Is Persian Identity rising again in Iran?

The tussle between the Islamic/Shiite identity and the Persian ethnolinguistic identity has been a constant theme in the modern Iranian politics (See blog post Iranian 'Persian-National' Identity). Sometimes, one type of identity becomes so powerful that it seems that the other type has been completely evanesced. However, soon the apparently evanesced identity reappears and dominates the political scene, making the once primary identity vanish. For instance, the Persian identity remained dominant during the reigns of Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah and the Islamic identity was on the fringe and mostly invisible but, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Islamic identity became the paramount identity and Persian identity was nowhere to be seen.

During the last decade, it appears the Persian identity is gradually rising again. Former President Ahmadinejad was the first one from the top elite of the Islamic regime to acknowledge/lay claim on the Persian identity (See blog post Afraid of Ahmadinejad). For the first time after the Revolution, Ahmadinejad loaned the famed Cyrus Cylinder from the British Museum and exhibited it in Iran. His advisor Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei even linked Cyrus with the prophets of Islam, drawing severe censure from the conservative circles.

Recently, there is more evidence of the growing influence of the Persian identity in Iran. During recent years, more and more Iranians are visiting the Tomb of Cyrus in Pasargadae on October 29, the internationally designated day of Cyrus the Great. In October 2016, there was an unprecedented traffic jam near Pasargadae as thousands of Iranians tried to reach the tomb and President Rouhani also joined the celebrations via Instagram:

The number of people who showed up at Pasargadae was surprising. The event fell on a Friday, which is a weekend in Iran, and reportedly saw a traffic jam in a 30- to 40-kilometer (19- to 25-mile) radius on the roads leading to the tomb. Those who had witnessed similar get-togethers say they had never seen such a large gathering. The locals, including those dwelling in the nearby Pasargadae village, were also quite amazed by the sheer number of visitors. Reports say people started gathering in the area, especially around the Tomb of Cyrus, from as early as the evening before and that there was heavy traffic on roads to the site. As such, the main entrance to Pasargadae was closed the night before, with no more cars allowed to enter. On Oct. 28, social media users shared widely circulated videos and pictures of the gathering of Cyrus devotees, showing some of them shouting slogans praising the Achaemenid king.

President Hassan Rouhani even published a picture of himself next to the nearby Achaemenid capital of Persepolis on his Instagram page, with the caption: “Persepolis is one of the invaluable and unique remains of the ancient history of this land, which demonstrates the antiquity of the civilization, the ingenuity, the wisdom, and the management skills of the great people of Iran, as well as their monotheism.” (See ‘Cyrus the Great’ enters Iranian politics)

Source: The rise of nationalist fervour in Iran

Not surprisingly, this gathering was criticized by the conservatives. Ayatollah Hossein Nouri-Hamedani, one of the most senior clerics, said on October 30th: 

"People rose and brought about the revolution and allowed the emergence of a true Islamic system. The shah used to say, ‘O Cyrus, sleep in peace as we are awake.’ Now, a group of people have gathered around the Tomb of Cyrus and they are circumambulating it and have taken their handkerchiefs out and cry [as they do for Shiite Imam Hussein]. In the time of Imam [Ruhollah] Khomeini, too, a group of people started commemorating Cyrus. The imam [Khomeini] said that these people have gathered and are crying because we have brought Islam to this country.” He added, “These are the same [people]; they are counter-revolutionaries. I am amazed that these people get together around the Tomb of Cyrus, shouting the same slogans for him that we shout in support of the supreme leader, and yet we are sitting here, alive and well, and just watching this...Who in power has been so negligent to allow these people to gather? We are in a revolutionary and Islamic country, and this revolution is the continuation of the actions of the prophet and the imams, and their point was to create a perfect populace."(See ‘Cyrus the Great’ enters Iranian politics)

After this statement, the local officials sprung into action and some organizers of the gathering were arrested. However,  Rohollah Faghihi (See What Iranian clerics really think of Cyrus the Great) argues that it would be wrong to think that conservatives are united in disowning Cyrus. Many Iranian clerics consider Cyrus, the Great, Dhul Qarnayn, an ancient king praised in Quran:

