participated and supported Gezi were considered antipathetic to these two visual items. In this sense, while raising a strong voice against the deterioration of human rights over the previous 11 years under the same party government, Gezi did not favour the old paradigm either. It did not demand a democracy enforced through rigorous secularism. This was a particular strength of the movement, emerging as a new collective demand on the political scene of Turkey, taking no particular sides in the conventional secular/non-secular divide in that society, despite the fact that a fair proportion of its participants were secular. 

Across borders and boundariesThe AKM facade, along with the overall imagery of the movement, was a visual statement of the multiplicity of identities, demands, and hopes. Gezi was home to an exciting companionship of erstwhile foes, where all looked for ways to coexist and collaborate. Even if it did not always work, a determined collective effort to transgress the long-standing borders of social divides, such as class, ethnicity, religion etc. was evident. 

AKM after police intervention, June 2013. Barış Karadeniz/Flickr. Cropped from the original. Some rights reserved. 

Gezi Park stayed occupied for more than two weeks, while the protesters created an environment of festive solidarity, where many cultural and artistic activities took place. A day before it was evacuated by force, the police also charged the AKM building and took the banners down. The facade was quickly dressed with Turkish flags and a large poster of Atatürk, not a favorite figure in the eyes of the government by then. It was an attempt to give the square a “safe and normal” look, but more thn this, a reluctant concession to soften secular indignation.
In the aftermath of the evacuation of the park, activists continued to gather in the neighborhood parks throughout the summer of 2013, holding more discussions andplanning further local initiatives. However, soon afterwards, several participants in Gezi and the movement itself were suddenly accused of being associated with a newly-identified terror organization named FETO (Fethullahist Terror Organization). Fethullah Gülen, a US-based cleric of Turkish origin and a long-term ally of Erdoğan’s, was accused of committing a plot to overthrow the government by force and take control of the constitutional order.
Although a number of people faced arbitrary arrests and charges in this period, most of the solidary networks and grassroots initiatives that were established and/or grew bigger throughout the Gezi days are still functional today. Some of these have continued to voice their concerns regarding the hazards of urban transformation projects, including the demolition of the AKM building. When Erdoğan assumed presidential office in 2014, there was no expectation that tensions would cool down. However, these voices found little purchase in the mainstream media, as the country descended into political turmoil, punctuated by a series of violent attacks and the imprisonment of politicians of opposing parties, as well as activists and journalists. Soon, Turkey was to be hit by another major incident. 

Coup attempt changes politicsOn the evening of July 15, 2016, the country was shaken by a military coup threat. Erdoğan called for mass resistance through a live video conference connection on the news and immediately found a response. Thousands of people, mostly either AKP local branch members or simply sympathizers of the party, took to the streets and risked their lives to stop the military advance. Several hours of clashes left more than 300 dead and long-lasting damage to the country.
When the threat was over and the soldiers surrendered, more people took to the streets with Turkish flags to celebrate. The morning after, enthusiastic crowds in streets and squares rejoiced in the victory of people over military firepower, while many others  mourned the loss of life. FETO was soon blamed for the attempt and the government declared a state of emergency. The AKM building was quickly dressed again, this time most probably by a pro-government group. 

Screenshot twitter. AKM after military coup attempt. Courtesy of Alev Scott. All rights reserved. 

