Shashi Tharoor:The Battle of Belonging: On Nationalism, Patriotism, and What it Means to Be’

Shashi Tharoor has delivered another tour de force. We have already discussed his book Why I am a Hindu on this blog Hinduism and Hindutva Debate. In 2020, he has come up with another book that broadly focuses on the same issues but from a different perspective. While Hinduism and Hindutva Debate unpacked the differences between Hinduism and Hindutva, the Battle of Belonging examines the differences between patriotism and nationalism and what it means to be patriotic and nationalist in India. He then contrasts the idea of India and the Hindutva idea of India. In the ongoing battle of belonging chapter, he analyzes various recent actions of the BJP government, such as the building of Ram temple, revocation of Article 370 for Jammu & Kashmir state, and Citizenship (Amendment) Act, and attempts to impose of Hindi language. In the final chapter, writing in a prophetic mode, he explains how the battle for the Indian soul can be won against the forces of Hindutva.

Source: Secularism as principle and practice in India is in danger': Shashi Tharoor

Following is a link to Shashi's 35-minute interview with Karan Thapar in which he talks about his book.

Are Some Indians More Indian than Others?'— Shashi Tharoor Echoes the Pigs in Orwell's Animal Farm

Following are some excerpts from Shashi's interview with the PTI (More excerpts can be found here 'Secularism as principle and practice in India is in danger': Shashi Tharoor):

I don't agree, because the 37% vote won by the BJP last year is not a majority! Yes, Hindutva has successfully exploited fear of the 'Other', just as most reactionary ideologies do. The Hindutva ideologues in power have also had no qualms about appropriating or undermining the ostensibly independent branches of governance, from autonomous bodies like the Election Commission or the RTI (Right To Information) commissioners or the Reserve Bank to even media and the courts, in the service of their version of nationalism. This creates a sort of self-reinforcing echo chamber, in which the government is able to constantly push Hindutva ideas.

That is why I would caution against the idea of Hindutva being 'popular', as you suggest. How can we tell? Sure, the BJP holds a commanding parliamentary majority, but it has worked overtime to suppress dissenting voices. In that sense, it is difficult to get an accurate gauge of support for Hindutva among ordinary Indians. I do not think that a majority of the country supports the hateful rhetoric and exclusionary nature of Hindutva...

Judging by the number of times I have been asked this question, I do recognise that there's a very real and tangible concern for some liberal Indians. But as I have often pointed out, we in the Congress Party are very clear that we cannot allow ourselves to become a BJP-Lite. I have long argued that any attempt to emulate 'Pepsi Lite' by 'BJP Lite' will end up with us becoming like ‘Coke Zero' that is, Congress Zero. Congress is not BJP in any shape or form, and we should not attempt to be a lighter version of something we are not. Nor are we trying to, in my view.

The Congress party makes a distinction between Hinduism and Hindutva. The Hinduism we respect is inclusive and non-judgemental, whereas Hindutva is a political doctrine based on exclusion. So we are not offering a watered-down version of the BJP's political messaging: Rahul Gandhi has made it explicitly clear that, for all avowing of his personal Hinduism by going to temples, he does not support any form of Hindutva, neither soft nor hard. 

As a Congressman, I understand that whereas Hinduism is a religion, which is the personal concern of every individual, Hindutva is a political doctrine that departs fundamentally from the principal tenets of my Hindu faith. While Hinduism is inclusive of all ways of worship, Hindutva is indifferent to devotion and cares principally about identity. Hinduism is open to reform and progress, which is why it has flourished for 4,000 years; Hindutva is reactionary and regressive, with its roots in the racial pride' ethos that spawned fascism in the 1920s, which is why it is unlikely to outlast its current peak this century.

Also, see Shashi discussing his book and his ideas with Shekhar Gupta:

Shashi Tharoor on ThePrint Off the Cuff with Shekar Gupta

The making of lynchistan and the cow cabinet

Earlier this year, the documentary  The Making of Lynchistan: Inside India’s Deadly Gau Raksha Network won the prestigious Ramnath Goenka award.  This documentary informs how mob lynchings by cow vigilantes in India are a pre-planned organized crime supported by politicians and police. Asmita Nandy and Meghnad Bose, the documentary makers said: 

“Our documentary The Making of Lynchistan: Killing in the Name of the Cow is an explainer on the nexus between the police, politician and the gaurakshaks,” said Nandy. “We spoke to gaurakshaks, who told us how these attacks are carried out. Sitting in front of people who proudly claim to have resorted to violence is intimidating,” said Bose.

In this blog, I have been writing about the rise of Hindu nationalism and increasing focus on saving cows and violence against Muslims. Some of the blogpost related to it are as follows

Hinduism and Hindutva Debate March 2019

A national ministry of cows? September 2017

Gau rakshaks' (cow protectors) rise under Modi/BJP: Is there a more sinister agenda? November 2017

More recently, another event demonstrated the increasing power of Hindutva, Hindu nationalism, and cow rakshaks. Madhya Pradesh chief minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan after praying at a temple announced on 18th November 2020 the formation of a "cow cabinet." It consists of ministers of the following departments: farmer's welfare, animal husbandry, forests, panchayat and rural development, revenue, and home. The significant point to note is that the Congress, which claims to secular and is the main opposition party in Madhya Pradesh, did not oppose this measure but tried to say that they were better cow rakshaks. They claimed that the Congress government had started the work on the construction of 1,000 cow shelters.

Former Chief Minister and state Congress president Kamal Nath said that Chouhan did not keep his promise made before the 2018 Assembly elections.

Shivraj Singh, who announced the formation of a separate cow ministry (department) in the state before the 2018 assembly elections, is now talking about setting up a cabinet for cow protection and fostering...He has forgotten his old announcement..."There has been no work for cow protection and promotion during the 15 years' BJP rule in the state. On the contrary, they reduced the money given for cow shelters. 

Source: The Times of India

To be fair, the Congress government did pass laws against cow vigilantism after two incidents in 2019 and also amended the anti-cow slaughter law, making provision for the transport of cows with permission. 

Hinduism and Hindutva debate

An interesting debate on the differences between Hinduism and Hindutva between Shashi Tharoor and Vinay Sahasrabuddhe. Shashi Tharoor is a member of Lok Sabha member from Congress Party while Vinay Sahasrabuddhe is a Rajya Sabha member from the BJP. 