In verses 83 and 98 of the chapter Kahf, the Quran narrates a story revolving around an individual named Dhul-Qarnayn, who is praised as a believer and ruler: “Indeed, we established him upon the earth, and we gave him to everything a way.” Allameh Muhammad Hossein Tabatabai, one of the most prominent thinkers of philosophy and contemporary Shiite Islam, cautiously identifies Cyrus as Dhul-Qarnayn in his 20-volume work of Quranic exigesis, the "Tafsir al-Mizan." Other scholars engaged in Quranic exigesis, such as Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi — one of the most senior clerics in Qom — have also described Cyrus as Dhul-Qarnayn.

Faghihi also quotes an anonymous Shiite scholar:

In an interview with Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, a Shiite scholar and cleric who has been teaching at the Qom seminary for the past two decades said, “Islam doesn’t seek to take away national pride from people. What is currently happening is a political issue.” He added, “The seminary and religion do not dismiss Cyrus and the ancient history of Iran at all. Some who are expressing their opposition to Cyrus aren’t speaking on behalf of the whole seminary. I should say that even those who have voiced their opposition regarding this issue do not hold an opinion against Cyrus. For instance, Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani criticized the tears the crowd there [in Pasargadae on Oct. 28] shed, not Cyrus himself.”

Are things going to change soon? Is there a coming together of the two Iranian identities? Not likely. Clerics consider nationalism as unislamic, Western import and the advocates of Persian ethnolinguistic identity consider clerics and their rule un-Iranian:

Like many other pious Muslims, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, viewed the concept of nationalism as un-Islamic. He thought nationalism was in opposition to the concept of ummah (Muslim worldwide community), which fundamentally rejects borders that divide Muslim societies. He asserted that “nationalism is designed by the plotters to create discord among the Muslims and it is being propagated by the agents of imperialism.”

Ayatollah Khomeini further remarked that “the plan of the great powers and their affiliates in the Muslim countries is to separate and divide the various strata of Muslims, whom God, the Blessed and Exalted, has declared brothers. … Those who, in the name of nationalism, factionalism, etc., create schism and disunity among Muslims are armies of Satan, opponents of the Holy Quran, and helping agents of the superpowers.”

Additionally, the conservatives view nationalism – essentially a secular movement that advocates separation of state and religion – as a serious threat to the foundation of the state’s ideology, which is based on the guardianship of the Islamic jurists. During the 28 October gathering, one of the slogans chanted was “freedom of thought cannot take place with beards,” a reference to the figures in power. (See The rise of nationalist fervour in Iran)

Pakistan, Sectarianism and Malik Ishaq's Death

Sectarianism has been on the rise for at least three decades as discussed in the last blogpost (See Rise of sectarianism and Pakistani Religious Nationalism). Due to the low capacity, ignorance or benign neglect of the Pakistani law enforcement agencies, the hydra of sectarianism got stronger and stronger and like in the case of mythical creature, banning one sectarian organization resulted in creation of two or more new ones. This is the story till 2015 which has the potential to be a game changer for Pakistan's fight against sectarianism.

However, before discussing what is happening in 2015, it is worthwhile to mention two developments that led to the changes that are witnessed in the current year. First, Nawaz Sharif, a right wing conservative and a sympathizer of Pakistani Taliban (mainly Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)) rhetoric, came to power in 2013 and tried to start talks with the TTP. After months of negotiations, the talks failed to take off ground as terrorist acts continued, making it clear to everyone, except the diehard supporter of the TTP, that the TTP are not interested in peace. Secondly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appointed General Raheel Sharif (no relation of Nawaz) as the new Chief of Army Staff in November 2013. Compared to  his predecessor General Kayani, General Raheel had a different opinion regarding how to react to the TTP's attacks on Pakistani state assets. General Kayani usually did not immediately react to the TTP attacks. However, soon after his appointment, General Sharif started responding to every major terrorist act by promptly bombing terrorist hideouts in the tribal areas. After it became clear that talks are useless, General Sharif started a large scale military action against the TTP in North Waziristan in June 2014. The TTP responded to this action by more terrorism. On 16th December 2014, seven TTP terrorists entered an army-administered school in Peshawar and killed 145 people, including 132 teenage students (See Peshawar School Massacre). 