A banner on the AKM facade, accompanied by two Erdoğan portraits read: “(You) FETO (Gülen), the dog of Satan, we will hang you and your dogs by your own leash. With God’s will, we’ll have the flag of democracy flutter in the sky.” The signature in the bottom line said: “The brave men of this beloved nation.” The photograph of this hateful banner was swiftly and widely circulated  in social media with an additional upper script: “Let the Gezists, who claim Taksim their stronghold, see a (real) banner.” The belief (and propaganda) that the Gezi movement had been incited by FETO only became stronger after the coup attempt, while the discontent around Erdoğan and his government was also growing. Now the banner marked a shift from the long-existing secular/non-secular tension into a new decisive division in Turkish society, between supporters of Erdoğan and his opponents, including Gezi activists and FETO supporters among others.
It is not common practice for public buildings to feature the portraits of presidents, apart from those of Atatürk, regarded as the founding father. But this now seems to be part of the ongoing efforts to build a cult around Erdoğan’s personality that is to compete with that of Atatürk: an omnipresent and omnipotent leader, whose single-handed guidance helps the nation to thrive. So, the visual presence of Atatürk and his iconography has been slowly vanishing, as Erdoğan’s, at least partially, takes over.
The banner, threatening FETO, stayed on display for two days before it was replaced with a massive Turkish flag, covering the overall facade of AKM and bearing the firm message: “Sovereignty Belongs to the Nation.” 

 

The phrase, an Atatürk quote, has spawned an article in the Turkish Constitution since 1921 and it is written on the main wall of the parliament. Although the original phrase was in Ottoman Turkish, it was translated into modern Turkish within years. The selection of wording on the flag is a simplified Ottoman version, a version frequently used by Erdoğan himself. The flag was not any more in its Gezi context, a single component of its diversity, and was not even used in a relatively modest way next to an image of Atatürk. Küçük and Türkmen observe that this is a symbol of the etent to which a mixture of religiosity and nationalism has come to penetrate and occupy all sections of social and political life. The AKM facade, once claimed by Gezi activists as a public space to acknowledge diversity and coexistence, has been usurped in the name of a particular section of the society.
Now, Erdoğan urged people to flood the squares and start democracy watches, emulating the organised sit-ins of Gezi and other Occupy movements. Certain scenes such as the occupation of squares with tents, the organization of culture and art events, and marriages taking place during the watches reminded everyone of Gezi and other protest events as well. However, they lacked the collective decision-making and practice mechanisms and remained government-controlled performances tsow 'our' strength against the archenemies: foreign powers, terrorists, FETO and its alleged extension, Gezi.
The democracy watches came to an end upon Erdoğan’s suggestion after a few weeks, but the state of emergency continued for a period of two years, solidifying Erdoğan’s executive powers as president. Societal polarization and indignation was skillfully managed into an exacerbated state of fear, terror and instability. The usual division of the society across a secular/non-secular axis was upgraded into a religious nationalism embodied within the new cult of Erdoğan. This embodiment eventually laid the grounds for constitutional change in 2017 towards a presidential system, and for Erdoğan to win the elections in 2018.    

ConclusionThe state of emergency was lifted shortly after the presidential elections, and a new system secured a permanent state of exception, whereby Erdoğan, as president, has consolidated and expanded his administrative powers. Denouncing those who opposed the demolition of AKM and the Gezi protesters as "terrorists" was a reminder of his power and commitment to smash any  dissent.
The struggle over the AKM reveals one permanent aspect of political contention in contemporary Turkey, formed traditionally through leader-embodied ideologies. Meanwhile, solidarity networks and grass-roots initiatives promise today more ways to communicate and interact than ever. These may one day inspire our thinking and acting beyond the usual paradigms.

Too liberal an outlook is resulting in a backlash because people want culturally rootedness, identity and traditions

Professor David Gushee argues that a liberal outlook that does not give importance to people's attachment to their country and/or  religion is perhaps resulting in a backlash. The signs of this backlash are Trump, Brexit and various type of religious fundamentalisms. 

One of the most important developments in global politics and religion is the triumph of “thick” over “thin.” By that I mean the triumph of politicians and religious leaders who offer strong rather than weak national identity platforms, passionate rather than becalmed articulations of loyalty, particularist rather than universalist policy visions.

He contends that it is difficult for universalism and liberalism (thin) to inspire people as much as nationalism and religion (thick) and this has been deomntrated by the events happening around the world. President Putin, President Erdogan and now President-elect are the proofs:

One of the most striking things Donald Trump regularly said during the election campaign was that without border enforcement, “you don’t have a country.” 