Issues discussed are triple talak, Sabarimala temple,  cow slaughter ban, lynchings, Gandhi's use of religion, Muslim appeasement, citizenship in Northeast India, etc.

Shashi is a well-versed scholar on this subject. He has published a book, Why I am a Hindu, on this subject that has been well-received and praised by many for the succinct analysis of a very complex subject. Some excerpts from Urmi Chanda-Vaz's review for Scroll.in are copied below. The review can be read here. 

Why I Am A Hindu, running close to 300 pages, is divided into two sections, the first of which offers a brief history of Hinduism. The first chapter is titled “My Hinduism”, presented in what can be called the Devdutt Pattanaik mode. It is a clever and necessary disclaimer underscoring subjectivity – especially useful for times when religious sentiments are easily hurt. Tharoor acquaints us with the kind of Hinduism he was raised with, and, along with a sprinkling of anecdotes, gives an overview of the religion...

The second part of the book is titled “Political Hinduism”. This is where Tharoor’s meticulous context-building through the history of Hinduism is particularly useful. He starts building his case with the idea of secularism, which becomes a moot point when viewed through the prism of Western political theory. The right term in the Indian context, he argues, is “pluralism”, for India is and has long been a land of many religions. Further, he says, religion when defined as “dharma” is impossible to divorce from the Hindu way of life...

The author explains the BJP’s brand of Hindutva politics as being based on a victim-turned-avenger complex, a narrative of failure and defeat, and hatred for the Muslim community. Even if one were to turn a blind eye to the clear lack of Muslim representation (at least in the Lok Sabha) in this government, one can hardly ignore visible and worrying trends such as lynching and cow vigilantism. Ideas like ghar waapsi and love jihad, and groups like gau rakshaks and “Anti Romeo squads” operate and thrive under the aegis of the ruling party, and Tharoor correctly echoes the alarm of peace-loving Indians in this context. 

He also critiques the “cultural project” of Hindutva, which aims to “nationalise and spiritualise”. By all means acknowledge the great accomplishments of ancient Indian science, but keep fact and fiction separate, he enjoins. 

“We should take pride in what our forefathers did but resolve to be inspired by them rather than rest on their laurels. We need to use the past as a springboard, not as a battlefield. Only then we can rise above it to create for ourselves a future worthy of our remarkable past.” 

He also strongly condemns the whitewashing, or saffronising, of India’s cultural past vis-à-vis the actions of vigilante groups such as the Bajrang Dal and, most recently, Karni Sena. Not just tolerance, but acceptance, is the hallmark of Hinduism, he reminds the reader again and again.

India: Religious Freedom Issues. A CRS Report on Hindutva

The Congressional Research Service, a bi-partisan research wing of the US Congress, published a report on rising Hindu nationalism and its threat to minorities and human rights in India. Below are some of the key excerpts. The whole report can be read or downloaded from here.

For roughly 500 years before British rule became direct in 1857, the Asian Subcontinent had been dominated by Muslims politically. Many Hindu nationalists, along with some historians, assert that Hindu traditions and institutions were suppressed during this period. As the Indian independence movement grew in the early 20th century, some were energized to "correct" this historic trend. Secularism became a more-or-less enshrined value for the independent Indian state, although its conception in both theory and practice varies widely. 

Because Hinduism does not have a specific sacred text to which conformity can be demanded, "Hindu fundamentalist" is not an accurate term to describe a purveyor of "Hindutva" or "Hindu-ness." Moreover, as conveyed by one scholar, "India's diversity along linguistic, regional, and caste line means defining a 'Hindu culture' is problematic." For political parties such as the BJP and its antecedents, Hinduism as a concept is almost always concurrent with nationalism, the core belief being that India is an inherently Hindu nation, even if establishment of a strictly Hindu state is not a goal. In this regard, it is the proselytizing religions—Islam and Christianity, in particular—that can be characterized as representing a threat to the "Hindu nation." 

In simple terms, the key tenets of the Hindutva ideology are three: (1) Hindus are the rightful rulers of India, which is a Hindu nation; (2) the Christian and, especially, Muslim minorities are viewed with ambivalence because their religious allegiances are not indigenous to India (in a way that those of Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains are); and (3) caste divisions undermine Hindu unity. 

According to close observers, despite fronting an overtly Hindu nationalist party, Modi's 2014 national political campaign touched upon these Hindutva themes only minimally, and instead stressed development and good governance as its guiding lights. Yet Modi himself repeatedly has emphasized his view that "Hinduism is a way of life and not a religion." According to USCIRF, Hindutva "forms the basis of an exclusionary national narrative focused exclusively on the rights of Hindus." In commenting on the role of nationalism in Indian politics, a group of Australian academics offers that, "The Hindu nationalists seek not so much to preserve existing social hierarchies in Hindu cultures as they do to rewrite social order fascistically to the benefit of Hindu populations.".... 

The report provides a brief overview of the RSS and BJP's violent and controversial history and their aversion to Muslims.

The RSS has had a controversial history in India, including connections to the 1948 assassination of Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi.45 The organization has since been directly implicated in domestic terrorism. RSS members have been implicated in several incidents of "Saffron" (Hindu extremist) terrorism in India, including the 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings that killed 68 people on a train that runs between Delhi and Lahore, Pakistan. In 2011, former RSS activist Swami Aseemanand confessed to involvement in this and other attacks, contending that some high-level RSS leaders had prior knowledge and were complicit.46 In 2016, Maharashtra's former senior-most police official reportedly called for banning the RSS as "the country's largest terror organization."...

The BJP (along with its 1951-1977 antecedent, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh) has been a primary political purveyor of Hindutva in Indian society. Narendra Modi and current BJP President Amit Shah are credited with orchestrating the party's national surge after 2013.56 Throughout the country's history, India's Muslims have consistently favored the Congress Party over the BJP. While at least one-third of Muslim votes nationwide were cast for the Congress in the 21st century, the BJP's share of the Muslim vote dropped from 7% in 2004 to 3% in the 2009 cycle. Some surveys suggest that Modi's party and its electoral allies received up to 8% of the Muslim vote in 2014, with the main opposition Congress Party and its allies garnering 38%.57 Of 1,400 BJP members serving in various Indian state assemblies in 2017, 4 were Muslim. Muslims comprise about 19% of Uttar Pradesh's population, but 6% of its state assembly.58 Muslim representation in the Lok Sabha peaked at 10% in 1980 and lingered at about 6% until dropping to 4% in 2014.59 A 2016 assessment found that Muslims were vastly underrepresented in the legislative assemblies of BJP-controlled states, an imbalance only exacerbated by subsequent state-level wins for the party. The problem was starker when examining state ministers: at the time, only a single Muslim was among the 151 in BJP-controlled states.