The year 2015 thus started with a major change in Pakistani elite mindset. For the first time in nearly three decades, everybody agreed that religious extremism is a threat to Pakistan's existence. After this massacre, any sympathy for the TTP in the public space ended and even diehard TTP supporters, almost all religious parties, had to support strict action against Taliban. It was decided by the civilian and military leadership that a comprehensive National Action Plan (NAP) would be devised to end all kinds of terrorism, including sectarian violence. Special military courts were established under 21st Amendment in the 1973 Constitution to speedily convict and sentence those involved in religious terrorism. Under NAP, it was also decided to ban and take strict action against those making hate speeches and publishing hate pamphlets, books etc. (See Pakistan announces a national plan to fight terrorism, says terrorists’ days are numbered). Some specific points related to sectarianism in the NAP are reproduced below:

1. We will act against literature, newspapers and magazines that are spreading hate, [ideas of] beheading people, sectarianism, extremism and intolerance.
2. Banned organizations will not be allowed to operate under another name.
3. Action is being taken to stop religious extremism and to protect religious minorities.
4. The registration and regulation of seminaries (madrassas) is being planned.
5. Decisive action is being taken against elements that spread sectarianism.

However, while there were visible changes regarding NAP implementation in other areas, action against sectarianism was halfhearted at best. Gruesome sectarian violence resumed; banned sectarian organizations continued to operate; and hate literature remained available in print as well as on social media. Just one month after unveiling of the NAP, on 30th January 2015, more than sixty people were killed in Shikarpur, Sindh in a bomb blast inside Shia mosque (See At least 60 killed in blast at Shikarpur imambargah). Two weeks later, on February 13, twenty people were killed in an attack on a Shia mosque in Peshawar (See Pakistan Battles Rising Sectarian Violence). On May 13, forty three Shia Ismailis were killed in Karachi when gunmen attacked their bus (See 43 killed in attack on bus carrying Ismailis in Karachi).   

So, there was widespread skepticism about Pakistani state's commitment to stop sectarianism. It was argued that various political parties and the military continue to see sectarian militias as allies in promoting their agendas. For example, Arif Rafiq, an expert on sectarianism in Pakistan, said to German broadcaster DW (See Examining Pakistan's growing sectarian violence):

The military as well as civilian politicians need to ease out of partnerships with groups that foment hate toward Shiites and other minorities in the country. The longer Pakistan's leaders continue to directly or indirectly aid hate groups, the longer it will be struggling to put out the fires started with its own hands. 

Source: BBC

So, killing of Malik Ishaq in 29th July, one of the most notorious sectarian militant leader, who boasted of killing more than hundred Shias, was against the run of the play. Not only Malik Ishaq was killed but his two sons and his second-in-command was also killed by the police. Malik Ishaq was in and out of jail for most of the last fifteen years, accused of being involved in hundreds of sectarian incidents but he was not convicted as witnesses and judges were threatened by him and his organization. It is widely believed that Malik was killed in a staged fight by police as he could not be convicted in a court. (See Malik Ishaq: Pakistan Sunni militant chief killed by police).

Does this means Pakistani state has finally decide to take on sectarian militants? It is too early to come to definite conclusion. However, things and events are snowballing. Army action in North Waziristan led to the Peshawar massacre which led to action against religious militants all across the country. While attacks by the TTP decreased, sectarian militancy continued, making the NAP a mockery as far as sectarian violence was concerned. There was pressure from public and media to punish sectarian militants. So, Malik Ishaq was killed. The cycle is continuing as according to many analysts Malik Ishaq's killing has led to the death of Punjab Home Minister Shuja Khanzada in a terrorist attack on 16th August (See Punjab home minister Shuja Khanzada killed in terror attack). Khanzada was not an ordinary minister. He was a close confidant of Prime Minister's brother Shahbaz Sharif, who is the Chief Minister of the Punjab province. He was also close to military hierarchy as he was himself an retired army officer, who had served in Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence. His death was widely condemned and both political and military authorities promised to bring his murderers to justice. 