Perhaps what he meant to apply to one policy issue has broader application, wider resonance. People want to “have a country” that still means something, so they choose country over Europe, country over global trade deals, country over international norms, country over inclusivity ethics. It’s a thick, local, particularist identity and loyalty. 

And in religion, “you don’t have a religion” without doctrinal borders, without behavioral expectations, without clear identity demarcations over against those of other religions and no religion.

Professor Gushee's recipe for avoiding future Trumps and religious fundamentalisms is coming up with a different type of religion and nationalism, not liberalism. He is following his own advice:

These days as I prepare to preach weekly sermons in a post-Southern Baptist church outside Atlanta, I am trying to offer a non-fundamentalist but still thick account of Christian theology and practice. Here, I am seeking to say, we teach a religion with substance, a religion worth devoting your life to, a religion with biblical rooting, doctrinal solidity, and ethical-communal expectations. So far, so good.

The same thing will need to happen at the national political level. If we don’t like Donald Trump’s version of thick American nationalism and national loyalty, we must offer an equally thick but more compelling alternative. We must articulate and demonstrate why our understanding of what it means to be American, of the core values of American democracy, and of best public policies, are superior to the alternative on display — within the terms of a thick American identity and loyalty.
Because thick beats thin every time.

Is Professor Gushee's argument valid? Maybe religion and nationalism are so potent (thick) because we socialise and indoctrinate every child with religion and nationalism. If we teach liberalism and universalism from age four, then maybe liberalism also becomes thick?

Illiberal Democracies and the Muslim World

For the first time, directly presidential elections were held in Turkey on 10th August, 2014. As expected, Prime Minister Erdogan won the elections and crossed the fifty percent threshold, making a second round of presidential election unnecessary. The idea of Erdogan ruling for five more years is disconcerting for many inside and outside Turkey. Erdogan, after an initial liberal start, has now become a symbol of elected illiberalism or illiberal democracy. Erdogan is not alone. Since the start of 2013, illiberal democrats have won elections in Algeria, Pakistan, India, Hungary, Egypt and Venezuela.  

The idea of illiberal democracy was first popularized by Fareed Zakaria (See The rise of illiberal democracy). He argued that democracy requires only regular competitive elections and can be liberal or illiberal. Liberal democracy, in addition to regular elections, entails individual liberty and constitutionalism. Without the protection of individual rights and limits on the power of democratic governments (usually through constitutions), there is no liberal democracy.

Source: Illiberal Democracy

Zakaria contended that sequencing of liberalism and democracy was different in the early Western European democracies (and East Asian democracies) and most third wave democracies. In the former, liberalism became entrenched before democracy became a reality but in the later, democracy came earlier. This led to illiberal democracy or infringement of individual and minority rights in many countries. According to Zakaria, 

The tension between constitutional liberalism and democracy centers on the scope of governmental authority. Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation and use. For this reason, many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberals saw in democracy a force that could undermine liberty. James Madison explained in The Federalist that "the danger of oppression" in a democracy came from "the majority of the community." Tocqueville warned of the "tyranny of the majority," writing, "The very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority."

Rest of the blog can be read at the Calgary Centre for Global Community website (See Illiberal Democracies) 

Saudi rulers castigating other Islamic religious nationalists?

Madawi Al-Rashid yesterday wrote an article on Saudi-Wahhabi criticism of Turkish PM Erdogan (See Saudi Wahhabi Leaders See Turkish Caliphate Threat). In this article, she explains the criticism of Suleiman Aba al-Khayil, the director of Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University of Erdogan and Turkey. 