A study by India's daily Hindustan Times found that, although only a small proportion of the more than 50,000 national and state-level politicians assessed were facing criminal charges for inciting religious violence or hatred (less than one-half of one percent), the BJP had the highest proportion (1.3%) of any party, more than triple that of the Congress Party. Moreover, the politicians facing such charges—including such high-profile figures as a federal cabinet minister and Uttar Pradesh's chief minister—were nearly five times more likely to win their elections than those not facing them....

 Religious Demographics in India

Source: CRS Report

The report explains that most of the political goals of the Hindu nationalists are about restricting minority rights, especially rights of the Muslim minority:

Hindu nationalists have a relatively short, but long-standing list of political goals. Many of these are found in the BJP's 2014 election manifesto.62 RSS leaders were mostly disappointed by the BJP-led government that ruled India from 1999 to 2004, in large part because then-Prime Minister Vajpayee and his lieutenants were not seen to be taking up core RSS issues. While out of power in the latter half of the 2000s, the RSS and BJP suffered a degree of mutual alienation; at one point in 2010 the then-RSS chief suggested that the BJP be dissolved and replaced by a new party. Yet the organization's leaders appeared to view the BJP victory in 2014 as crucial to the very existence of the RSS. Its leaders thus threw the full weight of their organization behind Modi's campaign while enjoying a correlate spike in participation in 2014.63 Leading Hindutva and widely-held RSS aspirations include

• scaling back laws and government programs designed to benefit the religious minorities, Muslims in particular;

• establishing a Uniform Civil Code (to replace current personal law based on religious customs and thus standardizing all national laws regarding such topics as marriage, divorce, and inheritance);

• repealing Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which grants limited autonomy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir (a step that would, if implemented, allow citizens from other states to buy property in Jammu and Kashmir, see "The Kashmir Dispute," below);

• redrafting public school textbooks to remove what are alleged to be insults to Hindu gods and excessive praise of the subcontinent's past Muslim rulers;

• constructing a Ram temple on the Ayodhya site of the Babri Mosque that was razed in 1992; and

• preventing cow slaughter through legislation (cows are revered animals in Hinduism)....

Overall restrictions on freedom of expression are also on the rise in Modi's India according to the report:

 A major 2016 HRW report, "Stifling Dissent: The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in India," contended that, "Indian authorities routinely use vaguely worded, overly broad laws"—a colonial-era sedition law perhaps the most abused among them—"as political tools to silence and harass critics." More recently, HRW warned that, "Journalists faced increasing pressure to self-censor due to threat of legal action, smear campaigns and threats on social media, and even threats of physical attacks."101 In September 2017, unidentified gunmen shot dead publisher and editor Gauri Lankesh, a vocal critic of militant Hindu nationalism, outside her home in Bengaluru. Evidence suggests the existence of organized campaigns to silence critics of the Hindutva movement, sometimes called "rationalists" for their opposition to the insertion of religion into politics.102 Indian journalists report coming under increasing pressure and bullying to remove stories critical of the Hindu nationalist government, and self-censorship by media organizations is seen to be a worsening problem by many.

Even before Modi's national elevation, his supporters were known for bellicose social media activity; in 2012, one former senior Indian intelligence officer wrote, "The style of the online blitzkrieg adopted by [Modi's] die-hard followers in India and abroad are reminiscent of the methods of the Nazi stormtroopers."104 The BJP has since been accused of cultivating "an army of cyber warriors to propagate its message of Hindu chauvinism and hyper-nationalism, and to launch vicious attacks on its opponents." "Modi's troll army" is, by some accounts, an orchestrated effort by the BJP to target critics on social media. Whether officially sanctioned or not, some of the most notable offenders—who openly celebrate the murder of critics for the mere act of exercising their right to free speech—are followed by Modi on Twitter.105 One U.S.-based commentator opined that, earlier in his prime ministership, Modi could afford to associate himself with "foul-mouthed trolls on Twitter," but his 2017 choice to allow Yogi Adityanath as Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister "makes it much harder to argue that power will moderate the [BJP's] more feral instincts.

Hindu nationalism takes on Tamil nationalism

An interesting analysis by Ana Pararajasingham (see here) of how the BJP is trying to bring Tamil Nadu, a major state in South India, in its orbit. Hindutva has been strong in the Hindi belt in the North but weak in the Dravidian South where ethnic and linguistic connections are much stronger. Southern India successfully resisted the imposition of Hindi as the national language after independence and has tried to chart an independent political course from the north since then.  

Tamil Nadu has been dominated by two parties since the late 1960s, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) formed in 1949 and its rival, All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), which split from the DMK in 1972. These two parties have governed Tamil Nadu since 1969. Both of them had a series of charismatic leaders which have supported Tamil nationalism and socialist ideology. The DMK had its founder C. N. Annadurai, M. G. Ramachandran and M Karunanidhi while AIADMK had its founder  M. G. Ramachandran and Jayalalithaa. 

The DMK ruled Tamil Nadu from 1969 to 1976, from 1989 to 1991, from 1996 to 2001, and from 2006 to 2011 while AIADMK ruled it from 1977 to 1987, from 1991 to 1996, a few months in 2001, from 2002 to 2006 and is the current ruling party (from 2011). Ana argues that the success of both parties is due to the strength of Tamil nationalism:

The success of the DMK and the AIADMK is a testimony to the potency of Tamil nationalism, which both parties have successfully exploited. In the hands of the DMK, Tamil nationalism became an ideology of mass mobilization. This has enabled the DMK and the AIADMK to secure and hold political power for more than 50 years.

Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay in his article 'Past Continuous: BJP’s Failure in Tamil Nadu Can Be Traced Back to Congress’s 1967 Defeat There' seems to agree:

The secondary presence of national parties in Tamil Nadu stems from two dominant features of state politics: the Dravidian movement and its ideology of Draviadianism that dominated political culture and social discourse. The second feature that had a pioneering effect on other states and parties was the distinctive use of populism as electoral craft by the two Dravidian parties. 

Though referred to as the Dravidian movement, the complex weave of caste, religious and linguistic concerns that articulated itself as a collective response from the early decades of the 20th century, remained confined to Tamil Nadu. This has been the principal reason behind the continued significance of national parties in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala. The idea and ideology of the Dravidian movement has not spread beyond Tamil Nadu because of its rootedness in Tamil nationalism which in turn had more than just traces of non-Brahminism. 