Rise of Sectarianism and Pakistani Religious Nationalism

Religious nationalism often leads to sectarianism. As explained in a previous blogpost (See Religious Nationalism and Sectarianism), when religious affiliation  defines citizen from a non-citizen, sectarian issues attain a political, economic and social significance. Far from being the concern of few theologians and zealots, they became the concern of everyone. For example, if religious law is not the law of the state and there is no chance it ever becoming state law or source of state law, few care how the rival sect differs in interpreting a certain Biblical or Quranic verse or hadith. However, once religious law is considered to be the source of state law, then everybody is concerned as there is a chance that one's religious beliefs maybe declared illegal or these beliefs maybe legal but would not entitle one full citizenship rights. 

An example would clarify. In 1978, General Zia introduced zakat (annual alms tax) system in Pakistan and ordered compulsory deduction of 2.5% from bank accounts that have amounts above a certain minimum level. Beliefs of Shia and Sunni sects about who can collect zakat differ. Sunnis believe state can collect zakat, Shias do not. Not many people, Shias or Sunnis, thought this difference was important before 1978. However, when Zia introduced the new system, Shias immediately protested and when Zia ignored them, they took control of some of the important government buildings in Islamabad and vowed to fight. In the end, Zia gave in and Shias were exempted from compulsory deduction of zakat by state.

So, a sectarian or confessional bias is inherent in a religious nationalist state. If state adopts religious laws, it has to choose between different interpretations. For example, in Saudi Arabia, state has adopted a particular religious interpretation about how women should appear in public. This particular interpretation has been rejected by most Muslims but Saudi state has enforced it. In Israel, marriage registration is controlled by the Orthodox Chief Rabbinate. If rules set by the Orthodox rabbinate are not followed, state would not register a marriage. Even a marriage under Reform or Conservative Judaism (rules), two other major streams in modern Judaism, is not kosher for the state. 

In Pakistan, sectarianism became an issue after General Zia started Islamizing the government. Before General Zia, there were sects and differences and sometimes violence would happen but such instances were few and far between. The knowledge of sectarian differences and the animosity that one saw in the 1980s and later was not present before. Rise of sectarianism was primarily because of General Zia's Islamization program but not all reasons of this rise were internal. Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which made Saudi Arabia a very important player in Pakistan's religious landscape, also helped the rise of sectarianism.

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal as given at Who is killing Pakistan's Shias and why?

Sectarianism continue to increase and become more violent after Zia due to the following reasons:

• Madrassas and religious nationalism: Mushrooming of madrassas, which promote religious nationalism and train students along sectarian lines, under Zia started to have its effect on Pakistan in the 1990s. Madrassas provided recruits to religious parties and sectarian militias but were also proponents of Pakistani religious nationalism that Pakistani state was also promoting so taking action against them was difficult. Moreover, religious parties, which had overlapping membership with sectarian militias and leadership of both were trained in the same madrassas, made any strict action against sectarian militias difficult as it was termed as an action against Islam and against Pakistan;
• Political instability in the 1990s: The nineties decade was highly unstable, with average tenure of Prime Minister being a year (nine Prime Ministers from 1990 to 1999). It not only undermined democratic development but also affected economic growth and law and order. A long term coordinated action against sectarian militias was not taken. Military sometimes used religious parties, which were supported by sectarian militias, to counter politicians' attempt to stabilize their rule and reduce military's power;
• Sectarian militias as tools to promote religious nationalism abroad: Sectarian militias were used by military (particularly ISI) as tools for promoting religious nationalism in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Any attempt to take strict action against sectarian militias by the civilian governments was undermined by this link;
• Rise of Taliban: Taliban and Pakistani Sunni sectarian militias had close links as Taliban also believed in same violent sectarian ideology and many members of Pakistani militias and Taliban had studied at the same Pakistani madrassas and fought alongside each other in Afghanistan. Therefore, Taliban rise and success in Afghanistan not only increased the confidence of Pakistani sectarian outfits but also provided them a sanctuary. 