The criticism is based on a theory that Erdogan wants to establish Islamic caliphate or revive Ottoman caliphate and become the new caliph or Sultan. And as Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University is considered the center of Wahhabi theology and jurisprudence and a defender of pure Islamic (read Wahhabi) creed against innovations, Suleiman found it necessary to refute this theory. Madawi reports that Erdogan and Turkey's (perceived) claims to caliphate were rejected by pointing toward Turkish 'blasphemy, debauchery and, amusingly, Turkish nudist clubs'. Suleiman questioned how a good Wahhabi Saudi can think of Erdogan restoring the caliphate as Turkish society is immersed in sin and is far away from 'true Islam'. Obviously, the real message for Saudis is that if 'true' caliphate is revived, it would only be on the basis of 'true' creed and under those who believe, uphold and defend the 'true' creed i.e. There is no real, authentic revival of caliphate, without Wahhabi ideology and Saudi state leading it.   

Without going into the merits of director's message, its interesting to see how Saudis, despite believing in Islamic religious nationalism, are trying to counter, discredit and de-legitimize other countries and movements that also believe in Islamic religious nationalism. 

The tussle between Iran and Saudi Arabia is old story. Since Iranian Revolution, Saudi royals have led the fight against the Shiite rafida. Iran and Saudi Arabia are continuing their decades-old verbal jihad. It appears that Saudi royals are more afraid of still to be manufactured Iranian nuclear bomb than already existing Israel's large nuclear arsenal. 

Saudi royals have also come out clearly against Muslim Brotherhood, another movement that believes in Islamic religious nationalism. They are funding and abetting Egyptian military's cruel attempts to destroy Brotherhood, cheering mass killings and mass sentences. The hatred against Brotherhood is astonishing as Saudi were the ones that saved Brotherhood from the previous onslaught of Egyptian military in 1950s and 1960s. Brotherhood, in return, provided the counter narrative to Nasser's Arab nationalism that was becoming popular in Saudi Arabia as it was in other Arab countries. 

Now, attack on Erdogan, again someone that has roots in an Islamic religious nationalist movement, shows a pattern. Are Saudi royals worried that their legitimacy based on Islamic religious nationalism is under threat and that's why they are attacking anyone who can be considered more legitimate? Does this feeling heightened because of Arab Spring or because of recent cooling off relations with the US?  

Saudi rulers find themselves in difficult position. They want their people to reject the West, but they have very close relations with the West and that is not hidden (anymore) from ordinary Saudis. Similarly, they proclaim their allegiance to Islam but their own lives are far from Islamic. Another fact that is now open to all Saudis. Finally, they profess to be Islamic religious nationalists, but also trying to promote Saudi nationality to counter the threat of extremists groups, like Al-Qaida.   

    

Mahathir and Erdogan: Similarities and use of nationalism

A lot has been written about the superb economic stewardship of both leaders and it has certainly been crucial for their popularity and electoral success. However, not many people know of another key ingredient behind their success – their management of ‘nationalism’.

My article published on Express Tribune Blog. A portion is reproduced below, rest can be read at Will Sharif be able to follow Mahathir and Erdogan?

Like Pakistan, the basis of nationalism is still open for debate in both Malaysia and Turkey. There are ethnic nationalists, religious nationalists and a large group of civic nationalists fighting over the raison d’être of their respective countries.

Mahathir and Erdogan both used this disagreement to their advantage and led coalitions of different nationalists at different times in their careers. Both adopted civic, ethnic or religious nationalism as the situation demanded.

Source: Will Sharif be able to follow Mahathir and Erdogan?

Mahathir began his career as an ethnic nationalist but later won popularity and even premiership as a Malay nationalist. He wrote a controversial book, The Malay Dilemma, to promote special policies for the people of Malaysia. However, once he attained power, he moved to the centre and tried to win overall Malaysians. And by the end of his rule, he started propagating a form of ethnoreligious nationalism, highlighting the special role of Malays and Islam in the creation of Malaysia.

On the other hand, Erdogan began his political career as a civic nationalist and despite his Muslim roots, presented himself as a leader for all Turkish people. He disparaged discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender or religion. However, in order to curtail the power of the Turkish military, he later became an ethnic nationalist and unashamedly claimed to be the redeemer of the ethnic nationalism of Ataturk and the early Turkish Republic.