The absence of non-Brahmin upper castes in significant numbers in Tamil Nadu enabled class and social polarisation between Tamilian Brahmins and others and they were depicted as outsiders who brought Brahminical – and discriminatory – Hinduism to Tamil Nadu. Consequently, when Dravidianism as an ideology developed, atheism and linguistic nationalism became its cornerstones. No such unifying cultural identity emerged in other southern states and this is the reason why Telangana was eventually hived off and the demand for Coorg or Kodagu, though muted currently, keeps rearing its head ever so often. 

The 1967 rout of the Congress – significantly this was not in terms of vote share – was preceded by a several decades old emotional agitation against the Centre’s attempt to declare Hindi as the official language. With its origins in the Congress government’s 1937 decision to introduce Hindi in secondary schools, the agitation gathered momentum as the January 1965 deadline neared for Hindi to become the sole official language of India.

Former Tamil Nadu AIADMK Chief Minister Jayalalithaa paying tributes to her mentor and another former Tamil Nadu AIADMK Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran

Source: 'Past Continuous: BJP’s Failure in Tamil Nadu Can Be Traced Back to Congress’s 1967 Defeat There

The BJP's strategy is, of course, dividing the Tamils on religious lines and undermining Tamil nationalism. It picks up issues that resonate with its Hindutva ideology and tries to break the Tamil consensus as Ana explains:

In late January, at an event marking the release of a book by H Raja’s father, a participant at the event, a Hindu priest, triggered a controversy by not standing up when the Tamil anthem was played. Vijayendra Saraswathi remained seated even as other dignitaries such as the chief guest, Tamil Nadu Governor Banwarilal Purohit, stood up for the Tamizh Thai Vazhthu. 

The Tamil anthem is sung or played at the beginning of functions in Tamil Nadu. By not standing up, Vijayendra Saraswathi angered the public. Several public figures condemned the Hindu priest for disrespecting Tamil sentiments, and these notably included leading politicians across Tamil Nadu with strong nationalistic leanings. 

Earlier in January, Vairamuthu, a Tamil scholar, speaking on Andal, one of the best-loved Hindu poet-saints of the Tamils, quoted from the 1978 book Indian Movements: Some Aspects of Dissent, Protest and Reform, which identified Andal as a devadasi. The term devadasi is open to interpretation; it could mean a female servant of a deva (god) or in a more pedestrian sense a temple prostitute. 

The BJP’s Raja mounted a vituperative attack by claiming that Vairamuthu had reduced the Hindu saint to a common prostitute. The attack gained momentum as several Andal devotees joined in, believing Vairamuthu had tarnished the image of Andal. This was met by a massive uproar against H Raja by Tamil nationalists who accused him of exploiting religious sentiments for political gain.... 

H Raja’s tactics are predicated on the assumption that by labeling anyone expressing anti-BJP sentiments, or by referring to his or her Islamic or Christian background, a religious divide could be perpetrated. Last October, Raja’s attempt to discredit Tamil actor Vijay, who had been critical of the BJP’s politics, by “outing” him as a Christian failed.

At present, the BJP aided by a lack of strong popular leadership in both the DMK and the AIADMK.

The DMK’s M Karunanidhi has led the party since 1969, when he became leader after the death of its founder C N Annadurai. At the age of 92, Karunanidhi created history by winning his seat in the legislative assembly for the 13th time in a row in 2016. However, old age and ill health made him retire from politics. 

The AIADMK owed its success to its own charismatic leaders, M G Ramachandran, who was its leader since his split from the DMK to form the new party in 1972 until his death in 1989. And thereafter Jayalalithaa led the party from 1989 until her untimely demise in December 2016 while in office. 

Since then the AIADMK has been torn apart by a leadership struggle, while the DMK is yet to find a leader who can match Karunanidhi. M K Stalin, the son of Karunanidhi and heir apparent, is yet to prove himself.

Role of Hindi journalism in fanning religious hatred during and after Babri Mosque destruction

Krishna Pratap Singh, who is from Faizabad district where Babri Mosque was located, tells the reader how responsible, factual and courageous journalism was thrown out and fake, malicious and communal karsevak journalism was embraced by many reporters and editors in the Hindi belt in the late 1980s. The Babri Mosque affair was especially affected by this fake print and later electronic journalism. Covering the VHP’s rath yatra from Sitamarhi to Ayodhya in December 1992 was Krishna's first assignment and he witnessed not only the destruction of the three domes of the Babri Mosque but also of his positive views about his profession. Following is an excerpt from his article on the role of journalism in fanning hatreds:

Maybe one should put it down to naïveté for thinking that that the job of a journalist, even in such dire times, was to be a ‘watchdog of the people’: to be an advocate of understanding an issue as it really is and presenting it as such; to cultivate a distance from the lure of gains and trickery; and with a habit of upholding moral and progressive values in life. It was painful to think that journalists, instead of giving a factual account of situations and events, could go to the extent of concocting them in the interest of an insular, communal group and be willing to work as their instrument.

To journalists like me, the very attraction of the world of journalism lay in the fact that one could constructively question the distortions abounding in the world – what makes the world such a heartless place; why, despite ceaseless efforts, is it not improving and, moreover, who are the people whose machinations are preventing it from straightening itself. 

One witnessed journalists afflicted by communal and professional vested interests immersing themselves in the manoeuvres of the VHP and BJP, hawking their point of view as a ‘truth’ that was far more dangerous and toxic than any falsehood. Since I had no right over them to subject them to my questions, I would ask myself those very questions: in a pluralistic society such as in India, when some people gather belligerent crowds in the name of religion, use the very provisions of democracy to raze it, give it a bad name; spare neither the constitution nor its values; and are intent on dressing up animosity as consciousness and intolerance as a fundamental principle of life, what is the duty of journalists in such a situation? Should they break all professional limits to be tolerant towards such people, egg them on? If so, wouldn’t they themselves become participants in furthering the cynical game of intolerance?

Source: The Time When Hindi Journalism Turned Into ‘Hindu’ Journalism 

Krishna acknowledges that there were journalists that did not report as karsevaks or to increase circulation but they were few:

It was not as if there were no voices of resistance against the prevailing state of affairs; just that they were confined to being voices in the wilderness.