After 9/11, sectarian outfits were banned and there were some attempts to limit them but these attempts were halfhearted at best. Internationally, General Musharraf was fighting against Muslim extremism but in Pakistan, Musharraf was in alliance with religious parties (Muthidda Majlis-e-Amal) that had a soft corner for the sectarian militias and publically supported Taliban's struggle in Afghanistan. Later, rise of Pakistani Taliban provided Sunni militias confidence, support and sanctuary inside Pakistan.

Benazir Shah writing in Foreign Policy in August 2014 (See The Trouble Convicting LeJ's Malik Ishaq) writes about these links between Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, one of the most notorious sectarian militias: 

In Pakistan’s toxic mix of terrorist organizations, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi maintains ideological and operational links with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda. When need be, its foot soldiers have not hesitated to take their mission of sectarian strife across the border. In 2011, an offshoot of the radical group claimed responsibility for killing 55 Shiites in Kabul, possibly in cahoots with al Qaeda. Other jihadist groups, including Jaish-e-Muhammad, espouse its mission of establishing a Sunni state. More than 600 Shiites were killed in Pakistan in 2013, and over 1,000 were injured in a troubling uptick in sectarian attacks.

Shah also asked the question, will the state act against sectarian militias as it had started acting against Taliban?

For now the state is engaged. On June 15, it launched a comprehensive military operation in North Waziristan, long considered a deadly crucible of local and foreign terrorists. But there is a sectarian face-off brewing in the Punjab heartland, where Jhangvi is firmly rooted. But when the state’s gaze will turn to that fight remains to be seen.

All this history brings us to the recent killing of Malik Ishaq, his sons and other leaders of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. This will be discussed in the next blogpost.

Hamas and Islamic State

Ali Mamouri has written an article on why there is no love lost between Hamas and the so-called Islamic State (of Iraq and al-Sham) (see Why Islamic State has no sympathy for Hamas?). Ali argues that there are some doctrinal reasons why the IS does not support Hamas:

Salafists believe that jihad must be performed under legitimate leadership. This argument is advanced through the “banner and commander” concept, which holds that whoever undertakes jihad must follow a commander who fulfills the criteria of religious and political leadership and has raised the banner of jihad. Given that there is neither a legitimate leader nor a Salafist-approved declaration of jihad in Palestine, fighting there is forbidden.

In addition, for Salafists, if non-Muslims control Islamic countries and apostates exist in the Islamic world, the Islamic world must be cleansed of them before all else. In short, the purification of Islamic society takes priority over combat against non-Islamic societies. On this basis, Salafists see conflict with an allegedly illegitimate Hamas government as a first step toward confrontation with Israel. Should the opportunity for military action present itself in the Palestinian territories, Salafists would fight Hamas and other factions deemed in need of “cleansing” from the land and engage Israel afterward.

This approach has its roots in Islamic history, which Salafists believe confirms the validity of their position. Relevant points of historical reference include the first caliphate of Abu Bakr, which gave priority to fighting apostates over expanding Islamic conquests, which occurred later, during the second caliphate, under Umar bin al-Khattab. Likewise, Saladin fought the Shiites and suppressed them before he engaged the crusaders in the Holy Land.

Salafists today see that their priority as fighting Shiites, “munafiqin” (dissemblers, or false Muslims) and apostates, whom they call the “close enemy.” During the current war in Gaza, a number of IS fighters have burned the Palestinian flag because they consider it a symbol of the decline of the Islamic world, which succumbed to national divisions through the creation of independent political states. In Salafist doctrine, the entire Islamic world must be united under a single state, an Islamic caliphate, which IS declared in late June.