His current stance is that of an ethnoreligious nationalist fighting against the world for his country, just like Mahathir near the end of his career.

Erdogan, Gulen and Power of Nationalism?

Not long ago, Turkey was an island of stability with Europe facing financial collapse on one side and Middle East experiencing revolutions on the other. Not any more. Since Gezi Park protests last year, Turkey has been rocked by regular protests and scandals that have made people worry about Turkey's political and economic stability. Erdogan's support and his ability to win elections has been questioned by analysts both outside and inside Turkey. This year is particularly crucial with local, presidential and possibly general elections happening before December. What might also be decided this year is whether Turkey would have a parliamentary or presidential system and whether the Kurdish 'problem' will be resolved after almost eighty years. Not surprisingly, this year is being called Turkey's year of destiny (See 2014: Turkey's year of destiny).

What has particularly made the coming local elections on March 30 a wide open contest is the rift within the pro-Islam or pro-religious camp. Gulen/Hizmat movement and Erdogan's AKP supported each other from 2002 to 2012, despite some differences. They won local elections, general elections and constitutional referendums together and defeated the political force that had dominated Turkey since independence, the Turkish military. AKP promoted organizations linked with Hizmet and these organizations in turn delivered money, support and votes.

So, how important are March 30 election results? To bring down the hype, following are the percentages of votes AKP got in the local and general elections since 2002.

General election 2002:  34.3%

Local election    2004:  42.2%

General election 2007:  46.6%

Local election    2009:  38.8%

General election 2011:  49.8%

Looking at the these figures, it is obvious that a dip in AKP votes on March 30, while important and certainly disheartening for AKP and invigorating for the opposition, does not means the end of Erdogan. AKP lost support in 2009 local elections and its vote remained below 40% mark but it still won big in 2011 general election. For my wish (i.e. Gul takes over AKP from Erdogan) to be granted, the dip in votes would have to be big, maybe around 30% with the loss of municipalities of Ankara and Istanbul.  

The situation is, of course, different now than in 2009 when last local elections were held. Two groups, youth and the religious, that supported AKP before are now divided. What is perplexing for many is Erdogan's strategy to win in 2014? 

One can disagree about Erdogan's morals or corruption but not about whether he wants to win this year. Again, very few will argue with the statement that Erdogan is one of the most intelligent and savvy political leaders of the Turkish Republic. So, if most analysts can understand that a little humbleness, a little less confrontational talk, and a little sympathetic attitude toward opposition can help him win again, why can't he understand this simple equation? Moreover, this is not a new strategy for him; he practiced it from 2002 to 2010. 

One way to make sense of this situation is to argue that Erdogan has changed. He has become arrogant after all these years in power. We have seen this happening before, haven't we? Popular leaders, at the height of their power, making stupid mistakes and sinking into obscurity and oblivion.

Another way to make sense of this situation is to see a method in the madness of 'prince of Istanbul'. As a student of Turkish nationalism, what I find pretty interesting was Erdogan's reference to a 'second war of independence'. Add it to his constant refrain about conspiracies/foreign powers and one can clearly see that Erdogan is trying to use 'Sevres Syndrome' (the fear of dismemberment of Turkey by foreign powers as they did in the Treaty of Sevres [1920] after World War I). For an Erdogan supporter, and maybe many other Turks, it can be seen as a coded message, a dog-whistle. Add to it the fact, how Erdogan policies during the last decade map Turkish history hundred year before Sevres. Maybe it is a figment of my imagination but do read.