I vividly recall one incident in 1990 when Vishwanath Pratap Singh was the prime minister and Mulayam Singh the UP chief minister. During a commotion masquerading as ‘kar seva’ on November 2, when as per the reports of Hindu journalism ‘Ayodhya was bathed in blood’, I was working in the editorial section of the daily Janmorcha, published from Faizabad. Several news agencies had set up temporary bureaus in the Janmorcha office located in the heart of the city.

Immediately after the police firing on the kar sevaks, one news agency started putting out inflated figures of casualties. When a correspondent of a rival news agency received a call from a flustered head office anxious not to be ‘left behind in the race’, he sarcastically replied, “I have given you the accurate figure of kar sevaks killed in police firing. As for the rest of the so-called casualties, you also know when and how the news agency in question killed them. But if you insist, I will try to find out once again. Although, if you wish to raise the number of casualties please send some guns. I myself will kill some to arrive at a figure that surpasses the rival news agency. But if an incident results in five casualties, don’t expect me to inflate the number to 15.” The phone conversation swiftly terminated on the other end.

The floodgates of self-control could not be maintained for long. In their rivalry to outdo the competition, the things journalists and newspapers did to sensationalise news by inflating the figure of kar sevaks killed in the firing is well-known. The conventional belief among ordinary people was that journalistic publications always underreported casualty figures, saying five had been killed when in fact the actual number would be 15. The police firing on the kar sevaks put paid to this innocent belief. Journalists busied themselves in cooking up ever more deaths adhering to the motto ‘if not real, fake will do’.

The article The Time When Hindi Journalism Turned Into ‘Hindu’ Journalism was published on the 25th anniversary of Babri Mosque destruction.

Is Rahul Gandhi a Hindu? And is this important?

There is currently a debate going on India about whether Rahul Gandhi, the scion of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty and the soon-to-be President of the Congress Party, is a Hindu or not. The debate started during the campaign for the Gujarat state elections. It was reported that Rahul signed the register for non-Hindus while visiting the Somnath Temple. The BJP is now accusing Rahul of not being a Hindu and falsely posing as a Hindu while the Congress is trying to prove that Rahul is a Hindu. 

Robin David, the resident editor of The Times of India's Chandigarh edition, has written an enlightening article on what this debate about Rahul's Hinduness means for Indians who are not Hindus.

An excerpt of the article is reproduced below. Rest can be read Disturbing debate on Rahul Gandhi’s Hindu-ness: India’s top national parties are reducing the importance of being Indian:

The loud and coarse debate over which register Rahul Gandhi signed when he visited Somnath temple has led to politicians of both Congress and BJP using an awkward hyphenation – the ‘non-Hindu’. With campaigning peaking in Gujarat, no one has bothered about how this ‘Hindu vs non-Hindu’ debate has marginalised those who are not Hindus. It has erased the many unique distinctions among different groups and reduced them to one broad, generalised category – the non-Hindu.

You are not a Christian or a Parsi or a Muslim or a Jew. You are a non-Hindu. Sit on the sidelines and watch us fight over who the real Hindu is, is the message BJP and Congress have driven home.

Given the manner in which both parties are fighting over the issue, it seems that the ‘Hindu’ is an exclusive club for the privileged. To become a member, you have to meet the stiff criteria set by the club management and be ready for a rejection.

By questioning Rahul’s Hindu identity, the BJP has challenged his membership to the club and asked him to establish his credentials. Although BJP leaders haven’t said it in as many words, the implicit message is that Rahul does not deserve to ask for the votes of Hindus in Gujarat because his Hindu credentials are questionable. BJP spokesperson Sambit Patra even demanded that Rahul “must say who he actually is”.

Rahul Gandhi in the Somnath Temple

Source: Disturbing debate on Rahul Gandhi’s Hindu-ness: India’s top national parties are reducing the importance of being Indian

The Indian Express has noted the same phenomenon but has ignored its implications for the minorities and the future of secularism in India. In their article, Gujarat assembly elections 2017: Rahul Gandhi’s devotion to temple politics catches BJP off guard, they point out that Rahul has visited 25 temples so far and it is the first time that party leadership of both major parties is trying to outdo each other in visiting temples. A excerpt from the article is reproduced below:

There is a new facet emerging in the Gujarat Assembly elections, the first phase of voting for which ended on Friday. Never before have temples played such a major role in politics of the state, since it was formed in 1960. The individual Hindu candidates used to launch their campaigning and election exercises by paying obeisance at their local temples or to their family deities, but the party top brass leading the campaign have never bothered to visit practically all important temples in their areas or on the route of their campaign.
This time, both the major political parties — the Congress and the BJP — have made it a point that their star campaigners visit important local temples wherever they go to address public meetings. While it was quite obvious for Prime Minister Narendra Modi or BJP national president Amit Shah to do so because of their religious background and RSS connections, it is quite new for Congress vice-president Rahul Gandhi to visit temples.
If it is a matter of prestige for the BJP and particularly, Modi, to ensure that his party retains the political power in the state as this election is being viewed as a precursor to the outcome in 2019 Lok Sabha elections, the Congress is doing everything available at its disposal to ensure that it wrests Gujarat from BJP after 22 years, to improve its prospects in 2019 general elections and come back to power at the Centre.

Gau rakshaks' (cow protectors) rise under Modi/BJP: Is there a more sinister agenda?

In November 2017, Reuters published an investigative report Cash Cows: Emboldened by Modi's ascent, India's cow vigilantes deny Muslims their livelihood by Zeba Siddiqui, Krishna N. Das, Tommy Wilkes and Tom Lasseter. This report explains that, along with the physical threat, cow protection movement is also an economic threat to the Muslim minority. Due to the Hindus' aversion to the killing of cattle, the slaughtering, animal transport and hides businesses had been primarily in the hands of Muslims. These businesses are now all under threat. The slaughterhouses are being closed. The cow vigilantes not only beat and kill Muslims but also take away the cattle and these cattle are later sold to Hindus. So, assets are transferred from the poor indigent Muslim minority to Hundi majority, making Muslims more destitute.

Some excerpts of the report are reproduced below (full report can be accessed here):

The beating that ended Pehlu Khan’s life was televised nationwide. Cell phone video captured a group of men punching and slinging Khan around the middle of a road in north India, stomping on him and then slamming the 55-year-old farmer down on concrete as he begged for mercy. 