So, there are two reasons:

• According to Islamic doctrine, jihad is only allowed under a legitimate leadership and Hamas is not the legitimate leadership because it fights for democracy and a Palestinian state (while IS fights for God and for an Islamic state)
• The IS has to fight the apostate Muslims first, before fighting the non-Muslims. Purification comes before the conquest. So, fighting Shias in Iraq and Syria comes before fighting Israel.

In a recent statement, the IS tried to deflect the criticism that it is not helping Palestinians in Gaza by reiterating its commitment to liberating Palestine and destroying Israel. It asked Gazans to be patient as the IS is working and is not interested in issuing empty statements like many Arab governments (See Gaza crisis: ISIS vows to help Palestinians fight barbaric Jews).

Source: Hamas Website

The IS spokesman, Nuseiri, also argued that it is following a systematic approach and has a plan (See ISIS Spokesman Explains Why 'Islamic State' Not Supporting Hamas) 

However, he pointed out that ISIS has been taking a systematic approach in its campaign, and outlined six specific stages it said needed to be fulfilled before taking on Israel.
Some of those "stages" - building a firm base for an Islamic state in Iraq, and using it as a springboard to wage war in Syria and Lebanon - have already been achieved. But he said a number of other criteria still needed to be fulfilled before challenging Israel directly.
Among them, Nuseiri said that the US - seen as Israel's greatest ally - needed to be weakened politically and economically via attacks on the American mainland, as well as US interests in Muslim countries. Additionally, the existing "Islamic State" needed to expand its borders to cover all of "Greater Syria" (which would include Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and possibly Gaza); such a state, he said, would then be in a position for a direct confrontation with Israel.

The IS statement can be taken as few practical considerations (which every successful movement has to take into account) in the expansion of the IS Caliphate and this is how the IS wants others to see it. However, these doctrinal and practical considerations can also be understood as a camouflage for nationalistic concerns. 

Doctrinally, the claim of legitimacy of IS is weaker than that of Hamas. Neither the IS leadership is more pious, nor it has support/baya of most of the pious Muslim leadership. Moreover, jihad needs legitimate leadership when Muslims are attacking. When Muslim lands, homes, and persons are attacked (as in Gaza), all Muslims are allowed/required to defend themselves, with or without legitimate leadership.

Source: Islamic State Threatens to Topple Hamas in Gaza

The argument about 'purifying' and killing apostate Muslims first and non-Muslims later is also weak. When Muslim women and children are being killed in hundreds, it is preposterous (and doctrinally indefensible) to not stop this massacre and focus on killing apostates. The fact of the matter is that IS's main enemies are Shias in both Syria and Iraq so it might also be a way to legitimize its own actions. Moreover, as Salafist groups are challenging Hamas in Gaza, the IS might want Israel to destroy Hamas so that more radical and doctrinally closer Gazan Salafists may take over.

Update: By mid-2015, the divisions between the IS and Hamas were public and the IS issued a threat to Hamas in a video statement as reported by YNet News:

The video statement, issued from an Islamic State stronghold in Syria, was a rare public challenge to Hamas, which has been cracking down on jihadis in Gaza who oppose its truces with Israel and reconciliation with the US-backed rival Palestinian faction Fatah.

"Eight years they control the territory, and have yet to enforce one Islamic teaching," the ISIS speaker said in the video.

"We will uproot the state of the Jews (Israel) and you and Fatah, and all of the secularists are nothing and you will be over-run by our creeping multitudes," said a masked Islamic State member in the message addressed to the "tyrants of Hamas".

"The rule of sharia (Islamic law) will be implemented in Gaza, in spite of you. We swear that what is happening in the Levant today, and in particular the Yarmouk camp, will happen in Gaza," he said, referring to Islamic State advances in Syria, including in a Damascus district founded by Palestinian refugees. (See Islamic State Threatens to Topple Hamas in Gaza)