The 19th century Ottoman history was all about Westernization and 'modernization'. Even Sultan Abdul Hamid II (Reign: 1876-1909), who is usually considered an Islamist, did not stop the Westernization project. Ottomans gradually gave Christian minorities in Europe more rights in the hope that they would not rebel and Empire will remain intact. However, most of the Christians did rebel and the West supported them. Ottomans were left with only their Asian/African possessions by the end of Balkan Wars. Ottomans/Committee of Union and Progress then tried to save this rump empire but Arabs, despite being Muslims, revolted and again Western powers supported them. Ottoman Turks were only left with Anatolia. However, outside powers were not ready to even allow Turks to have Anatolia and invaded Turkish mainland and forced the Ottomans to sign the Treaty of Sevres. It was Ataturk who then fought with the West and saved the current Turkish state. 

Now, relate this history to Erdogan's twelve year rule. He first tried to cozy up to Europeans/West. Although he was an Islamist, he introduced many reforms that to Westernize the country so that Turkey could join the European Union (EU). However, despite his efforts, French and Germans made it clear that Turkey could not join EU. Then, Erdogan changed his direction and tried to have good relations with Muslim countries. He was berated and castigated by the 'White Turks' as well as by the West, but he continued to try to have good relations with Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Libya etc. However, he was also rejected by the Muslim Arabs and Iran. His outstretched hand was rejected by the 'outside powers' both in the West and the East, just like Ottomans were rejected a century before. And now, like at the time of independence, as Erdogan keep saying in his speeches, foreign powers are not ready to leave Turkey to Turks and are trying to destroy Turkey financially. 

Many have described all this talk of 'outside powers', which now includes even foreign airlines, as nonsense.

Erdogan has called it a second “independence struggle,” invoking the real war that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk fought to prevent Greece, France, Britain and Russia from carving up the heart of the collapsed Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s. He’s even hinted that the U.S. ambassador in Ankara is behind an international conspiracy to unseat him. Nonsense of this sort threatens Turkey’s most important security relationship -- and who will it convince in any case? The investigators may be politically motivated, but the evidence they’ve collected is reaching the public and the wrongdoing they seem to have uncovered can’t be so easily dismissed.(See Turkey Needs Erdogan’s ’Master Period’ to End)

However, it is important remember that Sevres Syndrome is still powerful in Turkey. Turkish society have been described as ultra-nationalist. Surveys have consistently shown that a majority of Turks believe that Western powers are trying to dismember Turkey as they have done in the past (See Turkey: A Conspiratorial State of Mind and Sevres Syndrome). Who are these Turks who believe in these conspiracy theories? Are they voters of CHP, AKP or MHP? Clearly, majority of AKP voters and most of the MHP voters belong to this group. So, Erdogan is trying to mobilize his base. People do not come to vote in local elections and economy is also not doing that well so how to get your people to come out to vote--you play to people's innate/instinctive fears. 

So, how can Hizmet outplay Erdogan? It cannot change the Sevres Syndrome in the next few months, so it can highlight its Turkish and Islamic credentials to show that it is not part of a foreign conspiracy. So, are interviews/articles in Western media the best strategy, considering the fact that majority in Turkey do not read them and probably mistrust them? I do not know. What do you think? Here is what Erdogan said about foreign media a few days ago, clearly implying conspiracy:

My dear brothers, these [media] organizations have always stolen the will of this country. They are stealing the resources and energy of our country...Is it only the BBC? Also The Wall Street Journal. Who are the bosses of these newspapers? Who owns these newspapers? (See Troubled Turkey Looks to Conspiracy Theories for Answers)

What about the power of nationalism and the national myths, such as Sevres Syndrome? How can these be countered? Turkey is, of course, not unique. Many in India and Pakistan also believe other countries have set their minds to destroy them. Putin uses nationalism and fear of West/foreigners to continue to rule. As Emre Erdogan writes 

This situation is not unique to Turkey. You can replace “Turkey” and “Turks” with another nationality’s name in the region; the meaning does not change. A historical narrative based on a highly exploited trauma and the close proximity of potential enemies seems to be the norm for nation states, particularly in this part of the world. (See The Unbearable Heaviness of of Being a Turkish Citizen)