Khan had been stopped by the lynch mob of right-wing Hindus as he rode home from a market in April with two cows and two calves in the back of a truck. The crowd was furious at the sight of a Muslim transporting animals held sacred by Hindus, according to the accounts of his sons and two fellow villagers who were also attacked. Before the men beat Khan so badly that he later died, breaking his ribs in multiple places, they screamed that he was planning to slaughter the cattle for beef. 

Outside the frame of the video, something else was happening: Pehlu Khan’s cows were seized. They were hauled off to a nearby Hindu-run shelter that takes in cattle snatched from Muslims and sells them. 

Assaults meted out in broad daylight against India’s Muslim population, some 14 percent of the country’s 1.3 billion people, have sparked concern about the direction the country is taking under Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi. There has been another, less noted dimension to the violence: The theft from Muslims and redistribution to Hindus of cows that provide crucial income in the Indian countryside. 

Such scenes clash with India’s image as an investor darling in Asia and the pro-business message Modi broadcasts to foreign investors. But three and a half years after his electoral victory, the cow seizures illustrate how the nation’s right-wing Hindu factions that propelled Modi to power are now shaping India and stirring religious upheaval. 

Having stoked Hindu nationalist passions in his bid for the highest office, it’s unclear to what extent Modi can now control them. The bands of right-wing Hindus who seize the cows are operating essentially as private militias. They are undeterred by the prime minister’s public calls on them to end the violence. States governed by Modi’s party have seen a marked increase in cow theft from Muslims as well as funding for cow shelters that in many cases take in the stolen cattle. 

Interviews with nationalist Hindu leaders and militia members across the country reveal an impatience for Muslims to demonstrate obeisance to the Hindu majority. 

There are no official statistics for how many cows have been stolen from Muslims in incidents involving such groups since Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to national power in 2014. Reuters’ reporting across India, though, puts actual numbers on the extent of the cow theft. It also provides the first in-depth look at how the actions of cow vigilantes are leading to further economic marginalization of the country’s Muslim minority. 

In northern India, the leadership of just two of the main organizations of “gau rakshaks” – right-wing Hindu cow vigilantes, or literally “cow protectors” – said they have taken about 190,000 cows since the year of Modi’s election, some in the presence of police and almost every single one of them from Muslims, the reporting shows. 

Separately, Reuters surveyed 110 cow shelters or farms, known as “gaushalas,” across six Indian states that were led by BJP chief ministers from before or just after Modi’s 2014 election win. The survey found an increase of 50 percent in their cattle holdings - from about 84,000 head before Modi came to power in 2014 to more than 126,000 today.
The survey, conducted by phone and in person, covered a fraction of the thousands of cow sheds nationwide.It was not possible to determine how much of the 50 percent increase was due to cow vigilantes, because record-keeping in many cases is non-existent. But of the 110 cattle facilities surveyed, all but 14 said they receive cows from the Hindu vigilante groups. About a third said they sell or give cows away, nearly all to Hindu farmers and households.

In a separate survey, Reuters found that only three of 24 cow facilities in four states not ruled by a BJP chief minister said they sold or gave away cattle - mainly to Hindus - after receiving them. While cattle stock has risen about 40 percent in these gaushalas since Modi took office, only a small part of the increase was due to vigilantes. In many of the cases, cows were donated to the shelters for religious reasons or purchased from cattle markets for fear they would be slaughtered.... 

Cow slaughter is illegal in most of India, while committing cruelty to cattle by transporting them crammed into small spaces is outlawed across the country. Slaughtering buffalo, an animal not considered holy, is allowed, fueling a multi-billion dollar meat export industry that is dominated by Muslims. Penalties for killing a cow differ from state to state, with most ranging from six months to five years in prison....
People involved in snatching cattle from Muslims speak with a triumphant sense that their moment in history has arrived. “Everyone in this world is born Hindu. They are turned into Muslims when they are circumcised and Christians when they are baptized,” said Dinesh Patil, a district head of the Bajrang Dal group in the southwestern state of Maharashtra.

The Bajrang Dal organization is closely linked to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the nation’s umbrella right-wing Hindu organization. The RSS argues the purity of India was soiled by the foreign intervention of Muslims and then Christians beginning in the 8th century. The RSS helped create Modi’s political party, and the prime minister himself first attended the group’s meetings as a child.

At the complex he manages, Patil said that almost every one of the 1,700 cows grazing outside was “rescued by the Bajrang Dal” from “these Muslim slaughterers.” Patil described how a degree of law enforcement sanction is conferred on the cattle seizures: His group takes the cows and hands them over to the police, who then deliver the cattle to his facility. “The entire investigation and catching of the culprits is done by us,” Patil said.
The police, he added, “have to listen to us because the BJP is in power.” 

Told of Patil’s comments, Bipin Bihari, second-in-command of police for Maharashtra, said: “In a way their work supports the police. It eases our work. If they have some information on some illegal activities, they can share it with us, and we act on it. But they are not allowed to take the law into their hands.”.... 

Reuters found no evidence of a formal plan by the BJP to use cow vigilante groups to engineer the seizure and transfer of cows from Muslims to Hindus.

But in states where the BJP has taken power, cow seizures have ramped up. In the absence of official data on the number of cows taken, Reuters reporting and a review of past incidents show that the largest vigilante groups and the cattle seizures are concentrated in BJP-led states.

One organization of cow vigilantes in the northern state of Haryana has a golden cow with crossed swords and two AK-47s beneath it as its logo. The leaders of the Gau Raksha Dal, or cow protection group, say they have captured up to 120,000 across the country since beginning their campaign in 2013. Most of that activity was carried out after Modi’s victory in 2014, which was followed by a BJP chief minister taking office in Haryana later in the year.





Source: Cash Cows: Emboldened by Modi's ascent, India's cow vigilantes deny Muslims their livelihood

Dinesh Arya, state head of the Gau Raksha Dal, acknowledged his group is breaking the law. Arya produced a list of 27 criminal complaints lodged by cattle traders against his members that he said were still pending. “Seizing cattle is not legal and we know that well. We are not authorized to do this, it’s the police department’s work,” Arya said.

But he claims a higher calling: “Our religion has given us the right to stop our mother being butchered,” he said, referring to “gau mata,” or mother cow. “We have forcefully taken that right.” 

Outside his office, a truck converted into a “mobile cow ambulance” used to transport seized cattle bore a bullet hole – the aftermath of a recent gun battle with Muslim “cattle smugglers,” Arya said. 

Modi has at least twice publicly criticized cow vigilantism. “Do we get the right to kill a human being in the name of cow? Is this ‘gau bhakti’? Is this ‘gau raksha’?” he declared in a speech in June, using the Hindi phrases for cow devotion and cow protection. “Violence is not the solution to any problem,” he added. 

The Supreme Court has also addressed the issue. In September, the court ruled that central and state governments must deploy police officers to prevent cow vigilante violence.

On the ground, some Hindu activists aren’t heeding Modi’s calls. The leader of a group of cow vigilantes, which claims 10,000 members concentrated mostly in western and northern Indian states, said they were unmoved by the prime minister’s condemnation of what he called the vigilantes’ “anti-social activities.” 

“The cow protection movement totally belonged to the BJP before 2014,” said the group’s leader, Pawan Pandit, a part-time software engineer. “Now groups like ours have the momentum.” 

Pandit said networks of vigilantes operating under his Bhartiya Gau Raksha Dal – or Indian cow protection group – captured as many as 60,000 cows in the three years before Modi came to office. Since 2014, Pandit said, the group has grabbed more than 100,000 cows, often working with police.....

This lawlessness extends beyond the 18 states Modi’s BJP now controls directly or with coalition partners. In the southern state of Telangana, one of 11 states where the BJP is not in power, a man named Purushottam Gupta was arrested shortly after Modi gave a speech in August last year condemning cow vigilantes. Gupta had refused a court order to hand back 20 cattle seized by cow vigilantes and kept them with some 5,000 other cows at a facility next to the ashram where he is the de facto deputy head. Gupta said he was released the same day he was arrested and that the cows have yet to be returned to their Muslim owners.

India’s laws against cow slaughter predate Modi’s administration, and cow vigilantes were operating in India before Modi came to power. At the federal level, the BJP’s predecessor, the relatively liberal Congress party, funded the cow sheds via a federal animal welfare association at higher levels than Modi. Spending from the association’s four main gaushala grants, the primary source of federal funding for the facilities, was about 150 million rupees for the 2010-11 fiscal year, compared with some 58 million for 2015-16, the most recent period available. 

But at the state level, BJP politicians have in many cases sharply increased funding for the cattle shed facilities through government bodies. In Haryana, the state where Pehlu Khan lived, the Gau Seva Aayog, or cow protection commission, went from allotting 18.5 million rupees to cow sheds in the 2014-15 fiscal year, when a BJP chief minister took over, to more than 37 million for 2016-17. In Rajasthan, the state where Khan was killed, funding doubled from about one billion rupees in 2013-14, as the BJP captured the state, to more than 2.3 billion rupees in 2016-17, according to a state official... 

For Hindus, the cow has long been holy. In ancient scriptures, it is celebrated for its ability to nurture humanity and is compared to deities.  

During Modi’s Hindu nationalist administration, the cow has taken on additional political significance. In his campaign for office, Modi referred to the danger of a “pink revolution” under the relatively liberal Congress party, the domain of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. 

It was a play on Congress’ “green revolution,” under which agricultural output increased, suggesting the party had allowed the production and export of meat including beef to surge. 

Those in hardline Hindu groups supporting Modi frequently complain that Congress and its allies looked the other way when it came to illegal cow slaughter operations run by Muslims to gain favor with that community at the polls. Two spokespeople for Congress did not respond to questions from Reuters.

In May, Modi’s government banned the trade of cattle for slaughter. The measure mostly affected the buffalo industry, as killing cows for meat was already forbidden in most states. But the move was seen by many Muslims as a ploy to further squeeze them out of the multibillion dollar beef and leather industry, which employs millions in India. India’s Supreme Court in July suspended the government measure, effectively lifting the ban on the trade of buffalo for slaughter.

The list of cow rakshak attacks from September 2015 to June 2017 that caught media attention can be read in the article Una, Alwar and Delhi cow vigilantism: A list of 'gau rakshak' attacks since 2015 Dadri lynching. 

Modi, Prabowo and the threat to Indian and Indonesian civic nationalism

It is fascinating to compare India and Indonesia, two nations at critical junctures of their history. Narendra Modi, the current Indian Prime Minister and Prabowo Subianto, leading contender in the Indonesian presidential elections, are similar in promoting a strong nationalistic cum religious agenda. Despite lingering doubts about Modi and Prabowo's leadership qualities, they seemed to have captured the minds and hearts of many of their countrymen (and women). Can these strongly (religiously) nationalist leaders succeed in very diverse societies that are based on civic nationalism?

No doubt, India and Indonesia are different. Though both are very populous countries, India is much larger. In terms of nominal GDP, again Indian economy is more than double the size of the Indonesian economy, although Indonesians are richer. Their political systems and history are also different. While India is a stable parliamentary democracy, Indonesia is a military-dominated state, still trying to find its feet as a fragile democracy. Moreover, majority religion of India is Hinduism whereas the majority of Indonesians are Muslims.

However, Indonesia and India also share many characteristics which make their comparison compelling. Both Indonesia and India were successor states of colonial empires. As there was almost no history of a united India or a united Indonesia before colonial times, nationalist elites of both countries had to perform an exhausting balancing act. They had to fight against the colonial state but also try to preserve it. Preservation of the colonial state was difficult as not only the boundaries of the colonial state were new (similar to many other colonial states), but these states also had mind-boggling diversity. To deal with the ethnic/linguistic/religious/caste/tribal diversity, nationalist elites of both India and Indonesia adopted civil nationalism so that all communities can identify with the new state, ignoring the demands of many Hindus in India and many Muslims in Indonesia. This decision was one of the main reasons why both these states have not only managed to stay intact for the last sixty years but also showed impressive progress.        

Source: India, Indonesia Sign Pact To Cooperate On Criminal Matters

Another similarity between Indonesia and India is the recent rise of new elites; elites quite different from the leaders that had governed both these countries since independence. For more than half a century, the civic nationalism imposed by the founding fathers of both states was not under threat. There was some criticism but it lacked broad popular support. The nineteen nineties brought a big change in both countries. The Economic crisis in both countries (India in 1990-91 and Indonesia in 1997-98) jolted people out of their slumber and the spell that founding fathers' ideas had on the nation was broken. Suharto and aged Congress leadership, defenders of the old ideas, lost their grip on the country and were thrown out. New elites were 'outsiders'. Never before they had held power collectively. Their defining characteristics were overt religiosity and aggressive nationalism. This combination posed a threat to the civic and secular nationalism, both nations had adhered to since independence.

While economic crisis was the immediate cause of changes in both countries, two long-term developments helped the cause of the new elite. First, inhabitants of these countries were socialized, using public education system and national print media, into myths of (inherent) national greatness and threats to this 'manifest destiny' from outsiders and insiders. This socialization process was not very different from what happens in other countries but, due to the huge size of these two countries, these myths became more real. Socialized on these myths of national greatness, many ordinary Indians and Indonesians supported the strong nationalistic stance of the new elite. Second, the opening of a large number of private TV channels in both these countries around the start of 21st century gave an enormous fillip to religious nationalism. To win the rating war, TV channels mass-produced programs on two themes which the majority of the public can understand and appreciate i.e. religion and nationalism. These large doses of religion and nationalism fed to the public for the last fifteen years are now showing results. Modi's spectacular win is one such result and Prabowo's success in presidential election might be another.

Though both are using religious nationalism to win support, Modi and Prabowo have very different backgrounds. Modi is a man with whom most poor Indians can relate to. He belongs to a low-caste and poor household and didn't have much education. Starting from the lowest rung of the political ladder, he rose to become the chief minister of Gujarat state of India in 2001 and then Prime Minister of India in 2014. 

Prabowo's background cannot be more different. One can argue, he was born into Indonesian royalty and married a princess. Prabowo's grandfather was one of the founding fathers of Indonesia and his father was a cabinet minister under President Suharto. Prabowo joined military and then married President Suharto's daughter. As a princeling, Prabowo got the most prized assignments and rose in military quickly. In 1998, he was serving as Lieutenant General, commanding the key garrison near Jakarta. After his retirement from the military, Prabowo became a successful businessman. More recently, he led the newly formed Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) that came third in 2014 legislative elections and now, according to some polls, he is leading the Indonesia's presidential race.

Modi at a Hindu hardline RSS function, giving the RSS salute

Source: The Hindu hardline RSS who see Modi as their own

However, what unites Modi and Prabowo is their use of religious nationalism and the threat they pose to civic nationalism. They have been criticized for abetting or allowing the massacre of religious minorities. While one can argue Modi really believes in Hindutva and Prabowo's attachment to religious nationalism is more instrumental, but we really do not know. Prabowo has a strong support of the religious right and they obviously would demand more religion-based laws, if Prabowo won the presidential election. Prabowo's supporters, however, point to his brother and the major financier of his campaign (who is a Christian) and argue that Prabowo belief in civic nationalism (Pancasila ideology) is paramount.

Another factor that will affect the rise of religious nationalism under Modi and Prabowo is the economy. Both of them are very pragmatic and know that economy is the make-or-break criterion for their success as leaders. Therefore, it is hoped that they will try to unite the nation and move ahead, rather than dividing the nation along religious lines. However, if the economy falters, it is not difficult to see them using religion to win again. 

India-Israel ties under Modi: Can Jewish and Hindu nationalism fraternity help?

San Diego Jewish World yesterday published an article on the excellent prospects of Indo-Israel relationship after the recent coming to power of the BJP government (See India and Israel strengthen ties. Indian commentators have also agreed with the predictions. See India 2014 Elections: Narendra Modi, Israel's Best Friend In South Asia). Several reasons were given by author Sean Savage as to why the bilateral relations could see an upsurge under Prime Minister Modi.

First, there is a talk of similarities between the two countries: 

Differences in size and culture aside, India and Israel have many modern and historical similarities. Hinduism and Judaism are among the world’s oldest existing religions, and both share ethno-religious components that set them apart from other major faiths. At the same time, both religions have complicated systems of laws, purity codes, and dietary restrictions that define their communities. In modern times, both India and Israel achieved independence from Great Britain during the late 1940s, after long internal struggles and bloody partition plans.

But these similarities didn't initially result in close ties as Nehru and later Congress Party governments thought Israel as a sign of Western imperialism (colonial policy of divide and rule) and supported Palestinian struggle. So, due to Congress Party's 'mentality', India supported Palestinians from the 1940s to 1980s. However, during the last two decades, both countries have not only become close trading partners but also joint collaborators in military research.

Source: India & Israel Partner To Strengthen Startup Ecosystem

The reasons given for the improvement in relations under Modi are mostly related to the religious nationalism of BJP (particularly of Modi) and its affinity with Israel and Bibi's Jewish nationalism. The author argues that Modi gives importance to his religion as Bibi does.

One of Modi’s first public gestures as prime minister was to visit the Ganges River, one of holiest places in Hinduism, where he promised to restore the heavily polluted river to its former glory. Over the years, Netanyahu has taken a similar approach, focusing on securing Israel’s Jewish heritage sites and insisting that Jerusalem remain under Jewish sovereignty.

Due to this attitude, both and Modi are criticized in the West, which may bring them closer.

Modi, meanwhile, has garnered significant attention for his strong Hindu nationalism, resulting in criticism from the West—especially for Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002. Yet his views in that area may also allow him to form an ideological bond with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is similarly chastised in some Western countries.

It is also mentioned that Israel supported India during its Kargil conflict with Pakistan in 1999 and Israeli companies invested billions of dollars in Gujarat when Modi was Chief Minister there. Modi's foreign policy team is also considered Israel friendly. What is not directly mentioned, although implied, is the fact that the main enemies of both Hindu and Jewish nationalism are Muslims. Internally, Hindu and Jewish nationalism want to deny basic civil rights to their Muslim minorities and externally they have difficult relations with their Muslim neighbors and face terror attacks. These are probably the 'ideological affinities' mentioned in the article.

The new Indian prime minister “might warm up considerably to Benjamin Netanyahu, say, driven by ideological affinities on some issues,” said Jawaharlal Nehru University’s Ningthoujam.

So, does it matter for Indo-Israeli relations that Modi is a Hindu nationalist?

I think yes it matters but probably not much. Where it matters i.e. in security/military affairs, Indo-Israeli relations are already very close as accepted by Ningthoujam in his own article (See India-Israel Defense Cooperation). Incremental improvements aside, the next level of bilateral relations in these sectors can be a defense pact but that is never on the cards because of India's need for Middle Eastern 'Muslim' energy resources. So, the close cooperation will continue and increase but under wraps.  

Economic ties, despite efforts, have not been very close to the potential of improvement is greater there. Can Modi's regime be a game changer? Yes, it is possible and odds-on but does it has something to do with Modi being a Hindu nationalist? Probably not.